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Title variants
Environmental Virtue Ethics and the Sources of Normativity
Etyka cnót środowiskowych a źródła normatywności
Environmental Virtue Ethics and the Sources of Normativity
Languages of publication
Abstracts
This article is an attempt to identify the sources of normativity in virtue ethics. The starting point for the analyzes presented here is the book by Dominika Dzwonkowska Environmental virtue ethics. In § 1, I present the basic theses and assumptions of this approach to ethics. Then, with reference to the concept of the moral subject proposed by Dzwonkowska, I ask whether it constitutes the primary source of normativity (§ 2). I argue that environmental virtue ethics can be ascribed to arguments shared by supporters of the so-called constitutive arguments in metaethics (§ 3). Their position is based on the recognition that moral norms, obligations, etc., derive from the constitutive features of the subject. I call such an approach internalist and contrast it with the non-internalist approach, the outline of which I propose in § 4. In the Conclusion, I suggest that the pragmatic considerations and conservatism of researchers speak in favor of the internalist approach.
Niniejszy artykuł jest próbą wskazania źródeł normatywności w etyce cnót. Punktem wyjścia dla prezentowanych tutaj analiz jest książka Dominiki Dzwonkowskiej pt. Etyka cnót środowiskowych. W § 1 przedstawiam podstawowe tezy i założenia tego podejścia do etyki. Następnie odnoszę się do rozumienia podmiotu moralnego zaproponowanego przez Dzwonkowską i zadaję pytanie o to, czy stanowi on właściwe źródło normatywności (§ 2). Wykazuję, że zwolennikom etyki cnót środowiskowych można przypisać argumentację podzielaną przez zwolenników tzw. argumentów konstytutywnych w metaetyce (§ 3). Ich stanowisko opiera się na uznaniu, że moralne normy, zobowiązania itd., wynikają z konstytutywnych cech podmiotu. Takie ujęcie określam mianem internalistycznego i przeciwstawiam je koncepcji eksternalistycznej, której zarys proponuję w § 4. W Zakończeniu. sugeruję, że za stanowiskiem internalistycznym przemawiają względy pragmatyczne i konserwatyzm badaczy.
This article is an attempt to identify the sources of normativity in virtue ethics. The starting point for the analyzes presented here is the book by Dominika Dzwonkowska Environmental virtue ethics. In § 1, I present the basic theses and assumptions of this approach to ethics. Then, with reference to the concept of the moral subject proposed by Dzwonkowska, I ask whether it constitutes the primary source of normativity (§ 2). I argue that environmental virtue ethics can be ascribed to arguments shared by supporters of the so-called constitutive arguments in metaethics (§ 3). Their position is based on the recognition that moral norms, obligations, etc., derive from the constitutive features of the subject. I call such an approach internalist and contrast it with the non-internalist approach, the outline of which I propose in § 4. In the Conclusion, I suggest that the pragmatic considerations and conservatism of researchers speak in favor of the internalist approach.
Keywords
Journal
Year
Volume
Issue
Pages
29-36
Physical description
Dates
published
2020-09-30
Contributors
author
References
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- Dzwonkowska, Dominika. 2019. Etyka cnót środowiskowych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego.
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_21697_seb_2020_18_3_04
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