Teoria przetwarzania predykcyjnego a problem ogólnych pojęć abstrakcyjnych w perspektywie językoznawstwa kognitywnego

• Authors: Marzena Fornal

Title variants

EN

The theory of predictive processing and the problem of general abstract concepts from the perspective of cognitive linguistics

Abstracts

EN

The contemporary embodiment paradigm in cognitive linguistics provides a valuable conceptual framework for explaining the grounding of concrete concepts but faces fundamental difficulties in explaining the mechanism of abstract concept formation (the so-called disembodiment problem of concepts). It has been increasingly pointed out that the solution to this difficulty lies in combining the embodiment paradigm with the theory of predictive processing. Although this theory aspires to be a general brain theory in the cognitive sciences, it has some limitations, albeit in explaining the salient features of general abstract concepts. The article analyzes the theory of predictive processing in terms of its ability to explain the composability, productivity, systematicity and generality of conceptual thinking. Despite the limitations pointed out in the article, predictive processing theory, combined with the embodied language paradigm, is a promising proposal within second-generation cognitivism.

PL

Współczesny paradygmat ucieleśnienia w językoznawstwie kognitywnym stanowi cenne ramy pojęciowe dla wyjaśnienia ugruntowania pojęć konkretnych, lecz napotyka zasadnicze trudności w wyjaśnianiu mechanizmu tworzenia pojęć abstrakcyjnych (tak zwany problem odcieleśnienia pojęć). Coraz częściej wskazuje się, że rozwiązanie tej trudności leży w połączeniu paradygmatu ucieleśnienia z teorią przetwarzania predykcyjnego. Chociaż teoria ta aspiruje do bycia ogólną teorią mózgu w naukach kognitywnych, posiada pewne ograniczenia, chociażby wyjaśnieniu istotnych cech ogólnych pojęć abstrakcyjnych. Artykuł analizuje teorię przetwarzania predykcyjnego pod kątem jej zdolności do wyjaśnienia kompozycyjności, produktywności, systematyczności i ogólności myślenia pojęciowego. Pomimo wskazanych w artykule ograniczeń, teoria przetwarzania predykcyjnego w połączeniu z paradygmatem ucieleśnionego języka stanowi obiecującą propozycję w ramach kognitywizmu drugiej generacji.

Keywords

PL

przetwarzanie predykcyjne; ucieleśnione poznanie; ucieleśniony język; problem pojęć abstrakcyjnych; Clark; Hohwy

EN

embodied cognition; embodied language; predictive processing; problem of abstract concepts; Clark; Hohwy

• Publisher: Akademia Humanistyczno-Ekonomiczna w Łodzi
• Journal: Językoznawstwo
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 15-27

Dates

published

2023

Contributors

author

Marzena Fornal

• Akademia Humanistyczno-Ekonomiczna w Łodzi

• https://orcid.org/0000000202639081

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Identifiers

DOI

10.25312/j.6248

Biblioteka Nauki

37516234