PL EN


2015 | 49 | 4 |
Article title

Wpływ zjawiska przywództwa rynkowego na proces wyznaczania cen przez przedsiębiorstwa

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
PL
Artykuł analizuje zjawisko przywództwa rynkowego, skupiając się na wyeksponowaniu roli wewnętrznego haromonogramu działań umożliwiającego wybór najbardziej efektywnej firmy i optymalizację wyników wszystkich uczestników. Przedstawiono ewolucję procesu wyboru przywódcy na przykładzie różnych modeli oraz porównano efektywność jego skuteczności w ramach mechanizmu głosowania i procedury przetargowej.
EN
The paper analyzes the phenomenon of market leadership pointing out the role of the endogenous timing in the selection process of the most efficient company and in all participants’ results optimization. The evolution of the process in different models, and comparison of its effectiveness in the framework of the mechanism of voting and bidding were presented. 
Year
Volume
49
Issue
4
Physical description
Dates
published
2015
online
2016-01-28
Contributors
References
  • Amir R., Grilo I., Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium, “Games and Economic Behavior” 1999, No. 26.
  • Amir R., Stepanova A., Second-Mover Advantage and Price Leadership in Bertrand Duopoly, “Games and Economic Behavior” 2006, No. 55.
  • Bolton P., Farrell J., Polit J., Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay, “Economy” 1980, No. 98(4).
  • Brindisi F., Çelen B., Hyndman K., The Effect of Endogenous Timing on Coordination Under Asymmetric Information: an Experimental Study, “Games and Economic Behavior” 2014, No. 86.
  • Canoy M., Product Differentiation in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly, “Journal of Economic Theory” 1996, No. 70.
  • Chamley C., Gale D., Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment, “Econometrica” 1994, No. 62(5).
  • Damme E. van, Hurkens S., Endogenous Price Leadership, “Games and Economic Behavior” 2004, No. 47.
  • Damme E. van, Hurkens S., Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership, “Games Econ. Behav.” 1999, No. 28.
  • Dastidar K.G., Furth D., Endogenous Price Leadership in a Duopoly: Equal Products, Unequal Technology, “International Journal of Economic Theory” 2005, No. 1.
  • Farrell J., Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry, “RAND J. ECON.” 1987, No. 18.
  • Farrell J., Saloner G., Coordination Through Committees and Markets, “RAND J. ECON.” 1988, No. 19.
  • Farrell J., Saloner G., Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, “RAND J. ECON.” 1985, No. 16.
  • Furth D., Kovenock D., Price Leadership in a Duopoly with Capacity Constraints and Product Differentiation, “Journal of Economics” 1993, No. 57.
  • Gul F., Lundholm R., Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents Decisions, “J. Polit. Economy” 1995, No. 103(5).
  • Güth W., Pull K., Stadler M., Zabyc A., Endogenous Price Leadership. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis, “Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization” 2014, No. 108.
  • Hamilton J.H., Slutsky S.M., Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games: Stackelberg or Cournot Equilibria, “Games and Economic Behavior” 1990, No. 2.
  • Mouraviev I., Rey P., Collusion and Leadership, “International Journal of Industrial Organization” 2011, No. 29.
  • Radner R., Collusive Behaviour in Non-Cooperative Epsilon – Equilibria of Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives, “Journal of Economic Theory” 1980, No. 22.
  • Radzik T., Gry czasowe, „Matematyka Stosowana” 2010, t. 11/52.
  • Robson A.J., Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained, “International Economic Review” 1990, No. 31.
  • Yano M., Komatsubara T., Endogenous Price Leadership and Technological Differences, “International Journal of Economic Theory” 2006, No. 2.
  • Youping L., Price Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Market, “Economic Modelling” 2014, No. 38.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_17951_h_2015_49_4_579
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.