(Nie)obiektywna podmiotowość

• Authors: Piotr Piotrowski

Abstracts

EN

In this article, I analyze the issue of subjectivity in the form in which it appears in Charles Taylor’s and Richard Rorty’s writings. Positions of these philosophers aregenerally regarded as contradictory. I will, however, argued that the position on subjectivity represented by Rorty finds its complementation in Taylor’s concept. To do this, I will show firstly that both Rorty and Taylor use the category of contingency, presenting some common thesis about subjectivity. This way I will show that the location of the category of subjectivity and the scope of its use in each of them concept is closely related to the understanding of objectivity accepted by each of them. This will allow then to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity presented by Taylor and Rorty. Next, in the conclusion, I will present such a summary of those two standpoints, which will include justification of the thesis of their complementarity.

Keywords

EN

Rorty; Taylor; self; idiosyncrasy; contingency; good; objectivity; subjectivity; sense of the situation

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
• Journal: Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 36
• Pages: 113-131

Contributors

author

Piotr Piotrowski

• Uniwersytet Śląski

Identifiers

DOI

10.18276/aie.2016.36-06

Biblioteka Nauki

1622131