Does Hallie See a White Cup an a Desk? A Phenomenological Account of Hallucination Indiscriminability

• Authors: Hicham Jakha

Title variants

PL

Czy Hallie widzi biały kubek na biurku? Fenomenologiczne podejście do nieodróżnialności halucynacji

Abstracts

PL

W artykule argumentuję, że fenomenologia, a ściśle fenomenologia Husserla, dostarcza solidnych podstaw określania i oceny halucynacji. Analizuję argumenty Susanny Schellenberg na rzecz świadectw fenomenalnych i świadectw faktualnych, jakie znajdujemy w jej ewidencjalnej teorii percepcji. Aby precyzyjnie wskazać nieścisłości, jakie powstają na gruncie jej podejścia w przypadku, gdy halucynacje i postrzeżenia werydyczne dysponują tymi samymi świadectwami, odwołuję się do Husserla koncepcji wypełnienia epistemicznego, jako szczegółowej epistemologicznej analizy percepcji, która bierze pod uwagę fenomenologiczną złożoność postrzeżenia.

EN

In this paper, I argue for phenomenology, Husserlian phenomenology to be precise, as providing a solid paradigm on how to determine and assess hallucination. To be more explicit, in the context of my deliberations, I analyze Susanna Schellenberg’s arguments for “phenomenal” evidence and “factive” evidence, as regards her evidential theory of perception. To pinpoint the inadequacies raised in her account of (the hallucinating) Hallie and (the veridically perceiving) Percy sharing any kind of evidence, I propose Edmund Husserl’s epistemic fulfillment as a detailed epistemological analysis of perception, which takes into consideration the latter’s phenomenological complexity.

Keywords

EN

Susanna Schellenberg; Edmund Husserl; hallucination indiscriminability; perception; phenomenology

PL

Susanna Schellenberg; Edmund Husserl; nieodróżnialność halucynacji; percepcja; fenomenologia

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 71
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 183-203

Dates

published

2023

Contributors

author

Hicham Jakha

• John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, PhD candidate

• https://orcid.org/0000000231264100

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rf23713.9

Biblioteka Nauki

31232842