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2021 | 1(19) | 7-26

Article title

Muqtada al-Sadr from Opposition to Power: Democracy of the Cleric in Iraq After 2003

Content

Title variants

RU
Муктада аль-Садр от оппозиции к власти: демократия духовенства в Ираке после 2003 года

Languages of publication

Abstracts

RU
Согласно предположениям ученых, радикальные политические движения изменят свое поведение, участвуя в формальной политике. Муктада аль-Садр – это духовный лидер шиитов, который применял насилие для защиты своего политического движения. Движение садристов вначале было вооруженным восстанием, так называемая «Армия Махди». В статье анализируется переход аль-Садра от оппозиции к власти в новой политической системе Ирака. В 2004 году аль-Садр обратился к политике, признав политическую систему Ирака. Научная литература предполагает, что аль-Садр должен был преобразовать свое движение в политическую партию, чтобы взаимодействовать с государственной политической системой и отвечать за ее основные принципы. В 2006 году Муктада аль-Садр вернулся к насилию, угрожая новой демократии в Ираке. Почему же он продолжает применять насилие, если распознал политическую игру? В статье аргументируется, что для того, чтобы быть в политике после 2003 года, необходимо иметь военное крыло для достижения политических и материальных целей и для поддержки своего движения.
EN
According to learned scholars, radical political movements change their behavior when participating in formal politics. Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric, used violence in order to protect his movement. At its inception, the Sadrist movement became an armed militia called the Mahdi Army. This paper will examine al-Sadr’s transition from opposition to power in the new political system in Iraq. In 2004 al-Sadr turned to politics by recognizing the political system in Iraq. Learned scholars suggest that al-Sadr should have transferred his movement into a political party to interact with the state political system and should then have been responsible for its outline. Al-Sadr returned to violence in 2006, threatening the new democracy in Iraq. If he recognized the political game, why did he resort to violence? This work suggests that to be in politics in post-2003, he should have formed a military wing to achieve political and material goals to maintain his movement.

Year

Issue

Pages

7-26

Physical description

Dates

published
2021

Contributors

  • Uniwersytet Warszawski

References

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  • International Crisis Group, Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State Crisis, Report No. 144, 14.08.2013.
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  • Inna R., Holy Mobilisation: The Religious Legitimation behind Iraq’s Counter-ISIS Campaign, London 2018.
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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

Biblioteka Nauki
1934146

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_15804_so2021101
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