A Framework to Support Coalition Formation in the Fourth Party Logistics Supply Chain Coalition

• Authors: Anna Tatarczak

Title variants

Tworzenie koalicji między operatorami 4PL

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The growing diversity of programmes concerning the solutions associated with the fourth party supply chain operations, the increasing pressure to optimise all resources and capabilities, as well as the continually increasing integration of different types of technologies are the driving force in the establishment of fourth party logistics supply chain coalition. Choosing the most rational and practical cost allocation mechanism in the fourth party logistics supply chain coalition, with the aim of reducing the overall operating costs, is the main condition ensuring companies’ motivation to participate in collaboration. This paper addresses the concepts from the game theory combined with multi‑criteria problems in order to introduce a realisable profit distribution mechanism, with the potential to establish practical collaborations among companies. The aim is to achieve the best conditions for collaboration. Case studies are used to demonstrate the utility of the framework.

PL

Operator logistyczny 4PL (Fourth Party Logistics Provider) oferuje nowe i innowacyjne rozwiązania, mające na celu obniżenie kosztów, udostępnienie usług i usprawnienia w zarządzaniu złożonymi łańcuchami dostaw. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie najlepszych warunków do współpracy między wyspecjalizowanymi podmiotami zajmującymi się zarządzaniem łańcuchem dostaw – operatorami 4PL. Rozważania dotyczące czynników wpływających na tworzenie koalicji przez ope­ratorów 4PL, a także konkluzje z zakresu trwałości współpracy stały się podstawą do zaprojektowania dwustopniowej procedury, zbudowanej w oparciu o pojęcia z teorii gier. Celem przedstawionej procedury jest wybór metody alokacji kosztów/zysków przez koalicjantów. Analizy przeprowadzono na podstawie danych pochodzących z literatury.

Keywords

EN

Fourth Party Logistics; game theory; Shapley value; innovation; supply chain

PL

operator 4PL; teoria gier koalicyjnych; wartość Shapleya; innowacje; łańcuch dostaw; operator 4PL; teoria gier koalicyjnych; wartość Shapleya; innowacje; łańcuch dostaw

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
• Journal: Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 5
• Issue: 338
• Pages: 195-212

Dates

published

2018-09-28

Contributors

author

Anna Tatarczak

• University of Maria Curie‑Skłodowska in Lublin, Faculty of Economics, Department of Marketing Research

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18778/0208-6018.338.12