Budowanie państwa w Afganistanie w trakcie prezydentury Baracka Obamy

• Authors: Grzegorz Gil
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The article is focused on armed state-building in Afghanistan during the presidency of Barack Obama (2009–2017). The Afghan war was strongly debated in the early Obama administration, divided into proponents of an Al-Qaeda-focused approach (the Biden approach) with its limited military presence and those supporting a stronger military footing (the McChrystal approach). While the first Obama term employed counterinsurgency (COINtainment), the second employed a “non-kinetic” model and a phased withdrawal. Thus, the US has shifted its role from a regime-changer (but not a game-changer) with an anti-Taliban attitude to “Afghanistan good enough”. Finally, the author argues that there were only some enclaves of state-building “in” Afghanistan as the country is extremely resistant to international engineering. The US’s inconsistent, back-and-forth approach to Afghanistan should also be assessed in the context of the Taliban’s re-emergence.

PL

Problematyka artykułu koncentruje się na zbrojnym budowaniu państwa w Afganistanie w trakcie dwóch kadencji prezydenta Baracka Obamy (2009–2017). Afganistan traktowany jest w kategoriach państwa postinterwencyjnego. Autor przedstawia podejścia USA do interwencji państwotwórczej po 2009 r., które oscylowały wokół dwóch przeciwstawnych opcji: antyterrorystycznej z ograniczoną obecnością militarną USA w Afganistanie (m.in. Joe Biden) oraz przeciwpartyzancką (gen. Stanley McChrystal). O ile w trakcie pierwszej kadencji dominowało podejście przeciwpartyzanckie (COIN) do interwencji, po 2013 r. operacja zaczęła przybierać mniej kinetyczny kształt z docelowym wygaszeniem operacji „Trwała Wolność” (OEF). Równolegle doszło do zmiany roli USA, które ze stojącego za zmianą reżimu interwenta przeobraziły się w zwolennika Afganistanu „w wersji minimum”. Biorąc pod uwagę historyczną odporność Afganistanu na wpływy zewnętrzne, Autor suponuje jedynie fasadowy charakter koalicyjnego budowania państwa w Afganistanie. Ocena szeregu niespójności w polityce USA wobec Afganistanu powinna być także dokonana w kontekście odnowy sił Talibanu.

Keywords

EN

Afghanistan, intervention, Obama administration, state-building

PL

Afganistan, interwencja, prezydentura Baracka Obamy, budowanie państwa

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
• Journal: Teka Komisji Politologii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 2

Dates

published

2017

online

2018-09-17

Contributors

author

Grzegorz Gil

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Identifiers

DOI

10.17951/teka.2017.12.2.85