

Notable Scholarly Reaction/Response to Charles Norris COCHRANE, *Christianity And Classical Culture: 1940-1958**

1. Charles Norris Cochrane: A Biography of His Intellect. Born in Ontario in 1889, Charles Norris Cochrane became Canada's leading classical historian and philosopher of history and civilization during the first half of the twentieth century. Educated at the University of Toronto, where he received his bachelor's degree in 1911, he furthered his studies at Oxford shortly thereafter. At the time that he received his doctorate, the world was at war, and a little more than twenty years later when he published *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine*, his *magnum opus*, the entire world was at war yet again. There can be little doubt that this historical backdrop colored the direction that his studies took and also had a strong influence upon his intellectual formation and subsequent scholarly contributions to this field. While this assertion is in some regards speculative, textual support from Cochrane's corpus could be found to give credence to it; however, that is not the aim of this paper and is far beyond its scope. It is important to note, but now let us keep ourselves to exploring his relationships – both direct and indirect – with a few key figures, relationships which so thoroughly influenced the trajectory of his life's work that they must be understood for his scholarship to be fully appreciated.

Famed Oxford philosopher of history, Robin George Collingwood had a close relationship with Cochrane. Based on their age alone, one would have thought them to be colleagues for they had been born in the same year; nevertheless, Collingwood was already established in the field by the time Cochrane arrived at Oxford to commence his doctoral studies at Corpus Christi College. Thus, Collingwood served as a mentor to Cochrane during these formative years, and as the Canadian political scientist Robert W. Cox, Professor Emeritus at York University in Toronto, shows, "to rethink critically the thought of the past"¹ was the methodological principal that ultimately stood at the heart of both Collingwood's and Cochrane's academic endeavors. Cox further explains: "For Collingwood this

* Charles Norris Cochrane's book – *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine* was first published by Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1940; reprinted, with the text revised and corrected, 1944). In 2003 it was reprinted by the Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, Indiana, with the addition of an Appendix of Latin and Greek translations by Kathleen and John Alvis and a change of page numbers from the Oxford edition.

¹ R.W. Cox – M.G. Schechter, *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization*, New York 2002, 148.

meant not the passive assimilation of that thought, but the attempt to reproduce it in an awareness of all the circumstances in which it was formed. This was not an injunction to a simplistic idealism which would see history as shaped by the ideas in people's minds, but rather a method in which mind becomes the point of access to the historical process, the point at which the material conditions of existence bear upon human consciousness, leading to action or inaction"². Although not his most famous work, *Speculum Mentis* (Mirror of the Mind, published 1924) is a work by Collingwood which fleshes out these ideas. In this text, the very first line of his Prologue reads, "All thought exists for the sake of action"³. He then treats many subjects (art, religion, science), and he concludes with his most important two – history, then philosophy. In moving between these final two subjects, he notes, "in the transition from history to philosophy, history as such is destroyed, the transition is so brief and so inevitable that much belonging to the historical frame of mind is taken over almost unchanged by the philosophical"⁴. These two disciplines are so near to one another in their aim that changing is in one sense a destruction of the former, but only in so much as the former has been conceived of as its own discipline for, as he indicates by speaking of the brevity and inevitability of the change, much actually remains unchanged.

Another one of Cochrane's contemporaries whose life's work must be brought into this discussion is the philosopher William George de Burgh. Also educated at Oxford, though at Merton College, de Burgh's scholarship largely operated according to the same principle of understanding history through the relation between thought and action. His *magnum opus*, *The Legacy of the Ancient World*, explores a topic quite similar to that of Cochrane's in *Christianity and Classical Culture*. Both men acknowledge the good that came out of classical culture, but they also note quite clearly the ultimate insufficiency of classical thought to stand on its own apart from the influence of Christianity, which both men contend is the only means by which those good parts of classical culture (e.g. individual liberty, external governing authority, etc.) have been preserved unto our own day and the only means by which those good qualities were able to persist without decaying into something crippling by virtue of being extreme. The balance provided by the Christian worldview, the Christian mindset, fulfills and perfects the imperfections of the classical mind.

To find any concrete evidence linking de Burgh to Cochrane, however, is a difficult task. It is unknown whether – but rather unlikely that – the two may have ever crossed paths at Oxford, but it is quite apparent that they were educated and formed according to the same mold. The intellectual currents present at Oxford in the early decades of the twentieth century were clearly tending in the direction of linking inseparably the notions of thought and action in historical development, but it was de Burgh, roughly twenty years Cochrane's senior, who first published

² Ibidem, , p. 148.

³ R.G. Collingwood, *Speculum Mentis* or *The Map of Knowledge*, Oxford 1924, 15.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 246.

such an influential exploration of Christian development out of the classical context according to this principle. de Burgh's *The Legacy of the Ancient World* was published in 1923, while it was not until 1940 that Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture* was published. Although so similar in topic and methodology, to say definitively that Cochrane had full knowledge of de Burgh's work is impossible. The fact that they were trained in the same environment within the same general time frame may be all that can be said of their connection; nevertheless, this is important to note because it points back to an as-of-yet unidentified common source, whether it was one particular scholar-professor or a small intellectual movement among certain faculties across multiple colleges at the university.

Collingwood gives voice to the ideas in his philosophy, and de Burgh and Cochrane actualize them in extended, book-length studies of similar subjects. But since each of these men were roughly contemporary with one another and since the ordering of the publishing of the works discussed here shows no natural progression from idea to method to practice, one must assume that it was the professors at Oxford in that time who had created such an intellectual milieu that bore a uniform result within each student formed therein.

Cochrane's work, however it ultimately came to be, leaves readers with many questions yet to ponder. He delves into an exploration of the emergence of Christian metaphysics out of the classical context, which was in decay by virtue of its own philosophical deficiencies, and this opens up the question for modern readers about whether the principles of Christianity which allowed it to salvage what it could of classical ideas are principles which could still salvage the seeming trainwreck of modern civilization in the West, which is plagued by the same polar oscillation between extreme philosophical currents, a dyadic arrangement such as can only lead to unintentional self-destruction.

2. Is Cochrane a Christian Historicist? In the strictest sense, "Christian Historicism" is a misnomer: Historicism is, essentially, the conception that the meaning of history may be inferred from the phenomena of history according to intrinsic laws governing its progressive development. By rational deduction or empirical induction, the identification of those laws of history enables historical prediction and explanation. There is no necessity for referral to anything extrinsic to history for its normative elucidation (e.g., divine intervention or revelation).

On the other hand, Christian thought, including that of both Tertullian and Augustine, denies that history is self-explanatory. Rather, it asserts that the end and process of history is governed by divine intent and providence, both of which are often inscrutable but bracketed by the effects of providence and the elucidation of special revelation. Apart from either, the process of history is ambiguous regarding its vector quality, its cyclical characteristics, and its ultimate, objective significance. For Christian thought, history is understandable only within the redemptive purpose of God and culminates in the fulfillment of that purpose.

Accordingly, a philosophy of history (also known as: “metahistory”) was repudiated by both Tertullian and Augustine, who insisted upon the theocentric understanding of history. Cochrane tips his historicist hand in his vigorous attack upon Tertullian, whom he criticizes for identifying classical Greek idealism as “the enemy”, and calls him the “first apostle of modern relativism”. In so doing, Cochrane reveals his determined adherence to that historicist idealist tradition, saying, “He [Tertullian] has failed to realize that the law of progress is a law for man and that no coherent and intelligible theory thereof can be erected on speculation regarding the structure and process of external nature”⁵.

Disavowing both classical Greek naturalism and modern positivism, Cochrane is affirming his commitment to classical Greek idealism as a basis for *metahistory*.

Cochrane finds Augustine to be more congenial to his understanding of history, particularly in his epistemological appeal to the *imago Dei*. Cochrane recognizes the anticipation of Descartes’ “turn to the subject” but fails to recognize a vital difference: The Cartesian appeal affirmed the primacy of the self, whereas Augustine’s appeal affirmed the primacy of God as the context of understanding both the world and history. Greek and modern idealism differ fundamentally from Augustine’s purported idealism at the level of the *grundsatz*, the foundational presupposition, upon which they proceeded. The primacy-of-the-self dominated both classical Greek idealism and Cartesian Modernity, and was explicitly identified as such by Nietzsche in both his critique of Modern thought and his affirmation of the primacy of the self in the form of the primacy of the will⁶.

The patent incongruity of modern idealism and Christian thought led to the collapse of both the Kantian and Hegelian modifications of Christian thought and gave rise to the current, postmodern attempts to rescue the primacy of the self in the form of materialist, collectivist expressions of the “self”. Cochrane, writing in the late 1930’s as a former student of Collingwood, clearly was attempting to maintain a defunct alliance between classical idealism and Christian thought in the face of the post-Augustinian, modern rise and postmodern collapse of secular idealism.

In the final analysis, Cochrane cannot escape the vector of Christian thought and action as it relates to history. He asserts in ambiguous, almost resigned, terms his concluding conception of history that has been disciplined but not reformed by the close engagement with Augustine and even Tertullian: “Properly understood, history is the record of a struggle, not for the realization of material or ideal values but for the materialization, embodiment, the registration in consciousness of real values, the values of truth, beauty, and goodness which are thus so to speak thrust upon it as the very condition of its life and being. *In these terms and in these terms alone can the secular effort of the human spirit be explained and justified, for only thus does it become intelligible* [emphasis added]”⁷.

⁵ Ch.N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine*, Indianapolis 2003, 270.

⁶ Cf. F. Nietzsche, *The Use and Abuse of History*, transl. A. Collins, Indianapolis 1977², 54ff.

⁷ Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, p. 565-566.

This is a plaintive, last cry of a failed alliance in the deepening gloom of post-modern relativism and the demise of secular, historical thought. It also amplifies the crucial character of grounding presuppositions in the search for understanding history and the world at large. There is echoed here, the perennial question of Tertullian: “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem, the Academy with the Church?”⁸ Both the Self and God cannot enjoy primacy.

If history is “prophetic” and readable from its own pages, its declaration is that the primacy of the self in all of its manifestations has been and will be detrimental not only for the *cultures* that hold God in contempt, but for those *individuals* who, holding God in contempt, hold themselves and others in contempt. This is the “law for [sinful] man”, not historical progress. “Christian Historicism” is, technically, an oxymoron. But, as a suitable appellation for that failed alliance, one can investigate if it applies to Charles Norris Cochrane.

3. Introduction to the Reviews. Since its publication in 1940 (*Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine*), has been recognized as a major contribution to our understanding of Christianity in the Roman Empire. A number of reviews appeared in scholarly journals between 1941 and 1958, which are listed below in alphabetical order:

- Auden W.H. → “The New Republic” 1944 (25 IX), 373-376.
 Boas G. → “The Classical Weekly” 34 (1941) no. 12, 139-140.
 Burns C.D. → “Ethics” 51 (1941) no. 2, 236-238.
 Case Sh.J. → “The Journal of Religion” 24 (1944) no. 4, 289-290.
 Cilleruelo L. → “Religion y cultura” 1 (1956) 329-331.
 Faurot J.H. → “The Westminster Theological Journal” 3 (1941) no. 2, 194-199.
 Grant R.M. → “Anglican Theological Review” 27 (1945) no. 1, 60-61.
 Henry R.M. → “The Classical Review” 54 (1940) no. 4, 207-208.
 Kraeling C.H. → JBL 60 (1941) no. 3, 343-345.
 Kristeller P.O. → “The Journal of Philosophy” 41 (1944) no. 21, 576-581.
 Laistner M.L.W. → “The American Historical Review” 47 (1942) no. 2, 314-315.
 Marrou H.-I. → “The Review of Politics” 9 (1947) no. 2, 247-251.
 Momigliano A. → “The Journal of Roman Studies” 31 (1941) 193-194.
 Outler A.C. → “Theology Today” 2 (1945) no. 2, 265-267.
 Shepherd M.H. Jr. → “The Journal of Religion” 21 (1941) no. 4, 480-482.
 Wolf R.C. → “Journal of Bible and Religion” 26 (1958) no. 2, 148-149.

It is evident that scholars from a variety of disciplines have assessed Cochrane’s work from their own viewpoints in their respective professional journals. Because of its scope and the ability of its Author to discover historical patterns, this book has been ranked with Werner Jaeger’s *Paideia* (Wystan Hugh Auden) and William Foxwell Albright’s *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (Carl H. Kraeling). Max Ludwig Wolfram Laistner gives high praise to the factual accuracy of the book. Jean H. Faurot considers *Christianity and Classical Culture* to be a refutation of

⁸ Tertullianus, *De praescriptione* VII 9, ed. R.F. Refoulé, SCh 46, Paris 1957, 98, own translation.

Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. As such it is a "profound analysis of the inadequacies of the classical mind" (Reinhold Niebuhr). The book is a "landmark" in the history of the early church, because it offers a new interpretation of the period from 50 B.C to 400 A.D. (Richard C. Wolf). It is novel in the sense that few try to present history in terms of thought leading to action, which would seem to be a valid approach (George Boas). The work is described as successfully bridging the gap between the Classical and Christian realms of the Roman Empire with Cicero and Augustine "as giant pedestals supporting the structure of the argument" (Massey H. Shepherd, Jr.).

Appended below are reviews of Cochrane by four writers of note:

- a) Wystan Hugh Auden – Anglo-American poet, one of the great writers of the twentieth century, who attests that reading Cochrane led him back to the Christian faith and became a basis of his own theology.
- b) Paul Oskar Kristeller – foremost scholar of Renaissance humanism and archivist.
- c) Henri-Irénée Marrou – patristics scholar and theologian of history.
- d) Arnaldo Momigliano – scholar of ancient and modern historiography.

Whether the comments contained in these reviews and the others, which are listed but not reproduced here, are accurate, the reader will have to judge in light of the book.

a) W.H. Auden → "The New Republic" 1944 (25 IX), 373-376. Since the appearance of the first edition in 1940, I have read this book many times, and my conviction of its importance to the understanding not only of the epoch with which it is concerned, but also of our own, has increased with each rereading.

It is divided into three sections. The first, "Reconstruction", describes the attempt of the Principate to justify itself as the political form which could best realize the good life on earth as envisaged by classical philosophy. It traces the fortunes of the New Order, from its foundation by Augustus, attended by the hopes of all civilized mankind, to its collapse after the death of Diocletian. The second, "Renovation", beginning with the edict of Milan in 313 A.D. and ending with an edict of 403 which authorized private individuals "to exercise with impunity the right of public vengeance against criminals", describes the futile attempt, interrupted by the platonist Julian, of the last Caesars to give the dying empire a new lease of life by substituting Christianity for philosophy as a state religion. The last section, "Regeneration", is an exposition of the writings of St. Augustine, in particular of his views on the doctrine of the Trinity, the State and Divine Providence in history.

The distinctive mark of classical thought is that it gives no positive value to freedom, and identifies the divine with the necessary or the legal. It separates order and freedom, and presupposes two everlastingly opposite principles; on the one hand God, who is pure Mind, One, neuter, immobile, and on the other the World, which is Matter, many, in chaotic motion. God, as pure Order, is absolutely self-sufficient and does not need the World; the World, however, needs God, for

in its free state it is a meaningless chaos which can only acquire meaning by giving up its freedom and obeying law. According to Aristotle, it wants to do this and imitates God in the only ways which it can, namely, by taking typical forms and acquiring regular motions; according to Plato, it is helpless, and requires an intermediary demiurge who loves the divine ideas and models the world after them. Plato does not make it clear whether this is a voluntary act of the demiurge or a duty imposed on him by his knowledge of the ideas, but, in any case, it is not the demiurge that man is to get to know but the self-sufficient ideas. Man also consists of two elements, a rational soul which is “a scintilla of the divine archetype”, immortal, capable of recognizing the necessity of truth and so becoming incapable of error, and a finite body which is mortal, incapable of redemption, but on whose freedom the mind can impose a decent order. The final note in Homer was one of despair: the evil in the world is due to the gods from whose whims men cannot escape. Classical idealism, on the other hand, identifies evil with the freedom of finite matter, and believes that men can escape by becoming conscious of the truth which compels obedience. It agrees with Homer that history is evil, but believes that man has a *telos* which is, by imposing the true order on his nature, to rescue himself from the temporal flux. The aim of *paideia* (Jaeger’s volumes should be read in conjunction with this book) is the creation of a supra-historical society, in which succeeding generations shall be exactly like each other in their perfect obedience to eternal laws. Creation, whether political, educational or artistic, is a one-sided affair of imposing universal or typical meaning upon passive or reluctant meaningless individuals: all the initiative comes from the creator or the mind; the creature or the body obeys involuntarily. Classical idealism cannot therefore oppose tyranny on principle; it can only oppose a particular tyrant on the ground that his order is not the true order. Unable to give any meaning to individuality, it has no proper place for the individual who imposes law, and tends in consequence to give him a superhuman, demiurgic status.

Nor can it establish any intelligible connection between the natural affective bonds and the love of justice, for the characteristic feature of *philia* or of *eros* is that it is personal – families and lovers love each other, not each other’s virtues; they pity and forgive each other, that is, they allow each other to escape the universal law of justice.

By Augustine’s time, the attempt to build a society on these principles had completely failed; the introduction of Christianity had not arrested the collapse; if anything, it hastened it.

In his writings, he is not trying to offer a more efficient substitute, which can be guaranteed to make men healthy, wealthy and wise, but to show that the Christian faith can make sense of man’s private and social experience, and that classical philosophy cannot.

To the classical doctrine of God as an impersonal, immobile Being, the object of *phronesis*, he opposes the Christian doctrine of God as a unity of three Persons who created the world out of nothing: “The first hypostasis, Being, the creative

principle properly so called is, strictly speaking, unknown and unknowable, except in so far as it manifests itself in the second and third; the second [*sic*] hypostasis, the principle of intelligence, reveals itself as the logos, ratio or order of the universe; while the third, the hypostasis of spirit, is the principle of motion therein. To assert that these hypostases are uncreated is simply to assert their existence as principles. As such they are not to be confused in person; being is not to be resolved into order, nor is order to be resolved into process. At the same time, as a substantial unity of substance, they do not admit of separation, *i.e.*, they are not mutually exclusive or antithetic. In other words, the opposition between them is purely and simply one of internal, necessary, relations”.

The doctrine of the Trinity is the theological formulation of the Christian belief that God is Love, and that by Love is meant not Eros but Agape, *i.e.*, not a desire to get possession of something one lacks, but a reciprocal relation, not an everlastingly “given” state, but a dynamic free expression; an unchanging love is a continually novel decision to love. The formula is an offense to the will and a foolishness to the reason, because the will is only convinced by the necessity of superior power which all weaker objects must obey, the reason by logical necessity, like the timeless truths of geometry. The will could accept the idea of either one or three persons, “very big men with red hair”, but not the trinity in unity; the reason could grasp the latter as a concept, like a triangle, but not the doctrine, of three *persons*.

A monolithic monotheism is always a doctrine of God as either manic-depressive Power or schizophrenic Truth. As the first, it can account for the existence of the world, but not for the evil in it; as the second, it can account for the evil, once there is a world the existence of which it cannot account for.

It follows from the doctrine of the Trinity that to say God chose to create the word, and to say He had to create it, mean the same thing, for the love which is God is, by definition, a creative love. A God of power could create a world and perhaps love it, but he could not need it to love him, for to him reciprocity would have no meaning; a God of truth would be self-sufficient and to him creation would be meaningless. The Christian doctrine of creation asserts, among other things, that there is nothing intrinsically evil in matter, the order of nature is inherent in its substance, individuality and motion have meaning, and history is not an unfortunate failure of necessity to master chance, but a dialectic of human choice.

To the classical doctrine of Man as an immortal divine reason incarcerated in a finite mortal body, Augustine opposes the Christian doctrines of Man as created in the image of God, and Man as a fallen creature.

The contrast is not between body and mind, but between flesh, *i.e.*, all man’s physical and mental faculties as they exist in his enslaved self-loving state, and spirit, which witnesses within him to all that his existence was and still is meant to be, capable of loving God in the same way that God loves him.

When a Christian, like Augustine, talks about ethics, therefore, he begins not with the rational act or the pleasant act, but with the *acte gratuite*, which is neither reasonable nor physically pleasant, but a pure assertion of absolute self autonomy.

As the hero in Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky's *Notes from Underground* says: "You will scream at me (that is, if you condescend to do so) that no one is touching my free will, that all they are concerned with is that my will should of itself, of its own free will, coincide with my own normal interests, with the laws of nature and arithmetic. Good Heavens, gentlemen, what sort of free will is left when we come to tabulation and arithmetic, when it will all be a case of two times two making four? Two times two makes four without my will. As if free will meant that!"⁹.

Man, that is to say, always acts either self-loving, just for the hell of it, or God-loving, just for the heaven of it; his reasons, his appetites are secondary motivations. Man chooses either life or death, but he chooses; everything he does, from going to the toilet to mathematical speculation, is an act of religious worship, either of God or of himself.

Lastly to the classical apotheosis of the Man-God, Augustine opposes the Christian belief in Jesus Christ, the God-Man. The former is a Hercules who compels recognition by the great deeds he does in establishing for the common people the law, order and prosperity they cannot establish for themselves, by his manifestation of superior power; the latter reveals to fallen man that God is love by suffering, *i.e.*, by refusing to compel recognition, choosing instead to be a victim of man's self-love. The idea of a sacrificial victim is not new; but that it should be the victim who chooses to be sacrificed, and the sacrificers who deny that any sacrifice has been made, is very new.

In his description of the earthly and the heavenly cities, Augustine draws from the Christian faith certain political conclusions. The human individual is to be envisaged "not as a speck of cosmic matter, shooting up like a meteor through space, and for a brief moment lighting up the sky, before the darkness closes around it, nor yet as *anthropos tis*, a mere specimen in a biological, racial, occupational, cultural or political group, but, in Tertullian's words, as the *vas spiritus*, the one real subject of volition, *i.e.*, of intelligent and deliberate activity". At the same time, individuality is inconceivable except in relation to others; "his life and death are with his neighbors". Every society, from the smallest to the largest, is "a group of rational beings associated on the basis of a common tie in respect of those things which they love". In so far as its members love themselves, a society is an earthly city in which order is maintained by force and fear of chaos, bound sooner or later to break down under the tension between freedom and law; in so far as they love God and their neighbor as themselves, the same society becomes a heavenly city in which order appears the natural consequence of freedom, not a physical or logical imposition. "This may well be mysterious, but it is not mythical or hypothetical. For it means that the selfsame human wills have attached themselves, not to transcendental objects (that they leave to Platonism), but to a principle which gives the «object» world a wholly fresh complexion, thus making all things new".

To see this is to realize, first, that no power on earth can compel men to love; it can only compel them to conform till it is overthrown; all legislation and coercion,

⁹ F.M. Dostoyevsky, *Notes from Underground*, in: *Short Novels of the Masters*, New York 2001, 146.

however necessary, has a negative function only; respectability can be a consequence of habituation, though not for long; love never becomes a habit. Second, there is no perfect *form* of society; the best form can only be the form through which at any given historical moment or in any given geographical location, love for one's neighbor can express itself most freely, *i.e.*, it is a practical not an ideological matter. There can, for the Christian, be no distinction between the personal and the political, for all his relationships are both; every marriage is a polis, every imperium a family; and he has to learn to forgive and sacrifice himself for his enemies, as for his wife and children.

He is to be neither an anarchist nor a non-political "idiot", but to act now, with an eye fixed, neither nostalgically on the past nor dreamily on some ideal future, but on eternity – "redeeming the time" – In the words of Sidney Smith, he is to "trust in God and take short views".

Our period is not so unlike the age of Augustine: the planned society, caesarism of thugs or bureaucracies, *paideia*, *scientia*, religious persecution, are all with us. Nor is there even lacking the possibility of a new Constantinism; letters have already begun to appear in the press, recommending religious instruction in schools as a cure for juvenile delinquency; Mr. Cochrane's terrifying description of the "Christian" empire under Theodosius should discourage such hopes of using Christianity as a spiritual benzedrine for the earthly city, which may use the words of the Lord's Prayer but translates them into its own classical meanings, admirably retranslated into the vulgar English by William Blake: "Our Father Augustus Caesar who art in these thy Substantial Astronomical Telescopic Heavens, Holiness to Thy Name or Title, and reverence to Thy Shadow. Thy Kingship come upon Earth first and then in Heaven. Give us day by day our Real Taxed Substantial Money bought Bread; deliver from the Holy Ghost whatever cannot be taxed; for all is debts and taxes between Caesar and us and one another; lead us not to read the Bible, but let our Bible be Vergil and Shakespeare; and deliver us from Poverty in Jesus, that Evil One. For Thine is the Kingship or Allegoric Godship, and the Power or War, and the Glory or Law, ages after ages in Thy descendants; for God is only an allegory of Kings and nothing else".

b) P.O. Kristeller → "The Journal of Philosophy" 41 (1944) no. 21, 576-581. In a time when a widespread ignorance and neglect of the values of our intellectual heritage is threatening to destroy the monuments and institutions embodying those values, the recovery of the past by historians conscious of their task is more necessary than ever. For a proper understanding of that heritage, the period of late antiquity is of particular moment, because it was during that period that the two most important elements of Western civilization were first brought together: Christianity and classical culture. Professor Cochrane has given us a new and comprehensive description of that period in a book first published in 1940 which has now been issued in a revised, American edition.

The book certainly ranks among the most important contributions made to classical studies in the last few years. Professor Cochrane gives a complete survey of the administrative, legal, and social history of the Roman Empire during the first four centuries of our era. He skillfully illustrates the political ideologies and slogans which accompanied, decorated, or covered the actual course of events. He analyzes the literary, philosophical, and religious ideas and movements as they reflected or influenced the trend of political and social developments. His work shows a full and impressive command of the literary, legal, epigraphical, and numismatic sources of the period, and makes use of many recent studies by English, American, and French scholars. The book is written in a brilliant and lively style, and it shows on every page the author's keen awareness of present-day problems, which makes the reading very attractive for the general reader. At the same time, the scholarly specialist will admire the lucid exposition of administrative and legal developments, as well as the masterful pages dedicated to such figures as Augustus, Julian, Valentinian, and Theodosius. Those pages show a firm grasp on the facts and a subtle sense for historical nuances, two qualities that are not often found together. The book also contains a number of interesting interpretations of Cicero, Plutarch, and the Roman historians, and it treats at length the theological controversies of the fourth century, and the doctrine of the Church Fathers, especially Augustine, to whom the last chapters are dedicated. Problems of a more general scope are constantly discussed with great skill, and some of the digressions lead far back into early Greek thought and poetry.

The great merits of the work are somewhat counterbalanced by a number of serious defects which are likely to make the book unsatisfactory to the scholar and dangerous for the general reader. Professor Cochrane has a love for slogans that contributes to the elegance of his presentation, but that sometimes carries him beyond the bounds of good taste, clarity, and truth. His chapter headings, like the titles of our novels and movies, have more appeal to the imagination than a specific connection with the content of the chapters. In a time when even such established terms as Platonism and Aristotelianism have become of doubtful use, the author chooses to coin Catonism, Vergilianism, Theodosianism, and the like. Still worse, the author freely applies to late antiquity a good number of contemporary terms and slogans such as humanism, idealism, materialism, and the like. This might seem to be a harmless and even elegant play with words, but Professor Cochrane, like many other recent historians, tends to treat those abstract concepts and generalizations as if they were real entities, and thus to create a kind of historical mythology which implicitly favors bias and confusion. This habit becomes particularly misleading when the modern connotations of certain slogans are subtly used to interpret and judge ancient phenomena. To give an example, when Professor Cochrane characterizes the administrative system of Constantine the Great as "Christian socialism", he is not satisfied with this dubious definition, but proceeds to conclude that from the failure of Constantine's programme "it is possible to forecast the probable outcome of analogous movements in modern times" (p. 196f.). No less doubtful is

his attempt to associate the Greek notion of the hero with the modern concept of the superman (p. 110ff.) He fails to notice that the Greek idea of the hero, at least prior to Alexander the Great, had very specific religious connotations, and that such concepts as Ate, Hybris, or the envy of the gods, were far too important in early Greek thought to allow us to speak of the ideal of a “strictly human excellence”¹⁰.

Moreover, the general thesis and conception of the book lends itself to serious objections. Professor Cochrane understands the fall of Rome as “the fall of an idea, or rather of a system of life based upon a complex of ideas which may be described broadly as those of Classicism”. Emperors, like Constantine and Theodosius, tried to come to terms with Christianity, but they sought to make it subservient to the previous political and social system. This explains their failure (p. 355ff.). On the other hand, it is suggested that Christian thinkers like Augustine developed a new, Christian philosophy opposed to “classicism” which was destined to be the firm foundation of the following age.

The attempt to view the entire body of ideas that may be found in classical antiquity as a unified system of “classicism” can hardly be accepted. To be sure, most classical writers and thinkers share a few very general, common premises; and a few characteristically Christian doctrines in particular, like creation, grace, or the manifestation of a divine plan in history, are consistently absent in pre-Christian antiquity. Yet this is not enough to make “classicism” a unified body of ideas. Attention should be given to the various schools of philosophy and of rhetoric, to the political and religious ideas expressed by the early Greek poets, to the ideas inherent in popular Greek and Roman religion, and to the numerous Eastern cults brought to the West during the later centuries. Professor Cochrane disregards many of these elements or makes but casual reference to them. He describes “classicism” rather vaguely as a religion of culture, as humanism, as science, and the like. Sometimes he distinguishes “classical idealism” and “classical materialism”, meaning by the latter the Epicureans, and by the former mainly the Platonists. The Stoics, whom he tends to neglect, are also considered “idealists”, which is rather dubious if we take the term in the only sense in which it might be properly applied to classical thinkers.

Professor Cochrane has many eloquent denunciations of the barrenness of “classicism” and especially of “classical idealism”. The specific ideas singled out for criticism and almost made responsible for the fall of the Roman Empire are the distinction between fortune and virtue, and that between form and matter. These distinctions are certainly not identical, or even parts of a common “system”. The distinction between fortune and virtue appears quite commonly in popular Hellenistic thought,

¹⁰ Professor Cochrane, following the authority of Professor Maritain, even tries to trace the modern term “superman” back to Gregory the Great. He quotes Gregory as saying: *qui divina sapient videlicet supra-homines sunt*, and translates: “they are, so to speak (with apologies for the barbarism), supermen” (p. 113). There is no hyphen in Latin, and we must obviously read: *supra homines sunt*, and translate: “are above men”. The “barbarism” of language and thought thus is not of Saint Gregory, and we must return to the correct view that “the ugly word superman” is “a product of nineteenth century pseudo-philosophy”.

but certainly not as the dominating idea of any philosophical system. Moreover, the concept of fortune did not always have the connotation of blind, irresponsible chance to which Professor Cochrane objects so strongly; it was connected with divine action in early Greek poetry, with natural causes in Aristotle, and with providence in the Stoics, and in this less extreme sense the concept of fortune survived through the Christian Middle Ages. On the other hand, the distinction between form and matter is characteristic of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and it has played a major role in the history of Western thought. I can not see how it contributed to the downfall of the Roman Empire, nor do I think it was a major issue in the final contest between Christianity and paganism. Christian thinkers always asserted the conception of *creatio ex nihilo*, and hence rejected the eternity of matter; but the distinction between form and matter as such was not rejected by Augustine or any medieval Christian thinker, nor was the existence of transcendent, incorporeal "Ideas".

No less elusive than his concept of classicism is Professor Cochrane's concept of Christianity. He does not speak of the doctrines of the New Testament or of the early apologists at all, but begins his treatment of Christian authors with the Fathers of the late second century. The consequences of this omission are serious. Only by a comparison between the New Testament and pre-Christian classical writings can the novelty of Christianity and its basic difference from pagan thought be properly illustrated. The work of the apologists, the Fathers, and the Councils can not be understood as a complete destruction of classical thought, as Professor Cochrane seems to suggest; it is rather a gradual elaboration and systematization of the original Christian doctrine, in which classical methods, terms, and ideas play an increasingly significant role. The process was one of selection, and whereas all those ideas were discarded which seemed to be incompatible with the fundamental teachings of Christianity, many others were thought to be compatible and freely assimilated. To present the Church Fathers and Councils as the representatives of a totally new Christian thought, almost uninfluenced by classical thought and entirely opposed to it, is really a distortion of perspective. To maintain this view, Professor Cochrane is constantly forced to disregard or to minimize the classical elements in the Church Fathers. He fails to see that the trinitarian formula of Nicea, at least in its scheme and terminology, was influenced by the Greek philosophical tradition. His presentation of Augustine is particularly amazing in that respect. Augustine's debt to classical thought and literature is treated most casually. Several ideas are credited to Augustine which actually are derived from classical thinkers. On the other hand, Professor Cochrane engages in a lengthy diatribe against Platonism to which Augustine himself would hardly subscribe. The extensive analysis of Augustine, in spite of its many brilliant passages, thus remains unsatisfactory because the lines between the Christian, classical, and original elements in Augustine are not clearly drawn.

As to the relation between "classical idealism" and the fall of the Roman Empire, Christianity and the medieval world, Professor Cochrane's thesis is as fallacious as it is suggestive. Actually the Roman Empire lasted for almost five hundred years in the West after Augustus, which is a considerable period, and in the East

it persisted for another thousand years. Thus it still remains to be explained why “classicism” had less disastrous consequences in the East than in the West, in spite of the fact that the philosophical ideas of antiquity all originated in the East and were transferred to the West in a rather belated and superficial manner. On the other hand, although the lasting contributions of Augustine to Western thought are obvious, I can not see that his thought laid the foundation for any *political* organization that has equalled or surpassed the Roman Empire in historical vitality. All these difficulties vanish as soon as we stop conceiving the relation between thought and action in an oversimplified manner, and are ready to admit that social and intellectual developments, although interrelated in many ways, also follow their independent courses.

The underlying reason for all these controversial points is apparently the stand Professor Cochrane takes on the philosophical, political, and social issues of the present day. He seems to endorse a Christian point of view opposed to the principles implied in modern natural and social science. Instead of arguing his point in a philosophical or ideological treatise, he has written a book on ancient history in which the present-day contrast between Christianity and modern science, as he sees it, is read into the contrast between Christianity and ancient philosophy. If the author had stated his position more directly, we might argue against it along the lines of contemporary thought. If we follow his own method of historical polemic, we might merely say that Augustine never rejected the ancient concept of truth as such (as the author asserts on p. 506f.), but merely added Christian truth to what was really true in classical thought, which included much more than Professor Cochrane would have us believe.

As a book of historical scholarship, Professor Cochrane’s book ranks very high indeed in all those sections in which he gives a factual account of political developments or analyzes the content of specific texts. The remaining sections, dealing with a general discussion and criticism of philosophical and theological ideas, is always stimulating and provocative, but vitiated by his preconceptions, and hence to be read with caution. In view of the excellent qualities of the work, it is to be regretted that the author has not withstood more successfully the temptation to exaggerate the contrast between Christianity and classical thought and to play up the former against the latter. The contribution of both elements to Western civilization has been of equal importance, and both heritages are again badly needed if we want to overcome the confusion of ideas and of values that has been threatening our physical and spiritual existence.

c) H.-I. Marrou → “**The Review of Politics**” 9 (1947) no. 2, 247-251. This is a truly remarkable book, one of the most important to appear in many years in the field of classical scholarship. Professor Cochrane’s competence in Hellenistic studies has been established since his excellent *Thucydides*. He proves today that he is no less familiar with the Latin classics (note the admirable pages on Virgil) and that his curiosity extends to the field of patristic thought.

Here I wish to mention only those ideas which interest most directly the readers of "The Review of Politics". They are, as a matter of fact, the principal ideas of the book whose subject is really the transformation of the political ideal of the Roman Empire following the triumph of Christianity. The reader should be so warned for the ambiguous title might lead one to believe it concerns the role of the study of the classics in a Christian education.

The whole first part (p. 176ff.) is devoted to an analysis of the ideological structure of the imperial regime as it was organized by Augustus, thought of and dreamed of by the great Latin writers of his time, and as it developed under the Julio-Claudian and Antonine dynasties. No historian has ever so brilliantly described and justified the claims to glory of this Empire which, as Professor Cochrane shows, is the culmination, the very summit of all the history of the Greco-Roman world. The Empire assured the civilized world of order within and peace without; it solved thereby the twofold political problem which Greece had always failed to do. Moreover the state ceased to be moved, as under the Republic, only by the will to power, the spirit of conquest and *Raubwirtschafft*: but it deliberately placed itself in the service of the ideal values which animated the Hellenistic and Roman civilization. Augustus meant, as Professor Cochrane points out, to build a world safe for civilization. For the classical mind the final end of human life is to attain happiness. The Roman Empire was a state conceived and organized to make it easy for its citizens to attain happiness, the peaceful possession of the temporal and spiritual goods of this world whence happiness derives. Never was a more conscious effort made in the history of the world to organize the terrestrial city in the function of this human ideal.

It is needless to point out how foreign this ideology was to the Christian ideal. The Roman Empire which thought of itself as the final stage in the history of humanity – hence its belief in the eternity of Rome – made an absolute of terrestrial life. Its true religion was the religion of culture. This disposition of humanity which it considered definitive, represents, like an "antitype", an inverted image and an opposite conception of the ideal St. Augustine was to paint in the *City of God*. The Augustan Empire is *the City of Man*.

Carried away by his love of classical grandeur and also by the natural sympathy which every good historian ought to have for his subject, Professor Cochrane makes perhaps too much of this pagan ideal. Certainly he well knows that this attempt to solve the political problem with terrestrial elements alone failed in the end. The liberal Augustan Empire did not survive the crisis of the third century. Following the custom since Gibbon, Professor Cochrane tries to uncover the causes of the decline and fall of the classical Rome. He considers very ingeniously the cracks which weakened the classical ideology, the vague notion of Fortune which went counter to its strict rationalism. But there are many other criticisms to be made of the classical soul.

Its great error, and its great weakness, was in the haughty and cruel aristocratic conception it formed of culture. Only the members of the ruling urban classes

were admitted to this cooperative of happiness. The barbarians, the peasants and the poor were excluded, and thus denied happiness, life and humanity. The Christian notion of human brotherhood whereby all men are equally creatures of God and sinners in Adam for all of whom Christ came on earth and died on the Cross, remained practically and profoundly foreign to classical thought. This City of Man was managed in practice for the benefit of a very few men. The frustration of the masses seems to me the great mistake of the Empire, a great source of ideological, economic, demographic and moral weakness, the profound cause of its ruin.

The interest of this analysis is not only retrospective: the antitype of the City of God, the Roman Empire is the most characteristic type of all the attempts man will make in the course of history to organize society without God and independently of His Law, Thus the fundamental opposition of the young Church to the pagan Empire clarifies in advance what the Christian tradition will engender throughout the centuries against all similar attempts whether it be the "liberalism" of yesterday coming from the *Aufklärung*, or the worldly messianism of Russian Communism today.

The second part of the book treats the problem of the Christian Empire. With Constantine, the emperor and then the state became Christian, that is they wished to be and thought themselves Christian. But were they in fact?

The complex and finely drawn answers of Professor Cochrane will enlighten all those who, ignoring the ever ambiguous character of historical reality, are tempted to reply with a categorical yes or no. Maybe Constantine himself thought he found in Christianity a discipline helpful to the temporal salvation of the Empire. It is hard to know exactly what Constantine thought. (The numerous studies of this problem in recent years seem to me to prove that it is insoluble, for the problem is to measure not the sincerity but the quality of Constantine's faith.) But we do know well enough from Eusebius and Lactantius the ideas of his entourage. It is certain that they nourished rather summary and naive ideas about it. It was possible to conceive the Christian Empire at first as an ideal still quite worldly and to a certain extent Jewish: with the conversion of the Emperor and of the Empire appearing as a means of making order and virtue reign, the reign of God on earth. Reality was to undo brutally these "millenarian" dreams. Christian truth is an explosive which is not very easy to handle. If Constantine or his advisers believed that the new Faith would assure them of docile, peaceful and submissive subjects, they must have noticed very quickly that this was not to be the case: the Donatist schism in Africa, the Arian heresy in the Orient – both serious examples – showed clearly that religious problems had their own autonomy and dynamism which would not permit themselves to be reduced to the level of a political instrument.

In fact the empire of the Constantines and Theodosius is a complex regime based on an empirical synthesis of contradictory ideologies which were in permanent conflict. There was at first, of course, a sincere and really efficacious desire to promote Christian truth and morality, to make a world safe for Christianity. But at the same time there were also some tendencies less pure, a certain "clericalism" which manifested itself in the privileges and favors granted members of the

ecclesiastical hierarchy. This was a dangerous tendency in as much as it made the clergy a privileged and prosperous class and thus one exposed to egoistic ambition, to the envy or hatred of the laity and also to dependence as regards the power which was the source of these benefits. Again, the Empire was not all Christian; it carried within it the survivals of the liberalism of the time of Augustus and the Antonines. The last flowers of an aristocratic and bourgeois humanitarianism blossomed in it. But what dominated underneath was the ever savagely-affirmed barbarism of the totalitarianism inaugurated by Diocletian. The Christian Empire was at first the same old Roman Empire. It had accepted the task of saving the *Romanitas* from internal dissolution and the barbarian menace. It could not change methods. Under the Christian emperors they remained those of the pagan persecutors: control of cities and persons by the state, a strict regulation of all sectors of economic and private life (obligatory guilds, hereditary caste system) a crushing taxation, a police and administrative tyranny. The precise and detailed chapter of Professor Cochrane on Constantine, Julian the Apostate, Valentinian or Theodosius gives the reader an idea of the strange character of the new Roman commonwealth, of the paradoxical and dialectical tension which never ceased to exist between its conversion to Christianity and its purely human desire to save the Roman state as a state.

On the whole Professor Cochrane's judgment of this complex regime is extremely severe: temporally tyrannical, spiritually the empire of the sixth century is a caricature or an hypocrisy: "Theodosianism betrays a fatal confusion of ideas", it was "not so much to Christianize civilization as to «civilize» Christianity", that is to use God for the benefit of the *civitas terrena* of this "awdry and meretricious empire".

I fully appreciate the high political and spiritual ideal which animates this verdict. But the historian sometimes ought to become the devil's advocate. If I personally react in the same way as Professor Cochrane, I feel as an historian obliged to protest against such a formal condemnation. The judgment of the author seems to me to come too directly from what I will call the Western mind. It is quite true that the Christian empire failed in the West: as a Frenchman I feel how deeply I am the heir of the *Bagaudae*, the Gallo-Roman peasants of the third and fourth centuries who revolted and "took to the woods" rather than allow themselves to be smothered by the tyrannical bureaucracy of the totalitarian Roman state. But if, for us of the West, the Constantino-Theodosian ideology was in fact politically unbearable and spiritually inadmissible, we cannot forget that it appeared perfectly acceptable to our Christian brothers of Eastern Europe. The regime inaugurated by Constantine lived and worked efficiently for more than a thousand years in the Byzantine Empire and its ideology survived in the Russia of the Tsars, in the Moscow which proudly called itself the third Rome (and one may legitimately ask if it does not survive transplanted and deformed in the Moscow of Stalin).

We should not be in a hurry to condemn forms of thought or of life. Here is an example: Professor Cochrane is scandalized by a poem of Ausonius which compares the Emperor Valentinian and his co-regents, his brother Valens and his son Gratian to the three persons of the Holy Trinity. I grant that the old pedantic

schoolmaster is not too clever, but the idea he expresses so clumsily is not so absurd, or blasphemous. It was to appear normal to all the Byzantine theologians for whom the emperor was nothing less than a “theophany”, a visible manifestation of God on earth. We must remember this even if this ideology seems outmoded to us today or (under its avatars: *Führerprinzip*) dangerous, for it is essential to proclaim that there is not *one* political system which can claim to be logically deduced, by analytical deductions, from the Christian faith alone. I have the right to be a republican and a democrat and to determine my political action by my Christian faith. As Professor Paul Vignaux reminded us opportunely in a recent article in *Renaissance* (vol. II, New York 1945) I have not the right to pretend that this political ideal is the only legitimate one for a Christian. In fact, as Professor Erik Peterson has shown, Christianity, in so far as it is monotheistic can just as easily lead to monarchy: as there is one God in heaven, there will be one king on earth chosen by God, invested by God, the image of God...

Is that moreover such an “oriental” idea? We have known even here in France, something analogous under the divine right monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There is a church in Paris, Val de Grâce, built by Anne of Austria, mother of Louis XIV as an offering for the birth of her son. The inscriptions and bas-relief confuse at first sight, in a singular way, the glory of the Infant Jesus and that of the king, the divine maternity and the royal maternity. One seemed to be a reflection, or an image of the other.

I would likewise criticize Professor Cochrane for simplifying a bit, of impoverishing by modernizing it, the thought of the Fathers of the Church of the fourth century as he describes it in the third part of his book where he shows how the Church helped to civilize the Western barbarians in the period succeeding the fall of the Empire. He rightly insists on the basic personalism of Christian thought (which thereby became and still remains public enemy number one of the totalitarian spirit. Faith rests on personal liberty, that liberty which even grace itself refuses to violate). But perhaps he insists on it too onesidedly. For the Christian religion does not merely assure the salvation of a mass of souls taken individually; it is also the religion of the Mystical Body. The Church assumes the salvation of humanity as a whole, that the salvation of each soul is inseparable from that of all its brothers, and even overflows beyond humanity into a perspective of cosmic salvation.

Likewise the exposition of the political doctrine of St. Augustine, as remarkable as it is, burns its bridges behind it and returns too quickly to the problems of modern thought. Since it was a question of showing the educator and master of the Middle Ages in the Bishop of Hippo, the problem raised by the well-known thesis of Canon Arquilleère on *Political Augustinianism* (Paris 1934) should not have been neglected. It is still from St. Augustine, – whether he was rightly or wrongly understood matters little here – that came, in part at least, the mediaeval conception of a “sacral Christianity” – to use an expression of Jacques Maritain – in which the intervention of the Christian Church and faith made itself so profoundly felt in political life.

To me all these observations are less criticisms than complements to the remarkable work of Professor Cochrane. All that he says is true, but there are more things to be said. History is never quite simple. Its very complexity makes its study so fruitful.

d) A. Momigliano → “**The Journal of Roman Studies**” 31 (1941) 193-194.

One leaves this high-minded and good book with some regret. It might have become *the* history of the Empire of our generation, as Rostovtzeff's *Social and Economic History* was the representative achievement of the former generation and Mommsen's *Provinces* that of our grandfathers or great-grandfathers (on the intermediate period, dominated by Ferrero's *Grandezza e decadenza di Roma*, opinion is still divided). Mr. Cochrane's problem is precisely our problem when we happen not only to study, but also to think of, the Roman Empire: "...whether there was at bottom any real possibility of affecting a reconciliation between Classicism and Christianity, between the claims of a system which was directed to the achievement of temporal peace and one which aimed at the realization of a peace not of this world". That St. Augustine is one of the best keys to the Roman Empire – and a master-key to several other historical gateways – is now admitted in very different quarters, from Benedetto Croce to Professor A. Toynbee. After all, that was the key which Tillemont subtly used under the imposing apparatus of his philological erudition; and the neglected truth is that nobody handled the same key with more authority and less respect than the man, whom Shelley judged a “cold and unimpassioned spirit”, the anti-Augustinian Edward Gibbon.

For a task having such an ancestral line Mr. Cochrane had also two essential qualities – a thorough acquaintance with classical writers (and Gibbon), and a deep-searching mind. His gift for analysis of ideas never fails, and he always knows where to find the central point. From Livy and Tacitus (some of the best pages of the book) to Saint Augustine with excursions by the way on many earlier Greek and Roman writers, the wealth of acute observation is uncommon. Yet the great task has not been fulfilled, and we have a book, which prompts profound sympathy for its author, but which is not yet the history we need. The cause is perhaps not difficult to discover. C. has learned much from Gibbon, but not to smile at the human comedy.

He thinks in terms of abstract contrasts of ideas, when it has not unreasonably been suggested that history is made by men. Gerolamo Vitelli used to repeat to his young friends that philosophy is like salt: one cannot eat a whole dish of it. To say the least, the dish C. offers us is too salty. One gladly recognises that the pages on the fourth century A.D. are illuminating and that one cannot understand this century without taking into account the difficulties of making a synthesis of the pagan social structure and the new Christian ideals, but it is difficult to believe that barbarian invasions, *latifundia*, inflation and other usual devices mentioned by the handbooks may be left to the part of silent actors. Discussion of single points would be superfluous. Two general features of the book have struck me particularly

in this connection. First, the Christianity which C. explains is that of St. Augustine and not of the Gospels, which obviously cannot so easily be reduced to philosophical formulae. Secondly, the development of papal authority does not attract the writer's attention, although some recent research (cf. for instance U. Gmelin, *Römische Herrscheridee und Päpstliche Autorität*, 1937) should have warned him of its relevance to the theme of the book. But C. is as little interested in modern bibliography as in an ancient factual development. He barricades himself behind the ancient texts and Gibbon. Perhaps one ought not to be so rigid in this matter.

As it is, the book is better than most of the former attempts of the same kind, such as Salin's *Civitas Dei* (1926), and will greatly help every student of Roman History. It should be particularly suggestive to young scholars.

Margaret A. Schatkin
Christopher J. Canniff
David E. Stephens*

REAKCJA ZNANYCH NAUKOWCÓW NA KSIĄŻKĘ Ch.N. CHOCHRANE'A:
CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE: 1940-1958

(Streszczenie)

Niniejszy artykuł daje przegląd naukowych opinii o książce Charlesa Norrisa Cochrane'a: *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine*, która została po raz pierwszy opublikowana przez Clarendon Press w Oksfordzie w 1940 r., przedrukowana zaś ze zmienionym i skorygowanym tekstem w 1944 r.; w 2003 r. wydany został przez Liberty Fund (Indianapolis, Indiana) jej reprint wraz z dodatkiem aneksu tłumaczeń łacińskich i greckich zebranych przez Kathleen i Johna Alvis, zmieniły się też numery stron w porównaniu z edycją oksfordzką. Praca Cochrane'a jest z pewnością jednym z najbardziej głębokich i trwałych przyczynków myśli anglojęzycznej do interpretacji chrześcijaństwa IV wieku. W przedmowie do swego dzieła Autor stwierdza, że „odważył się przeciwstawić przyjętej konwencji rozdzielania studiów klasycznych i chrześcijańskich”, oraz że „podjął próbę przejścia od świata Augusta i Wergiliusza do świata Teodozjusza i Augustyna”. Czyniąc to odkrył podstawowe zasady cywilizacji klasycznej i chrześcijaństwa oraz relacje między nimi. Artykuł niniejszy przedstawia kilka istotnych naukowych opinii o dziele Cochrane'a, w celu lepszego poznania jego koncepcji na temat rozwoju Kościoła w IV wieku vis-à-vis kultury i myśli klasycznej oraz grecko-rzymskiego życia politycznego. Intencją tego przedsięwzięcia jest też zbadanie, w jaki sposób naukowcy zareagowali na poglądy Cochrane'a związane z tym doniosłym okresem historii i czy jego spostrzeżenia zaakceptowali.

* Margaret A. Schatkin, Ph.D., Th.D. – Associate Professor of Theology at the Theology Department of Boston College; email: margaret.schatkin@bc.edu; Christopher J. Canniff, Ph.D. – candidate at Boston College; email: cannifch@bc.edu; David E. Stephens – retired theologian, independent researcher.