EN
This paper is an attempt to answer the question, what is exactly represented by our thoughts or language expressions. At the beginning, the article presents the main philosophical problems regarding the understanding of the nature of the subject of reference of such representations as names or descriptions. Is the name directly referred to the real object or rather to the content of thought? What about cases when the name cannot be referred to the real object? What is the relation between the intentional subject connected with every name (or description) and the external object to which only some names can be referred to, and which one is prior to the constitution of representation? The idea to understand the subject of mental or language representations as a complex structure which has a relational nature is the solution proposed in this paper. This structure is constituted by cognition and ties internal elements of a given representation such as the content with the elements which are external with regard to this given representation. This structure reflects such elements as the content of representation, the way in which this content is given, the correlate of the content and its mode of existence as well as additional systemic information coordinated with given representation. Some consequences of this proposal are discussed at the end of the article. It is explained how the differentiation of the elements of this structure can lead to different types of reference. The basis to understand the issue in question is the relation between internal and external object of reference. It can be interpreted (as is suggested in the paper) as a connection between internal elements of the described structure.