Is the Rothbardian Theory of Punishment Retributive?

• Authors: Łukasz Dominiak

Title variants

PL

Czy rothbardowska teoria kary jest retrybutywna?

Abstracts

PL

Murray Rothbard twierdzi, że „jest oczywistym, że nasza teoria proporcjonalnej kary-iż ludzie mogą być ukarani przez utratę swoich praw do poziomu, do którego sami pogwałcili prawa innych -jest, szczerze mówiąc, retrybutywną teorią kary, teorią ‘ząb (lub dwa zęby) za ząb’”. Niniejszy artykuł argumentuje, że tak nie jest. Rola, jaką Rothbard przypisuje ofiarom w określaniu kary, uzasadnia zaklasyfikowanie jego teorii kary jako teorii korekcyjnej raczej niż retrybutywnej, ponieważ przyznanie ofiarom praw decydowania o karze podważa wymóg sprawiedliwości retrybutywnej, aby przestępcy byli karani wyłącznie dlatego, że na to zasługują i dokładnie w tej mierze, w jakiej na to zasługują. Zamiast dawać przestępcom to, na co obiektywnie zasługują, rothbardowska teoria kary pozwala ofiarom zamienić wymierzenie kary na uzyskanie odszkodowania lub zadośćuczynienia, również w formie zemsty.

EN

Murray Rothbard claims that it is “evident that our theory of proportional punishment-that people may be punished by losing their rights to the extent that they have invaded the rights of others-is frankly a retributive theory of punishment, a ‘tooth (or two teeth) for a tooth’ theory.” The present paper argues that it is not. The role that Rothbard assigns for victims in determining punishment justifies classifying his theory of punishment as corrective rather than retributive, for vesting victims with rights over punishment defeats the retributive justice requirement that criminals are punished solely because they deserve it and in accordance with their respective deserts. Instead of giving offenders what they objectively deserve, the Rothbardian theory of punishment allows victims to seek compensation in various forms, including revenge.

Keywords

EN

libertarianism; punishment; retribution; restitution; compensation; Murray Rothbard

PL

libertarianizm; kara; retrybucja; restytucja; odszkodowanie; zadośćuczynienie; Murray Rothbard

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 71
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 5-23

Dates

published

2023

Contributors

author

Łukasz Dominiak

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

• https://orcid.org/0000000161928468

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rf23713.1

Biblioteka Nauki

31232845