The Curious Sensations of Pain, Hunger and Thirst. Reliabilism in the Second Part of Descartes’ Sixth Meditation

• Authors: Stefaan E. Cuypers

Title variants

EN

The Curious Sensations of Pain, Hunger and Thirst. Reliabilism in the Second Part of Descartes’ Sixth Meditation

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Osobliwość takich doznań, jak ból, głód i pragnienie. Reliabilizm w drugiej części szóstej Medytacji Kartezjusza Artykuł omawia epistemiczny status cielesnych doznań takich, jak ból, głód i pragnienia, o których mowa w drugiej części szóstej Medytacji Kartezjusza. Argumentuję, że ów fragment stanowi integralny komponent epistemologicznego programu, który można znaleźć w Medytacjach. Na ogół widzi się Kartezjusza jako zwolennika infallibilizmu, internalizmu oraz fundacjonalizmu. Tymczasem w odniesieniu do wiedzy i przekonań opartych na doznaniach cielesnych przyjmuje on fallibilizm, eksternalizm i reliabilizm. Na rzecz tego wniosku przemawia z jednej strony, analiza tego, czego naucza nas – według Kartezjusza – natura przez wrażenia bólu, głodu i pragnienia, z drugiej strony jego analiza błędów, którym podlega nasza natura, przeprowadzona przeze mnie z wykorzystaniem zaproponowanego przez Wilfrida Sellarsa podziału na logiczną przestrzeń rozumu oraz empiryczną przestrzeń przyczyn.

EN

This paper discusses the epistemic status of bodily sensations-especially the sensations of pain, hunger and thirst-in the second part of Descartes’ Sixth Meditation. It is argued that this part is an integral component of Descartes overall purely epistemological project in the Meditations. Surprisingly perhaps, in contrast with his standardly taken infallible, internalist and foundationalist position, Descartes adopts a fallibilist, externalist and reliabilist position as regards the knowledge and beliefs based on bodily sensations. The argument for this conclusion is justified by an analysis of both the criterion of nature’s teachings and the concept of true errors of nature in terms of Wilfrid Sellars’ distinction between the logical space of reasons and the empirical space of causes.

Keywords

PL

doznania cielesne; niedostatki natury; pouczenia natury; reliabilism; empiryczna przestrzeń przyczyn; logiczna przestrzeń rozumu; doznania cielesne; niedostatki natury; pouczenia natury; reliabilism; empiryczna przestrzeń przyczyn; logiczna przestrzeń rozumu

EN

bodily sensations; errors of nature; nature’s teachings; reliabilism; the empirical space of causes; the logical space of reasons

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 68
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 139-154

Dates

published

2020-06-30

Contributors

author

Stefaan E. Cuypers

• University of Leuven (KU Leuven)

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8503-6015

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rf20682-7