Uprawnienia indywidualne w filozofii politycznej Roberta Nozicka

• Authors: Marcin Saar

Title variants

EN

Individual rights in Robert Nozick’s political philosophy

Abstracts

EN

With respect to Robert Nozick’s political philosophy (as it is to be found in Anarchy, State, and Utopia), one of the most prominent theses is the one that asserts that in Nozick’s mind individual rights are founded on the principle of self-ownership - the principle that says that all individuals have, with regard to themselves, rights identical with (or parallel to) rights of property. In this paper we want to focus on slightly different interpretation of Nozick’s thought. First, we summarize Nozick’s account of rights: its main points being the individual being proper subject of rights and the nature of rights as side-constraints. Then we turn our attention to the metnioned interpretation itself. It was proposed by Mark D. Friedman, and it synthesizes Nozick’s insights on this topic scattered throughout his book. It focuses on argument “from moral form to moral content” (from the fact that the form of morality includes side-constraints to the content of libertarian constraint against aggression) suggested by Nozick and on features in virtue of which persons have rights - this features being free will, rationality, moral agency and ability to live one’s life according to some general conception of it.

Keywords

PL

uprawnienia; Nozick; Friedman; racjonalna sprawczość; jednostka

EN

rights; Nozick; Friedman; rational agency; individual

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
• Journal: Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 49
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 42-63

Dates

published

2020

Contributors

author

Marcin Saar

• Uniwersytet Łódzki

References

• Bader, R. (2010). Robert Nozick. New York: Continuum.
• Cohen, G. A. (1995). Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Friedman, M. D. (2011). Nozick’s Libertarian Project: An Elaboration and Defense. London: Bloomsbury.
• Grafstein, R. (1983). The Ontological Foundation of Nozick’s View of Politics: Robert’s Rules of Order. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 44 (3), 401-424.
• Harman, G. H. (1965). The Inference to the Best Explanation. The Philosophical Review, 74 (1), 88-95.
• Hart, H. L. A. (1955). Are There Any Natural Rights?. The Philosophical Review, 64 (2), 175-191.
• Hunt, L. H. (2015). Anarchy, state, and utopia. An advanced guide. West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell.
• Juruś, D. (2012). W poszukiwaniu podstaw libertarianizmu. W perspektywie rothbardowskiej koncepcji własności. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.
• Mack, E. (2002a). Self-Ownership, Marxism, and Egalitarianism. Part I: Challenges to Historical Entitlement. Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 1 (1), 119-146.
• Mack, E. (2002b). Self-Ownership, Marxism, and Egalitarianism. Part II: Challenges to the Self-Ownership Thesis, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 1 (2), 237-276.
• Nozick, R. (1981). On the Randian Argument. W: J. Paul (red.), Reading Nozick. Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia (206-231). Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.
• Nozick, R. (2010). Anarchia, państwo i utopia. Tłum. P. Maciejko, M. Szczubiałka. Warszawa: Aletheia.
• Scheffler, S. (1981). Natural Rights, Equality, and the Minimal State. W: J. Paul (red.), Reading Nozick. Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia (148-168). Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.
• Thomson, J. J. (1981). Some Ruminations on Rights. W: J. Paul (red.), Reading Nozick. Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia (130-147). Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.
• Wolff, J. (1991). Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Identifiers

DOI

10.18778/1689-4286.49.03

Biblioteka Nauki

18105211