How might we apply the trinitarian notion of ‘Person’ to mere humans?

• Authors: Colin Patterson

Title variants

PL

Jak trynitarne pojęcie „osoby” można zastosować do zwykłych ludzi?

Abstracts

PL

Refleksje teologiczne oraz rozróżnienia podjęte przez sobory w pierwszych siedmiu wiekach historii Kościoła doprowadziły do powstania niezwykłego i oryginalnego pojęcia „Osoby”, które znajduje się w samym centrum chrześcijańskiego wyznania wiary. Wierzymy w jednego Boga w trzech Osobach oraz w Syna Bożego, drugą Osobę Trójcy Świętej, który łączy w sobie naturę boską i ludzką. Taka koncepcja osoby zastosowana do Boga nie przyczyniła się do równie głębokiej refleksji nad osobowością istot ludzkich innych niż Chrystus, czyli zwykłych ludzi. Co jednak stałoby się, gdybyśmy podążyli tym tropem myślowym? Niniejszy artykuł bada tę możliwość, podkreślając trzy cechy teologicznego rozumienia Osób Boskich: Osoby Boskie nie mogą być pojmowane w kategoriach pozytywnych; Osoby Boskie są całkowicie pojedyncze; oraz Osoby Boskie posiadają rzeczywistość tylko w relacji do siebie nawzajem. Chociaż na pierwszy rzut oka taki zabieg myślowy nie wygląda obiecująco, to jednak głębsza analiza sugeruje, że jest inaczej. Na tej podstawie artykuł bada niektóre z implikacji takiego rozumowania, wprowadzając przy tym pojęcie „semblantu” jako koniecznego pośrednika między pojęciem „osoby” a pojęciem „natury ludzkiej”.

EN

The theological concept of ‘person’ and its complementary notion of ‘nature’ were developed through early church teaching on the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation. Persons in this case referred solely to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit while ‘nature’ expressed the unity of the Godhead and encompassed those attributes which were shared by the divine Persons. The later history of this theologically derived notion of ‘person’ took a different turn, moving away from the early complementarity of nature and person in order to embrace the notion of human person for which complementarity seemed ill fitting. In this new conception, ‘person’ was subsumed under the category of ‘nature’. A human person came to refer to the full human reality, body and soul, while a more general notion, aimed at accommodating both divine and human personhood, as famously expressed by Boethius, thought of a person as an individual substance of a rational nature. One might ask, however, whether it is possible and fruitful to develop the initial, complementary concept of ‘person’ in a different direction, that is, so that it covers not only divine Persons but also mere humans. Does it give a coherence to the area of theological anthropology beyond that afforded by the classical, nature-based concept of ‘person’? Here I attempt to set out a conceptual framework for the application to humans of the concept of ‘person’ as it was developed with the theological controversies of the early Church – or at least according to one reading of that process. I first take note of the features of the theological notion of personhood and test whether human persons might be understood in the same or similar terms, taking into account the difference between divine and creaturely existence.   I then draw comparisons with the traditional concept of ‘person’ as it has been applied to human beings to show that the former version is to be preferred. I conclude with comments which draw out some of the implications of this theological notion of person.

Keywords

PL

osoba; natura; osobowość; relacyjność; pojedynczość; semblant

EN

person; nature; self; relationality; singularity; semblant

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Teologiczne
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 69
• Issue: 11
• Pages: 197-219

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Colin Patterson

• John Paul II Institute for Marriage and Family, Melbourne, Australia

• https://orcid.org/0000000277529362

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rt226911.11

Biblioteka Nauki

31343201