2017 | 51 | 5 |
Article title

Progresja podatkowa a Indeks Wzrostu i Rozwoju (GDI)

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The main purpose of this article is to present a correlation relationship of the average tax rate, the amount of tax brackets and the so-called economic “growth & development index” (GDI) in the “high taxed” and “low taxed” European countries. The hypothesis is as follows: the more number of tax brackets in income progressive tax, the lower the GDI. Research methods used in the study are: unity-based normalization and Spearman’s rank correlation analysis. Spearman’s correlation between the average tax rate in “low tax rate” countries and GDI was negative and very strong, which means that as the average tax rate increases, the GDI decreases. That correlation was statistically significant. The correlation between the number of tax brackets and the GDI was examined only for the group of countries with the highest average tax rate as the second group of EU countries are progressive-free and was positive and strong, that is, with the increase in the number of tax brackets, the value of GDI increases. But by normal standards, the association between the two variables would not be considered statistically significant. Therefore, the hypothesis has been rejected. The subject of study requires further analysis.
Głównym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie zależności korelacyjnej między średnią stawką podatkową, ilością progów podatkowych i tzw. indeksem wzrostu i rozwoju gospodarczego (GDI) w krajach wysoko opodatkowanych i nisko opodatkowanych w Europie. Postawiono hipotezę: im większa liczba progów podatkowych w podatku progresywnym od dochodów, tym niższy indeks GDI. Metody badawcze zastosowane w badaniu to unitaryzacja i analiza korelacji rang Spearmana. Zależność korelacyjna rang Spearmana między średnią stawką podatkową w krajach o niskim opodatkowaniu a GDI była negatywna i bardzo silna, co oznacza, że wraz ze wzrostem średniej stawki podatkowej GDI maleje. Korelacja ta była statystycznie istotna. Zależność korelacyjna między liczbą progów podatkowych a GDI była badana tylko w grupie krajów o najwyższej średniej stopie podatkowej, gdyż w drugiej grupie państw UE (nisko opodatkowanych) progresja podatkowa nie występuje. Była ona pozytywna i silna, co oznacza, że wraz ze wzrostem liczby progów podatkowych wzrasta wartość GDI. Jednak korelacja ta, zgodnie z przyjętymi założeniami, nie jest statystycznie istotna, dlatego hipoteza została odrzucona. Przedmiot badań wymaga dalszej analizy.
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