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2018 | 16 | 1 | 5-14

Article title

Filozoficzny realizm między naturą a zdrowym rozsądkiem, część II

Authors

Content

Title variants

EN
Philosophical realism between nature and common sense (part II)

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

PL
W pierwszej części tego artykułu, opublikowanej w poprzednim numerze tego czasopisma, omawiałem renesans filozoficznego realizmu, skupiając się głównie na różnych wersjach zdroworozsądkowego realizmu. W tym artykule omówię realizm naukowy i inną, pośrednią wersję realizmu (pluralistyczną pod względem ontologicznym i epistemologicznym). Moim zdaniem ta wersja realizmu jest w stanie uwzględnić najlepsze elementy realizmu zdroworozsądkowego i naukowego, a jednocześnie uniknąć ich wad.
EN
In a companion article to this one, published in the previous issue of this journal, I discussed the renaissance of philosophical realism, focusing particularly on the different versions of common-sense realism. In this article, I will instead discuss scientific realism and another, intermediate version of realism (which is pluralistic both in ontology and epistemology) that, in my view, incorporates the best elements of common sense realism and scientific realism while avoiding their shortcomings.

Year

Volume

16

Issue

1

Pages

5-14

Physical description

Dates

published
2018-03-31

Contributors

author

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_21697_seb_2018_16_1_01
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