Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

PL EN


Journal

2018 | 69 | 493-526

Article title

Potentia dei absoluta et potentia dei ordinata u Orygenesa? Nowa próba wyjaśnienia kontrowersyjnych fragmentów "De principiis"

Content

Title variants

EN
Potentia dei absoluta et potentia dei ordinata in Origen? A new attempt to explain the controversial fragments of "De principiis"

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

EN
The medieval dispute over the absolute and the ordered, power of God (poten­tia Dei absoluta et potentia Dei ordinata) began with a tract by Peter Damian entitled De divina omnipotentia. One of the questions posed in this work was whether God could indeed do everything, including those things that God did not in fact do. The same question, and a similar answer, appears in Origen’s work Contra Celsum: God can do everything except that which is evil. The impossibi­lity of doing evil, however, does not diminish the omnipotence of God, because evil, is by its very nature, non-being. Beyond that, Origen, in numerous statements appearing in his exegetical works, distinguishes between the absolute power of God, which is infinite, and the power of God that creates the world and operates within it, which has a certain God-given limit – that is, this power is adapted to the abilities of the creatures who receive it. The purpose of this article is to show that, in the light of the distinction of the potentia Dei absoluta and the potentia Dei or­dinata, fragments of De principiis (II 9.1 and IV 4.8), in which a finite world and finite power of God are posited, can be interpreted in a new way. Many contem­porary scholars, on the basis of these fragments, conclude that Origen inherited from the Greek philosophers a negative understanding of infinity as something imperfect, but the analysis carried out in this article shows something different. In talking about a certain range of God’s power, which is available to creatures, or in which creatures participate only partially, Origen does not actually exclude the proposition that, in God himself, power – existing in an absolute way – can be infinite.

Journal

Year

Volume

69

Pages

493-526

Physical description

Dates

published
2018-12-16

Contributors

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_31743_vp_3272
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.