2015 | 49 | 2 |
Article title

Koncepcja Rady Polityki Fiskalnej w Polsce

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Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w jezyku polskim.
This paper discusses whether an independent fiscal policy council (FPC) should be set up in Poland, a country that has had problems with fiscal discipline for years. It starts with theoretical underpinnings for such an institution, namely the reasons for a so-called deficit bias such as shortsightedness of the government, common-pool problem and time-inconsistency of optimal policy. Then it proceeds to the variants of delegating control over fiscal policy, forecast formulation and evaluation and advice to such a body by elected politicians. After these considerations, the arguments in favor of setting up an FPC in Poland are outlined and broad guidelines to its shape are presented.
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