Przemoc, przymus i eskalacja we współczesnej rywalizacji strategicznej

• Authors: Mirosław Banasik

Title variants

EN

Violence, Coercion And Escalation In Contemporary Strategic Competition

Abstracts

EN

The purpose of the research was to clarify and characterize the meaning of violence, coercion and escalation in contemporary strategic competition. The main research problem was articulated with the question: in what is violence, coercion and escalation expressed and characterized in contemporary strategic competition? The research process used literature analysis and criticism, non-participatory observation and case studies. As a result of the research, it was established that violence and coercion are always present in strategic competition. They are specific tools of international influence to achieve specific political goals. Coercion is the use of force in a limited way, a demonstration of force, or the use of armed force and the conduct of an armed clash. Coercion includes deterrence and forcing. Escalation is an increase in the intensity or scope of a dispute or conflict between two parties that exceeds a threshold considered significant by one or more of its participants. Escalation is an interactive phenomenon that occurs between two (or more) parties to a conflict who seek unilateral advantage. Escalation is prevented by strategic deterrence or by having escalatory dominance.

PL

Celem badań było wyjaśnienie i scharakteryzowanie znaczenia przemocy, przymusu i eskalacji we współczesnej rywalizacji strategicznej. Główny problem badawczy wyartykułowano pytaniem: w czym wyraża się i charakteryzuje się przemoc, przymus i eskalacja we współczesnej rywalizacji strategicznej? W procesie badawczym wykorzystano analizę i krytykę literatury, obserwację nieuczestniczącą oraz studium przypadków. W rezultacie przeprowadzonych badan ustalono, że w rywalizacji strategicznej zawsze jest obecna przemoc i przymus. Są one swoistymi narzędziami oddziaływania międzynarodowego do osiągania określonych celów politycznych. Przymus jest użyciem siły w sposób ograniczony, demonstracją siły, lub użyciem sił zbrojnych i prowadzenie starcia zbrojnego. Przymus zawiera w sobie odstraszanie i wymuszanie. Eskalacja to wzrost intensywności lub zakresu sporu albo konfliktu pomiędzy dwiema stronami, który przekracza próg uznawany za istotny przez jednego lub więcej jego uczestników. Eskalacja jest zjawiskiem interaktywnym, zachodzącym pomiędzy dwoma (lub więcej) stronami konfliktu, które dążą do uzyskania jednostronnej przewagi. Eskalacji zapobiega się poprzez odstraszanie strategiczne lub posiadanie dominacji eskalacyjnej.

Keywords

EN

Strategic competition; violence; coercion; escalation; conflict; war

PL

rywalizacja strategiczna; przemoc; przymus; eskalacja; konflikt; wojna

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
• Year: 2024
• Volume: 52
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 93-107

Dates

published

2024

Contributors

author

Mirosław Banasik

• Akademia Piotrkowska w Piotrkowie Trybunalskim

• https://orcid.org/0000000293581240

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rns2024.0001

Biblioteka Nauki

30147138