Radykalny emocjonalizm jako stanowisko metametaetyczne

• Authors: Jan Hartman

Title variants

EN

Radical emotionalism as a meta-metaethical position

Abstracts

EN

This paper attempts to develop a theoretical perspective which combines ethics and metaethics jointly with their links to the rational plots of the living moral reality. The author claims that the nature of morality is strictly emotional and criticizes false attempts to rationalize moral sphere, in many cases resulting from the ideas and arguments produced by the academic ethics or metaethics and subsequently infiltrating the social life. Imposed by the very theoretical nature of philosophy, intellectualism of the theoretical developments in ethics has a wrongful effect for public morals, falsifying the emotional nature of morality and providing individuals with false and rhapsodic, pseudo-theoretical topoi of contention, justifying and assessment. The article may be read as fundamentally undermining ethics as a historically influential moral as well as theoretical enterprise (with exclusion of the emotionalist tradition).

Keywords

PL

etyka; metaetyka; emocjonalizm; emotywizm

EN

ethics; metaethics; emotionalism; emotivism

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
• Journal: Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 53
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 30-55

Dates

published

2021

Contributors

author

Jan Hartman

• Jagiellonian University

References

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• Brandt R. The Definition of an `Ideal Observer` Theory in Ethics”. w: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15 (1995).
• Hartman J. Istotowy formalizm filozofii praktycznej, w: E. Nowak-Juchacz (red.), Transcendentalna filozofia praktyczna, Poznań: WN UAM 2000, s. 169-180.
• Hartman J. 2007. Tożsamość etyka, czyli uprawianie etyki jako problem moralny, w: Diametros 14 (2007). s. 14-21; tekst dostępny online pod adrsem: https://bazhum.muzhp.pl/media/files/Diametros/Diametros-r2007-t-n14/Diametros-r2007-t-n14-s12-31/Diametros-r2007-t-n14-s12-31.pdf
• Jaśtal J. 2007, Teoria idealnego obserwatora a problem relatywizmu, w: Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 43/2, s. 92-108.
• van Roojen M. Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism. W: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/#Emo
• Smith A. 1976. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. s. 110-180.

Identifiers

DOI

10.18778/1689-4286.53.02

Biblioteka Nauki

18105182