The Authority of Precedents in Civil Law Systems

• Authors: Bojan Spaić
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper, precedents are analysed in terms of reasons that they can give to judges in various legal systems, with the purpose of identifying the ways in which precedents can be authoritative in judicial reasoning. The analysis starts with the distinction between two kinds of precedents – precedents of solution and precedents of interpretation. The ways in which both precedents of solution and precedents of interpretation affect the reasoning of future courts are identified and described, in order to focus on instances in which this affection can be considered practically and epistemically authoritative. Finally, conditions for considering under which it can be justified to treat precedents as authoritative are laid down, with a special emphasis on the possibility of justifying the epistemic authority of interpretative precedents.

PL

W artykule omówiono teoretycznoprawne aspekty wpływu precedensów na praktykę stosowania prawa w systemach prawnych należących do kręgu civil law jako modelu przyszłych decyzji prawnych. W tym kontekście analizie poddano samo pojęcie precedensu i wskazano różnice pomiędzy precedensem decyzyjnym i interpretacyjnym. Na gruncie tych ustaleń prowadzone są rozważania dotyczące źródeł „autorytetu” precedensu oraz podstaw i sposobu jego wpływu na późniejsze orzeczenia. W efekcie prowadzi to do wyodrębnienia i dostrzeżenia specyfiki praktycznego i epistemicznego ujęcia oraz uzasadnienia autorytetu precedensu.

Keywords

EN

precedent; authority of precedents; precedential practice; epistemic authority; practical authority

PL

precedens; autorytet precedensu; praktyka precedensowa

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
• Journal: Studia Iuridica Lublinensia
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 1

Dates

published

2018

online

2018-05-02

Contributors

author

Bojan Spaić

References

• Alexander L., Constrained by Precedent, “Southern California Law Review” 1989, Vol. 63(1).
• Doyle O., Constitutional Cases, Foreign Law and Theoretical Authority, “Global Constitutionalism” 2016, Vol. 5(1).
• Duxbury N., The Nature and Authority of Precedent, Oxford University Press, 2010.
• Dworkin R., Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, 1977.
• Flanders C., Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, “Oklahoma Law Review” 2009, Vol. 62(1).
• Foley R., Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, Cambridge University Press, 2001, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498923.
• Fricker E., Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy, [in:] The Epistemology of Testimony, eds. J. Lackey, E. Sosa, Oxford University Press, 2006, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0011.
• Gadamer H.-G., Truth and Method, Continuum, 2006.
• Glenu H.P., Persuasive Authority, “McGill Law Journal” 1987, Vol. 32(2).
• Green L., The Authority of the State, Oxford University Press, 1988.
• Hardwig J., Epistemic Dependence, “The Journal of Philosophy” 1985, Vol. 82(7), DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2026523.
• Hardwig J., The Role of Trust in Knowledge, “The Journal of Philosophy” 1991, Vol. 88(12), DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2027007.
• Hart H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, 1994.
• Hellman D., An Epistemic Defence of Precedent, [in] Precedent in the United States Supreme Court, ed. Ch.J. Peters, Springer Publishing, 2014.
• Himma K.E., Morality and the Nature of Law, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2018.
• Holmes O.W., The Collected Legal Papers, Courier Corporation, 2012.
• Hurd H.M., Moral Combat, Cambridge University Press, 1999, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896880.
• Kronman A.T., Precedent and Tradition, “The Yale Law Journal” 1990, Vol. 99, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/796595.
• Lackey J., Introduction, [in:] The Epistemology of Testimony, eds. J. Lackey, E. Sosa, Oxford University Press, 2017.
• Lukes S., Power, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-80257-5.
• MacCormick N., Summers R.S., Further General Reflections and Conclusions, [in:] Interpreting Precedents, eds. N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Routledge, 1997.
• MacCormick N., Summers R.S., Introduction, [in:] Interpreting Precedents, eds. N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Routledge, 1997.
• Marmor A., Social Conventions, Princeton University Press, 2009, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831654.
• Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/precedent [access: 10.02.2018].
• Peczenik A., Scientia Juris: Legal Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of Law, Springer Publishing, 2005.
• Postema G.J., On the Moral Presence of Our Past, “McGill Law Journal” 1991, Vol. 36(4).
• Raz J., Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford University Press, 1999, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268345.001.0001.
• Raz J., The Authority of Law, Oxford University Press, 1979.
• Raz J., The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1988, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001.
• Schauer F., Authority and Authorities, “Virginia Law Review” 2008, Vol. 94.
• Schauer F., Precedent, “Stanford Law Review” 1987, Vol. 39(3), DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1228760.
• Schauer F., Profiles, probabilities, and stereotypes, Harvard University Press, 2003.
• Summers R.S., Departures from Precedents, [in:] Interpreting Precedents, eds. N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Routledge, 1997.
• Troper M., Grzegorczyk Ch., Precedent in France, [in:] Interpreting Precedents, eds. N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Routledge, 1997.
• Zagzebski L.T., Epistemic Authority, Oxford University Press, 2012.

Identifiers

DOI

10.17951/sil.2018.27.1.27