Bitwy pod Fredericksburgiem i Gettysburgiem w świetle Sztuki Wojny Sun Tzu

• Authors: Zbigniew Mazurak
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Można zadać pytanie, co bitwy wojny secesyjnej pod Gettysburgiem i Fredericksburgiem mają wspólnego z traktatem strategii wojskowej napisanym przez starożytnego chińskiego generała Sun Tzu (ca. 544 – ca. 496 p.n.e.). Okazuje się, że bardzo dużo. Dzieło to zawiera ponadczasowe porady, dzięki którym można wyjaśnić wyniki bitew i wojen w każdym okresie historycznym, łącznie z XIX w. Ze względu na brak tłumaczenia na język angielski do 1910 r. traktat ten był nieznany dla świata zachodniego, w tym dla generałów Ambrose’a Burnside’a i Roberta Lee. Dowódcy ci, nie znając jego porad, doświadczyli katastrofalnych porażek militarnych. Burnside próbował szybkiego przekraczania rzeki Rappahannock pod Fredericksburgiem, ponieważ we właściwym czasie nie zostały dostarczone dla armii mosty pontonowe. Zamiar się nie powiódł i element zaskoczenia został utracony. Generał Lee niewiele się nauczył na błędach przeciwnika i powtórzył je pod Gettysburgiem w lipcu 1863 r.

EN

What do the Civil War battles of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg have to do with the Art of War, the military strategy treatise written by ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu (ca. 544 – ca. 496 BC)? Very much, in fact. The Art of War’s timeless advice and principles can explain the results of battles and entire wars in every historical period, including the 19th century. The unorthodox way of war advocated therein allowed Sun Tzu, the commander of the army of Wu, to defeat a much larger army of the neighboring state of Chu, but due to a lack of English translation until 1910 was unknown to the English-speaking world, including Generals Ambrose Burnside and Robert Lee, who, ignorant of its sage advice, made catastrophic blunders at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, respectively. Burnside attempted a rapid crossing of the Rappahannock river at Fredericksburg, but pontoon bridges did not arrive in time, so the element of surprise was lost, and even when they did, he hesitated to cross until December 1862 when Confederates had already dug themselves in at Marye’s Heights; he sent his men like swarming ants towards the Confederate trenches on the heights, losing thousands of them. Lee evidently didn’t learn from his enemy’s mistakes and repeated them at Gettysburg in July 1863. Although no river crossing was involved, Lee wrongly abandoned his original plan to capture Harrisburg and Camp Curtin (which would have been a huge prestigeous blow to President Lincoln and might have encouraged a European recognition of the Confederacy) and, upon hearing that Union divisions were at Gettysburg, he moved his entire army there. At Gettysburg, he first issued unclear orders to subordinate Gen. Richard Ewell, then, the next day, clarified these by ordering multiple suicidal assaults on fortified Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. Sun Tzu counseled against attacking an enemy’s strong positions and especially against charging uphill to attack. He also stressed the importance of clarity of orders and of not trying the same type of attack over and over again. As Burnside’s and Lee’s examples show, generals who ignore Sun Tzu’s advice do so at their own peril.

Keywords

PL

Gettysburg; Fredericksburg; Robert Lee; Ambrose Burnside; wojna secesyjna; Sun Tzu

EN

Gettysburg; Fredericksburg; Robert Lee; Ambrose Burnside; Civil War; Sun Tzu

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
• Journal: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio F – Historia
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 69

Dates

published

2014

online

2016-10-25

Contributors

author

Zbigniew Mazurak

References

• Źródła
• A. Burnside do H. Hallecka, 9 listopada 1862 r., cyt. za: W. Marvel, Burnside, Chapel Hill 1991, s. 169–170.
• J. Davis do R.E. Lee, 11 sierpnia 1862 r., “Southern Historical Society Papers” 1876, Vol. 2, No. 1, http://tinyurl.com/d37rqf2 [dostęp: 13.12.2012].
• Lee R.E., General Lee’s Final and Full Report of the Pennsylvania Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, “Southern Historical Society Papers” 1876, Vol. 2, No. 1, http://tinyurl.com/cnnnovl [dostęp: 13.12.2012].
• R.E. Lee do J. Davisa, 8 sierpnia 1862 r., “Southern Historical Society Papers” 1876, Vol. 2, No. 1, http://tinyurl.com/d37rqf2 [dostęp: 13.12.2012].
• Sun Tzu, Sztuka Wojny, przeł. i oprac. L. Giles, Londyn 1910 (najnowsze wydanie: Special Edition Books, Londyn 2007), www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html [dostęp: 11.12.2012].
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Identifiers

DOI

10.17951/f.2014.69.89