

HICHAM JAKHA

DOES HALLIE SEE A WHITE CUP ON A DESK?
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF HALLUCINATION
INDISCRIMINABILITY*

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of philosophy, the reliability of our senses has been put under the spotlight. To what extent can we trust the data we reach via our senses? This is a question that has been pondered for ages. It seems that the more we learn about our senses, the stronger our skepticism becomes. There are many factors that can compromise the integrity of our sense data, and, by implication, our worldly experiences. Hallucination is one example of what can go wrong with the senses. Naïve realists approach hallucination adhering to common sense (i.e., hallucinations seem to be false *representations* of non-existent objects). A hallucinating subject (A) and a non-hallucinating subject (B) might see different things while being situated in the same environment. Naïve realism suggests that the perception of subject (B) is valid, while subject (A)'s is invalid. But what naïve realism seems to neglect is the experiences of the subjects as subjective experiences.

“Things” as experienced by individuals fall within the scope of phenomenology. It is this that Edmund Husserl started in his *Logical Investigations* and developed throughout his career. Phenomenology thus understood, Dahlstrom *et al.* (2016) write, is a description of individual experience, its content, and structure (2). Since the aim of the present paper is to study hallucination, it is fitting to adopt a kind of philosophy that was specifically established to unravel the mysteries of the experiencing consciousness. Another philosopher who established an account of hal-

HICHAM JAKHA, PhD candidate, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy; correspondence address: Wydział Filozofii KUL, Al. Raławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland; e-mail: hicham.jakha@kul.pl; ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3126-4100>.

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lucination that considers its subjective dimension is the analytic philosopher, Susanna Schellenberg. In her account, Schellenberg argues for a controversial view, on which hallucinating subjects have some kind of evidence for their bad perceptions. In Schellenberg's account, the hallucinating Hallie and the veridically perceiving Percy are said to share the same perceptual experience of a white cup on a desk. To back Hallie's bad perceptual experience, Schellenberg outlines two kinds of evidence, "factive" and "phenomenal". But, as I shall attempt to show in this paper, there are many problems with Schellenberg's account. *Contra* Schellenberg, I shall argue for Husserl's "epistemic fulfillment" as the better paradigm with which we can assess the apparent indiscriminability of hallucination. Following a detailed analysis of Schellenberg's "phenomenal" and "factive evidence", I will propose Husserl's "epistemic fulfillment" as offering a philosophically coherent account of how perception leads to knowledge.¹

1. HALLUCINATION AND INDISCRIMINABILITY

Bracketing any assumptions that are not part of its experience, hallucination, we can all agree, involves *seeing*.² Hallucinating subjects see things, and by seeing

¹ Before proceeding to the body of my paper, a point of clarification is in order. I am aware that many take the problem of perception, both in philosophy and psychopathology, to necessarily involve a *phenomenological* dimension. That is, scholars dealing with perception often make the point that we cannot address the peculiarities of perception without giving people suffering from hallucination or psychosis in general a voice to speak for themselves (cf. GARCÍA-MONTES, PÉREZ-ÁLVAREZ, and PERONA-GARCELÁN 2012, 764; see also STANGHELLINI and LYSAKER 2007, 165, in which an emphasis is put on the Husserlian method of "bracketing" any external assumptions about the studied phenomena for a better assessment). Giving patients a voice is of course compatible with Husserl's phenomenology (as is evident in Stanghellini's and Lysaker's paper). With that said, relying solely on patients' phenomenology may result in some undesirable outcomes. For example, as is explored in MCCARTHY-JONES ET AL. (2013), we could face some difficulties with setting the boundaries of hallucination (in their paper, they examine AVHs [auditory verbal hallucinations]), as some similar experiences, phenomenologically speaking, are hard to definitively classify. With the use of philosophical phenomenology, we can determine whether these experiences are qualitatively distinct and examine if there are any traceable links underlying different sorts of experiences (2). This is one of the main reasons why I am focusing primarily here on philosophical phenomenology. In other words, what makes the phenomenon of hallucination indiscriminability appealing is precisely its indiscriminability. What I will argue for later, and which I think McCarthy-Jones et al. will agree with, is that hallucinating subjects cannot resort to their phenomenology to discriminate perceptions and hallucinations. This is why philosophical (Husserlian, in my case) phenomenology is necessary to determine the boundaries of hallucination and its qualitative character.

² Hallucination can occur in any sensory modality. In my paper, I confine my analysis to visual hallucination.

them, they experience them.³ Their experiential phenomena, therefore, can be reduced to seeing, understood as the most basic sense of getting to know stuff in the world. Invoking Husserl's phenomenology, seeing performs the function of *presenting* the world as experienced from a first-person perspective. In *Ideas I* (1983), Husserl brackets the existence of the world and focuses on consciousness, where only "immanent" experiences and their structures are evaluated (63–66). Consequently, what matters for phenomenology is what is given *originally* to us. The proper object of experience for the phenomenologist is whatever is given in "originary presentive intuition" (44; cf. 36). All presentive originary intuitions, Husserl upheld, are sources of cognition (44).

As the title of this paper suggests, hallucinatory phenomena tend to be indiscriminable from genuine phenomena, where seeing presents the world as it really is. By genuine phenomena, I mean those reached via "veridical" perception. By contrast, phenomena that present the world incorrectly are "non-veridical" or "falsidical". Hallucinatory phenomena fall under the latter, for their "content" does not match the world as it is:

- (1) Necessarily, a phenomenally red experience of an object is veridical iff its object instantiates the property attributed by the experience.
- (2) For any veridical phenomenally red experience of an ordinary object, it is possible that there is a falsidical phenomenally red experience of an object with the same nonrelational properties as the original object. (CHALMERS 2006, 56)

(1) denotes that a perceptual experience is veridical *iff* its object (content) correctly matches the reality in which it is given. On the other hand, (2) indicates that there may well be a falsidical perceptual experience that shares the same properties with the object perceived veridically. So far, we have explored that veridical perceptions are correct presentations of the world, and that they can be indistinguishable from falsidical perceptions. But an important question remains unanswered: what does the indiscriminability datum entail for philosophy? To answer this question, it is crucial to, first, define indiscriminability.

In his *Identity and Discrimination* (1990), Williamson defines indiscriminability as follows: "*a* is indiscriminable from *b* for a subject at a time if and only if at that time the subject is not able to discriminate between *a* and *b*, that is, if and only if at that time the subject is not able to activate (acquire or employ) the relevant kind of knowledge that *a* and *b* are distinct" (8).⁴ On the one hand, the

³ Of course, hallucinating subjects do not see things; they rather hallucinate things. But this does not detract from the experiences they have based on their hallucinations.

⁴ In the context of hallucinatory experiences, Martin (2006) terms this "The Common Kind Assumption". That is, "whatever kind of mental ... event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur were one hallucinating" (357).

subject relativity argues the case for a view of indiscriminability that takes into consideration the distinct subjectivities involved in experience. For instance, the perceptual experiences of a hallucinating individual might differ from those of a non-hallucinating individual. The second relativity that Williamson ascribes to indiscriminability has to do with the temporal dimension of perceptual experiences. To elaborate, you may not be able to tell two distinct things apart at t_1 , and, at t_2 , easily distinguish them. “For example, if I am looking at two people at a distance or in half-light, I may well be unable to make a discrimination. According to this definition, those individuals are therefore indiscriminable (by me, at that time). But bring them closer to me, or turn up the lights, and I may then be able to tell one from the other” (FISH 2009, 82).

Thus far, I have given an outline of the problem with which I am concerned here; namely, the indiscriminability of hallucinatory phenomena. But there is more to the problem. Hallucinations are basically experiences, and through experiences we formulate beliefs about the world. Put differently, the validity of our perceptual experiences can determine the validity of our belief systems. So, it is safe to make the transition from the experiences we have to the beliefs we formulate based on those experiences. A key component in assessing the indiscriminability of hallucinatory experiences, therefore, is to focus on the beliefs they generate and contrast them against the beliefs that would be generated under normal circumstances. In the following, I shall turn my attention to Schellenberg’s account of perception. After exploring her view and the main problems it raises, I shall defend the significant role Husserlian phenomenology plays in examining subjects’ beliefs, and what the latter adds, *vis-à-vis* Schellenberg’s “phenomenal” and “factive” evidence.

2. PHENOMENAL EVIDENCE VS. FACTIVE EVIDENCE

In her paper, “The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience” (2014), Susanna Schellenberg defends the *evidential* power of perception, in both the “good” (veridical) and “bad” (non-veridical) cases. She argues that perceptual experience performs three functions: (a) it justifies our worldly beliefs, (b) it generates conscious mental states, and (c) “it converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of features that we attribute to the world” (87). Schellenberg’s paper novelty lies in her effort to integrate the study of perception with the epistemology-question (a), the mind-question (b), and the information-question (c). She formulates the example of a white cup on a desk, and states that, although a good case of perception and a bad case of perception can seem to be

of the same object, in the latter, “we are not causally related to the white cup our experience is seemingly of” (88–89). However, Schellenberg acknowledges that the good and bad cases of perception can be *subjectively* indistinguishable. In order to account for the indistinguishability of the good and bad cases of perception, she adopts elements from the *common factor view* and *austere relationism*. According to the common factor view, a good case of perception and a bad case are both united by a common factor. We can only talk of a perception taking place *iff* the subject perceiving an object is in a mental state characterized by the common factor in question, with the addition of a causal relation binding the subject and the perceived object. The austere relationist view, by contrast, argues that perception and hallucination have nothing in common, and that hallucination is nothing but “a deficiency of an accurate perceptual experience” (89).

Before I say more about Schellenberg’s view, it is crucial to engage *disjunctivism* at this juncture. After all, one of the main tenets of disjunctivism is the rejection of the common kind claim. As laid out by its father, J.M. Hinton (1967), disjunctivism rests on the premise that hallucinations and perceptions do not share a common element. He argues that when someone says *I seem to see a flash of light*, what that entails is a disjunction: “either *I see a flash of light*, or *I have an illusion of a flash of light*” (217). In short, we should not consider seems-propositions as containing the conjunction of perceptions and non-perceptions, for that would commit us to the common kind view. A similar view is held by Snowdon (1990), who advocates a view in which the truth-value of “looks-judgements” is determined in hallucinations by some sort of (non-object involving) inner experience, and in perceptions by some feature of a particular relation to an object (130). We can sense in Hinton’s and Snowdon’s disjunctivism an appeal to naïve realism. As Martin (1997) argues, a naïve realist holds that, in the good cases, an external object and its properties “partly constitute one’s conscious experience” (83). Therefore, it is safe to say that advocating a naïve realist theory of perception is advocating disjunctivism. Nonetheless, positing that hallucinations and veridical perceptions have nothing in common “simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted” and “offers no positive story about hallucination at all” (STURGEON 2000, 11–12). It is incontestable that hallucinations and veridical perceptions are both mental states, which is a common factor bringing the two experiences together, with hallucinations being indiscriminable from mental states with a phenomenal character (FISH 2008, 145). It is, therefore, a burden on the disjunctivists’ shoulders to reconcile the apparent indistinguishability of hallucinations with the rejection of the common kind factor.

In response to the aforementioned challenge, disjunctivists have broken down disjunctivism into different kinds. Byrne and Logue (2008) have developed an *epistemological* view of disjunctivism, which takes “perceptual evidence” as its main focus. Running along McDowellian lines, Byrne’s and Logue’s epistemological disjunctivism attempts to part ways with Hinton’s *metaphysical* disjunctivism. In “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge”,⁵ McDowell is primarily interested in an epistemological version of disjunctivism, and not so much in a metaphysical, Hintonesque “common element”.⁶ McDowell’s epistemologically-oriented disjunctivism gives us insight into his emphasis on “S sees that p” and “It looks to S as if p” propositions, as opposed to Hinton’s metaphysically-oriented propositions in the form of “S sees an F”.⁷ McDowell’s chief claim is that, in the good cases, the “epistemic warrant” a person may have to believe that the world is such-and-such is substantially better than its counterpart in the bad cases (66). We can understand McDowell’s position as advocating an epistemological view of disjunctivism, in which the good and bad cases are indistinguishable by virtue of their epistemic values. “If the subject’s evidence in a bad case is weaker than his evidence in the good case, then in the bad case he is not in a position to know what his evidence is—else he would be in a position to know that he is not in the good case” (ibid.). However, as Williamson (2002) notes, the evidence in the bad case and the good case is the same. We can be rational even in the bad cases, provided that we “respect one’s evidence, which one cannot expect to do without knowing what it is” (169–70). A similar view is held by McDowell, who maintains that what is at the foundation of the “space of reason” must be the same in “the favorable and potentially misleading cases” (397). Therefore, “what is available to experience in the deceptive and the non-deceptive cases alike” is perceptual evidence. This is what he calls “the highest common factor” (MCDOWELL 1998a, 386). But how can we assess the validity of perceptual evidence? Surely, we cannot rule that all perceptual evidence is equally corroborative.

Epistemological disjunctivism accounts for the indistinguishability of hallucinations and perceptions in terms of the epistemic evidence there is for each of them. McDowell’s and Williamson’s claim that the good and bad cases share a common evidential value raises a number of skeptical arguments.⁸ Byrne and Logue (2008) write:

⁵ MCDOWELL 1998a.

⁶ SNOWDON 2005, 139–40.

⁷ Cf. SNOWDON 1990, 131–32; MARTIN 2002, 395 note 24).

⁸ It must be noted that Williamson (2002) rejects the highest common factor view. Byrne and Logue (2008) argue that Williamson’s allegiance to epistemological disjunctivism is questionable, as it is not clear whether he believes a subject’s evidence is good enough in the bad cases (67 note 19).

The subject's (perceptual) evidence in the bad cases is very impoverished, being solely a matter of how things appear. That evidence plainly does not *entail* that (for example) there is a red spherical thing before the subject—but might it nevertheless *justify* the belief that there is a red spherical thing before the subject? “Anyone who knows the dreary history of epistemology knows that this hope is rather faint” (McDowell 1998b, 396). Hence, even if “the world is doing me a favor” (*ibid.*) by placing a ripe tomato on the table in good light with nothing funny going on, I do not know there is a red spherical thing before me. (66–67)

McDowell (1998a) has already addressed this issue, arguing that “when someone has a fact made *manifest* to him, the obtaining of the fact contributes to his epistemic standing on the question” (390–91), suggesting that the evidence one has in the good case is much better. Byrne and Logue (2008) proceed:

Let E be the strongest perceptual evidence that the subject has in the bad cases. Say that E is *good enough* evidence if and only if, in the good case—an ordinary perceptual situation where the world is not playing any tricks—the subject knows propositions about the external world (that there is a red spherical thing before her, say) on the basis of E. The good case and the bad cases have a *common justifying element* if and only if E, the evidence the subject has in the bad cases, is good enough. (67)

McDowell (1998a), in response to the sceptic's line of reasoning, has re-evaluated his “highest common factor” and reinforced a pure disjunctivistic position, *vis-à-vis* the “deceptive” and “non-deceptive” cases. According to him, when we perceive something, what we see is *either* a mere appearance *or* the actual “perceptually manifest” thing. The sceptic's argument that both the deceptive and non-deceptive cases alike share mere appearances is overcome by establishing the content of the non-deceptive cases as actual facts about things in the world (386–87).

Coming back to Schellenberg's intriguing evidential theory of perception, epistemic evidence is serviceable to the bad/good cases controversy. As has been stated a few paragraphs back, through perception we gain and justify our knowledge of the world. Schellenberg outlines the example of a white cup on a desk, to which Hallie's and Percy's perceptions are directed. Hallie's perception is “bad”, while Percy's is “good”. Following a Hintonesque view of disjunctivism, we would account for Hallie's and Percy's perceptual experiences as being fundamentally different. There is nothing in common between them whatsoever. But this is clearly false. Hallucinations and veridical perceptions *do* share at least one element: they are both mental states. Schellenberg, however, is more interested in an epistemological view of perception. That is, her analysis is primarily centered around the epistemic justifications the bad and good cases share, rather than their problematic metaphysical status. So, Hallie's and Percy's perceptual experiences are subjectively indiscriminable, in the sense that they, Schellenberg

(2014) believes, equip them with the same “phenomenal evidence” (97). But, on what ground can we posit that Hallie and Percy share the same phenomenal evidence, bearing in mind that Hallie’s perception is bad? In order to answer this question, we need to examine Schellenberg’s phenomenal evidence and show in what way it is shared by Hallie and Percy.

Schellenberg claims Hallie has evidence for her (bad) perception that there is a white cup on a desk, just like Percy does. So, as argued in Byrne (2014), her (bad) perception of the white cup is the evidence she has for her experience. But would it not be weird to regard someone’s *seeing something* as additional evidence for their perceptual experience? Consider the example of the pig illustrated in Austin (1962). We can be said to possess evidence for the proposition that some beast is a pig if what we have before our senses is not the pig itself, but pig-like marks on the ground, pig food, pig smell, etc. What we have then is evidence for the proposition that some beast is a pig. However, once the beast appears before our eyes and turns out to be a pig, what we have is not evidence for the proposition. What we have is not in need of further evidence. It is settled; the beast is a pig.⁹ Philosophers have often disagreed over the nature of evidence. One doctrine suggests that evidence is comprised of facts.¹⁰ So, what Austin has before seeing the pig are pieces of evidence that the beast is a pig. He needs to, at least, “believe that there is a bucket of pig food outside the door for this fact to be part of his evidence. If he didn’t believe it, he is not in position to reason from his evidence, and one’s evidence is at least something one is in a position to reason from. (According to Williamson’s “E = K” thesis, one’s evidence comprises all and only the facts one knows)” (103).

What Schellenberg means by stating that Hallie has phenomenal evidence is that she has what Byrne (2014) calls “sophisticated beliefs” about her perceptual states, since, if we adopt Williamson’s “E = K” thesis, we would have to dismiss her evidence for being based on non-facts (103). Byrne notes that Schellenberg’s phenomenal evidence is “shaky” and in need of further elaboration, suggesting a change of terminology to avoid any unnecessary complications to her theory. Instead of “evidence” talk, Byrne reckons using “justification”. Thus, we can conceive of Schellenberg’s proposition as indicating that “Hallie’s belief that there is a white cup on a desk is *justified*” (104). Nonetheless, as Byrne points out, the original problem with Hallie’s case still stands. Justified belief is generally understood to entail having evidence for believing such-and-such. With that said, Hallie deserves some appraisal for fulfilling her “epistemic obligations.” Her

⁹ AUSTIN 1962, 115.

¹⁰ Cf. WILLIAMSON 2002, chap. 9.

belief that there is a white cup on a desk is admirable, for it is the same as Percy's. In short, introducing "normative justification", Byrne believes, improves Hallie's perceptual validity, in comparison with Percy's (104–5). To further examine Schellenberg's account of Hallie's perception generating beliefs, let us take a closer look at her argument for phenomenal evidence:

1. Hallie's sensory state is "systematically linked to what it is of in the good case".
2. If Hallie's sensory state is systematically linked to what it is of in the good case, then "it is epistemically rational [for Hallie] to heed the testimony" of this sensory state.
3. If it is epistemically rational [for Hallie] to heed the testimony of this sensory state, then it "provide[s] evidence".

Hence:

C. Hallie's sensory state provides evidence. (BYRNE 2014, 106)

By "systematic linkage", Schellenberg (2014) means that "sensory states are systematically linked to what they are of in the good case in the sense that the perceptual capacities employed in the bad case are explanatorily and metaphysically parasitic on their employment in the good case" (93–94). The first premise is particularly of great importance to my analysis of hallucination generating justification. Schellenberg, as Byrne (2014) notices, regards the good cases of perception to take precedence over their bad counterparts (107). Because Hallie's (bad) perception is "linked to what it is of in the good case", "she is in a sensory state that is as of a white cup in virtue of employing the capacity to discriminate and single out white from other colors and cup-shapes from other shapes" (SCHELLENBERG 2014, 91). Therefore, following the established arguments thus far, we can say that Hallie and Percy share the same "visual capacities" (BYRNE 2014, 108). Namely, the capacity to *see* a white cup on a desk and recognize each as such. Nonetheless, only Percy is employing his capacities successfully:

Percy "singles out" a particular white cup, and "discriminates" and "singles out" white from other colors. To a first approximation, this amounts to saying that Percy sees a white cup, and that the white cup looks white to him. Hallie, we may grant, has the same capacity to see white cups, and to have white cups look white to her; absent certain interfering conditions and with a white cup present, she would be as successful as Percy. (108)

Talk of (un)successfully employing one's capacities as explaining their *being in a sensory state as of something* is problematic. Byrne (2014) has argued that the criteria for unsuccessful employment of one's capacities, as adopted by Schellenberg, are ambiguous. We may distinguish amongst various instances in which a person unsuccessfully employs their visual capacities to see a white cup on a desk, and which have nothing to do with hallucination:

Consider a scenario in which there is a white cup before Hallie, who is not hallucinating. She does not see the cup because she is suffering from macular degeneration or, alternatively, because her office is filled with smoke. Then there is a perfectly good sense in which Hallie is (unsuccessfully) employing her capacity to see white cups, to have white cups look white to her, and the like. After all, the appropriate counterfactuals are true: if her macula had been intact, or if the smoke had been absent, she would have seen a white cup and it would have looked white. (108–9)

All in all, Schellenberg's attempt to support her second premise with her idea that Hallie is unsuccessfully employing her capacities raises more questions than it answers. It is odd that Schellenberg gives Hallie some epistemic appraisal for holding the same belief as Percy. After all, Hallie cannot know that there is a white cup on a desk, and her belief is just as epistemically worthless as Byrne's (2014) Harold, who believes that Obama was born in Kenya and hence is not a legitimate president. There is no rational justification for Harold's belief, since his premise, "Obama was born in Kenya", is false (109).

Let us now proceed to Schellenberg's second kind of evidence, namely "factive evidence". Factive evidence, as Schellenberg intends it, is supposed to overcome the problem with phenomenal evidence explored above. As Byrne notes, phenomenal evidence is, at best, flawed subjective evidence that bears no relation to how the world actually is. Factive evidence, by contrast, "is necessarily determined by the environment to which one is perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment" (SCHELLENBERG 2013, 722). She adopts Williamson's $E = K$ thesis to account for the "factive conception of evidence". Therefore, "factive perceptual evidence" is "the set of propositions that one knows at any given moment" (ibid.):

4. If a subject S accurately perceives her environment, then S accurately represents her environment on the basis of her environment.
5. If S accurately represents her environment on the basis of her environment, then S has factive evidence determined by her environment.

So

6. If S accurately perceives her environment, then S has factive evidence determined by her environment. (723)

Adhering to Schellenberg's $FE = K$ thesis, Byrne (2014) argues, we would have to reject her second premise. This premise is supposed to rule out cases of so-called veridical hallucinations and veridical illusions. Hallie's case is one of veridical hallucination. That is, her perception is non-veridical but her experience, nonetheless, leads her to a white cup on a desk. Although Hallie's experience "accurately represents her environment", it is "not on the basis of her environment". So, it seems that factive evidence requires an accurate representation

of one's environment. This view, however, is not entirely correct. Bearing in mind $FE = K$, Goldman's Henry refutes Schellenberg's second premise. To be more explicit, Henry accurately sees one of the barns in fake-barn country, and, based on his perception, believes that there is a barn ahead of him. Henry's perception is not a case of veridical hallucination or illusion. He sees that there is a barn ahead, but he still does not know that there is a barn before him.¹¹ "Granted $FE = K$, the fact that there is a barn before him is not part of his evidence, which falsifies the second premise" (111).

Schellenberg's project, as Byrne (2014) conceives of it, is undermotivated. If we ask the question, how strong is Hallie's phenomenal evidence? There are two possible answers. We can say that Hallie's phenomenal evidence is weak. It only renders the proposition that there is a white cup on a desk more probable than it was prior to the hallucination. Hence, she should believe that it is more likely that there is a white cup on a desk but not believe it outright. The second answer would be that Hallie's phenomenal evidence is strong. She and Percy share this evidence, and she should believe that there is a white cup on a desk. But Hallie lacks phenomenal evidence. Percy should claim all the epistemic credit for his perception (112). Schellenberg's attempt to establish a shared epistemic experience between Hallie and Percy is not argued well enough. Adopting any of the definitions of evidence that have been explored by Byrne leads to one outcome, namely that Hallie's evidence is flawed, and Percy should take home all the points. In the following, I shall establish a phenomenological argument for hallucination discrimination based on Husserl's epistemic fulfillment, which, I believe, can provide a better argument for perception = knowledge than Schellenberg's.

3. HUSSERLIAN EPISTEMIC FULFILLMENT AND PERCEPTION = KNOWLEDGE

In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl (1970) tackles the problem of perception and outlines a detailed account of its structure. Husserl, as is the case with analytic philosophers, focused on how perception generates knowledge. Indeed, his fulfillment acts, as Hopp (2008) describes them, "are one of the few detailed accounts in the philosophical literature of *how* a perceptual experience can transform a mere thought into knowledge" (219). In order to adequately fathom Husserl's theory of perceptual acts, we need to place it within a general phenomenological ontology. Every act of consciousness, Husserl (1970) insists,

¹¹ Cf. GOLDMAN 1976.

has two inseparable aspects: a *matter* and a *quality*. On the one hand, the quality of an act is “the general act-character, which stamps an act as merely presentative, judgemental, emotional, desiderative, etc.” (586). The matter of an act, on the other hand, is characterized by the intentionality of the act. “It is itself complex, consisting of both a *reference* to something, an ‘objective reference’, and an ‘interpretive sense’, which determines the manner in which that something is meant, what it is intended *as*” (HOPP 2008, 221). Hopp elaborates:

The matter of an intentional experience is, in short, “that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant.”¹² The union of matter and quality is the *intentional essence* of an act.¹³ So, to provide examples, believing that grass is green and believing that snow is white have the same quality but different matters, while believing that snow is white and wondering whether snow is white have identical matters but differ in quality. The belief that Hesperus is Hesperus and the belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus differ in matter despite having the same objective reference and quality. Like Frege, Husserl maintains that identity of sense is sufficient for identity of reference.¹⁴ (221)

Intentional acts can further be broken down into “signitive acts” and “intuitive acts”. Husserl believes that signitive and intuitive acts share the same matters. “However the fullness of a presentation may vary within its possible gradients of fulfilment, its intentional object, intended as it is intended, remains the same: its ‘matter,’ in other words, stays the same.”¹⁵ Hopp conceives of the signitive and intuitive acts distinction as drawing a clear borderline between “merely believing” that *X* is *Y* and “actually seeing” that *X* is *Y*. Granted that an intuitive act and a signitive act can have the same matters, it follows that the former’s intuitiveness must be traced back to something other than its matter. This is precisely the act’s intuitive fullness (*Fülle*). In short, the moments of matter, quality, and fullness constitute Husserl’s “epistemic essence” of an act, encompassing “all the content which has relevance for the knowledge-function”.¹⁶ Intuitive contents, despite being “blind” and epistemically dispensable, are the reason objects are *given* to us perceptually, by virtue of “interpretation” (*Auffassung*) and “apprehension”. Hyletic data are turned into “presentations of objective sense-perceptible qualities” through apprehension. Hyletic data, Husserl maintains, are “in a certain manner ‘interpreted’ or ‘apperceived,’ and [...] it is in the phenomenological character of such an

¹² HUSSERL 1970, 589.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 590.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 589.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 738.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 745.

animating interpretation of sensation that what we call the appearing of the object consists.”¹⁷ We can thus conclude that a perceptual act consists of both matter/quality and interpreted hyletic data. Provided the conditions under which the perceptual act is performed are normal, a hyletic datum will be apprehended as the presentation of some objective quality of the perceived object (HOPP 2008, 222–24).

Husserl’s fulfillment (*Erfüllung*) is a higher-order act with complete acts—a signitive act and an intuitive act (HOPP 2008, 225). Husserl (1970) understands fulfillment as entailing an act of identification, with the two constituent acts forming a “unity of identity” (696). Fulfillment occurs when “an act of meaning” is carried out, about which nothing is “recognized” (694), such as believing that the Olga Tokarczuk poster on my apartment wall is still up there. This belief can be verified once I face the wall and make sure the poster is still pinned to it. Doing so would render the act of meaning previously stated fulfilled (*erfüllt*) (cf. *ibid.*). For epistemic fulfillment to occur, these conditions must be met:

- (1) The intuitive condition: the object A must be perceived or otherwise intuitively presented.
- (2) The conceptual condition: A must be conceived of, judged about, or otherwise conceptually represented.
- (3) The synthesis condition: the intuitive and conceptual acts of perceiving must be appropriately synthesized. (HOPP 2011, 192)

Let us now apply Husserl’s fulfillment acts to Schellenberg’s Hallie and Percy. Schellenberg has attempted to argue a case, where Hallie and Percy share a perceptual experience of a white cup, despite Hallie’s being hallucinatory. But, as has been demonstrated by Byrne, there can be no tenable argument for Hallie deserving any epistemic appraisal for her bad perceptual experience. “Evidence” is a central concept here. Revisiting Williamson’s $FE = K$, evidence is seen as generating true knowledge about the external environment. Arguing for Hallie having evidence for her perception is, therefore, arguing for her having environmental knowledge. This cannot be right, or else, it would run contrary to one of the widely accepted facts that makes hallucination distinct from veridical perception, namely that, as defined in APA dictionary, the former is perception *without* external stimulus. To strengthen my point, I believe Husserl’s fulfillment acts can raise a strong case against Hallie, and, by implication, a strong case for Percy. The content of believing that there is a white cup on a desk is supported by actually seeing the cup on the desk; hence the intuitive (1) and conceptual (2) conditions are crucial for fulfillment. The synthesis condition (3) indicates that fulfillment is a complex operation that is very unlikely to occur in conjunction

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 539.

with hallucination. To elaborate, “keeping the conceptual content of an act constant, we can vary its intuitive content drastically, even within the context of fulfillment” (HOPP 2011, 193). Percy’s belief that there is a white cup on a desk can be constantly fulfilled as he moves around it. Hallie’s, on the other hand, is highly unlikely to fulfill the same criterion. Given that hallucinations (in schizophrenics, for example) exhibit fragmentary and surrealist visions (see, e.g., CHAUDHURY 2010, 5), it is very unlikely that Hallie’s bad perception’s conceptual content would remain the same as she moves around the desk. Moreover, “keeping the intuitive content of an act of epistemic fulfillment constant, we can vary its conceptual content as well” (HOPP 2011, 193). Looking straight at the white cup on the desk before his eyes, Percy can fulfill all sorts of thoughts (that the white cup has his initials, that the desk is brown, that the cup is half-full, etc.). Hallie would not be able to fulfill the same thoughts due to the sketchy and incoherent nature of hallucinatory experiences. What is more likely to happen is, once Hallie re-focuses her attention toward the apparent white cup, it would disappear, following her employment of “a coping strategy” (cf. DIEDERICH *et al.* 2009).

One might argue that these cases show that meeting the conceptual condition is not a prerequisite to meeting the intuitive condition, which allows perception to happen without fulfillment (HOPP 2011, 194). To that end, fulfillment does *not* dismiss Hallie’s sharing Percy’s perceptual experience. It is important, however, to keep in mind that fulfillment includes also the synthesis of the first two conditions. For the synthesis condition to be met, the acts must (a) be attributed to the same person (*ibid.*), hence Percy’s thought of the cup does not fulfill Hallie’s. (b) The two acts must happen at the same time (*ibid.*). So, Hallie must recognize that her thought of the cup and its directedness toward the external object happen *simultaneously*, which rules out cases of knowledge based on “reflective introspection”. Once Hallie is past her hallucinatory state, she might realize that her perception was bad. However, this does not fulfill her previous misperception, but rather fulfills her present thought that whatever is in front of her *now* is so-and-so.¹⁸ Nonetheless, these criteria, the perceptual and the conceptual directed at the same object simultaneously, as Husserl (1970, 690–91) posits, are not sufficient for fulfillment to occur. Two additional criteria must be met to ensure fulfillment occurs. First, “attentional resources” must be deployed successfully (HOPP 2011, 195). Hallie’s bad perception might deflect her attention to other chaotic objects in the room, making her attention, due to the nature of hallucination, divided.¹⁹

¹⁸ Cf. WILLARD 1984, 225–26.

¹⁹ The centrality of “attention” in veridical perceptions has been emphasized in a study by Fazekas (2021), which proposes that hallucination is correlated with “mind wandering”. A similar

Furthermore, for the synthesis condition to be met, one must possess the concepts in question *authentically* (ibid.). By possessing concepts authentically, it is understood that the person possessing them can consider various thoughts about the thing to which they are aimed.²⁰ Concept authenticity, Hopp elaborates, concerns “one’s mode of possessing the concept”, not the concept itself (195–96). Let me elaborate with an example. I have with me now a book from my wife’s collection: Shelby Mahurin’s *Golqb i Wqz*. I can entertain various thoughts about the concept of “Mahurin’s *Golqb i Wqz*”. For instance, I can tell you that the book was originally written in English (*Serpent & Dove*) in 2019, and in 2020 it was translated into Polish by Agnieszka Kalus. The Polish version was published by We need YA. I can also tell you that the book is 480 pages long. Quality-wise, the book is good as new. While skimming the pages of the book, I noticed that my wife left a page marker on page 235, the last phrase of which is “zabójca czarownicy”. I can go on and on. The point is, I can say many things about the book because I possess the concept “Mahurin’s *Golqb i Wqz*” authentically.

Concept authenticity is an acquired skill, and as is the case with any learned skill, it can be lost. Generally, it can be lost either due to changes in the individual or changes in their environment. It can also be lost due to being situated in an environment radically different from that where one’s recognitional skills were first learned. Recognitional abilities vary from one individual to another due to, mainly, the position of the perceiver and the nature of the perceived (HOPP 2011, 197). Revisiting Schellenberg’s phenomenal evidence, she has argued for Hallie’s sensory state generating evidence for her bad perception, holding that the former is “systematically linked to what it is of in the good case”. Schellenberg gives primacy to veridical cases of perception, rendering the bad cases mere cases of “as-of”. Because her experience is *as of* perceiving a white cup on a desk, Hallie shares Percy’s “visual capacities” to see and discriminate the perceived object. Nonetheless, as Byrne argued, only Percy employs his capacities successfully. In light of the articulated argument for concept authenticity, we can state that Hallie lost her recognitional abilities the moment she started hallucinating, for the resultant environment following her dissociative state is radically different from the normal environment. Therefore, her sensory experience as of a white cup on a desk cannot be admitted as part of her phenomenal evidence for authentically perceiving it, which, consequently, makes it unfulfilled. To make my point even

view is held by Bachmann (2021), who maintains that “people tend to hallucinate in dual-task conditions when task attention is directed to an object different from another, task-irrelevant object that is conditioned to be associated with it” (2).

²⁰ Cf. DAVIS 2003, 429 and FODOR 1998.

stronger, let us entertain the possibility that Hallie's hallucination is veridical. Schellenberg has devised her "factive evidence" to avert the problems raised by veridical hallucinations. Namely, even though Hallie's non-veridical perception leads to a white cup on a desk based on an accurate representation of her environment, it is not an accurate representation based on her environment, hence she lacks factive evidence. Accordingly, Hallie does not possess concept authenticity, for her sensory experience is not based on her environment. Let us take Goldman's Barn Country as an example of perceptually experienced objects, which, albeit identical to the way things are in home environment, are factive but still inauthentic. Henry accurately represents his environment based on his environment. There actually is a barn ahead of him. Nonetheless, he does not know that, for, unbeknownst to him, the barn is fake. So, Henry's apparent factive evidence cannot be a part of his evidence for believing that there is a barn ahead of him, given $FE = K$, which falsifies Schellenberg's second premise of the argument for FE (see BYRNE 2014, 11). Similarly, Goldman's example can constitute a critical argument for accurately representing one's environment based on their environment resulting in concept inauthenticity. Henry's belief that there is a barn before him, although supplemented by veridically perceiving the barn, is inauthentic and thus unfulfilled (HOPP 2011, 197).²¹ All points considered, Hallie lacks concept authenticity, and her belief *as of a white cup* is unfulfilled.

With that said, an argument similar to (but less problematic than) Schellenberg's phenomenal evidence can be put forth in cases of *as-of-fulfillment*. "There is a distinctive phenomenological character to fulfillment—there's something it's like to find the world to be as one thinks it to be—and even in environments in which one's recognitional abilities are compromised, experiences with that same phenomenological character can persist". If Henry can't know if he's in Barn Country, that doesn't take away from his fulfillment experience. It's just that his experience will not be one of actual fulfillment, but once he knows where he is, his experience's phenomenological character will be modified and thus fulfilled (HOPP 2011, 197–98). Therefore, as long as Hallie does not recognize that she is undergoing a hallucinatory experience, her perceptual experiences will, even if they coincide with how certain things actually are, remain unfulfilled.

The fake Barn Country example highlights a crucial component in Husserl's epistemic fulfillment. In his *Ideas I* (1983), Husserl makes a distinction between two elements in the structure of intentionality: *noesis* (pl. *noeses*) and *noema* (pl.

²¹ Henry's possession of the concept "barn(s)" is inauthentic because he does not know that Barn Country, the thing to which his concept is directed, is full of facsimiles, fake barns made of papier-mâché. This unfavorable environment results in Henry's loss of concept authenticity.

noemata). The noetic element applies to the conscious experience of the act's side (e.g., perceiving, remembering, judging, etc.). The noematic element, on the other hand, applies to the perceived, remembered, or judged as precisely the same thing of which we were "perceptually conscious" prior to the "phenomenological reduction" (236–37). This indicates that the act of perceiving is a conscious act, and its noemata are to be identified as they are consciously meant and known. Adopting Husserl's distinction, we can account for Goldman's Henry finding himself in an unfavorable situation, where his veridical perception of the barn compromises his recognitional abilities and prevents the fulfillment of his experience. Fulfillment goes beyond the intuitive and conceptual acts of an experience. It is also a synthesis of the two acts, which, as Willard (1995) argues, makes fulfillment "an additional act in its own right" (150). This, Hopp notes, is what is missing in cases similar to Goldman's Henry. He lacks the synthesis of his thought about the barn and the barn as it is *meant*. "In the unity of fulfillment, the fulfilling content coincides with the intending content, so that, in our experience of this unity of coincidence, the object, at once intended and 'given' stands before us, not as two objects, but as one alone" (HUSSERL 1970, 291). Acts of epistemic fulfillment, therefore, are distinct from acts of perception or judgment, in the sense that the object given in fulfillment is not merely given or given and meant, but rather *given as it is meant* (HOPP 2011, 199). In the case of Hallie, like Henry, she lacks the synthesis of her thought and intuition. The white cup on the desk is not only given or meant, it is given as it is meant. Since the hallucinating Hallie lacks external stimulus, an identity act synthesizing her thought and intuition cannot be formed. Only Percy can be said to fulfill the synthesis criterion, based on the givenness of both the synthesis of the two acts and the identity of the synthesis and the object to which it is directed. This underlies the significance of consciousness in the fulfillment of perceptual experiences. While Henry can overcome the deficiency of his recognitional abilities by taking a closer look at Barn Country (cf. HOPP 2011, 198), Hallie cannot do that. The deficiency of her recognitional abilities is "environmentally indexed" (cf. MILLAR 2008). That is why it is not possible for her to improve her recognitional abilities while undergoing a hallucination.

The difference between Schellenberg's phenomenal/factive evidence and Husserl's (2001) "evidence-consciousness" lies in the latter's emphasis that "the same object that was meant in an empty manner [be] there in intuition in a genuine way, as the same [object] actually presented" (114). So, even if Hallie gets away with recognizing a white cup as such in the same manner Percy does, her experience does not meet the conscious synthesis necessary for fulfillment to obtain. Hopp (2011) stresses the importance of consciousness in fulfillment:

A recognitional ability can be exercised without any distinctive phenomenological experience taking place. A blindsighter might reliably recognize squares, and a chicken sexer might reliably recognize female chicks. Perhaps even zombies could have recognitional abilities. But the ability to do that does not entail that the requisite conscious synthesis, which accounts for the fact that the object is given as it is meant, takes place. Fulfillment is an essentially conscious experience. (199)

Another distinctive feature of Husserlian epistemic fulfillment has to do with the degree to which an experience is fulfilled (HUSSERL 1970, 720). “The highest possible degree is adequacy, in which each part and property of the thing is given exactly as it is meant to be” (HOPP 2011, 200). However, reaching a physical object as it is meant, Husserl contends, is an unachievable ideal. When I think about some object as a whole, my perception of it is inadequate. My perception cannot exhaust all its properties (HUSSERL 1983, 331–33). Back to Hallie and Percy. Even though reaching an adequate perception of the white cup on his desk is unachievable, it is possible for Percy to reach the highest possible degree of adequacy by inspecting the cup and the desk. It is, however, very unlikely for the hallucinating Hallie to reach the same degree of adequacy, even if we assume, as wild as it sounds, that her bad perception “got lucky”. Moreover, *contra* Schellenberg, Hallie’s bad perception does not give her any evidence (or epistemic justification) to believe that there is a white cup on a desk, for “the degree of epistemic warrant of a belief within the context of fulfillment does not line up in any neat way with the degree to which it is perceptually given” (HOPP 2011, 201). That is to say, Percy can be certain that there is a white cup on a desk just by quickly scanning his room. Hallie, however, may not have any ground for the same belief even after staring at the alleged white cup on the desk for hours.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have argued for phenomenology, Husserlian phenomenology to be precise, as providing a better paradigm on how to approach and assess hallucination than Schellenberg’s. To be more explicit, I have analyzed Schellenberg’s arguments for phenomenal evidence and factive evidence, as regards her evidential theory of perception. To pinpoint the inadequacies raised in her account of Hallie and Percy sharing any kind of evidence, I have proposed Husserl’s epistemic fulfillment as a detailed epistemological analysis of perception, which takes into consideration the latter’s phenomenological complexity. In short, perception should be regarded as involving a conscious fulfillment of certain acts.

As has been presented in my paper, hallucinating subjects lack this condition. Therefore, Hallie's perceptual experience cannot be fulfilled, and the unfulfillment of her experience discriminates it from that of Percy, whose experience is epistemically fulfilled.

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DOES HALLIE SEE A WHITE CUP ON A DESK?
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF HALLUCINATION
INDISCRIMINABILITY

S u m m a r y

In this paper, I argue for phenomenology, Husserlian phenomenology to be precise, as providing a solid paradigm on how to determine and assess hallucination. To be more explicit, in the context of my deliberations, I analyze Susanna Schellenberg’s arguments for “phenomenal” evidence and “factive” evidence, as regards her evidential theory of perception. To pinpoint the inadequacies raised in her account of (the hallucinating) Hallie and (the veridically perceiving) Percy sharing any kind of evidence, I propose Edmund Husserl’s epistemic fulfillment as a detailed epistemological analysis of perception, which takes into consideration the latter’s phenomenological complexity.

Keywords: Susanna Schellenberg; Edmund Husserl; hallucination indiscriminability; perception; phenomenology

CZY HALLIE WIDZI BIAŁY KUBEK NA BIURKU?
FENOMENOLOGICZNE PODEJŚCIE DO NIEODRÓŻNIALNOŚCI HALUCYNACJI

S t r e s z c z e n i e

W artykule argumentuję, że fenomenologia, a ściślej fenomenologia Husserla, dostarcza solidnych podstaw określania i oceny halucynacji. Analizuję argumenty Susanny Schellenberg na rzecz świadectw fenomenalnych i świadectw faktualnych, jakie znajdujemy w jej ewidencjalnej teorii percepcji. Aby precyzyjnie wskazać nieścisłości, jakie powstają na gruncie jej podejścia w przypadku, gdy halucynacje i postrzeżenia werydyczne dysponują tymi samymi świadectwami, odwołuję się do Husserla koncepcji wypełnienia epistemicznego, jako szczegółowej epistemologicznej analizy percepcji, która bierze pod uwagę fenomenologiczną złożoność postrzeżenia.

Słowa kluczowe: Susanna Schellenberg; Edmund Husserl; nieodróżnialność halucynacji; percepcja; fenomenologia

Informacja o Autorze: HICHAM JAKHA, MA, doktorant — Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, Wydział Filozofii; adres do korespondencji: Wydział Filozofii KUL, Al. Raclawickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Polska; e-mail: hicham.jakha@kul.pl; ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3126-4100>.