The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection

• Authors: Eric T. Olson

Title variants

PL

The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

PL

Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.

Keywords

EN

Swinburne; personal identity; immortality

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 69
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 89-101

Dates

published

2021-03-18

Contributors

author

Eric T. Olson

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2199-2083

References

• Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. 2. Edited and translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: CUP, 1985.
• Hasker, William. “Souls Beastly and Human.” In The Soul Hypothesis, edited by Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz. New York: Continuum, 2011.
• Olson, Eric T. “A Compound of Two Substances.” In Soul, Body, and Survival, edited by Kevin Corcoran. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.
• Olson, Eric T. “Swinburne’s brain transplants.” Philosophia Christi 20 (2018): 21–29.
• Swinburne, Richard. “Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory.” In Personal Identity, edited by Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
• Swinburne, Richard. The Evolution of the Soul. Revised edition. Oxford: OUP, 1997.
• Swinburne, Richard. “The Argument to the Soul from Partial Brain Transplants.” Philosophia Christi 20 (2018): 13–19.
• Swinburne, Richard. Are We Bodies or Souls? Oxford: OUP, 2019.
• Van Inwagen, Peter. Metaphysics. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014.

Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rf21691-9