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Language of Being in Heidegger’s “Turn” (*Kehre*)

Abstract: In this article, I attempt to analyze some of the contexts of the language of being after Heidegger’s “turn” (*Kehre*), a clearly discernible change in his philosophy in the second half of the 1930s. Heidegger proposed a new concept to revealing being itself, namely its “event-enowning” (*Ereignis*). The key to this understanding of being is that now language becomes “the house” of being. Heidegger combined this with the “joint” (fugue) function. Language as a fugue joins with being itself, and therefore constantly follows and touches upon the boundary of silence. Silence is the ultimate complement of language and constantly limits it, because what is said only reveals a part of being, while the rest remains hidden and “expresses” silence, as it is in the case of a fugue, where the main motif of the theme “escapes” into silence. In the text, I first consider the fugue of being, then the language of being as its expression, in order to consider the problem of saying further, and finally analyze the limit of language, i.e. the way to silence.

Keywords: language, being, turn, enowning, silence, saying

A Short Introduction

In an intriguing book written between 1936 and 1938 and first published long after his death, on the hundredth anniversary of the author’s birth in 1989, Martin Heidegger presented an interesting perspective on the language of being, the language “that rejects what was before.” The

book in question, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, is one of the greatest philosophical challenges of the 20th century.¹ It presents an advancement of Heidegger's philosophical thought and is an attempt at abandoning traditional philosophy, or even the fundamental ontology previously proposed by the author himself. In this book, Heidegger encourages the reader to follow the right way of thinking, where the theme of the "path" seems to be the key. The subtitle *From Enowning (Vom Ereignis)* suggests that the way of thinking, the path of truth, is to disclose the precise nature of "event" or "enowning."² According to Heidegger, enowning is present to *Dasein* and if we want to follow his thinking, we must be sometimes ready to accept the unique, aphoristic style of his *Contributions*. Heidegger uses mental shortcuts, where a thought is unexpectedly abandoned, just to return to it in a new form in later passages. The aphoristic style, combined with the shortage of footnotes characteristic of a traditional text, compels the reader to concentrate all the time, as he follows the unruly thoughts of the author. This state of affairs does not facilitate reading and analyzing, but it can provide a deeper insight into the text and thus help to discover its hidden meanings.³

¹ Probably the first mention of Heidegger's unpublished *Beiträge zur Philosophie* we can find in Pöggeler's text, see: O. Pöggeler: *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Neske, Pfullingen 1963, pp. 233, 236, 254–255, 257, 262–264.

² P. Trawny: *Adyton. Heideggers Esoterische Philosophie*. Matthes & Seitz, Berlin 2010, p. 41; Idem: *Martin Heidegger*. Verlag Karl Albert, Freiburg/München 2003, pp. 90–91; H. Ruin: *Contributions to Philosophy*. In: *A Companion to Heidegger*. Eds. H. L. Dreyfus and M. A. Wrathall. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 2005, pp. 358–359; R. Polt: *The Event of Enthinking the Event*. In: *Companion to Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy"*. Eds. Ch. E. Scott et al. Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis 2001, p. 81; H. Philipse: *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being. A Critical Interpretation*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1998, p. 234; G. Harman: *Heidegger Explained. From Phenomenon to Thing*. Open Court, Chicago 2007, p. 117. In this text I follow the translation of *Ereignis* as proposed by P. Emad and K. Maly: M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. Trans. P. Emad, K. Maly. Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1999. It is necessary to mention that there also exists a second English translation of this book: M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. Trans. R. Rojcewicz, D. Vallega-Neu. Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis 2012. I prefer the first translation and the word "enowning." The reasons are exposed in the translator's foreword, see: P. Emad, K. Maly: *Translator's Foreword*. In: M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, pp. XIX–XXII.

³ I am aware that this is a controversial issue and it is difficult to present it in this short article. It seems to me that the problem of language renewal and reading *Contributions...* were perfectly presented by Ch. E. Scott in the introduction to the very important book: *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*. See E. Ch. Scott: *Introduction: Approaching Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy" and Its Companion*. In: *Companion to Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy"...*, pp. 1–12. In this very volume, Dennis J. Schmidt also concisely remarks on the specificity of Heidegger's language: Heidegger

In this article, I mainly refer to *Contributions...* and I have tried to construct my text according to the narrative of this book. However, in several places I also refer the reader to another work of Heidegger – to a collection of his articles about language, which was published in *Gesamtausgabe* (Band 12) entitled *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Regarding Heidegger's key concepts, I refer the reader to Michael Inwood's brilliant book *A Heidegger Dictionary*. The second necessary work is a collection of articles of various authors entitled *Companion to Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy."*

The Fugue

Perhaps the best way to describe Heidegger's later philosophy is by means of the term "fugue," which he first used in the book mentioned above. The word "fugue" (Latin for "flight") is usually associated with a musical form in which a composition of the theme determines the form of the other elements of the structure. The main theme is a point of reference, which "flees" and returns constantly. Hence, Heidegger mentions the fugue of being, the constant returning of what is present, the returning of enowning which is disclosed in truth as the basic motif of being. He uses the fugue as an essential character of being, with fugue itself meaning "a joint." According to Heidegger, the fugue belongs to the essence of being and plays a role "to ordain or to adopt oneself to something."⁴ In the thought presented in *Contributions...* fugue joins and fits various motifs of being – the echo, the pass, the leap, the grounding, the future ones and the last god, which all join in the essence of being itself,⁵ but rather in opposi-

"spins out a vocabulary very insulated from anything outside itself, it indulges in grammatical and syntactical abuses that would never pass the scrutiny of a copy editor, and it sometimes masks its own topic." J. D. Schmidt: *Strategies for a Possible Reading*. In: *Companion to Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy"...*, p. 33.

⁴ M. Inwood: *A Heidegger Dictionary*. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford–Maiden, Massachusetts 1999, pp. 204–205.

⁵ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. Ed. F. W. von Herrmann. [*Gesamtausgabe*. Band 65]. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1994, p. 6. "Die Fuge ist etwas wesentlich anderes als ein 'System'... Diese sechs Fügungen der Fuge stehen je für sich, aber nur, um die wesentliche Einheit eindringlicher zu machen." Ibidem, p. 81.

tion to systemic philosophy.⁶ Heidegger writes that the new philosophy must be systematic, but not systemic: “the time of systems is over.”⁷ Philosophy must be built as a project of other beginning, and this purpose is served by adopting the “torn” parts of being. This is the task of the fugue that joins what is separated/disconnected, that is the parts mentioned above.⁸ Heidegger leads the reader along certain paths within a maze of issues, and the reader may get lost on the way. Getting lost is not only possible but even desirable, as it makes one learn how to find the way back. The main motif of fugue created by Heidegger helps us to find the right track and return to the real “enowning” of being. The “marks” are only left to prevent the reader from getting stuck in the obscuring “veil” of entities.⁹

As is perhaps well known, Heidegger departs from systemic philosophy and also from his conception of the fundamental ontology presented in *Being and Time* after his “turn,” because he realized that the fundamental ontology was a less precise instrument to disclose the concealed being.¹⁰ A hope gives a new way, and in it a “fugical” approach to being. The fugue of being proves useful in the attempt to explain “enowning,” because as enjoining, fitting, or adapting to it involves persistent appearance and disappearance of a motif (the truth of being), and, at the same time, it is the joining of elements, making them complete or coherent. Like a musical fugue resonates in a returning motif, so too are the topics in the *Contributions...* joined to become a general motif of “the sound” of being. What comes to mind here is a comparison with J. S. Bach’s work *Die Kunst der Fuge*, in which counterpoints join into one main theme. The fugue of being “resounds” in similar way in the language of Heidegger’s thinking, divided into six aforementioned motifs: the echo, the playing-forth, the leap, the grounding, the ones to come, and the last god.¹¹

In this consonance of topics, everything is different: the beginning, reasoning, and saying – *sagen*. In this case, “different” means essential, original, and critical of tradition. “Different” also announces a different language. But it should not be mistaken for an attempt to create a new, original language.

⁶ F. W. von Herrmann: “*Contributions to Philosophy*” and *Enowning-Historical Thinking*. Trans. P. Emad. In: *Companion to Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy”...*, pp. 112–113.

⁷ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, p. 5.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 81–82.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 82.

¹⁰ I am not analyzing the “turn” in Heidegger’s thought. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the discussion on the issue has been ongoing for a long time. It has been analyzed by Kenneth Maly in an extensive article entitled *Turnings in Essential Swaying and the Leap*. See K. Maly: *Turnings in Essential Swaying and the Leap*. In: *Companion to Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy”...*, pp. 150–167.

¹¹ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, pp. 9, 82–83.

Instead, Heidegger intends to proceed with the “optimalization” of language. M. Inwood writes that Heidegger tries to get away from the stale language of traditional philosophy and, following Plato and Socrates, reverts to the language of the marketplace: “In *Being and Time* [language] is peppered with everyday talk about hammers, wood, gear, and so on.”¹² However, his main intention is not to talk about hammers, chairs and wood, but through the use of such language, he tries to show the relationship between the abstract language of philosophy and the language of the marketplace. Heidegger’s language is thus supposed to “return” to natural language – the language of everyday life, in which ordinary things are spoken, but also in that language one can speak of being itself. M. Inwood mentions Heidegger’s two very important innovations. First, he wants to use words in their broadest sense and abstracts from their diversifications.¹³ Secondly, as a consequence of the first, Heidegger believes that primarily a word belongs to someone or something in the sense of the whole.¹⁴ This means that the word is ascribed to every entity, and then the word must be understood in the “ontological” sense.¹⁵ In this way Heidegger understands language that is ontologically jointed with being. In other words, language in this way fugues and joins the motifs of being. This is the language of being, in which every word says (*sage*) about being and thus the saying of being becomes the main leitmotif.¹⁶

The Language of Being

This language, therefore, expresses a being that has been forgotten in the history of philosophy. Heidegger thinks that it is the language that is able to properly “join” being. For this reason, language “saying from enowning” answers the primary question of philosophy, that is, the question about being (*Seinsfrage*), which is basically about the truth of being.¹⁷ The most

¹² M. Inwood: *A Heidegger Dictionary...*, p. 2.

¹³ See, for example, the word “care” – *ibidem*, pp. 2–3.

¹⁴ If I were to indicate a fragment in *Contributions...*, it seems to me that this sense can be found, for example, when Heidegger writes about *Verhaltenheit* (restraint) and *Sorge* (care). See: M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, pp. 35–36.

¹⁵ D. Vallega-Neu: *Poetic Saying*. In: *Companion to Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy”...*, p. 69.

¹⁶ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, pp. 83–84.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 6–9.

appropriate form of language is “saying” (*gesagen, sagen*), not just “talking” (*Rede*).¹⁸ The language of being must “say” and not “talk,” because talking is merely the construction of sentences, and only formalizing communication between people, and saying is about being itself.¹⁹

A special example of the “talking” of language would be the kind of discourse which floods human mind with technological reasoning so typical of modern civilization, when language has been treated and used as an instrument. In consequence, language has lost its proper form, or the connection between what it really is and the ground – its meaning only results from the correct usage of syntactic and semantic patterns. Such language entangles human beings in unreflective everyday life and mundane existence, and distances them from the truth of being. Heidegger understands that this language “talks or chatters” and in consequence covers the truth of being and causes the state of “forgetting of being.”²⁰

Hence, if the fugue is to draw on the source of the truth, it must take advantage of the essence of language, that is, saying. Heidegger defines saying as the boundary between *sagen* and *syge*, that is, saying and keeping silent.²¹ Being is disclosed between sound and silence, which is reflected in the subtitle of *Contributions...: From Enowning*. He elaborates on the subtitle in the *Preview*, going as far as to indicate it as the proper title of his book. Being is enowned – in other words, it is given to *Dasein*, who is transformed and ready to accept such experience. The essence of Heidegger’s idea is “saying from enowning,” rather than trivial talking about it.²² So the language should be transformed and depart from the traditional metaphysics, because language should be able to connect representation and can be expressed as *λόγος*.²³

¹⁸ F. Dastur: *Heidegger*. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2007, pp. 114, 159–160.

¹⁹ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, pp. 4–5, 497–498.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 124. Heidegger does not specifically analyze the issue of language in *Contributions...* Nevertheless, the concept outlined here is developed by him in other texts, including several of his aforementioned lectures and readings, which were taken together in the volume entitled *On the Way to Language (Unterwegs zur Sprache)*. For, an excellent analysis the problem of language, see J. T. Lysaker and his *Language and Poetry* (In: *Martin Heidegger. Key Concepts*. Ed. B. W. Davis. Acumen Publishing, Durham 2009, pp. 195–207). It is necessary to point to two elements that determine Heidegger’s view of language. First of all, Heidegger is interested in the relationship between man and language, not in stating any facts about language. Secondly, Heidegger understands language not as our human way of communicating, but as a surface of human reference to self-being, which is why language cannot be described by human categories of communication (*ibidem*, pp. 198–199).

²¹ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, p. 36.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 3.

²³ See F. Dastur: *Heidegger...*, p. 158; M. Inwood: *A Heidegger Dictionary*, pp. 115–116.

Heidegger points to the process of the “rationalization” of language which occurred in the history of metaphysics, which means that human beings use language as *λόγος*, directly connecting language and human reason, as *ratio*. Human beings have become “the stewards” of language, thanks to which they have developed the cognition of being, that is, expressing the essence (whatness) of being with properly chosen language forms.²⁴ A unique trinity has developed: human being – *λόγος* (language) – being. Therefore, Heidegger writes: “*όγος* is taken as assertion and assertion as the binding of representations. Language takes over assertion of beings. At the same time language – again as *λόγος* – is allotted to man (*ζωον λόγον έχον*). The basic relations of language, from which ‘what is its ownmost’ and ‘origin’ is adduced, extend to beings as such and to man.”²⁵

Thus, a human being is able to adopt language that expresses being. Through this, language as *λόγος* literally refers to human beings defined from the perspective of rationality – *animal rationale*.²⁶ Heidegger concludes that in the natural approach, language is connected with being, expressing and predicating it, both in the case of metaphysically expressed being itself (it is then described with trans-categorical concepts – transcendentals) and in the case of entity (it then follows the structure of categories). Thus, language is entangled in some relationships, which Heidegger understands but tries to oppose: “One has hardly attempted, out of this relation to and from language, to grasp more originarily what is ownmost to man and his relation to beings and vice versa.”²⁷ It can be assumed that his consideration of language is an attempt to find language freed from the relationship with humans and being. The first step would be to reject language understood historically, because it means talking about what being is – *quid est (τί εστί)*²⁸ or what has essence. Heidegger suggests that such language is too entangled in the traditional metaphysics of entity and irrevocably doomed to using catego-

²⁴ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, p. 457.

²⁵ M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, p. 350. See: P. Trawny: *Martin Heidegger...*, pp. 96–97; O. Pöggeler: *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, pp. 196–198.

²⁶ M. Inwood: *A Heidegger Dictionary*, pp. 21–22. In the 1950s text, Heidegger emphasizes that there is a natural relationship between man and language: “Man speaks. We speak when we are awake and we speak in our dreams. We are always speaking, even when we do not utter a single word aloud, but merely listen or read, and even when we are not particularly listening or speaking but are attending to some work or taking a rest. We are continually speaking in one way or another. We speak because speaking is natural to us. It does not first arise out of some special volition. Man is said to have language by nature. [...] In any case, language belongs to the closest neighborhood of man’s being. We encounter language everywhere.” M. Heidegger: *Language*. In: *What is Literature? A Critical Anthology*. Ed. M. Robson, Wiley Blackwell, Hoboken 2020, p. 350.

²⁷ M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, p. 350.

²⁸ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, pp. 270–271.

ries and transcendentals which define entity from other perspectives and variants (being as being, substance). The second step is to take language as a language, and that means pointing it to an authentic, proper “object.” Therefore, language should refer not to essence (*τί ἐστί*), but to the very existence – *ὅτι ἐστί*.²⁹ This language directs us to being (not to entity) and its truth, since only then does it reach its real ground and true perspective opens for it. Language no longer uses the “forced” relationships with entities and human beings, resulting from the structure of syntactic and semantic categories, it is no longer “talking,” but rather instead “saying.”³⁰

Saying directly refers to the truth of being, so language adopts the proper “specificity,” which Heidegger shows by the play on words that reveals the deep sense of the above-mentioned approach to language. He writes: “Being and nothing less than its most ownmost (*eigenste*) essential swaying could actually make up that ground of language out of which language could draw its owning for determining first of all and all by itself that in relation to which language is explained metaphysically.”³¹ Heidegger just wants to refer language to being itself, because being provides the true ground for language, which means that any metaphysical approach and explanation should be properly rooted in the essence of language that says about being itself. Perhaps we might better understand his intention, when we notice the German root used in the text: *-eig-*. First, it is used in the superlative adjective form *eigenste*. *Eigenste* gives specificity to the term *Wesung* – being ownmost, so it refers to “the most specific ownmost state.” Then, *-eig-* is used in the nominal form, *Eignung*, which means being specific, or being own. I point this out because both *eigenste* and *Eignung* cast some light on the term *Ereignis*, enowning, which also contains the root *-eig-*. The demand to draw on the essence of language, that is its proper historical approach, can only be met if language asks about “is” alone, that is, about being itself.³² Obviously being enowns, so the history is just the enowning of being: “Das Seyn als Er-eignis ist die Geschichte”³³ – “The beings as en-owning is the history.” If so, the most specific (*eigenste*) ownmost state is the expression of the deepest enowning of being, which gives language its own properties, and as a result language can be metaphysically referred to being itself and to human being as *Dasein*.³⁴

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 271.

³⁰ H. Meschonnic: *La Langage Heidegger*. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1990, pp. 189–191.

³¹ M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy*..., p. 351.

³² P. Trawny: *Martin Heidegger*..., pp. 90–101; F. Dastur: *Heidegger*..., pp. 250–253.

³³ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie*..., p. 494.

³⁴ Ibidem, p. 78.

Language, *Dasein* and Being

Perhaps Heidegger's proposal concerning language might encourage us to emphasize its historical character, that is, to define language from the perspective of the enowning of being. This means that being, revealing itself in enowning – giving itself – makes language historical, and language occurs in history, it is enowned, and thus adopts specificity. Remembering the *eigenen-Eignis* relation, it should be understood as adopting the proper character of the metaphysical expression of being. Hence, language connects the metaphysical ground with man as *Dasein* who discovers it. The new perspective proposed by the philosopher focuses on referring language to being³⁵ and he poses the fundamental question of language's reference to being, meaning the question of how language says about it what is disclosed and makes present in language or through language. As a result, language has always been connected with human being understood as an *animal rationale*. Language expresses our rationality, which Heidegger emphasizes in the affirmation that language is given together with human being, and conversely, the human being is given together with language.³⁶

Due to such a close relationship, human being and language define each other. Trying to explain this definition, Heidegger points out that what needs to be specified in the case of the human being is that it “is-exists,” and it “is-exists” in a special way. What is more, “is-exists” expresses man in the most general way. It positions him with regard to being, which simply means that man is an existing being. But such a definition does not distinguish the individuality of man; it rather makes him similar to any other entity, to anything that “is-exists.” Heidegger wants to highlight the distinct nature of human being, so he stresses its relationship with being: a human being can be aware of its being, then it refers to being itself, or even, going beyond being, reaches for more.³⁷ Such a human being begins to belong to being, and only then does it reach its proper (specific) essence. In other words, only in the context of being is a human being able to understand its nature (essence). This occurs through the reference to being, that is, through com-

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 500; M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, p. 352.

³⁶ “[...] bis heute gültige Bestimmung des Menschen als animal rationale ist die Sprache mit dem Menschen gegeben und dies so gewiß, daß auch in der Umkehrung gesagt werden kann, mit der Sprache erst ist der Mensch gegeben.” M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, p. 499.

³⁷ S. M. Schoenbohm: *Reading Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy": An Orientation*. In: *Companion to Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy"...*, pp. 25–26.

prehending it. A human being is able to comprehend being, and as it does, it transforms from an “ordinary” entity into *Dasein*, which is aware of its being both “with” (*mit*) and “in” (*in*). This relation of comprehension changes human beings, who from that moment on focus on being. As Heidegger writes, the human being becomes the guardian of being.³⁸ The human being as *Dasein* emerges from being and can only find its sense in reference to it. No other way is possible for *Dasein*, since it would mean the loss of its humanity. Thus Heidegger tries to show a human being’s uniqueness by explaining its relationship with being itself. The human being-*Dasein* as an explorer of truth realizes the need to consolidate the truth by participation in the enowning of being, in its being en-owned, connected with acquiring the proper, owned (specific) essence-nature.³⁹

This understanding of human being-*Dasein* relates it to language, because language is part of its essence. For the human being, language is an instrument thanks to which it asserts whatever that “is-exists,” so language refers directly to being and it should be considered in relation to it. Language is a gift of being to a human being, and the nature of language comes from pure being. This may suggest that the proper question of the essence (nature) of language should refer to the essence (nature) of being, to its presence. Heidegger asks: “How does language sway in the swaying of be-ing?”⁴⁰ and suggests that language is essentially related to being and belongs to it, and as an instrument of being, it accomplishes its own goal in “thinking.” *Dasein*, then, is a determined projection of being and in the projection language is revealed as historical, connected with the history of human reference to being. The philosopher writes: “The language is ‘our’ language; ‘our’ language, not only as mother tongue, but also as the language of our history. And thus what is finally question-worthy within the mind-fullness of ‘the’ language befalls us.”⁴¹ Through being, language is connected with the human being, but only a human being understood as *Dasein* is aware of being, and only through being does it reveal its real nature.

Heidegger identifies the moment of the dynamic historicity of language by drawing on the historicity of a human being only identified from the perspective of being. A historically approached human being is immersed in a kind of metaphysics of being that conceals the human being’s real sense and essence. Language as *λόγος* expresses the historical human being as doomed

³⁸ “Man understands be-ing; he is the governor of projecting-open be-ing. The guardianship of the truth of be-ing makes up what is ownmost to man, gasped out of be-ing and ‘only’ out of this. Man belongs to be-ing as the one who is enowned by be-ing itself for grounding of the truth of be-ing.” M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, pp. 351–352.

³⁹ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, p. 294.

⁴⁰ M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, p. 352.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 353.

to “abground,” that is, suspended in the reality of being. Properly approached language – the language that expresses being in *Dasein*, aware of “what grounds,” is historical. Traditional language, which an *animal rationale* owns, is anthropologized and tries to describe “what is” using symbols. This way of using language undoubtedly blocks the way of what conceals the ground.⁴² The true being clears language of all the metaphysical symbols and represents the thinking of being itself; it is the transition from “logicizing” to “thinking” of the very “is.” Heidegger calls this kind of thinking being-historical thinking, thinking of enowning, and resounding of being in words. Thus, Heidegger’s pure language is the voice of being, the language that says the being, not only asserts it. We assert what we want to present, and that leads and limits us to beliefs and convictions. Instead of disclosing, it conceals what is already concealed even more. According to Heidegger, this is the type of language of traditional metaphysics, where it is used to explain, define and form the contents in the rational, that is, measurable, area (*ratio*-measure) to understand and possess it. This is what characterizes “owning the language” and its belonging to the human being as an *animal rationale*. The pursuit of “owning the language” leads to its anthropologization, which means that language is understood from the perspective of the human being: “The sound of word can be traced back to anatomical-physiological constitutions of the human body and can be explained in its terms (phonetics-acoustics). Likewise a word’s attunement and word’s melody and saying’s feeling-stress are objects of psychological explanation; and word’s meaning is the matter for logical-poetic-rhetorical analyses. The dependence of this explanation and analysis of language on the kind of conception of man is obvious.”⁴³ In such conditions, the essence and role of language are determined by the level of its anthropologization, which makes it impossible to express in language whatever is concealed. However, as the human being turns from an *animal rationale* entity to an entity aware of being, that is, *Dasein*, language arrives at its proper ability. With this turn, language belonging together with being becomes the expression of what is disclosed in enowning. When being can be ownmost, it can also make language ownmost, as it is free from any artificial character and logical ossification and then moves toward being.⁴⁴ The meaning and sound of words return to the sources, the hidden sense is disclosed in words, and language occurs, saying the history, sounds in enowning, and discloses its essential nature. This is where Heidegger tries to restore the originality and primacy to language.

⁴² “La ‘décadence du langage’ (*Sprachverfall*), conséquence du règne de la métaphysique moderne de la subjectivité.” H. Meschonnic: *La Langage Heidegger...*, p. 200.

⁴³ M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, p. 354.

⁴⁴ See D. Vallega-Neu: *Poetic Saying...*, pp. 72–73.

An Obstacle in the Path to a Language of Being – the Problem of Saying

Thus, we see that Heidegger tries to transform the useless traditional language of metaphysics into the language of being. He tries to draw on the inner, hidden contents of words and extract their senses in saying, so as to endow language with its proper character. He supposes that, as result, the words of language grasp the sense of what is concealed and transfer it to the unconcealed sphere: the sphere of enowning, specificity, and owning the essence of being (in accordance with the meaning of the terms *Ereignis*, *eig*, *eigen*, and *eignen*). Language accomplishes the ownmost belonging to the essence of being, and *Dasein* who uses the language acquires the specificity and ownship that is disclosed in the enowning of being.⁴⁵ Thus, Heidegger tries to acquire the proper language necessary to discover being itself and “other beginning,” the language that could bear the difficulty of turning of philosophical thought about the concealed ground that needs to be disclosed. Heidegger looks for the essence of language by removing the form that discloses the true content; he feels that language connected with being, extracted from being and saying of it, is in fact saying the saga of being. Heidegger devotes a lot of attention to the function of language “speaking-saying.” The role of language is unique, because its nature is not limited just to uttering words. Speaking is associated with something else, something that Heidegger expresses by comparing *Sprache* to *Sage*, as he writes: “Die Sprache als Aussagen und Sage.”⁴⁶ The German *Sage* means saying, or saga. Language in the meaning of *Sage* is not the same as language understood as *Sprache*. It could be assumed that language perceived as *sagen* is broader and deeper than *sprechen*. The verb *sprechen* well expresses the activity, art or ability connected with English speaking. In English, we can ask “Do you speak...?,” while in German “Sprechen Sie...? Sprichst du...?” to find out whether a person can use a given language. This illustrates understanding of speaking as a human skill. The saying (*sagen*) focuses exclusively on “what” is said. Thus, the essence of language is not the very function of speaking, the activity a human being is able to do (*sprechen*), but the essence of language is saying (*sagen*), which can also be explained as saying out, showing, manifesting, or even the possibility to hear or show.⁴⁷ When Heidegger

⁴⁵ S. M. Schoenbohm: *Reading Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy"...*, p. 25.

⁴⁶ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, p. 497.

⁴⁷ M. Heidegger: *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Ed. F. W. von Herrmann. [*Gesamtausgabe*. Band 12]. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p.188.

writes that language *aussagt* or *sagt*, he tries to point out, not its formal ability – the possibility to convey information in a symbolic way, but the source function of language – the ability to show a content of grounding, to say the saga of being. When a human being speaks in the “technical” sense, then he just uses language, but when he says, then that said content is the saying of being and makes *Sagen*, a saga.⁴⁸ Hence, a saga reveals being. It does not speak about being but “is” from it – “is” its voice.⁴⁹

Therefore, Heidegger purposefully emphasizes that language is truly saying, or *sage*. Language itself says, or asserts (*aussagen*), so it is not a human being-*Dasein* that speaks, but language says through *Dasein*, referring in the saying to its proper sense, that is, to being itself. In enowning, being “says” and “is enowned” in language, or reveals itself in language.

Sage, *sagen* in German is related to *Zeige*, *zeigen*, that is to show, to reveal, or to point. *Zeige* and *zeigen* also include *eigen*, which relates the word to *Er-eignis* – enowning. In the function of *Sage-Zeige*, language is enowning being with regard to *Dasein*.⁵⁰ The *Sage* (saga) approaches the limit of discourse or saying. The language appears to human being as a gift, enowning of being, and resounds in speech, but also in what is unsaid, what is *Sygetik*.⁵¹ It originates from the enowning of being itself, so it leads to silence, keeping silent, to the limit of “is” (being), behind which there is nothing.⁵² Asserting the very “is,” given to human being, is *sprechen*-speaking, yet not in the sense of activity but only in the sense of saying, like in German *sagen*.⁵³

The Silence

In *Contributions...* we read: “Language [as] the resonance that belongs to enowning, in which resonance enowning gifts itself as enstrifing of the strife into strife itself (earth-world).”⁵⁴ In this fragment, language appears as

⁴⁸ Ibidem, pp. 191–192.

⁴⁹ See P. Trawny: *Adyton...*, pp. 42–44; F. Dastur: *Heidegger...*, p. 249.

⁵⁰ See M. Heidegger: *Unterwegs zur Sprache...*, p. 210.

⁵¹ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, p. 79.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 78.

⁵³ Ibidem, p. 79.

⁵⁴ M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, p. 350; see P. Trawny: *Martin Heidegger...*, pp. 101–109.

the ringing (resonance), and as strife between the Earth and the World, which becomes the source of works of art. This expected ringing-sound will talk to the human being, to the *Dasein* that responds to it. The strife is the difference expressed in the work of art and the need of art, which presents itself to a human being between what is earthly and what is worldly.⁵⁵ Proper art looks for the truth and finds it in the disclosure of being. Heidegger links it to the appearance of gods and divinity.⁵⁶ Gods reveal the truth for a short time, and by their manifestation they call to make the effort to refer the Earth to the World. This calling echoes and sounds in human beings. In a way, this calling is the revealing of its being for the human being. The human being as *Dasein* receives the voice of the gods. The voice is revealed in its sound. It is the act of language, which – by enowning – like a saga says whatever is concealed. Language says to the human being, spins a saga for it, and resounds with the silence, which allows them to reach the end. Heidegger's language has nothing in common with "logicizing language" only focused on entity, on what is entity. Therefore, Heidegger's idea is aimed to show the source meaning of language in the sense of sound and silence at the same time, and to refer to the proper foundation, to the very being. Language is enowned but also in a way shows up in silence.⁵⁷ Perhaps it is possible to explain it the following manner: language as *Sage* resounds and then is consumed in silence – it reaches the limits and leads the human being understood as *Dasein* towards being itself, which is given in enowning. Silence (*syge*) prevents a human being from immersing into subjectivity; it makes the human being leave his anthropological point of view. So *Da-sein* is revealed in "de-humanized" human being and becomes manifest through saying language. Heidegger sees the role of gods and divinity here, because it is their call, their "voice," that makes the essence of the transformation of the human being into a conscious being: "When gods call the earth and a world resonates in the call and thus the call echoes as *Da-sein* of man, then language is a historical, as history-grounding word."⁵⁸ The essence of language is connected with the essence of being, and since the hidden being is expressed in silence too, then silence belongs together with language: it is its ground.

Language is based on silence, it emerges from silence and concealment. Heidegger recognizes the process as becoming present, that is, the self-determination of a certain measure – *Maß*. In German, the word *Maß* means

⁵⁵ Perhaps the meaning of strife is best presented by Heidegger in the context of concealment of being, but also its disclosing, unconcealment by delivering truth to whatever is generated, see: M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, pp. 262–263.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 269.

⁵⁷ M. Heidegger: *Unterwegs zur Sprache...*, p. 26.

⁵⁸ M. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy...*, p. 358.

measure, but also pattern or moderation, and perhaps the latter term is the most appropriate, because it means a specific ability to adopt the appropriate measure, or reserved attitude. According to Heidegger, the moderation needs to show because of the enowning of being and accompanies the appearance of fugue, it enables the joining of being, and thus enables the expression of the whole disclosed content of what is concealed and forgotten. The fugue fills the space between voice-language (i.e. what is able to be asserted by an entity) and silence (the silence of concealed basis). This transpires as part of the strife between the Earth and the World, which a human being as *Da-sein* joins through language. Heidegger explains this phenomenon in the final sentences of his *Contributions*...: "Language is grounded in silence. Silence is the most sheltered measure-holding. It holds the measure, in that it first set up measures. And so language is measure-setting in the most intimate and widest sense, measure-setting as essential swaying of the jointure and its joining (enowning). And insofar as language [is] ground of *Da-sein*, the measuring lies in this [*Da-sein*] and indeed as the ground of the strife of world and earth."⁵⁹ The measure of a human being is, therefore, a measure in the meaning of moderation, and it results from language disclosed to the human being as speech-saying of being. This happens in the obscure balance between saying and keeping silent, between sound and silence. Human being as *Dasein* experiences the language becoming present and listens to the voice of being that is being disclosed, which inevitably sounds out and leads to silence.⁶⁰ This is how Heidegger conceives the fugue as a constantly recurring sound, thus disclosing the boundary between sound and silence. The fugue also fills (joins) the space "in between" sound, causing the echo of silence.⁶¹ Each fugue can be referred to as the complement of silence, a voice leading right to the area of silence. Through the moderation of language, *Dasein* does not only experience sound, but also silence. Enowning-*Ereignis* is the full echoing of being between sound and silence.⁶²

The human being is not only an entity conscious of who is or what is. First of all, the human being is an entity conscious of what "is." The question of "is" constructs the whole nature of the human being. This is expressed by the linguistic term *Dasein*, in which *Da-* means location in a specific time and place, whereas *Sein* means being. So a human being

⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 359.

⁶⁰ M. Inwood: *A Heidegger Dictionary*..., p. 198; D. J. Schmidt: *Strategies for a Possible Reading*..., pp. 34–35.

⁶¹ A. Vallega: "Beyng-Historical Thinking" in Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy." In: *Companion to Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy"*, p. 51.

⁶² M. Heidegger: *Unterwegs zur Sprache*..., pp. 27–28; D. Vallega-Neu: *Poetic Saying*..., pp. 74–75.

becomes being-there – it is conscious that it is also in a specific way – in terms of time, space, and the world. Language allows the human being to define itself with reference to *Sein* and go towards what is concealed therein. Language is not at all artificial here, it is not a product or construct. It is natural, most original language that resounds and echoes till the end, until the ultimate silence.⁶³

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⁶³ M. Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie...*, p. 510.

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