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# Bottom-up peace-building: Local engagement in resolving conflicts

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**Summary:** The article discusses how local engagement can contribute to preventing or ceasing ongoing conflicts. By the comparative analysis of three case studies – Somaliland, the Idjwi island in eastern Congo and Colombia, the author examines what methods do the local inhabitants use in order to successfully maintain peace and build a coherent society. The research on a bottom-up approach may supplement the strategies implemented by the international organisations of peace-building or peace-keeping missions, which usually neglect the engagement of local society and thus do not ensure sustainable peace.

**Keywords:** local engagement, Somaliland, Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, war, peace-building

## Introduction

The idea of civil dialogue is usually combined with socially well-developed and economically advanced Western democracies, where conscious and truly engaged society communicates with state authorities about its needs, wishes or dissatisfactions, for the mutual

goal of creating a prosperous state<sup>1</sup>. Nevertheless, modern societies are becoming ascending inert and unconcerned about their state's development, leaving the burden of leading a country to politicians, who frequently act for their personal benefits<sup>2</sup>.

However, civil dialogue can also have a different form. Surprisingly, it can be present in the most dangerous parts of the globe, engulfed by contemporary civil wars, where ordinary people, willing to live peacefully, organise themselves for the sake of the whole society. As the examples used in the paper the author chose the citizens of the autonomous region of Somaliland in Somalia, considered as a failed state since 1991<sup>3</sup>, Idjwi in Congo – at war since 1996, and Colombian rural societies creating peace-zones during the civil war. Each case presents the elaborate and persistent practices of maintaining peace on the local level, in spite of the general disorganisation of the countries. The citizens of Somaliland, by relying on local leaders and the engagement of ordinary people managed to rebuild a society and governance from scratch<sup>4</sup>. The leading role of the clans' elders enabled Somalilanders to sustain peaceful relations and resolve conflicts between members of different clans or villages. Civil organisations and diaspora also played a significant role in reinforcing the society of Somaliland and its economy<sup>5</sup>. A similar, bottom-up peace building procedure has been successfully implemented by the residents of Idjwi, which avoided the fightings as the only region in eastern Congo. Apart from possessing features, such as natural resources, geostrategic location, poverty and ethnic tensions, which inflamed the conflicts in other areas of Congo, the citizens managed to initiate various organisations, groups and social

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<sup>1</sup> R. List et al., *Civil Society, Conflict and Violence*, London 2012, p. 5–6.

<sup>2</sup> D. Rutzen, *Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): Civil Society Under Assault*, "Journal of Democracy" 2015, vol. 26/4, p. 31–33.

<sup>3</sup> A.B. Hashim, *The Fallen State: dissonance, dictatorship and death in Somalia*, Lanham 1997, p. 23.

<sup>4</sup> M.V. Hoehene, M.H. Ibrahim, *Rebuilding Somaliland through economic and educational engagement*, [in:] *Diasporas, development and peacemaking in the Horn of Africa*, eds. L. Laasko, P. Hautaniemi, London 2014, p. 62.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 53.

networks, that helped in resolving disputes before they spun out of control. Moreover, family blood pacts as well as traditional belief in the importance of clans contributed to consolidation of the exceptional “culture of peace”<sup>6</sup>. Lastly, rural societies in Colombia present a different approach to the local engagement in peace-building. During the civil war, which ended in 2016, many different cities and regions created organisations that brought together all citizens, in order to collectively defend themselves from guerillas. Moreover, they organised peaceful manifestations to voice their opinion on the ongoing conflict and show their dissatisfaction. The important role was played by nongovernmental organisations and church institutions, which spread the information worldwide about the engagement of Colombian civilians in peace-building and yielded them aid<sup>7</sup>.

Considering these examples, active support for local engagement can be advantageous to peace-building missions led by the United Nations, which at present rely on understaffed and underpaid “blue helmet” troops<sup>8</sup>. Contemporary peace-building strategies of the UN primary focus on maintaining peace within conflict sides, rather than striving to end war. Due to the prohibition of using weapons in any different situation than self-defence, the peacekeeping soldiers often helplessly observe the raging wars<sup>9</sup>. Although they assist in organising elections, train police officers and soldiers, monitor human rights abuses and rebuild state governments, they base on top-down strategies, which usually do not eliminate the roots of a problem, making the conflicts likely to recrudescence. According to many scholars, sustained peace can be guaranteed by the active embracement of local leaders and ordinary citizens, who know their needs best<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> S. Autesserre, *The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can't End Wars*, “Foreign Affairs” 2019, vol. 98/1: p. 113–114.

<sup>7</sup> G. Alther, *Colombian peace communities: the role of NGOs in supporting resistance to violence and oppression*, “Development in Practice” 2006, 16:3–4, p. 281.

<sup>8</sup> S. Autesserre, *The Crisis of...*, p. 101.

<sup>9</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, p. 102; M. Barwani, *Somaliland and Somalia peace-building process: actors, interventions and experiments*, “International Journal of Development Research” 2017, vol. 7/8, p. 14250.

By implementing bottom-up strategies, drawn from local knowledge, the UN may significantly increase the possibility of conducting more successful peace-building missions<sup>11</sup>. I argue that with the adequate international support, resolving conflicts on the local level can be more effective than sending soldiers.

The article will address the question: how can local engagement contribute to ceasing and preventing conflicts, thus resulting in a successful nation-building after a war? The analysis of the examples of Somalia, Congo and Colombia can supplement the research in effective peace-building strategies and prevent the conversion of local conflicts into civil wars. Moreover, it will present a different form of civil dialogue, understood alternatively to the perception of generally peacefully-living Western societies.

The methodology applied for the article are case study methods. By using detailed analysis of the three chosen examples, I am going to examine what methods citizens of Somaliland, Idjwi and Colombia use to maintain peace, and what makes them effective. Moreover, the research will apply the qualitative, within-case process tracing method, in order to evaluate the universal usefulness of these methods and ascertain whether they can contribute to the improvement of the United Nations' peace-building strategies, thus reinforcing the local engagement globally.

The research paper is organised as follows: First, I shall present the background of the civil war in Somalia and the subsequent involvement of neighbouring countries and international organisations – the United Nations in particular. Then, I analyse the situation of Somaliland and the process of its internationally unrecognised state-building, with the active participation of local leaders and ordinary citizens, engaging in various social networks, designed for resolving conflicts and maintaining peace between different clans. Subsequently, I describe the grounds of wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the engagement of the international society. Afterwards, I portray the situation on the Idjwi island and the exceptional character of the inhabiting it society. Similarly as

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<sup>11</sup> S. Autesserre, *The Crisis of...*, p. 101.

in the Somaliland's case, I shall depict various methods used by the locals in order to maintain peace and resolve conflicts, before they transformed into civil war. Lastly, I briefly discuss the background of Colombian civil war with the subsequent analysis of several examples of "peace-zones" created by the rural communities.

## 1. Somalia

### The civil war in Somalia and international support

The roots of the conflict in Somalia are usually equated with the global trend of authoritarian regimes decay, commenced in the late 80s<sup>12</sup>. Jaalle Mohamed Siad Barre had been ruling the Somali Democratic Republic as a perpetual president from 1969 until 1991, when, on the wave of political upheavals, his government was overthrown by a coalition of clan-based, armed opposition groups. Nevertheless, there were other important factors of dissolution of the country, such as explicit and firm clan and kinship-based discords or abortive external interventions.

Since the 19th century, Somali terrains had been divided between northern, British and southern, Italian colonies. 1960 brought the unification of the two regions into one independent Somali Republic under a civilian government, however, in 1969 the power was seized by the communist revolutionaries, who established the authoritarian Somali Democratic Republic, ruled by Siad Barre<sup>13</sup>. When the Somali Civil War broke out in 1991, Somalia became a so-called "failed state"<sup>14</sup>, due to lack of central government and multiple armed factions, competing for power. Different autonomous regions began to

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<sup>12</sup> B.E. Afyare, A. Barise, *The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles, and Peace-building Strategies*, "African Security Review" 2012, vol. 15/1, p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 42.

<sup>14</sup> A.B. Hashim, *The Fallen State...*, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

emerge, and on account of the constant absence of national authorities civilians started to turn to customary and religious laws<sup>15</sup>.

The existing importance of kinship and clans was present in the state's administrative division before the war. Therefore local governments quickly replaced the central government's power in the particular regions in 1991. Somalia is officially divided into eighteen regions, each subdivided into districts<sup>16</sup>. When the civil war began, several regions self-declared themselves as autonomous states – Puntland and Somaliland in north, Galamudug in the centre and Jubaland in the south. Until 2015 two more entities emerged – South West State and Central Regions State<sup>17</sup>.

Clan affiliation is the fundamental prerequisite of identity. According to Ioan Lewis, the Somali population is divided into six major clans, within which there are sub-clans and sub-sub-clans<sup>18</sup>. The relations between different groups constitutes the basis of Somali social order, however during the civil war it was clans, which battled against each other “in constantly shifting alliances”<sup>19</sup>. The prolonged fightings created debts owed between different clans, thus perpetuated the violence<sup>20</sup>.

The colonial rule entirely ignored the importance of clan-based Somali society. After taking over power by Siad Barre, Somali politics was based upon his favoured clans. The dictatorship enhanced the tensions between different families and the distribution of foreign aid and money elicited “a contest of patronage and loyalty”<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibidem, p. 37.

<sup>16</sup> *Somalia*, World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency (online), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>18</sup> I.M. Lewis, *Blood and bone: the call of kinship in Somali society*, Lawrenceville 1994.

<sup>19</sup> K.C. Upsall, *State Building in Somalia in the Image of Somaliland: A Bottom-Up Approach*, “Inquiries” 2014, vol. 6/3, [www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/880/state-building-in-somalia-in-the-image-of-somaliland-a-bottom-up-approach](http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/880/state-building-in-somalia-in-the-image-of-somaliland-a-bottom-up-approach), 31.10.2018.

<sup>20</sup> R. Posner, *A theory of primitive society, with special reference to law*, “Journal of Law and Economics” 1980, vol. 23, p. 46.

<sup>21</sup> K.C. Upsall, op.cit.

The state's dissolution in 1991 quickly attracted regional as well as international attention. Ethiopia and Djbuti, Somali neighbours, attempted to reunite the country and subsequently reconstruct government, however without success<sup>22</sup>. The United Nations commenced the first mission in 1992, aimed at providing humanitarian aid, on the basis of the UN Security Council resolutions. UNOSOM I consisted of a coalition of peacekeepers led by the United States. It was tasked with restoring order in Somalia and assuring there security. UNOSOM II began in 1993 and its activity was focused in the southern regions of the country. The UN withdrew from Somalia after two years, due to the inability to stabilise the situation and intensifying combats between Somalis<sup>23</sup>. Similarly, neither the African Union, nor the Arab League, were able to reconstruct central governance or maintain a long-lasting peace in Somalia until today.

Kenneth Upsall estimates that there have been at least sixteen attempts to reconstitute the state's government since 1991<sup>24</sup>. The top-down approach usually did not consider the voice of the state's different communities, such as elders, merchants, women's groups, but only the strongest political elite<sup>25</sup>. Thus, no single political group was able to control the entire Somali territory or "even maintain a prolonged existence"<sup>26</sup>. Particular areas are claimed by several different clan-based groups, each controlling a few square miles of the country. None of the emerged autonomous regions is internationally recognised as a separate state, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), acknowledged as the official representative of the country, do not supervise more than a few blocks of the capital

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<sup>22</sup> I. Farah, A. Hussein, J. Lind, *Deegaan, Politics and War in Somalia*, [in:] *Scarcity and surfeit: the ecology of Africa's conflicts*, eds. J. Lind, K. Sturman, Pretoria 2002, p. 327.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 328.

<sup>24</sup> K.C. Upsall, *op.cit.*

<sup>25</sup> I. Ahmed, R.H. Green, *The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction*, "Third World Quarterly" 1999, vol. 20/ 1, p. 113–127.

<sup>26</sup> K.C. Upsall, *op.cit.*

Mogadishu<sup>27</sup>. According to Upsall, since the beginning of the conflict, Somalia has been “a black hole of governments, international aid and efforts at state and nation building”<sup>28</sup>. Many attempts of the international community have failed to stabilise Somalia, and billions of international aid have been invested into the region, however without any substantial result<sup>29</sup>.

The Somali civil war is most importantly catastrophic for ordinary citizens, who, without any legal protection or aid, constitute the highest numbers of the conflict’s victims<sup>30</sup>. Almost all of the country’s logistics are prohibited, roads are blocked, the state’s economy is ruined. The resulting famine caused half a million people dead, two million internally displaced and one million forced to migrate abroad<sup>31</sup>.

### **Local engagement in Somaliland**

The self-declared and internationally unrecognised Somaliland Republic, located in north-western Somalia, constitutes an example of a successful state building and maintaining peace due to fierce local engagement. Numerous failed attempts to reconstruct a government in Somalia, convinced some observers that the western-style democracy cannot be implemented in that part of Africa, and proved the ineffectiveness of a top-down approaches, suggested by the international community<sup>32</sup>. Nonetheless, inhabitants of Somaliland

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<sup>27</sup> K. Menkhaus, *Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building and the politics of coping*, “International Security” 2006, vol. 31/ 1, p. 92.

<sup>28</sup> K.C. Upsall, op.cit.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>30</sup> UNSOM, *Somalia conflict: exacting a terrible toll on civilians, Al-Shabaab responsible for most civilian casualties*, 2017, <https://unsom.unmissions.org/somalia-conflict-exacting-terrible-toll-civilians-al-shabaab-responsible-most-civilian-casualties-%E2%80%9331.10.2018>.

<sup>31</sup> W.I. Zartman, *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse*, London 2005, p. 88.

<sup>32</sup> M. Byrne, *The failed state and failed state-building: How can a move away from the failed state discourse inform development in Somalia?*, “Birkbeck Law Review” 2013, vol. 1/1, p. 113.



implemented a mixture of traditional practices, like the authority of clan elders, with modern solutions, such as general elections, in order to create a sustainable governance<sup>33</sup>.

The state is steadily functioning since 1991 and international observers repeatedly admit the positive effects of its post-conflict reconstruction<sup>34</sup>. Somaliland declared its independence on 18th May 1991 and in 2001 it adopted a constitution. Additionally, since 2001 Somaliland held several elections: municipal elections in 2001, parliamentary elections in 2005 (the next are scheduled for April 2019) and presidential elections in 2003, 2010 and 2017. International monitors observing Somaliland's elections acknowledged them free and fair, providing Somaliland one of the best democratic examples in Africa, even though it remains an unrecognised state<sup>35</sup>.

A bottom-up approach to peace-building of Somaliland's citizens consists of several features. First, the general state-building is derived from the legitimacy of local elders of each clan. According to NimaElmi, Somalilanders form one large ethnic clan, dividing into numerous sub-clans and families<sup>36</sup>. Upsall calls clan elders "the catalyst for ending violence between clans and sub-clans", which provided security and legitimacy of Somaliland's new government<sup>37</sup>. Clan elders played a crucial role in ceasing the fights in 1991, due to their strong position in society and the ability to reconcile disputes. According to Yoshito Nakagawa, the bottom-up approach in Somaliland's state-building culminated in 1993 during the Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland (the Boroma Conference). It assembled 150 elders from all major clans and more than two thousand religious leaders, women and members of diaspora groups.

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<sup>33</sup> I. Jhazbay, *Somaliland: Africa's best kept secret, a challenge to the international community?*, "African Security Review" 2003, vol. 12/4, p. 51.

<sup>34</sup> M. Doornbos, *Somalia: Alternative scenarios for political reconstruction*, "African Affairs" 2002, vol. 101/402, p. 95.

<sup>35</sup> N. Elmi, *What Somaliland can teach the rest of Africa about peace and stability*, World Economic Forum 2016, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/what-somaliland-can-teach-africa-about-peace-and-stability/>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>37</sup> K.C. Upsall, *op.cit.*

Throughout five months the Conference established basic laws of Somaliland and its political system, as well as chose the government and the president<sup>38</sup>.

Most importantly, the clan elders' legitimacy results from the way they are chosen. It is not simply age that decides about this role, but the "virtue of personal attributes" as well as the experience in peace-building after the civil war<sup>39</sup>. Somaliland's elders form *Guurti* – the House of Elders, which gathers the representatives of major clans and ensures a dialogue between them, and it is functioning beside the elected parliament. *Guurti* can be compared to the upper house of the governments in western democracies. Its responsibility is to establish and pass laws related to religion, tradition, culture and security<sup>40</sup>.

The political order of Somaliland is described as "hybrid", according to Kevin Clement's terminology<sup>41</sup>. It means that it has its roots "in both non-state indigenous social structures" and is introducing both state and civil structures. Such system places greater impact on traditional and "other not democratically legitimated institutions"<sup>42</sup>, as they are more effective in setting an obeying rules. Next to the elected president and the lower house, the upper house of the elders forms such a hybrid.

Collective rules are obeyed on the local level due to numerous kinship structures related to blood. *Diya* can be an example of such an institution. *Diya* groups are blood-related clans, internally organised, which have a collective responsibility for obeying the common rules and they strengthen them by certain taxes, providing them

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<sup>38</sup> Y. Nakagawa, *A Societal Model of Peacebuilding and Its Challenges in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005*, "Deliberative peacebuilding" 2017, p. 10–11.

<sup>39</sup> I. Ahmed, R.H. Green, *The heritage of war...*, op.cit., p. 127.

<sup>40</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland, *Somaliland Government*, 2000, p. 29, [http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland\\_Constitution\\_Text\\_only\\_Eng\\_IJ-SLL.pdf](http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Constitution_Text_only_Eng_IJ-SLL.pdf), 31.10.2018.

<sup>41</sup> K.P. Clements et al., *State Building Reconsidered: the Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order*, "Political Science" 2007, vol. 59/1, p. 45–56.

<sup>42</sup> M.V. Hoehne, *Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland*, "Journals of Eastern African Studies" 2013, vol. 7/2, p. 199.

with protection<sup>43</sup>. Additionally, the elders of each clan possess the authority to introduce customary laws and maintain social order<sup>44</sup>. Somalilanders form a traditionally nomadic society. The search for water and pastures may constitute a basis for conflicts, that is why good relations with neighbours are so important<sup>45</sup>. The elders of each community traditionally used their experience and authority as arbiters and negotiators, therefore they obtain a deep trust and nowadays constitute the basis of a successful governance in Somaliland.

Second, Somaliland's peace and state-building involves all groups forming the society. Different organisations and social networks are actively taking part in state-building, however Somaliland's society is traditionally patriarchal, and women and youth are often excluded from the decision-making processes<sup>46</sup>.

However, the situation of women in Somaliland is a particularly interesting case. Women are often said to be "the first to take the risks necessary to promote dialogue across divided communities"<sup>47</sup>, therefore their contribution to the conflict-resolving is crucial. Even though they usually do not take part in battles, they actively participated in diffusing major confrontations between armed groups during the civil war. After the proclamation of independence, Somaliland's women successfully organised themselves in various institutions and networks, and nowadays request a greater equality in terms of education and security between them and the traditionally ruling men<sup>48</sup>. Women call the equality "prerequisite for peace" and they voice their contribution in peace-building since 1991.

Despite the marginalised role, women in Somaliland organise themselves on the community level and build relations with women

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<sup>43</sup> I. Ahmed, R.H. Green, *The heritage of war...*, op.cit., p. 114.

<sup>44</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>45</sup> R. Omar, *Peace building and democracy – Lessons of Somalia and Somaliland*, "Whitehall Papers" 2004, vol. 61/1, p. 88.

<sup>46</sup> Y. Nakagawa, *A Societal Model...*, op.cit., p. 9.

<sup>47</sup> S. Dini, *Women building peace: Somali Women in Puntland and Somaliland*, "Conflict Trends" 2009, vol. 2, p. 31.

<sup>48</sup> Ibidem, p. 32.

from different clans<sup>49</sup>. Thus, they actively participate in resolving disputes and maintain amicable relations on the local level. Similarly, cross-clan marriages positively affect maintaining peace between different clans, as they monitor the situation and transfer information, however Somaliland's women are strongly opposing the traditional social structures and they fight for equalising both sexes in terms of marriage<sup>50</sup>.

Third, diaspora as well as local and foreign companies significantly influenced the peace-building in Somaliland. The lack of recognition of Somaliland as an independent state resulted in both positive and negative effects. It brought international isolation, and thus the absence of external aid and revenues, but on the other hand it allowed the civilians to maintain peace by locally-driven solutions<sup>51</sup>. In effect of the war many Somalis left the country and accumulated significant profits. Then, driven by the economic motivations, but also having interest in the country's peaceful reconstruction, invested substantial amounts of money in Somaliland's development<sup>52</sup>. The investments, such as building two hotels in Hargeisa – the Maansoor Hotel and the Ambassador Hotel, encouraged further investments in the city, provided vacancies as well as overall stimulated the economy, contributing to the improvement of living conditions<sup>53</sup>. Similarly, several privately founded universities encouraged the transformation of Somaliland's society and improved the situation in human resources, providing educated workers<sup>54</sup>. Moreover, students commenced numerous field research in conflict dynamics, peace-keeping and maintaining local dialogue by interviewing local leaders, religious leaders and cooperated with international NGOs located in the country<sup>55</sup>.

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<sup>49</sup> Ibidem, p. 34.

<sup>50</sup> Ibidem, p. 36.

<sup>51</sup> S. Njeri, *Somaliland; the viability of a liberal peacebuilding critique beyond state building, state formation and hybridity*, "Peacebuilding" 2018, p. 7.

<sup>52</sup> M.V. Hoehene, M.H. Ibrahim, *Rebuilding Somaliland...*, p. 72.

<sup>53</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>54</sup> Ibidem, p. 54.

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem, p. 64.

Another diaspora-initiated programme was the Peace Initiatives Programme, started in 2007, which aims at actively responding to local conflicts, through collaboration with religious and traditional leaders and by using direct and indirect methods of conflict resolution. The Programme identifies local conflicts and organises separate meetings with the involved parties in order to ease tensions and build trust between them<sup>56</sup>.

Actions undertaken by the Somali diaspora suit the general approach of a bottom-up state and peace-building and are usually defined as the phenomenon of “build your own community/neighbourhood”, without the necessity of foreign aid or intervention<sup>57</sup>.

## 2. Congo

### The wars in Congo and international support

Territories belonging to present-day Congo have been torn by disastrous wars since 1996. The so-called First Congo War, or the “Africa’s First World War”<sup>58</sup>, began due to Rwandan invasion on a former Belgian colony, Zaire. Rwanda intervened in Congo shortly after the civil war, which led to one of the most brutal genocides in modern history<sup>59</sup>. Zaire’s destabilisation resulted in removing president Mobutu SeseSeko and taking over the office by the rebel leader Laurent-DésiréKabila, supported by Rwanda and Uganda. The first war in Congo lasted until 1997 and brought the proclamation of Democratic Republic of Congo. However, besides the name and the ruling leader, the state remained politically unstable<sup>60</sup>.

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<sup>56</sup> Ibidem, p. 89.

<sup>57</sup> Ibidem, p. 73.

<sup>58</sup> G. Prunier, *Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*, Oxford 2009, p. 348.

<sup>59</sup> *Rwanda: Genocide Anniversary*, “Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Science” 2014, vol. 51/4.

<sup>60</sup> E. Kennes, *The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed*,

Due to altercations with his former allies, Kabila expelled the foreign soldiers from DRC, which resulted in the second war on Congo's territories<sup>61</sup>. However, this time the war attracted bigger international concern, and it involved nine African countries overall. The conflict officially ended in 2003, by signing the peace agreement and taking power by the Transitional Government, nevertheless, the fights continued, especially in the eastern regions, close to the borders with Rwanda<sup>62</sup>.

It is estimated that in the aftermath of the wars, over five million people were dead, principally because of disease and starvation, but also in the effect of fighting. Thus, the ongoing conflict in Congo is called the deadliest since the Second World War<sup>63</sup>. Moreover, two million people were displaced and forced to seek asylum abroad, and thousands were victims of sexual violence and human trafficking<sup>64</sup>. The United Nations described the conflict as "one of the world's worst humanitarian crisis", due to the scale of death and displacement<sup>65</sup>.

Beside political discords on the international level in Sub-Saharan Africa, natural resources are also being mentioned among other causative factors of the wars<sup>66</sup>. Congo is the largest producer

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*Networks of Need*, [in:] *Rethinking the Economics of War*, C.J. Arnson, W.I. Zartman, Washington, D.C. 2005, p. 147.

<sup>61</sup> Ibidem, p. 154.

<sup>62</sup> C. McGreal, *Fear of fresh conflict in Congo as renegade general turns guns on government forces*, "The Guardian" Sep 3, 2007, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/03/congo.rwanda>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>63</sup> M. Spagat et al., *Estimating War Deaths: An Arena of Contestation*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2009, vol. 53.

<sup>64</sup> S.D. Jenkins, *Preliminary Assessment of Trafficking in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*, ICC Forum 2012, [https://iccforum.com/media/sdj\\_human\\_rights\\_project/201203\\_SDJ\\_Human\\_Rights\\_Project\\_at\\_UCLA\\_Report-Trafficking\\_in\\_the\\_DRC.pdf](https://iccforum.com/media/sdj_human_rights_project/201203_SDJ_Human_Rights_Project_at_UCLA_Report-Trafficking_in_the_DRC.pdf), 31.10.2018.

<sup>65</sup> *DRC in one of world's 'worst humanitarian crises': UN*, "Expatica" Jun 11, 2010, <https://www.expatica.com/ch/drcongo-in-one-of-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crises-un/>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>66</sup> C. McGreal, *The roots of war in eastern Congo*, "The Guardian" May 16, 2008 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/16/congo>, 31.10.2018.

of cobalt ore and one of the biggest exporter of copper and industrial diamonds. Additionally, it possesses significant deposits of tantalum used for the production of electronic components in computers and mobile phones<sup>67</sup>. Several of the extraction regions and mines are located on the conflict zones between Congo and Rwanda. Moreover, the so-called conflict resources, extracted by rebellious groups constitute a significant profit and subsequently perpetuate the fightings<sup>68</sup>.

Secondly, ethnic differences contributed to the disastrous character and escalation of the conflict. Along with political instability, economic and social trouble on the national scale, ethnic conflict was possible, due to domination, oppression and legal injustice of one group over another. Congo's inhabitants divided into numerous separate ethnic groups, counted upon approximately two hundred. There is no single dominant clan, and the groups are usually regionally concentrated<sup>69</sup>. The wars in Congo were strongly connected with the struggles between Rwandan and groups of Hutu and Tutsi, which eventually led to the genocide of Tutsi, and their flow over the Congolese border in search for asylum. However, Tutsi's militia entrenched themselves in refugee camps in eastern Congo, thus providing Hutu a reason to initiate fightings in DRC. Moreover, Rwandese government began to arm Congolese civilians, also belonging to Hutu clan, and initiated fights with Tutsi refugees<sup>70</sup>. Thus, Rwanda's internal conflict embraced Congolese civilians.

In 1999 the United Nations Security Council established the largest peacekeeping forces in history – MONUSCO in the Democratic

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<sup>67</sup> G. Rayner, *Is your mobile phone helping fund war in Congo?*, "The Telegraph" 27 Sep, 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticrepublicofcongo/8792068/Is-your-mobile-phone-helping-fund-war-in-Congo.html>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>68</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>69</sup> B.E. Sawe, *Ethnic Groups in The Democratic Republic of The Congo*, Worldatlas 2018, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-congo-kinshasa.html>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>70</sup> J.M. Rochester, *The New Warfare: Rethinking Rules for an Unruly World*, New York 2016.



Republic of Congo<sup>71</sup>. The soldiers were responsible for monitoring the peace process after the Second Congo War, principally focusing on stabilising the conflicts in eastern Congo. Nevertheless, they have not always been able to contain renewing fights and numerous cases of violence against civilians<sup>72</sup>. The most sensitive regions are located close to the eastern borders, with the highest numbers of representatives of different, hostile clans. Those regions include North and South Kivu, as well as the Ituri region, in the northern DRC<sup>73</sup>.

### **Local engagement on Idjwi**

The Idjwi island is located in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, on the Lake Kivu constituting one of the natural borders with Rwanda. The large population of over 300 000 inhabitants is concentrated on the area of only 310 km<sup>2</sup> <sup>74</sup>. Nevertheless, people on Idjwi managed to coexist peacefully, even though the war was raging around them. They constitute an exceptional example of a local engagement and bottom-up approach in peace-building, as well as of a successful civil dialogue aiming at maintaining peace.

The island isolated by the Lake Kivu's waters is often called "a heaven of peace" by foreign observers<sup>75</sup>. But it is one not only for its indigenous inhabitants. After the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, many refugees found asylum on the island and continued to live there afterwards. Due to the large inflow of migrants the population

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<sup>71</sup> MONUSCO *at glance*, MONUSCO, UN Missions 2019, [https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/factsheet\\_monusc\\_february\\_2019\\_-\\_english.pdf](https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/factsheet_monusc_february_2019_-_english.pdf), 31.01.2019.

<sup>72</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>73</sup> M. Kavangh, *The Roots of Ethnic Conflict in Eastern DRC*, Pulitzer Center 2009, <https://pulitzercenter.org/projects/africa/roots-ethnic-conflict-eastern-drc>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>74</sup> P. Rdc, *Idjwi, an incubator for local development in South Kivu, DRC*, "Medium" Jun 13, 2017, <https://medium.com/@pnudrdc/idjwi-an-incubator-for-local-development-in-south-kivu-drc-59c8d43319b9>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>75</sup> Ibidem; S. Autesserre, *The Crisis of...*, p. 113–114.



grew significantly over the years, and in effect it is now struggling with the lack of places to live and work<sup>76</sup>. Most of the inhabitants are employed in farming, fishing or agriculture, some also work in the informal sector<sup>77</sup>. They usually live for 1\$ per day. Moreover, they find the state bureaucracy, police and justice system corrupt and inefficient<sup>78</sup>.

However, even though all the factors causing fights in the region also occurred on the island, such as natural resources, ethnic division, poverty and unstable political authority, its inhabitants avoided engagement in the wars. According to Séverine Autesserre, it was because of the involvement of all locals, including young and old, the rich and the poorest residents<sup>79</sup>.

The so-called “culture of peace” present on the island indicated the help of local associations’ in resolving conflicts and defusing ethnic tensions by mediating between its parties. Moreover, individual clans made blood pacts – promises of never hurting each other, amplified by connecting families by marriages<sup>80</sup>. Tradition constitutes one of the most important factors in maintaining peace on Idjwi. It is forwarded by elders who are teaching the subsequent generations about the importance of blood pacts and deathly consequences of breaking such contracts. Additionally, the inhabitants strongly

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<sup>76</sup> A. Jacobsen, *Looking for Peace on a Forgotten Island in DRC*, “Fair Observer” Nov 15, 2016, <https://www.fairobserver.com/region/africa/democratic-republic-of-congo-refugees-rwanda-conflict-news-78321/>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>77</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>78</sup> S. Autesserre, *Here’s what Congo can teach the world about peace*, “The Washington Post” Oct 19, 2016, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/19/heres-what-this-island-in-congo-can-teach-the-world-about-peace/?utm\\_term=.7001416e66ca](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/19/heres-what-this-island-in-congo-can-teach-the-world-about-peace/?utm_term=.7001416e66ca), 31.10.2018.

<sup>79</sup> S. Autesserre, *There’s another way to build peace. And it doesn’t come from the top down*, “The Washington Post”, Oct 23, 2018, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/23/theres-another-way-to-build-peace-and-it-doesnt-come-from-the-top-down/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.2883502ce36b](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/23/theres-another-way-to-build-peace-and-it-doesnt-come-from-the-top-down/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2883502ce36b), 31.10.2018.

<sup>80</sup> Ibidem.

believe in magical rituals which cast protection on the island and prevent external invasions<sup>81</sup>.

In a situation of conflict, local people do not involve the police. Instead they contact one of many local groups, including religious institutions, youth groups, women organisations or traditional networks. Therefore, each citizen, involved in such a strong social system, is able to maintain the stability by resolving conflicts almost immediately.

Idjwi is not the only example of a successful peace-keeping. Throughout the eastern Congo people in various villages chose to resolve conflicts in a similar way, relying on local leaders and organisations<sup>82</sup>. In the village of the Kalehe people, in order to resolve conflicts, they used personal connections and negotiated with fighting groups, simultaneously activating the whole community to support peace-building actions.

Apparently, no foreign army or police is needed. It is the community members themselves, who maintain peace and prevent eruption of violence between the inhabitants. However, it is difficult, or even impossible, to defend themselves from armed rebels or organise similar peace-keeping networks on the national scale<sup>83</sup>. Therefore local people from conflict zones do need international support, but not the “foreigners-know-best assistance” that is usually implemented<sup>84</sup>.

Apart from the difficulty in engaging the whole Congolese society in civil dialogue and active peace-building on the local and national level, there are several examples of effective organisations and civil initiatives, which mainly concern the status of farmers and landowners, like the Forum of Friends of the Earth or the Union for the Defence of Farmer’s Interests, but also the general peace-building, for example the Life and Peace Institute or Action for Peace and

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<sup>81</sup> S. Autesserre, *Here’s what...*, op.cit.

<sup>82</sup> S. Autesserre, *There’s another...*, op.cit.

<sup>83</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>84</sup> Ibidem.

Harmony<sup>85</sup>. Congolese civilians also organised themselves to address trauma and rehabilitate conflict victims, for instance by implementing artistic activities<sup>86</sup>.

### 3. Colombia

#### The civil war in Colombia and international engagement

The civil war in Colombia began in the 1960s, as a result of the competition for power between the government and various paramilitary groups, as well as numerous far-left guerrillas like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the National Liberation Army (ELN)<sup>87</sup>. The left-wing rebels, insensibly differing in the adopted ideology, used to cooperate as well as fight against each other in the course of the conflict<sup>88</sup>. Nevertheless, in the 1980s new actors emerged, namely right-wing paramilitary groups, with fierce connections to the state military<sup>89</sup>.

The United States was the most involved foreign actor, partly due to the large amounts of drug trafficking controlled by the Colombian paramilitary groups and guerrillas. It is estimated that in the early 2000s Colombia supplied 90% of the world's cocaine. Both left and right-wing rebellions were involved in illegal production, taxation and trafficking, however FARC was said to be the main coca plantations owner. The incomes from illicit drug business provided the groups with much profit and fuelled the conflict with the competition for territories. The US government announced in 2009 that FARC

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<sup>85</sup> International Alert, *Ending the deadlock: Towards a new vision of peace in eastern DRC*, 2012, p. 44.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 45.

<sup>87</sup> C. Felner, D. Renwick, *Colombia's Civil Conflict*, Council of Foreign Relations 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict>, 31.10.2018.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibidem*.

was the producer of 60% of Colombian cocaine illegally exported to the USA<sup>90</sup>.

In spite of declaring the desire to protect peasants and rural poor, FARC and ELN frequently used violence against civilians as well as kidnapping for ransom or extortion of food and money. Colombia's National Center for Historical Memory estimates that 25 000 people had been kidnapped by guerrillas between 1970 and 2010. Additionally, more than 10 000, including 4 000 civilians have been killed. Overall, the conflict costed 220 000 people dead, 25 000 disappeared and 5,7 million displaced<sup>91</sup>.

In 2002 Álvaro Uribe was elected as a new Colombian president and he pledged to “take a hard-line stance against the guerrillas”. However, it was in the terms of office of Juan Manuel Santos, when the peace talks were officially commenced in 2012. After several talks with international mediators and a number of failed agreements, the peace process between FARC and the government finally began in 2016 and halted the violence<sup>92</sup>.

The subsequently analysed rural communities were the most serious victims of the Colombian civil war. Due to the impacts of former president Álvaro Uribe and his Democratic Security Policy, large cities became safer, but the conflict was pushed towards the country's peripheries<sup>93</sup>. Thus the strong presence of rebel groups such as FARC or ELN, as well as the right-wing guerrillas, was especially obnoxious in the rural regions<sup>94</sup>.

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<sup>90</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>91</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>92</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>93</sup> ICG, *Moving Beyond Easy Wins: Colombia's Borders*, “Latin America Report” 2011, vol. 40.

<sup>94</sup> A. Idler et al., *Peace Territories in Colombia: Comparing Civil Resistance In Two War-Torn Communities*, “Journal of Peacebuilding and Development” 2015, vol. 10/3, p. 1–15.

### Local engagement in Colombian rural communities

A different approach to local engagement in peace-building was present among the Colombian rural societies during the civil war. The phenomenon of implementing the so-called “zones of peace” has been observed over many years. The overall number of declared peace communities in Colombia was approximately fifty, however many others might have functioned the same way, but without the official declaration<sup>95</sup>. Usually, the communities consisted of traditionally marginalised inhabitants, including Afro-descendants, indigenous or *campesino* (peasant farmers)<sup>96</sup>.

Colombian peace communities are considered as unique phenomena, which asserted its members the strength to voice their demands and protests. The members of peace communities refused to carry arms and did not join any of the fighting groups. The whole communities refused to support any side of the Colombian conflict and frequently they abstained from involving in the illicit drug production, even though it provided a stable income and economical security<sup>97</sup>.

The oldest peace community in Colombia is that of San José de Apartado, on the Caribbean coast. With the support from the Catholic Church and international NGOs, civilians developed the way to protect themselves from militias. San José declared itself a peaceful community in March 1997 and since then it operated with dialogue and negotiations, collective protection and casual gatherings. The civilians were always travelling in groups and avoided regions where armed parties of the conflict were present. They prayed together and gathered in numerous occasions to share their thoughts and feelings. During such meetings they ensured that everyone was present. They participated in various community works and organised the committees of security and food<sup>98</sup>.

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<sup>95</sup> G. Alther, *Colombian peace...*, op.cit., p. 282.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 283.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 280.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibidem*.

Another community, the Mogotes from eastern Andes, similarly declared their municipality as a peace zone with the support from the Catholic Church. The community organised their own system of education, organisation and empowerment. In 1998 they formed the Municipal Constituent Assembly (MCA) of the Sovereign Town of Mogote, which constituted a space for popular political participation. It comprised approximately two hundred delegates and concluded decisions by consensus. In 1999 the Mogotes obtained the Nobel Peace Prize and thus inspired other communities in Colombia to engage in civil participatory process<sup>99</sup>.

The community of the Nasa People, in order to defend their territory, in 2001 initiated the Indigenous Guard, responsible for maintaining peace and preventing any armed group to enter the communities territories. The Guard was consisted of men and women, armed only with sticks. Likewise, the Indigenous Guard was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize<sup>100</sup>.

The inhabitants of Las Mercedes and Samaniengo villages engaged in civil resistance on the less organised level, however not less efficient. Their civil resistance was based on non-violent protests, strikes, boycotts and demonstrations<sup>101</sup>. All members of the societies, including youth, negotiated and established numerous agreements with guerrillas, concerning maintaining the peace territories, free from fightings<sup>102</sup>. Moreover, they established a collective leadership, where the whole community participated in decision-making.

Equally important was the engagement of non-governmental organisations. REDEPAZ, a Colombian NGO, in 1998 commenced the initiative *One Hundred Municipalities of Peace in Colombia*. It aimed at promoting peace in the country and supported small rural communities in maintaining peace, despite the rule of guerillas<sup>103</sup>.

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<sup>99</sup> Ibidem, p. 285.

<sup>100</sup> Ibidem, p. 286.

<sup>101</sup> E. Chenoweth, K.G. Cunningham, *Understanding nonviolent resistance: An Introduction*, "Journal of Peace Research" 2013, vol. 50/3, p. 271.

<sup>102</sup> A. Idler et al., *Peace Territories...*, p. 4.

<sup>103</sup> C. Rojas, *Islands in the Stream: A Comparative Analysis of Zones of Peace*

The initiative was integrating a large number of Colombian communities and provided trainings in strengthening peace.

With international support the communities were able to live non-violently. NGOs provided the communities with safe spaces and information about emergency procedures and mechanisms of self-protection implanted in other regions of the world. Most importantly, foreign institutions informed the international society of the struggles of Colombian community and thus increased the possibility of foreign aid.

## Conclusions

The paper discussed the importance of local engagement in resolving conflicts and maintaining peace on the territories presently engulfed by wars. By analysing the case studies of societies in Somaliland, the island Idjwi and in rural Colombia, the author presented various forms of civil dialogue and local strategies of sustaining peace, by the engagement of all inhabitants. The studied methods constituted examples of a bottom-up approach to peace-building, alternative to a top-down approach, commonly implemented by international organisations, particularly the United Nations, responsible for numerous peace-building and peace-keeping missions.

According to the African examples, modern, western ideas of citizenship are usually contrary to the ideals of clan-based society, and are not perceived as a basis of successful nationhood. European state models proved to be ineffective in Africa during post-colonial times, not considering the specific culture and different social construction, thus inducing disastrous dictatorships and conflicts<sup>104</sup>.

European-style, centralised democracy proved to be ineffective in traditionally decentralised Somali society, divided according to

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*Within Colombia's Civil War*, [in:] *Zones of Peace*, eds. L.E. Hancock, C.R. Mitchell, Bloomfield 2007, p. 71–89.

<sup>104</sup> K. Barkey, S. Parikh, *Comparative perspectives on the state*, “Annual Review of Sociology” 1991, vol. 17, p. 529.

different clans and pastoral lands. Thus, all the attempted to recreate the government after 1991 were sentenced to failure, as they excluded different culture and governance traditions of Somalis<sup>105</sup>. According to Upsall “if Somalia is to achieve stability and success the legitimacy of the government needs to come from the Somali people and not from an outside source”<sup>106</sup>.

The process of state and peace-building in Somaliland was based on the formal hybridisation of indigenous clan-based structures with those characteristic for western democracies. The traditional elders played the central role in formation of peace and governance in Somaliland<sup>107</sup>. According to Deqa Osman, “good governance derives from a strong social contract and good leadership, which them, can produce good policies”<sup>108</sup>. It seems that Somalilanders are on a right way to fulfil this goal.

Similarly, the inhabitants of the Idjwi island on the Lake Kivu in eastern Congo proved the effectiveness of local engagement in peace-building strategies. In the most vulnerable region of the country, the citizens of Idjwiorganised themselves into a coherent network of social organisations and groups, responsible for resolving conflicts before they transformed into regular battles. Such civil organisation effected in peaceful coexistence of members of different clans and families in a region of war, violence and poverty.

The different approach to civil dialogue during the times of conflict was presented on the example of rural societies in Colombia, which created numerous so-called “peace-zones” in the state torn by civil war. Marginalised rural communities committed themselves to non-violent resistance and popular participation in the life and

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<sup>105</sup> J.P. Pham, *The Somaliland exception: Lessons on post-conflict state building from the part of the former Somalia that works*, “Marine Corps University Journal”2010, vol. 3/1, p. 10.

<sup>106</sup> K.C. Upsall, op.cit.

<sup>107</sup> M.H. Schwoebel, *Hybrid sources of legitimacy*, [in:] *Local Peacebuilding and Legitimacy: Interactions Between National and Local Levels*, New York 2018, p. 218.

<sup>108</sup> D. Osman, *Lack of Recognition: A Blessing in Disguise?*, [in:] Social Research and Development Institute (eds.), *Somaliland Statehood, Recognition and the Ongoing Dialogue With Somalia*, Hargeisa 2012, p. 49–58.



protection of the community. In many cases such actions were supported by religious institutions and NGOs.

I argue that Somaliland's and Congolese attempts to build a peaceful society have proven to be comparatively successful and they ought to be perceived as models of successful civil dialogue, local engagement and a bottom-up approach to peace-building. The Colombian example, on the other hand, proved the importance of local society, which does not have to be a passive observer or victim of conflicts. By the active engagement and mutual protection, strengthened by the aid provided by NGOs and church organisations, Colombian civilians were able to lead almost undisturbed life and in critical situations they peacefully demonstrated or negotiated with guerillas<sup>109</sup>.

According to John Paul Lederach, resolving conflicts requires building peace through active engagement of local communities and reconciliation on all levels of the society. He argues that "broken relationships generate conflict, while harmonious relationships generate peaceful solutions". He also stresses the importance of external actors, such as NGOs or religious institutions, which often serve as the bridge between the demands of ordinary citizens and authoritative powers<sup>110</sup>.

Séverine Autesserre advises rethinking current peace-building techniques and involving local strategies to resolve national conflicts. Because most of the foreign intervenes assume that local populations are uninterested, incompetent or violent, all policymakers in international organisations have to take into consideration the successful cases of the local engagement in maintaining peace. By providing appropriate resources and technical advisory, peace-building can become more effective. According to Autesserre, the combination of local, national and international efforts seem like the only solution for a successful conflict-resolving strategy<sup>111</sup>.

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<sup>109</sup> G. Alther, *Colombian peace...*, op.cit., p. 280.

<sup>110</sup> J.P. Lederach, *Construyendo la Paz: Reconstrucción Sostenible en Sociedades Divididas*, Bilbao 1998.

<sup>111</sup> S. Autesserre, *Here's what...*, op.cit.

Autesserre proposes a brand new approach to looking at peace-building<sup>112</sup>. She is a firm supporter of engaging local population in the conflict zones, which may be the most effective method to cease conflicts and maintain peace. According to Autesserre, international organisations such as the UN should focus its aid and financial resources not on the ineffective military missions, international conferences between the political elites or pushed elections in the western manner, but on maintaining amicable relations between ordinary citizens and helping in organising the country according to their culture and traditions<sup>113</sup>. In her opinion, the lack of such approach resulted in the failure of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, Congo, Iraq and South Sudan<sup>114</sup>. The top-down approach resulted contrary to what it was intended. In the past ten years deaths during battles have risen by 340% and more than 50 conflict zones are triggering “the worst refugee crisis of the past 70 years”<sup>115</sup>.

Similarly, Max Byrne argues that top-down strategies do not allow local discords to be reconciled and in effect the society lacks stable foundations<sup>116</sup>. Social, clan-based contracts between citizens can only assume a successful nation-building and present wars are not likely to be terminated, without the engagement of local people<sup>117</sup>. Byrne convinces that a stable society, and thus the whole nation, must be derived from its nature, and place emphasis on its construction and various connections, like clan-based relations in Somalia and Congo<sup>118</sup>.

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<sup>112</sup> S. Autesserre, *There's another...*, op.cit.

<sup>113</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>114</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>115</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>116</sup> M. Byrne, *The failed state...*, p. 121.

<sup>117</sup> D.K. Leonard, M.S. Samantar, *What does the Somali experience teach us about the social contract and the state?*, “Development and Change” 2011, vol. 42/2, p. 561.

<sup>118</sup> M. Byrne, *The failed state...*, p. 120.

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## Lokalna ludność a pokój i rozwiązywanie konfliktów

**Streszczenie:** Artykuł bada, w jaki sposób zaangażowanie ludności lokalnej może przysłużyć się powstrzymaniu lub rozwiązywaniu aktualnie trwających konfliktów. Autorka rozpatruje metody, dzięki którym mieszkańcy skutecznie tworzą spójne i pokojowo współzależne społeczeństwo, analizując porównawczo trzy przykłady – Somalilandu, wyspy Idjwi w wschodnim Kongo oraz wiejskich społeczności w Kolumbii. Badania nad lokalnym zaangażowaniem mogą uzupełnić aktualne strategie budowania i utrzymywania pokoju wprowadzane przez organizacje międzynarodowe, które bardzo często pomijają ten aspekt, a w efekcie nie zapewniają długotrwałego pokoju.

**Słowa kluczowe:** ludność lokalna, Somaliland, Demokratyczna Republika Konga, Kolumbia, wojna, budowanie pokoju