Militarne konsekwencje sankcji gospodarczych wobec Rosji

• Authors: Nika Czitadze

Title variants

EN

Military consequences of economic sanctions against Russia

Abstracts

PL

Przemysł wojskowy Rosji jest strategicznie ważnym sektorem i  dużym pracodawcą w Rosji. Przed wojną rosyjsko-ukraińską liczba zatrudnionych w przemyśle obronnym wynosiła około 23,5% ogólnej liczby zatrudnionych w kraju. Około 2 milionów ludzi produkowało bezpośrednią broń i sprzęt wojskowy. Jest również znaczącym graczem na światowym rynku zbrojeniowym, Federacja Rosyjska jest drugim po Stanach Zjednoczonych eksporterem broni konwencjonalnej, z  eksportem o wartości ponad 13 miliardów dolarów rocznie w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Jednocześnie z powodu sankcji ekonomicznych i nieudanej operacji wojskowej na Ukrainie zdolności militarne Rosji poniosły po ośmiu miesiącach wojny niepowetowane straty. W  związku z  tym pytanie jest następujące: czy kompleks wojskowo-przemysłowy w Rosji jest gotowy na wystarczająco szybkie odzyskanie utraconej broni? Zdaniem ekspertów kraj ten potrzebuje co najmniej 10 lat na odrobienie strat.

EN

The military Industry of Russia is a strategically important sector and a large employer in Russia. Before the Russia-Ukraine war, the number of employees in the defense industry was about 23.5% of the total number of employees in the country. About 2 million people produced direct weapons and military equipment.  It is also a significant player in the global arms market, with Russian Federation being the second largest conventional arms exporter after the United States, with more than $13 billion worth of exports annually within the second decade of the XXI Century. At the same time, due to the economic sanctions and unsuccessful military operation in Ukraine, Russia’s military capabilities have suffered irreparable losses after Eight months of the war. In this regard, the question is the following: Is the military-industrial complex in Russia ready to recover the lost weaponry fast enough? According to the experts, the country needs at least 10 years to make up for the losses.

Keywords

EN

Russia; Military – Industrial Complex; Economic Sanctions; military trade

PL

Rosja; kompleks wojskowo-przemysłowy; sankcje gospodarcze; handel militariami

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
• Journal: Wschód Europy. Studia humanistyczno-społeczne
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 8
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 173-191

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Nika Czitadze

• International Black Sea University, Georgia

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.17951/we.2022.8.2.173-191

Biblioteka Nauki

31343673