Municipal investment expenditures by pork-barrel mayors: evidence from a transition economy

• Authors: Katarzyna Leśniewska-Napierała , Tomasz Napierała

Abstracts

EN

The focus of this study is electoral accounting practices employed by mayors in municipalities in a selected, exemplary region in a post-socialist country - the Lodz region in Central Poland. The goal is to identify characteristics of pork-barrel mayors responsible for municipal investment expenditures: their terms of ofice, partisan afiliation, and gender. The generalised method of moments was applied to estimate the impact that the electoral accounting practices of mayors had on municipal investment expenditures. All 177 municipalities in the Lodz region were investigated, from 2003 until 2019. Contrary to expectations, it was found that electoral accounting was practised by next-term and independent mayors rather than first-term or party-afiliated ones.

Keywords

EN

Municipal investment expenditures; political budget cycle; mayors; transition economy; Poland

• Publisher: Wydział Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
• Journal: Miscellanea Geographica. Regional Studies on Development
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Katarzyna Leśniewska-Napierała

• Faculty of Geographical Sciences, University of Lodz, Lodz, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000000329986179

author

Tomasz Napierała

• Faculty of Geographical Sciences, University of Lodz, Lodz, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000000264075197

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/mgrsd-2022-0004

Biblioteka Nauki

2096275