The Revival of Substance Dualism

• Authors: Howard Robinson

Title variants

PL

The Revival of Substance Dualism

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

PL

I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.

Keywords

EN

Swinburne; dualism; personal identity; epiphenomenalism

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 69
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 33-43

Dates

published

2021-03-18

Contributors

author

Howard Robinson

• Central European University, Austria

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2972-5692

References

• Madell, Geoffrey. The Identity of the Self. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981.
• Robinson, Howard. “A Dualist Account of Embodiment.” In The Case for Dualism, edited by John R. Smythies and John Beloff, 43–57. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1989.
• Robinson, Howard. “Dualism.” In The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Stephen Stitch and Ted A. Warfield. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003.
• Robinson, Howard. “Dualism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed September 25, 2020. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism.
• Robinson, Howard. “Substance Dualism and Its Rationale.” In Free Will and Modern Science, edited by Richard Swinburne, 158–77. Oxford: OUP (for the British Academy), 2011.
• Robinson, Howard. From Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind. Cambridge: CUP, 2016.
• Swinburne, Richard. Are We Bodies or Souls?. Oxford: OUP, 2019.

Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rf21691-4