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Generational Specificity of Socio-Political Transformation in Georgia: Between Tradition and Modernity

Preliminary Remarks

The concept of “transformation” means a complete change – in the case of a systemic transformation, it means drastic changes in the political system of a state. This profound restructuring of power affects both political life and society regarding values and identity². The essence of the transformation in the post-Soviet area was the transition from the authoritarian (communist) regime imposed from the outside to building a democracy. Two generations participated in this transformation in Georgia in 1991. As a result, the present-day Georgian society, made up of four generations, has adopted specific values and patterns of behaviour from previous generations and new values promoted from the outside as part of democratisation. According to G. Godlewski, the present generations living in the world: “(...) have their own dictionaries and symbols, cognitive categories and patterns of feelings, forms of communication and models of friendship, myths, and projects of the future. It is not just different environments or social strata – they are different cultures” [translation]³. The situation is similar in the case of Georgian society. This article is a snapshot of studies on the generational transformation of Georgian society.

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² A. Turska, *Transformacja ustrojowa jako proces społeczny*, „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 1994, No. 4.

³ G. Godlewski, *Animacja i antropologia*, [in:] *Animacja kultury*, eds. G. Godlewski, I. Kurz, A. Mencwel, M. Wójtowski, Warsaw 2002, p. 60.

This article aims to analyse generational transformation and outline the characteristics of individual generations. Moreover, I juxtaposed the concept of V. Papava (which can be considered quite controversial, yet in my opinion, it is adequate to the situation of Georgia) with the concept pointing to general generational trends. This analysis will allow me to characterise the young generation of Georgians in relation to other generations. The issue studied is particularly important. Firstly, due to the specific transformation in the post-Soviet states, political structures, and society. Secondly, the systemic transformation and the current democratisation of Georgia are driven by the generations that currently function and operate within this system. However, this analysis focuses mainly on identifying the young generation that will soon constitute the new elite of Georgian society. This generation constitutes the core for further research on the perception of democracy and democratisation in Georgia. The objective of this paper indicates, firstly, a comparison of the generations of Georgian society with the global characteristics of generations, and secondly, it indicates a young generation that is internally conflicted.

To analyse this research problem, I used research methods based partly on secondary sources. The basic research methods used in the article are the method of analysing existing data and the comparative method, which allowed for juxtaposing the division into generations proposed by V. Papava with the general characteristics of global generation trends. Secondary statistical data studies from the Caucasus Research Resource Center completed these methods, allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the generations.

The article is part of a series of articles on the young generation of Georgians and their opinions about democracy and democratisation.

Generational Transformation: General Thoughts


Over the years, the communist system evoked a sense of security in post-Soviet societies, dominating most spheres of life. Currently, in many countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, societies expect a change in the styles and forms of governance without having a clear vision of the opportunities and threats that will accompany such transformations at the social level.

According to the adopted definition of “transformation”, I have divided the transformations in Georgia into two. The first socio-political transformation was the systemic transformation of 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which took place in the context of the beginning of the transition from socialism to democracy, and at the same time, from a centrally planned economy to capitalism. This change can be described as imitative and “West-ori-

ented". J. Tatum emphasises that there have been two waves of social change in Georgia. The first was the struggle for independence and the spurring of nationalism in 1991, and the second was the correction of the mistakes of the first wave, the Rose Revolution. Under this second wave, democratisation, Europeanization, and westernisation were particularly strong⁴. The main goal of the Rose Revolution was to eliminate Eduard Shevardnadze's regime to enable Georgia to transform into a modern and democratic state⁵.

The above changes were related to the transformation of generations. According to V. Papava, the specificity of such a transformation in the post-Soviet area was the transformation from *homo sovieticus* into *homo transformaticus* and *homo oeconomicus*⁶. In my opinion, one more transformation is taking place within Georgian society – into a paradoxical generation, i.e., the youngest generation born after 2000 (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Generational Transformation in Georgia Since 1930.



Source: Own study.

*The red lines show the two transformations (the 1991 transformation and the Rose Revolution)

Transformation from *Homo Sovieticus* to *Homo Transformaticus*

According to V. Papava, the *homo sovieticus* generation, born in 1930–1945⁷, lived during Soviet rule and were unfamiliar with the first version of democrat-

⁴ J.D. Tatum, *Democratic Transition in Georgia: Post-Rose Revolution Internal Pressures on Leadership*, "Caucasian Review of International Affairs" 2009, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 156–171.

⁵ N. Lavert, *The Problem of Lasting Change: Civil Society and the Colored Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine*, "Demokratizatsiya the Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization" 2008, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 143–161.

⁶ V. Papava, *Necroeconomics: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism (Lessons from Georgia)*, New York 2005.

⁷ In other words, "Silent Generation" according to the general standards of research on generations and generations. The term was first used by the Times in 1951 to refer to people born in 1928–1945, people who were afraid to "speak out". According to the Pew Research Center, these are people born 1928–1945, according to the Resolution Foundation 1926–1945, Strauss and Howe 1925–1941 for Canadian society, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233466490_Profiling_the_Silent_Generation.

ic Georgia (1918–1921). Similarly, *The Moscow Times* defines *homo sovieticus* as “(...) the archetype of a person born and shaped by a totalitarian regime [translation]”. The concept of the *homo sovieticus* generation by V. Papava can be compared with the term “Silent Generation”. It is recognised that this generation is characterised by traditionalism, a great sense of duty, and the need for security. Due to the characteristics of the silent generation according to the universal values of Sh. Schwartz⁸, I recognised that the *homo sovieticus* generation is its Georgian/post-Soviet counterpart (Table 1).

V. Papava characterises this generation in terms of changes in some family's traditional functions. In Soviet times, against the family's will, the state took over the responsibility to satisfy all its needs. There was an undesirable transformation of the family from independent of the state to dependent on it. Due to the limitation of economic independence, the family lost the ability to increase income, and the state entered its household. Ignorance of the family's independence violated the “partnership relations” between the state and family, so the family did not fully fulfil its traditional functions, and the state failed to fulfil its obligations. The result was a conflict between the family and state, which was reflected in the destabilisation of some family functions⁹.

According to the research of Sh. Schwartz, people from the Silent Generation are not open to changes, do not need to develop professionally, they only need a peaceful life in line with religious beliefs¹⁰. Surveys conducted by the Levada Center and the Pew Research Center in 2017 and 2018 in the post-Soviet space showed that former Soviet citizens still feel apathy, disappointment, uncertainty about their identity and a combination of longing for communist times on the one hand and the need to protect religious values on the other¹¹. Moreover, by disrupting the “partnership relations” between the state and family, this generation continues to build its relations with state institutions on suspicion and distrust, while pessimism about the future continues to affect the daily behaviour of this generation¹². In the context of special values at the social and cultural levels, the *homo sovieticus* generation considers kinship as a very important bond – bonds to family and friends are considered a priority,

⁸ Sh. Schwartz, *An overview of the Schwartz theory of basic values*, “Online Readings in Psychology and Culture” 2012, No. 2 (1).

⁹ V. Papava, *Necroeconomics...*, op.cit.

¹⁰ Sh. Schwartz, *An overview of the Schwartz theory of basic values...*, op.cit., pp. 1–20.

¹¹ Levada Center; Pew Research Center, *Public opinion survey: Residents of Georgia*, 2017, http://www.levada.org/sites/default/files/2018-5-29_georgia_poll_presentation.pdf.

¹² I. Merheim-Eyre, *After homo sovieticus: Democratic governance gaps and societal vulnerabilities in the EU's eastern neighbourhood*, “European View” 2018, Vol. 17, No. 2.

Table 1. Characteristics of the Generations from 1930 to the Present

Generation	Years of birth	Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Elements of demography and sociology [Problem - Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze -	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Veterans/Silent Generation / <i>Homo sovieticus</i>	1930–1945 (74–89 years old)			Family of the <i>sovieticus</i> type – a Soviet consumer and authoritarian family whose members have state-guaranteed employment and a decent standard of living, a retirement pension. The state budget funds social welfare, health care, and education. His / her main source of income are: 1) Salaries, pensions, and social aid from public funds. 2) In small towns and villages, he/she has his/her own subsidiary farm, from which he/she consumes part of the proceeds from the product in kind and receives part of the proceeds from the sale of the part (since the latter was largely unregistered by the state, this was reflected in the family income as hidden income). 3) The socioeconomic strata (types) of family members were represented as servants, workers, and peasants.	Openness to changes: little Open to changes; Self-enhancement (achievement-motivated person (as much as 91%) or a person of a different faith (42%) as a neighbour; other races (36%); other languages (26%), or immigrants (37%).	This generation would definitely not like to have a homosexual person (as much as 91%) or a person of a different faith (42%) as a neighbour; other races (36%); other languages (26%), or immigrants (37%).
Baby Boomers/ <i>Homo transformaticus</i>	1946–1969 (50–73 years old)		A <i>homo transformaticus</i> is partially developed, based on privatisation and newly formed private structures. Such people are still afraid of the state. They still try to maintain dependence on the state and expect its help. They gradually adjust to the rules of the market economy.	The <i>transformaticus</i> family – a kind of family moving from a socialist farm to a market economy. Types of members of the <i>transformaticus</i> family (according to the sociological survey of 1997) can be summarised as follows: 1) New Georgians; 2) optimist"; 3) socialists; 4) Traditionals (5) Conservatives; 6) Europeans; 7) Pioneers	Openness to changes: little Open to changes; Self-enhancement (achievement-motivated person (as much as 91%) or a person of a different faith (37%) as a neighbour; other races (36%); other languages (23%), or immigrants (35%).	This generation would definitely not like to have a homosexual person (as much as 91%) or a person of a different faith (37%) as a neighbour; other races (36%); other languages (23%), or immigrants (35%).
Generation X/ <i>Homo transformaticus</i>	1970–1980 (40–49 years old)/1970–1990 (29–40 years old)				Openness to changes: open Open to changes; Self-enhancement (achievement-motivated person (as many as 86%) or people of another faith (34%) as a neighbour; other races (32%); other languages (20%), and immigrants (34%).	This generation would definitely not like to have a homosexual person (as many as 86%) or people of another faith (34%) as a neighbour; other races (32%); other languages (20%), and immigrants (34%).

Generation	Years of birth	Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	დემოგრაფიის და სოციოლოგიის პრობლემები [Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze –	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Generation Y (Millennials; Homo economicus)	1990–2000 (19–29 years old)	Portrait of the young generation (14–29 years old): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 85% believers 47% after high school 70% live with their parents 62% financially dependent on parents 55% get along with their parents 34% do not work 42% would prefer to work in the public sector 87% have their own business 94% do not attend any social gatherings 94% are not socially and politically active online 46% are not interested in the development of other countries 81% trust only God 42% believe abortion should be prohibited 46% do not trust LGBT people 43% would like to get married 1% of women had more than 1 sexual partner 			<p>Openness to change: very open to change;</p> <p>Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life;</p> <p>Conservation (traditions, sense of security and conformism): very important for each generation.</p>	This generation shows a similar attitude as the older generations, but the trend is definitely declining: homosexuals (79%, 18–25 years old and 89% 26–35 years old)
Generation Z/ Homo economicus (V. Papava); Paradoxical generation (K. Skiert-Andrzejuk)	After 2000 (19 and younger)	56% feel Georgian, 20% individuals, 19% world citizens. 57% of men have had more than 1 sexual partner 1% of women have had more than 1 sexual partner			<p>Openness to change: very open to change;</p> <p>Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life;</p> <p>Conservation (traditions, security and conformism): very important for each generation</p>	

Source: Own study based on the literature on the subject.

especially in the hierarchy of values, they are placed before obligations towards the state and the entire society¹³.

The Georgian systemic transformation has had a multidimensional impact on society. The changes in the political, economic, and social life primarily influenced the family structure, which was previously dependent on the state, and the roles of gender in the family and society. According to V. Papava, the generation born in 1970–1990 is referred to as *homo transformaticus* – which means people who cannot eliminate the fear of the state and thus slowly begin to pursue their own private interests and benefit from it. The attempt to transfer Western individualism to the place on which *homo sovieticus* was formed, and to replace this generation's identity with individualism in the context of *homo transformaticus* failed, or rather in creating a hybrid between the Soviet man and the *oeconomicus* man¹⁴.

The economic reforms that followed 1991 were shaped on a ground unprepared for these changes, and their consequences were unfair privatisation, corruption, the expansion of the shadow economy and hyperinflation. These negative results of the reforms also influenced the direction of some *homo transformaticus*. On the one hand, people of this generation focused on social justice (the example of the Rose Revolution), ensuring material security for every member of society, in opposition to the free market economy. On the other hand, some headed towards *homo deformaticus*, interpreting the free market economy as being particularly oriented towards the needs of an individual at the expense of society and the state's economic development. Similarly to the concept of *homo adapticus* by Y.A. Levada, a person from the *homo transformaticus* generation can be described as one who gradually gets used to the principles of the market economy and democratisation, interpreting these principles through the prism of the values professed by *homo sovieticus*¹⁵. Moreover, the analogically terms “Baby Boomers” and “Generation X” coincide with the author's assumption. According to B. Hysa, the Baby Boomers generation grew up in a period of socio-political transformations and economic development based on the free market economy, which were a barrier for this generation¹⁶. However, this generation is already referred to

¹³ N. Sumbadze, G. Tarkhan-Mouravi, *Transition to Adulthood in Georgia: Dynamics of Generational and Gender Roles in the Post-Totalitarian Society*, Institute for Policy Studies, Georgia 2003.

¹⁴ V. Papava, *Necroeconomics...*, op.cit.

¹⁵ Y. Levada, *Chelovek prisposoblennyi (Homo Adapticus)*, “Monitoring Public Opinion: Economic and Social Changes” 1999, No. 5 (43), <http://www.ecsocman.edu.ru/images/pubs/2006/12/02/0000296966/02levada-7-17.pdf>.

¹⁶ B. Hysa, *Zarządzanie różnorodnością pokoleniową*, “Zeszyty Naukowe Politechniki Śląskiej” 2016, No. 97.

as the transition generation, the generation of individualists, people who value independent work, with recognition of authorities and the need for support in making any changes, inherited from the previous generation. In the literature on the subject, Generation X is referred to as Stability Seekers.

In the context of social and cultural changes, the transformation of the family and its functions took place through the transformation of individual factors: religious, psychological, and traditional ones. *Homo transformaticus*, like *homo sovieticus*, prioritises ties with family and friends¹⁷. The *homo transformaticus* generation, however, also values commitment at the level of public life. Representatives of this generation started the second transformation, that is, the Rose Revolution – they held protests in Tbilisi. M. Saakashvili, a leader of the protests, later the president, was 35 years old during the dissents (generation of Baby Boomers, *homo transformaticus*). Moreover, the Revolution combined many political and independent forces, including the Kmara [Eng. “Enough”] youth group, significant to some extent in mobilising the population. Thus, political activity is an important difference between the Soviet generation and the *homo transformaticus* generation. The Rose Revolution promoted the creation of a “new man”; in Georgia, this man obeys the law, is incorruptible, i.e., the antithesis of *homo sovieticus*. According to revolutionaries, only radical capitalism was a means that could deconstruct *homo sovieticus* into modern *homo oeconomicus*.

One can also distinguish the Jeans Generation among the *homo sovieticus* and *homo transformaticus*. It was a small transitional subculture of people born in 1945–1955, from middle-class or upper-class families, united under the influence of Western culture and music. They were characterised by a love of the American way of life, music and art, and a rebellious attitude towards the USSR. Few representatives of this subculture went down in history, because in 1983 a group of seven young people tried to hijack a plane (Aeroflot Flight 6833) from Tbilisi to escape to the “West”. The pilot of the plane resisted the hijacking and eventually returned the plane to Tbilisi. After the Soviet special forces stormed the plane to the ground, the four remaining members of the group were arrested and finally tried (three hijackers, three crew members and two passengers died in a fire on board). This generation of late socialism became symbolically associated with freedom, music, art, and Western clothing (jeans fashionable at the time) only ten years after the fall of the Iron Curtain¹⁸.

¹⁷ N. Sumbadze, G. Tarkhan-Mouravi, *Transition to Adulthood in Georgia...*, op.cit.

¹⁸ N. Gozalishvili, *The Late Cold War and Cracks in the Iron Curtain for Georgian Youth in the 1980s: The Subcultural Nature of the “Jeans Generation”*, “Corvinus Journal of International Affairs” 2018, Vol. 3, No. 2.

Transformation from *Homo Transformativus* to *Homo Oeconomicus*

The democratisation currently taking place in Georgia has affected political and social structures. The transformation of a generation from *homo transformativus* to *homo oeconomicus* is a gulf in the context of attitudes towards the political, economic, and social spheres. In general terminology, *homo oeconomicus* functions as Generation Y, which grew up in the age of computerisation and the development of the Internet. According to B. Hysa, they are people open to the world without socio-political limitations, with the possibility of career development and economic emigration. People from this generation need independence, but they are looking for their mentors. They invest in themselves, showing reluctance to make long-term commitments¹⁹. And the generation born in 2000 is Generation Z, that is, the Connected Generation – connected to the network, the Internet²⁰. They cannot function without new media as it is part of their everyday life. They are mobile people, open to other cultures, and open to changes. In my opinion, Generation Z, or Paradoxical Generation in Georgia, is an internally conflicted generation, placed between tradition (the values of previous generations) and modernisation (values flowing from the “West”). In Western societies, attachment to tradition is not such a key element as it is in Georgia. Older generations and the *homo oeconomicus* generation itself, despite different values, share those associated with traditions in the context of family structure and attachment to the national culture. However, the external values related to democratisation, the free-market economy and, above all, the Western lifestyle focused on egocentrism and personal development put the youngest generation at a crossroads in choosing a life path. When analysing this generation, it is worth paying attention to the concept of the paradoxical man. According to this concept, a transitional society produces such a unique and surprising phenomenon as individuals who focus on mutually exclusive values while simultaneously seeking to achieve conflicting goals. In the minds and behaviour of the same individual, opposite, and sometimes simply mutually exclusive judgments, attitudes, orientations, and intentions coexist, which creates an image of paradoxical behaviour²¹.

¹⁹ B. Hysa, *Zarządzanie różnorodnością pokoleniową...*, op.cit.

²⁰ A. Turner, *Generation Z: Technology and Social Interest*, “The Journal of Individual Psychology” 2015, Vol. 71, No. 2.

²¹ Z.T. Toshchenko, *Парадоксальный человек*, Москва 2008.

In the consciousness of the paradoxical generation, under the influence of external and internal factors, cardinal changes occur, the result of which is the paradoxicality of thinking and cognition, and the evaluation of phenomena and processes surrounding a representative of the generation. It is characterised by a specific type of contradiction that increases due to changes in economic and political relations, the breakdown of the image and lifestyle, and the violation of stereotypes and national mentality²².

Summary and Conclusions

According to M. Mnacakanyan, this paradoxical character of people's consciousness and behaviour rapidly increases in times of crises and the deformation of social bonds, i.e., in the conditions of creating and deepening the "atomic" state of society²³. There is an internal connection between the paradoxicality of consciousness and the behaviour of people with various forms of deviation. We are faced with a specific class of public life phenomena which can be characterised as "incompatibility" in the most general form.


According to T. Khoshtaria's research based on Schwarz's theory regarding the basic values of generations with the 2014 World Values Survey data, the older and younger generations do not differ much. Quantitative data analysis suggests that the values, according to Schwarz's theory, such as "security" (which includes the core values of "conformity", and "tradition") and "self-direction" (which includes the basic values of "benevolence" and "universalism") are very important for people of all ages in Georgia. Over 70% in all age groups rated the people described in verbal portraits representing these five basic values as "very similar to them" or "like them" (Figure 1). On the other hand, some values have been assessed completely differently by people in different age groups. Within the values of "self-direction", "stimulation", and "hedonism" (representing a higher ordered value of "openness to change"), there are differences depending on the age group. Compared to older generations, a greater percentage of young people identify with someone for whom it is important to come up with new ideas, take risks and have a good time. Likewise, the core values of "achievement" and "power" (representing a higher value of "self-improvement") were assessed differently by young people and the elderly.

²² Z.T. Toshchenko, *Парадоксальный человек: феномен общественного сознания и социальной практики*, „Вестник Российской Академии Наук” 2006, Vol. 76, No. 8.

²³ M. Mnatsakanyan, *Парадоксальный человек в парадоксальном обществе*, „СОЦИС” 2006, No. 6.


While success is important to 66% of young people, this percentage is lower among older people (Figure 2)²⁴.

Figure 1. Question: “I will briefly describe a person. Could you please tell me whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, a little like you, not like you, or not at all like you?” [by age, in 2014]



Source: Social Science in the Caucasus, CRRC, <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2018/01/>.

Figure 2. Question: “I will briefly describe a person. Could you please tell me whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, a little like you, not like you, or not at all like you?” [by age, in 2014]



Source: Social Science in the Caucasus, CRRC, <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2018/01/>.

²⁴ T. Khoshtaria, *What are the values of young people and how are these different from the values of older generations in Georgia?*, “Journal of Beliefs & Values” 2018, Vol. 39.

In a nutshell, the transformation in 1991 changed the political system and society. The theoretical division into generations has also become a reality, where the division into older and younger generations is visible, within which we can distinguish the *homo sovieticus*, *homo transformativus*, *homo oeconomicus*, and the paradoxical generation. Each of these generations creates its own values and has its own political awareness, but with common elements that bind all generations – such values are family, religion, and traditions. They differ mainly in their approach to government, openness to the world and the resulting globalisation and westernisation. However, as the name suggests, the youngest generation is peculiar, stuck between the clashes of tradition and modernisation. Observation of the generations, the changing trends in the values of the young generation, the influence of the older generation on the younger, inconstant generational dialogue, and above all, the new socio-political reality related to democratisation and the search for new variants and forms of democracy and economic development will push young people to specific actions in the future. The questions remain, what values related to the political and national tradition of Georgians will remain passed on by this generation, which will constitute the new political elite? Will they become a hybrid between the new and the old? Will the next transformation occur, observing changes in public sentiment and the visible polarisation of opinions about the transformation and the current governments? An attempt to answer these questions will contribute to further research on the place of young people in the socio-political space.

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Summary

The article's purpose is to analyse the generational transformation and outline the characteristics of individual generations. Moreover, the concept of V. Papava indicating generational trends was juxtaposed. The analysis characterises the young generation of Georgians in relation to other generations. I used research methods to solve this research problem based partly on secondary sources. The basic research methods used in the article are the method of analysing existing data and the comparative method, which allowed for juxtaposing the division into generations proposed by V. Papava with the general characteristics of global generation trends. Secondary statistical data studies from the Caucasus Research Resource Center completed the other methods, allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the generations. This article is a snapshot of studies on the generational transformation of Georgian society and is part of a series of articles on the young generation of Georgians and their opinions about democracy and democratisation.

Keywords: transformation, Georgia, generation, young people, democratisation, democracy

Поколенческая специфика общественно-политической трансформации в Грузии: между традицией и современностью

Резюме

Цель статьи состояла в том, чтобы проанализировать смену поколений и наметить особенности отдельных поколений в грузинском обществе. Кроме того, в статье также сопоставляется концепция поколений В. Папавы с концепцией генеральных трендов поколений. Этот анализ позволил автору охарактеризовать молодое поколение грузин на фоне других поколений. Для анализа этой исследовательской проблемы был использован ряд методов исследования, частично основанных на вторичных источниках. Основными методами исследования, использованными в статье, являются метод анализа имеющихся данных и сравнительный метод. Это позволило провести, предложенное В. Папавом, деление на поколения с общей характеристикой мировых тенденций поколений, а также сопоставление различий и сходства в контексте этих понятий. Обзоры вторичных статистических данных Кавказского исследовательского ресурсного центра дополнили вышеуказанные методы, позволив провести углубленный анализ указанных поколений. Эта статья является вкладом в дальнейшее исследование поколенческих трансформаций грузинского общества и является частью серии статей о молодом поколении грузин и их взглядах на демократию и демократизацию.

Ключевые слова: трансформация, Грузия, поколение, молодежь, демократизация, демократия