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2017 | 42 | 2 |
Article title

Laudan vs. Lakatos: kilka uwag na temat ostatecznej oceny demarkacjonizmu

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ES
Abstracts
ES
El artículo reconstruye y examina el metacriterio de demarcación entre ciencia y pseudociencia como fue propuesto por Laudan (1983). Este análisis demuestra que el metacriterio de Laudan pasa por alto requisitos cruciales que cualquier criterio aceptable debería cumplir. Lo que a su vez posibilita una modificación no ad hoc de la propuesta de Laudan. Cuando el metacriterio finalmente se enfrenta al requisito que establece que cualquier criterio de demarcación aceptable tiene que posibilitar la comparación de dos teorías científicas cualesquiera con respecto a su grado de progresividad, es posible señalar al menos una teoría avanzada que dé una definición aceptable de ciencia, es decir, la metodología de los programas de investigación científica de Lakatos, omitidos en el artículo de Laudan, por extraño que parezca. Por esto pueden refutarse las conclusiones dudosas de su artículo; y lo que es más, tras la modificación, el metracriterio de demarcación adquiere una forma homogénea que lo hace estable, tal y como Laudan pretendía originariamente.
EN
The paper reconstructs and examines the meta-criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo-science as proposed by Laudan (1983). The analysis shows that Laudan’s meta-criterion overlooks a crucial demand that any reliable criterion should satisfy. This, in turn, opens up a possibility of a non-ad hoc modification of Laudan’s proposal. When the meta-criterion finally meets the requirement which states that any reliable criterion of demarcation has to enable a comparison of any two scientific theories with regard to the degree of their progressiveness, it is possible to point out at least one advanced theory which gives an acceptable definition of science, i.e. Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs – strangely enough, not attended to by Laudan. Therefore, the skeptical conclusions of his paper can be refuted; furthermore, after such a modification the meta-criterion of demarcation acquires a homogenous form what makes it stable in a way originally intended by Laudan.
PL
Celem artykułu jest rekonstrukcja i analiza przedstawionego przez Laudana (1983) metakryterium demarkacji między nauką a pseudonauką. Okazuje się, że Laudan przeoczył kluczowy warunek, który powinno uwzględniać każde godne uwagi metakryterium. Otwiera to z kolei możliwość wprowadzenia do jego propozycji poprawek, które nie będą miały charakteru ad hoc. Kiedy tym sposobem metakryterium obejmuje również wymóg, by kryterium demarkacji umożliwiało porównanie teorii naukowych co do stopnia ich postępowości czy naukowości, można wskazać przynajmniej jedną teorię podającą akceptowalne kryterium demarkacji, mianowicie Lakatosową metodologię naukowych programów badawczych, którą w swej pracy Laudan pominął jednak milczeniem. Wtedy też można odrzucić sceptyczne wnioski jego artykułu. Dzięki tej modyfikacji metakryterium demarkacji otrzymuje dodatkowo jednolitą postać, za sprawą której staje się ono stabilne, tak jak tego pierwotnie chciał Laudan.
Year
Volume
42
Issue
2
Physical description
Dates
published
2017
online
2018-06-13
Contributors
References
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Publication order reference
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YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_17951_i_2017_42_2_147
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