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„All Captains of His Majesty” The Quarter Army between 1589–1591¹

ABSTRACT

The article discusses the strength and functioning of the quarter army (pol. *wojsko kwarciane*) between 1589–1591. At the time in question a large Tatar invasion was in progress, which resulted in the rapid enlargement of the entire Crown army. Huge tax increases were introduced due to the prospect of an offensive war against the Ottoman Empire. The rapidly expanding army did not receive its due pay, leading to the first army confederation (pol. *konfederacja wojskowa*) in history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Consequently, there was a reduction of the quarter army.

This article is a continuation of previous research I undertook concerning the quarter army (pol. *wojsko kwarciane*)² between 1587–1588, the results of which were published in issue 3/2021³ of *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy*. This paper aims to characterize the quarter army banners⁴ in the context of the

¹ Article and the quotes are translated by Lee Richards from Polish with their meaning preserved. Names of places are given in English and Polish, unless the place has only Polish name or Ukrainian name (due to the fact that a significant part of the south-eastern lands that was part of the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland are now the part of Ukraine).

² Quarter army was the term used for regular army units of the Crown since 1562. The term „quarter” comes from the type of the tax, paid from income of the Crown estates (pol. *królewszczyny*) by tenants (starosts). See footnote number 18.

³ Maciej A. Pieńkowski, „«To jest firmamentum potestatis regia.» Wojsko kwarciane w latach 1587–1588”, *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* 22 (73), no. 3 (277) (2021): 9–42, [http://doi.org.10.32089/WBH.PHW.2021.3\(277\).0001](http://doi.org.10.32089/WBH.PHW.2021.3(277).0001).

⁴ *Chorągiew*, literally: „banner”, was the basic administrative unit of the Polish and Lithuanian cavalry from the 14th century.

contemporary military and political situation of the Crown between 1589–1591 by taking into account their strength, the type of enlistments and the names of individual captains against the background of the increased activity of the state's temporary increase of the Crown army's strength. Although the article contains detailed information regarding the supplementary units (pol. *wojsko suplementowe*)⁵ that were recruited at the central level and the units formed at the provincial level, the main axis of the study concerns the quarter army banners. These troops constituted the only regular army of the Crown in peacetime, which was significantly expanded and then reduced during the seven quarters of service covered by the analysis.

The main source for the article was provided by the handwritten materials of the Field Crown Clerk (pol. *pisarz polny koronny*) Jan Potocki, which are located in the Central Archives of Historical Records (pol. *Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych*, hereafter: AGAD), the Archives of the Crown Treasury (pol. *Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego*, hereafter: ASK) Departments LIV, 82 and 86⁶. Despite the fact that these materials have the same provenance (as they were produced by military officials) they differ in their place and time of creation, which makes it possible to distinguish two basic types of records amongst them: nominal and so called *akta popisowe*⁷. The first type includes (apart from the list of units themselves) details concerning the maintenance costs incurred during individual quarters of service, including the regulating of the payroll and the permanent and extraordinary revenues and expenses of the Crown treasury. The second type, on the other hand, omits upkeep costs by listing individual units as part of their review register in the field at the place indicated by the great Crown hetman. Thanks to this, it is possible to compare the type and size of individual units that were physically on active duty with the declared enlistments, which prompts the following questions: what factors determined the differences and why are some banners present in only one type of record⁸.

⁵ Supplementary units (pol. *wojsko suplementowe*) consisted of units (both cavalry and infantry) formed at times of a more serious threat paid from extraordinary taxes enacted by *Sejm* (Polish-Lithuanian Parliament).

⁶ Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Central Archives of Historical Records, hereafter: AGAD), Akta Skarbu Koronnego (Archives of the Crown Treasury, hereafter: ASK), Department LIV, No. 17, Summariae rationes ex preventibus publicis Regni primo in comitiis Warsoviensibus 1589 postea Lublini a. 1591 coram deputatis exhibita, s.l., s.d., 21v–24v; Department 82, No. 6, Popis Rot Wojska Koronnego pod Gliniany, Brzeżany i Trembowłą Roku 1589, 1–77; 86, No. 30, s.p.; No. 32, 1v–5r; No. 33, s.p.; No. 34, 3r–15v.

⁷ *Akta popisowe* – documents in the form of registers of the number of units during active duty.

⁸ In both cases one must remember to subtract the „blind soldier's pay” (the officer received a higher pay), which is about 10% of each group. As a result, the size of the army must always be reduced by 1/10.

The basic work concerning the size of the Crown army between 1587–1588 is Jan Wimmer’s article „Wojsko i skarb Rzeczypospolitej u schyłku XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII w.”⁹, which requires elaboration due to its general nature. The following scholars (and material sources) have also contributed to our understanding of the subject at hand. Marek Plewczyński, who is also the author of a valuable study that discusses the command staff of the permanent defense (pol. *obrona potoczna*) forces during the reign of Sigismund II Augustus, has produced a number of articles regarding warfare in the context of the Tatar invasions¹⁰. Anna Filipczak-Kocur’s research concerns the treasury expenses of the Polish Crown¹¹. Marek Ciara¹², Przemysław Gawron¹³, Kazimierz Lepszy¹⁴ and Halina Michalak¹⁵ have investigated the activities of the Great Crown Hetman Jan Zamoyski and the Field Crown Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski. Dariusz Milewski has written about the attempts of the Crown to obtain foreign aid in the event of war with the Ottoman Empire in 1590¹⁶, whilst Dariusz Kupisz has discussed the provincial units of Małopolska that were enlisted in 1589¹⁷. The *Herbarz Polski*, developed by Kasper Niesiecki, as well as the *Ordynacja dworu Zygmunta III z 1589* and the lists of non-borough court starosts (pol. *starosta niegrodowy*)¹⁸ in the Crown are particularly helpful with regards to

⁹ Jan Wimmer, „Wojsko i skarb Rzeczypospolitej u schyłku XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII w.”, *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* (hereafter: *SMHW*) 14, vol. 1 (1968): 9–13.

¹⁰ Marek Plewczyński, *Wojny i wojskowość polska w XVI wieku*, vol. 3, 1576–1599 (Zabrze – Tarnowskie Góry: Infortitions, 2013), 105–114; Plewczyński, *Żołnierz jazdy obrony potocznej za panowania Zygmunta Augusta* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1985).

¹¹ Anna Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość Rzeczypospolitej 1587–1648: projekty, ustawy, realizacja* (Warszawa: Wyd. Sejmowe, 2006), 78–82.

¹² Marek Ciara, „Konfederacje wojskowe w Polsce w latach 1590–1610”, *SMHW* 31 (1989): 61–80.

¹³ Przemysław Gawron, *Hetman koronny w systemie ustrojowym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1581–1646* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2010), 228–241; Gawron, „Hetman i kanclerz Jan Zamoyski wobec sporu o uprawnienia buławy w dobie zjazdu kolskiego w roku 1590”, in *Wobec króla i Rzeczypospolitej. Magnateria w XVI–XVIII wieku*, eds. Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz and Jerzy Urwanowicz (Kraków: Avalon, 2012), 637–670.

¹⁴ Kazimierz Lepszy, *Rzeczpospolita Polska w dobie sejmu inkwizycyjnego 1589–1591*, 2nd ed. (Oświęcim: Napoleon V, 2015).

¹⁵ Halina Michalak, „Jan Zamoyski – propaganda i autoreklama”, *Przegląd Historyczny* 57, no. 1 (1988): 25–41.

¹⁶ Dariusz Milewski, „Zabiegi Zygmunta III o pomoc zagraniczną na wojnę z Turkami w 1590 roku”, *Balkanica Posnaniensia* 28, no. 2 (2021): 41–56, <https://doi.org/10.14746/bp.2021.28.19>.

¹⁷ Dariusz Kupisz, *Wojska powiatowe samorządów Małopolski i Rusi Czerwonej w latach 1572–1717* (Lublin: Wyd. UMCS, 2008), 219–222.

¹⁸ Starosty (pol. *starostwo*), literally „eldership”, was an administrative unit established from the 14th century in Poland administrated by starost, which received the office from the king.

identifying individual cavalry captains, especially those not holding senatorial¹⁹ or land offices²⁰. Finally, several works written by myself concerning the beginnings of Sigismund III's reign, which has been the subject of my research for a long time, have been published²¹.

During the last quarter of 1588 the Crown army consisted of 18 banners with a combined total of 1,680 horses, led by the Hussar Banner (pol. *rota*) of the Great Crown Hetman under the command of Mikołaj Uhrowiecki²². After the conclusion of the *Sejm* held in Warsaw on 23 April 1589, two senators were appointed to supervise the finances of the *kwarta* tax: Wojciech Ręczajski (the Castellan of Warsaw) and Stanisław Bykowski (the Castellan of Łęczyca), along with two deputies: Jan Pieniążek (the Cupbearer of Cracow) and Jan Pułdowski (wojski²³ of Sochaczew). Also, in order to raise money to pay for additional

Starosty were divided into two types: borough court (pol. *starostwo grodowe*): county-level official responsible for the execution of judicial crime verdicts; non-borough court (pol. *starostwo niegrodowe*): deprived the execution of judicial crime verdicts. In both cases the starosty was a part of the Crown land (pol. *królewszczyzny*). The starost was a Crown tenantry and drew income. The starosty was the subject of rivalry among the senators and nobility and gave the king the opportunity to create his own political base. It's worth adding that in the Crown there were many more non-borough court starosties. This was all the more significant as the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not hereditary as well as the titles of the aristocracy. After taking the throne in 1587, Sigismund III was in an exceptionally difficult political situation, because his predecessor King Stephen Báthory made Jan Zamoyski as Great Crown Chancellor and Great Crown Hetman the most powerful man in the country. Zamoyski (he also was married to Griselda Báthory) had ambitions to become a king himself during the election *Sejm* in 1587, however Sigismund – Swedish prince and Great Duke of Finland was very popular among polish nobility as a descendant of the Jagiellonian dynasty and nephew of Sigismund II Augustus.

¹⁹ The Senate of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at this time consisted of a total 140 senators, including 2 archbishops, 14 bishops, 35 voivodes, 79 castellans and 10 ministers. Apart of senators, there was also court offices. These offices were for life. Although the king could promote a person to a higher office, he could not force to do so, except on charges of treason or *crimen laesae maiestatis*.

²⁰ Kasper Niesiecki, ed., *Herbarz Polski*, vol. 1–10 (Lipsk: nakładem i drukiem Breitkopfa Haertela, 1839–1846); Krzysztof Chłapowski, ed., *Ordynacja dworu Zygmunta III z 1589 roku* (Warsaw: Neriton, 2004); Chłapowski, ed., *Starostowie niegrodowi w Koronie 1565–1795 (Materiały źródłowe)* (Warszawa: DiG, 2017).

²¹ Pieńkowski, „Kwestia wojny z Turcją na sejmie warszawskim 1590 r.”, in *Studia historyczno-wojskowe*, vol. 6, eds. Plewczyński and Marek Wagner (Siedlce: Uniwersytet Humanistyczno-Przyrodniczy w Siedlcach, 2015), 11–42; Anna Pieńkowska and Pieńkowski, „Spory o prerogatywy buławy wielkiej koronnej w latach 1587–1589”, in *Studia nad staropolską sztuką wojenną*, vol. 6, eds. Zbigniew Hundert, Jan Jerzy Sowa and Karol Żojdź (Oświęcim: Napoleon V, 2017), 21–52.

²² Pieńkowski, „To jest firmamentum”, 30.

²³ Wojski, in latin: *tribunus*, was the land office responsible for the security of voivode-ships or districts at times when voivods and castellans had accompanied the nobility to war.

banners the *Sejm* imposed extraordinary taxes, which included a field tax, an alcohol tax, a Jewish poll tax, a tax from store of the wine, and the so-called „fourth grosz”, as well as a water duty. This money was to be used in the event of Emperor Rudolf II’s failure to meet the peace conditions of the Treaty of Bytom-Będzin, which resulted from Archduke Maximilian’s defeat at the Battle of Byczyna. Contrary to previous customs, the *Sejm* allowed tax revenues to bypass the treasury and go directly to the assemblies. This unusual solution was the result of pressure from the nobility of the south-western voivodeships, who were fearful of the proximity of the Habsburg Empire’s Silesian territories and the remoteness of the hetmans, who were based in Red Ruthenia and Podolia. The tax universal of 1589 emphasized that: „After joint consultations of the Lords of Our Councils, and the chamber of deputies of the both nations [Polish and Lithuanian – M.P.], we set about this so that the enemy, if he wanted *moliri*, that *nervus belli* would be persuaded, decided and prepared against him”²⁴. An additional deciding factor that prompted this form of tax management was the forthcoming departure of Sigismund III to meet his father, King John III of Sweden, in Reval (now Tallin). During the sovereign’s absence, the leadership of the state was to fall to the Primate Stanisław Karnkowski and the senators²⁵. It was therefore believed that a faster response could be facilitated if money for recruitment was sent directly to the voivodeships in the event of any danger. As far as the south-eastern border was concerned, the *Sejm* passed the „Suppression of Ukrainian frivolity” act and appointed a commission whose task was „to judge and punish all these frivolities”²⁶.

The ratification of the Treaty of Bytom-Będzin by Rudolf II in June 1589 restored proper relations with the Habsburg Empire, however this was met with a negative reaction from the Ottoman Empire, who had already warned the Crown against electing a representative of the House of Habsburg to the Cracow throne during the 1587 election. From Istanbul’s point of view, this would tilt the balance of power in the region in favour of the Habsburgs, who wanted to make the Crown the third branch of their empire alongside Austria and Spain²⁷. Therefore, the coronation of Sigismund III was received with satisfaction in Istanbul, which was

²⁴ „Uniwersał poborowy Roku Bożego 1589”, in *Volumina Constitutionum*, ed. Stefan Grodzki, vol. 2, 1550–1609, pt. 2, 1587–1609 (Warszawa: Wyd. Sejmowe, 2008), 126, 134–136.

²⁵ Pięnkowski, *Trudna droga do władzy w Rzeczypospolitej. Sejm koronacyjny Zygmunta III 1587/1588 i sejm pacyfikacyjny 1589 roku* (Warszawa: Wyd. Sejmowe, 2021), 421–423.

²⁶ *Volumina Constitutionum*, 2/2:115. The *Sejm* wanted to stop Zaporozhian Cossacks attacks on Turkish possessions on the Black Sea, because it negatively affected the relationship between Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire.

²⁷ See also Aleksandra Barwicka-Makula, *Od wrogości do przyjaźni. Habsburgowie austriaccy wobec Polski w latach 1587–1592* (Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski, 2020).

confirmed by Fryderyk Łukomski's embassy to the Ottoman Sultan Murad III²⁸. The subsequent rapprochement with Prague, although consistent with the interests of the Commonwealth, resulted in the threat of a retaliatory Tatar invasion. The pretext for which was the adventurous exploits of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who in the spring of 1589 attacked Yevpatoria (Kozłów), one of the largest trading centres on the Crimean Peninsula. The Zaporozhian Cossacks then turned their attention to Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiyi (Akkerman, pol. Białogród), Bender (Tehinia) and Azov. The scale of destruction that ensued was quite considerable, which reverberated widely at the Ottoman court. This meant that the above-mentioned resolution of the *Sejm* regarding the maintaining of order on the south-eastern border, turned out to be too late and too difficult to enforce, even with the help of the starosts, due to the vastness of Ukrainian lands²⁹. In August, Murad III ordered the *Beylerbey* of Silistria (The Eyalet of Silistra), Hejderpasha, to cooperate with the Crimean Khanate and the Moldavian-Wallachian reinforcements, which threatened the Crown with a large military invasion. Fortunately, the Tatars failed to coordinate their actions with the *beylerbey* and entered Podolia alone on 15 August numbering about 25,000 men under the command of Gazi II Gerei³⁰.

The great Crown hetman did not have much opportunity to protect the south-eastern voivodeships at that time. This was due to the small size of the quarter army – during the second quarter of 1589 (starting from 1 July) the army was not enlarged and, according to Potocki's calculations, consisted of only 16 banners with a strength of 1,662 horses³¹. In fact, Zamoyski (who was in Red Ruthenia at the time) did not have all his forces to hand, as in July and August some banners were sent to escort Archduke Maximilian III (who had just been released from prison) on his journey from Krasnystaw to the Silesian border, where 900 imperial reiters were waiting for the would-be Polish king³². The absence of these units in Red Ruthenia created an urgent need for new cavalymen. The exact composition of

²⁸ Zbigniew Wójcik et al., eds., *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 2, 1572–1795 (Warszawa: PWN, 1982), 71; Mirosław Łukomski, *Kwestia turecka, jako czynnik polityki wewnętrznej Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1587–1606* (Zabrze – Tarnowskie Góry: Inforteditions, 2011), 24–25.

²⁹ This problem was signaled to the king by the Grand Crown Marshal Andrzej Opaliński and Aleksander Wiśniowiecki, the Starost of Cherkasy (Czerkasy) in 1588; see Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich in Cracow (hereafter: B.Czart.), no. 93, Wiśniowiecki do Opalińskiego, Cherkasy, 5 VIII 1588, 609–611.

³⁰ Plewczyński, *Wojny i wojskowość*, 3:110.

³¹ See table 1.

³² Joachim Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg „Kroniki polskiej” zawierającej dzieje od 1587 do 1598 r.*, ed. Franciszek Maksymilian Sobieszczański (Warszawa: Samuel Orgelbrand, 1851), 106; Henryk

the quarter army during this period was recorded on 16 July 1589, near Gliniany, Bratslav, Terebovlia (Trembowła) and Berezhany (Brzeżany) by a Field Crown Clerk Potocki, who documented 10 banners (the size of the captain's sub unit called „fellowship”, pol. *poczet*, is indicated in brackets):

- Mikołaj Uhrowiecki's – 216 hussars of the great Crown hetman (20 horses),
- Mikołaj Herburt's, Voivode of Ruthenia – 50 hussars (unspecified),
- Stanisław Włodek's, Voivode of Bełż – 160 hussars (16 horses),
- Jan Tomasz Drohojowski's, Crown Referendary and Starost of Przemyśl – 148 hussars (unspecified),
- Potocki's, Field Crown Clerk and Starost of Kamianets-Podilskiy (Kamieniec Podolski) – 184 hussars (24 horses),
- Jakub Potocki's – 160 hussars (20 horses),
- Jerzy Struś, Starost of Bratslav (Braclaw) – 190 cossacks³³ (24 horses),
- Zamoyski's, Field Crown Guardian – 101 cossacks (36 horses),
- Szymkowicz Temruk's – 145 cossacks (20 horses),
- Szymon Charłęski *aka* Charliński's – 98 arquebusiers (20 horses)³⁴.

This gives a combined total of 1,452 show horses, which was 144 more compared to the treasury bills submitted to the *Sejm* for the second quarter of 1589. This discrepancy is most probably explained by the periodic adoption of additional troops by individual banners, although during this period the hetmans were cautious not to exceed the full-time size of the quarter army that was established by the *Sejm*. These slight fluctuations, however, did not translate into an increase in the combat strength of the army, which remained relatively small (especially in relation to the large Tatar invasion). It can therefore be assumed that a total of six banners made it to the Silesian border, which were led by the following:

- Jakub Struś (Starost of Khmilnyk, Chmielnik) – 100 horses
- Jan Prusinowski – 100 horses,
- Mikołaj Podlodowski – 50 horses,
- Andrzej Bełżecki – 50 horses,
- Prokop Nowicki – 100 horses,
- captain Krassowski – 50 horses.

Barycz, ed., „Kronika mieszczanina krakowskiego z lat 1575–1595”, *Biblioteka Krakowska* 70 (1930): 77.

³³ Despite the similarity of the names, the cossacks cavalry of the Crown army, had nothing to do with the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The cossacks cavalry was a medium-armed cavalry supporting the hussars.

³⁴ AGAD, ASK, Department 82, no. 6, Popis Rot Wojska Koronnego pod Gliniany, Brzeżany i Trembowłą Roku 1589, 16 VII 1589, 2v–14v.

Table 1. List of active quarter army banners of the „old enlistment” during the seven quarters of service between 1 April 1589 – 31 December 1590 (according to the accounts of the field Crown clerk)

No.	Captain	Unit type	Number of horses during each quarter						
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Mikołaj Herbut, Voivode of Ruthenia	hussar	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
2	Stanisław Włodek, Voivode of Bełz	hussar	100	150	150	150	150	150	150
3	Mikołaj Uhrowiecki, Starost of Góra (the captain of the great Crown hetman banner)	hussar	200	200	200	200	200	200	200
4	Jan Tomasz Drohojowski, Crown Referendary and Starost of Przemyśl	hussar	200	150	100	100	100	100	100
5	Jan Potocki, Field Crown Clerk and Starost of Kamianets-Podilskyi	hussar	130	162	176	223	223	223	223
6	Jakub Potocki	hussar	100	150	50	50	50	50	50
7	Jerzy Struś, Starost of Braclaw	cossack	200	100	100	100	100	100	100
8	Jakub Struś, Starost of Kholmilnyk [*]	cossack	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
9	Jan Prusinowski	cossack	150	100	100	100	100	100	100
10	Mikołaj Podlodowski	cossack	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
11	Jan Zamoyski, Field Crown Guardian	cossack	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
12	Andrzej Bełżecki	cossack	100	50	50	50	50	50	50
13	Szymkowicz Temruk	cossack	100	150	150	150	150	150	150
14	Szymon Charłęski <i>aka</i> Charliński	arquebusier	50	100	30	30	30	30	30
15	Prokop Nowicki	arquebusier	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
16	Krassowski ^{**}	arquebusier	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Total horses			1680	1662	1456	1503	1503	1503	1503

^{*} Despite the death of Jakub Struś in 1589, this banner was included in the accounts in subsequent quarters under his name.

^{**} First name unidentified.

Source: AGAD, ASK, Department LIV, No. 17, JMP *Żołnierzom starych rot od dnia 1 Aprilis 1589 do dnia ostatniego Decembris 1590 za kwartałów 7, s.l., s.d., 21v–22v.*

Being aware of the danger from the south, the king, who at the time was in Vilnius on his journey to Tallinn (old name Reval), issued a universal order on 11 August, calling on the hetmans, voivodes, and castellans to make defensive preparations, without specifying the reasons for such measures in advance³⁵. Based on this order, Zamoyski hastily summoned a war council in Lviv (Lwów), which was attended by Jan Dymitr Solikowski (Archbishop of Lviv), Mikołaj Herburt of Dziedzilow (Voivode of Ruthenia), Mikołaj Herburt (Castellan of Przemyśl), and Stanisław Lanckoroński (Castellan of Halych, Halicz). Differences of opinion regarding how to repel the invasion were apparent during the meeting, although among those present „everyone saw that once you went to war with the Turk, you should quickly and maturely think about the benefits for further war.”³⁶ Zamoyski wanted to stay in Lviv and defend the city, while Solikowski demanded that the quarter army be withdrawn along with the surrounding noble mass levy (pol. *pospolite ruszenie*). Zamoyski knew that this solution was risky considering the enemy’s large numerical superiority, but he agreed to start recruiting. He also needed to address the senators who were able to grant loans and the *sejmiks* who were collecting taxes based on the last tax universal of the *Sejm*. A request was sent to Primate Karnkowski to convene the *Sejm*. This, however, was not possible during the king’s absence, as it was beyond the remit of the Archbishop of Gniezno. Ultimately, Karnkowski decided to invite the senators and nobility of Greater Poland (pol. *Wielkopolska*) to a congress in Łęczyca on 20 September. As far as the more tangible decisions of the military council in Lviv were concerned, it is worth emphasizing that one of them was the decision to fortify Terebovlia and Kamianets-Podilskiy³⁷. The task of commanding the Podolian fortress was entrusted to Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, the Starost of Sniatyn (Śniatyń), who since the Convocation *Sejm* of 1587 had commanded Kamianets-Podilskiy from time to time. This did not alter the fact that the initiative was very late, which is hardly surprising since Karnkowski did not appear to have the best understanding of the situation, writing in June: „I can’t hear anything from there, we have a peace here. [Field Crown Guardian – M.P.] Jan Zamoyski [a relative of the great Crown hetman – M.P.] in Sini-ca was beating Tatars, he got not bad prisoners”³⁸. It remains an open question

³⁵ AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich (Potocki’s Family Public Archive), no. 6, Uniwersał Zygmunta III, Vilnius (Wilno), 11 VIII 1589, 291–293; Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego (hereafter: BUW), no. 46, Miscellanea, Uniwersał Zygmunta III, Vilnius, 11 VIII 1589, 18.

³⁶ Jan Dymitr Solikowski, *Krótki pamiętnik rzeczy polskich od zgonu Zygmunta Augusta, zmarłego w Knyszynie 1572 r., w miesiącu lipcu, do 1590 r.*, ed. and trans. Władysław Syrokomla (Petersburg – Mohylew: Bolesław Maurycy Wolff, 1855), 95.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ „Jan Zamoyski do Krzysztofa Radziwiłła, Zamość, 26 VI 1589”, in *Archiwum Domu Radziwiłłów* (hereafter: *ADR*), ed. August Sokołowski, vol. 8, *Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum* (Petersburg – Mohylew: Nakładem Bolesława Maurycego Wolffa, 1855), 96.

why the Polish spy network operating in the Khanate did not inform hetman Zamoyski in time about the enemy's preparations, since he was personally in Red Ruthenia after the last *Sejm* had ended.

Meanwhile, the Tatars acted quickly. After entering Podolia, they crossed the Zbruch (Zbrucz) river and set up a base near Ternopil (Tarnopol) on 18 August, sending out chambuls throughout the region. They then attempted to capture the castle at Baworiw (Baworów), however Zamoyski sent 6 cavalry banners to its aid, including 4 quarter army banners led by: Jan Potocki with 130 horses, his brother Jakub with 100 horses, Mikołaj Podlodowski with 50 horses, and Jakub Struś with 100 horses³⁹. Together with the local noble mass levy, the cavalry group consisted of no more than 1,100 horses. However, after a bloody battle in which Struś was killed and Podlodowski was taken prisoner, they managed to repel the enemy forces. Moreover, Żółkiewski defeated a unit of chambuls at Glinna near Lviv. However, even though the Tatars had been repelled, the effects of the invasion were felt when the horde withdrew at the end of August, as they took with them an estimated 20–30 thousand prisoners from the Crown. Zamoyski did not attempt to recapture the prisoners, even though, as Plewczyński points out, the Konstanty Ostrogski (Voivode of Kyiv) and Janusz Zbaraski (Voivode of Bratslav) had their own private banners who could have helped in this situation⁴⁰. Unfortunately, Zamoyski was unable (or unwilling) to organise a joint action with the voivodes, which was most likely due to his own ambitions⁴¹. An additional factor may have been Zamoyski's fears of provoking the Ottoman forces, which were currently assembling in Moldavia. In a letter dated 25 August addressed to Stanisław Reszka, the permanent representative of Sigismund III to Pope Sixtus V in Rome, Zamoyski wrote: „It is bad for us. The Turk, having sent *beylerbey* and Tatars, is making war on us [...]. The *beylerbey* of Wallachia follows with a cannon. [...] By the greatest men a little, from a hundred and several tens of thousands of people can be embraced, especially in such spacious fields as there are. May the Lord God allow us to hold these two places until the winter, Kamianets-Podilskyi and Lviv”⁴². As can be seen, Zamoyski's opinion of the situation was respected. Therefore, the great Crown hetman put pressure on the Great Crown Treasurer, Jan Dulski, to find

³⁹ See table 1.

⁴⁰ Plewczyński, *Wojny i wojskowość*, 3:111–112.

⁴¹ Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg „Kroniki”*, 105; Tomasz Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ok. 1524/1525–1608). Wojewoda kijowski i marszałek ziemi wołyńskiej* (Toruń: Wyd. UMK, 1997), 201.

⁴² „Zamoyski do Stanisława Reszki, Lviv, 25 VIII 1589”, in *Starożytności Historyczne Polski*, ed. Ambroży Grabowski, vol. 2 (Kraków: Józef Czech, 1840), 400.

funds for the Polish legation to Istanbul that was announced by the *Sejm*. Paweł Uchański, the Starost of Drohobych (Drohobycz) who was based in Lviv, was appointed to perform this task. Uchański eventually started his journey at the end of August, which raised hope that the strained relationship would be eased. Unfortunately, the starost's trip was delayed due to him suffering a broken leg, and thus his audience with Murad III would not take place for a few months. It was also not known what results this mission would bring, although there is no doubt that Uchański had the opportunity to normalize the relationship at the expense of punishing the Zaporozhian Cossacks and offering gifts to the Tatars⁴³.

According to Potocki, despite the financial difficulties Zamoyski managed to recruit 19 new banners at the beginning of the fourth quarterly period, i.e. from 9 September 1589, although only 13 were in Red Ruthenia at the time. These units were all composed differently and the register in the field itself involved two companies not mentioned by Potocki, namely: Bełżecki's 100 hussars and Jarosz Bulatowicz's cavalry unit with 50 horses⁴⁴. It follows that the banners not mentioned below entered service in this quarter in different months.

Table 2. List of cavalry banners of the quarter army in service from 9 September 1589.

No.	Captain	Type	Horse strength (according to the field Crown clerk)	Horse strength (according to the register in the field of September 9)
1	Stanisław Żółkiewski, Field Crown Hetman	hussar	150	164
2	Stanisław Lanckoroński, the Castellán of Halych and Starost of Skala	hussar	100	unknown
3	Piotr Łaszcz	hussar	150	unknown
4	Jan Bułakowski	hussar	100	100
5	Adam Stadnicki	hussar	100	106
6	Krzysztof Leśniowski	hussar	100	106
7	Mikołaj Daniłowicz	hussar	100	100
8	Krzysztof Broniowski	hussar	100	100
9	Jan Szucki	hussar	100	113
10	Jan Swoszowski, Land Clerk from Lviv	hussar	50	53

⁴³ *Historia dyplomacji*, 2:71.

⁴⁴ See table 2.

11	Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, Starost of Sniatyn	hussar	110	unknown
12	Aleksander Wiśniowiecki, Starost of Cherkasy	hussar	200	unknown
13	Andrzej Potocki, Cupbearer of Kamianets- Podilskiyi	hussar	100	100
14	Prokop Raszko, Chamberlain of Halych	hussar	126	136
15	Jan Golski	arquebusier	100	unknown
16	Jan Ulanicki	arquebusier	150	unknown
17	Mikołaj Baworowski	arquebusier	100	unknown
18	Michał Stanisławski	cossack [?]	130	118
19	Stanisław Górski	cossack [?]	126	unknown
Total horses			2192	1196

Source: AGAD, ASK, Department LIV, no. 17, Jezdni w 1589 roku przyjęci, s.l., s.d., 22r–22v; dz. 82, no. 6, Popis rot tych, które brały pieniądze, którym służba poczęła się ad 9 septembris Anno 1589, s.l., s.d., 15r–29v.

Due to this the quarter army now consisted of 3,648 horses in 35 banners, which included 20 hussar, 7 cossack and 6 arquebusier banners (1,456 horses from the „old enlistment” and 2,192 horses from the „new enlistment”)⁴⁵. Therefore, the army was mainly composed of hussars and arquebusiers, which resulted on the one hand from the character of the enemy and his sensitivity to fire, and on the other hand from the possibility of having to fight a major battle. For this reason, Zamoyski did not limit recruitment to the central level, as he also turned to the nobility in this matter. The Tatar invasion coincided with the convening of the *sejmiks* of the Crown (which took place on various dates in the first half of September), whom in addition to selecting representatives for the Crown Tribunal also dealt with the issue of enlisting new recruits and providing them with pay using tax revenues (as was decided by the *Sejm* in April). This was particularly important because, as Filipczak-Kocur points out, the *kwarta* tax had limited funds at the time⁴⁶. The king was aware of this, which is why he issued an order in June that enabled individual banners to receive their pay and supplies from the economy of Sambor, which was a Crown estate in the Ruthenian Voivodeship. They could do so from the middle of 1588; however uptake was limited as most of the units decided to await the decisions of the next *Sejm* about new tax in order to settlement of soldier’s pay⁴⁷.

⁴⁵ See Wimmer, „Wojsko i skarb”, 11.

⁴⁶ Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość*, 82.

⁴⁷ Pieńkowski, *Trudna droga*, 254.

The nobility (pol. *szlachta*) of the *sejmik* in Sudova Vyshnia (Sądowa Wisznia), which was held on 11 September 1589, were keen with regards to strengthening the Crown army due to the fact that the last invasion affected them directly. Thus, they agreed that tax revenues from the Ruthenian Voivodeship could be used for enlisting new cavalymen, although they indicated that they would not be able to recruitment banners at such short notice. Instead, they expressed their readiness to assemble a noble mass levy, because „we cannot have a soldier so quickly who would be able to come to such an urgent need, so we, of our good will, promise to meet this need”⁴⁸. During the assembly, apart from J.T. Drohojowski, the Starost of Przemyśl and quarter army captain, two senators were present: Mikołaj Herburt, the Castellan of Przemyśl and Jan Drohojowski, the Castellan of Sanok, which certainly had an impact on the deliberations⁴⁹. The decisions made at Sudova Vyshnia had the full approval of the Lviv *sejmik*, which was convened three days later. The Lviv nobility agreed to pay the army out of the province’s tax revenues and also proposed that the personal funds used by Zamoyski for recruitment should be compensated by the *kwarta* tax or by the *sejmiks*. Interestingly, the *sejmik* agreed that the army could choose provisions in clerical and noble estates, whilst respecting the inviolability of the owners⁵⁰. Consequently, the nobility suspended two of their own constitutions: „On Soldiers”, adopted at the Coronation *Sejm* of 1588 and the resolution bearing the same title that was adopted at the *Sejm* of 1589. These constitutions allowed for penalties for choosing „soldier’s stations” (pol. *stacje wojskowe*)⁵¹ in noble estates based on the hetman’s crime articles⁵². This clearly indicates that the haste to provide the new recruits with material resources was motivated by the fear of further military escalation between the Crown and the Ottomans, or the Khanate, or both. The nobility of Chełm Land approached the defence of their territory in a similar manner as they decided to not recruitment their own banners, nor did they mention the levy. However, they agreed to pay any overdue salaries as soon as possible based on the tax universal from the last *Sejm*,

⁴⁸ „Uchwała sejmiku wiszeńskiego, Sudova Vyshnia, 11 IX 1589”, in *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z Archiwum tzw. Bernardyńskiego we Lwowie*, vol. 20, *Lauda sejmikowe wiszeńskie 1572–1648*, ed. Antoni Prochaska (Lwów: Główny skład w księgarni Seyfartha i Czajkowskiego, 1909), 82.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁵⁰ „Uchwała sejmiku lwowskiego, Lviv, 14 IX 1589”, in *ibid.*, 84–85; Kupisz, *Wojska powiatowe*, 220.

⁵¹ In the absence of pay, soldiers often arbitrarily compensated for this by taking provisions in Crown estates.

⁵² Pieńkowski, *Trudna droga*, 186.

as it can be assumed that they were intended for enlistments by the great Crown hetman⁵³.

Other Lesser Poland (pol. *Małopolska*) *sejmiks* approached this problem differently (because they were geographically closer to the threat), not limiting themselves to only issuing salaries. The *sejmik* of Bełz (representing the Bełz Voivodeship) and Lutsk (Łuck, representing the Volhynian Voivodeship) committed themselves to recruitment a total of three banners with a combined strength of 450 horses, although due to the lack of preserved documentation from this assembly, we do not know how these troops were to be paid and who was responsible for issuing the enlistments letters (pol. *listy przypowiednie*)⁵⁴. The nobility of Bratslav also committed itself to providing cavalry units, Potocki's accounts indicate that they decided to recruit two banners with a total strength of 300 horses. However, we know nothing about the resolutions of the Kyiv Voivodeship nobility from the Zhytomyr (Żytomierz) *sejmik*⁵⁵. The news of the Tatar invasion was met with great concern by the nobility of the Lublin Voivodeship, who met on 11 September. In its subsequent resolution the assembly emphasized that „we also have, for this time, the Crown hetman with other gentlemen, the senators from Lviv let us know that the further they go, the more dangers in the Ruthenian lands are revealed, and they bring the Turkish emperor's army closer to the Crown regions, demanding rescue from us, although already soldiers of half a third of a hundred horses according to the resolution we here today they did a week, which we confirm now *unanimiter, nemine contradicente*, for a quicker rescue we sent them money. We decide to recruitment cavalry for half a year with payment from ours taxes”⁵⁶. The nobility of Lublin expressed its readiness to appear as a noble mass levy, if necessary, and ordered Castellan of Lublin Piotr Schwarzenberger-Czerny and Chamberlain of Lublin Stanisław Myszkowski to recruitment three banners in the voivodeship with a combined strength of 350 horses.

The Tartar invasion was also taken seriously by the Cracow nobility at the Proszowice *sejmik* held on 11 September. Due to the recent events, they decided to recruit 1,000 cavalry and 500 infantrymen at the expense

⁵³ „Zjazd w Chełmie, Chełm 11 IX 1589”, in *Akta sejmikowe ziemi chełmskiej 1572–1668*, ed. Wiesław Bondyra, Henryk Gmiterek and Jerzy Ternes (Lublin: Wyd. UMCS, 2013), 76–77.

⁵⁴ Enlistment letter it was a document issued for the captain to recruitment the banner in the name of the king.

⁵⁵ See table 3.

⁵⁶ „Sejmik deputacki w Lublinie, Lublin, 11 IX 1589”, in *Akta sejmikowe województwa lubelskiego 1572–1632*, ed. Gmiterek (Lublin: Wyd. UMCS, 2016), 67–68; Kupisz, *Wojnska powiatowe*, 220–221.

of the voivodeship – such large commitments the *sejmik* recently decided during the third *interregnum*, taking 1,350 soldiers for its maintenance⁵⁷. This can be explained by concern for the safety of the capital and the regalia held in the royal treasury at Wawel. The fears of the Cracow nobility were undoubtedly intensified by the fact that the king was currently absent from the Crown. At the Proszowice *sejmik*, the following captains were appointed: Joachim Osiecki (Starost of Olsztyn); Jan Pieniążek (Cupbearer of Cracow); Kasper Dembiński (Chamberlain of Mielnik); Jan Staszkowski; Piotr Kazimirski and Krzysztof Cikowski. In addition, the nobility agreed to noble mass levy, noting that the senators, after an agreement with the king, could summon them „in time, not after time, which God forbid, they deceived this bunch”⁵⁸. Ultimately, however, it can be assumed that the Cracow province provided only two banners under the command of the following: Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, the Voivode of Lublin, Court Crown Hetman and Starost of Cracow (the *sejmik* did not mention him originally) and J. Ocieski, the Starost of Olsztyn, with a strength of 200 horses each. Having said that, only these two banners appear in the treasury records, thus it cannot be ruled out that the *sejmik* retained other units whose role was to protect Cracow.

The nobility of Sandomierz also committed itself to recruitment cavalry units, stating that „the Tatars, having invaded the Crown lands, have done and continue to do a lot of damage, for which it is our duty that we, like our famous ancestors, seek such a danger and be able to quickly rescue it by reviewing the power of this enemy, about whom we are sure that he is already in Wallachia with a large army and there is a certain message from those countries, in the hope of Turkish help”⁵⁹. The assembly resolved a total of 405 horses under the command of: Stanisław Tarnowski (Castellan of Sandomierz); Hieronim Mielecki (Starost of Sandomierz); Stanisław Ligęza (Starost of Opoczno); and Krzysztof [?] Koniecki. Most of whom were representatives of old and distinguished families⁶⁰.

Solidarity was also expressed by the assemblies of Greater Poland, located far from the southern border. The nobility of this region, who had

⁵⁷ See Pieńkowski, *Trudna droga*, 41.

⁵⁸ „Sejmik deputacki województwa krakowskiego, Proszowice, 11 IX 1589”, in *Acta sejmikowe województwa krakowskiego*, vol. 1., pt. 1, 1572–1620, ed. Stanisław Kutrzeba (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1932), 133–135.

⁵⁹ Biblioteka Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności i Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Krakowie (Library of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow, hereafter: BPAU/PAN w Krakowie), Teki Pawińskiego (Files of Pawiński), No. 8338, Sejmik województwa sandomierskiego, Opatów, 11 IX 1589, 51–55.

⁶⁰ See table 3. Kupisz identified only two banners from this voivodeship, see Kupisz, *Wojaska powiatowe*, 221.

gathered at the *sejmik* in Środa on 11 September, stated „for the sudden need of the Republic the councils and knights of the Poznań and Kalisz Voivodeships at the *sejmik* in Środa send a certain group of servants to Podolia to Ruthenia against the Tatar and Turkish troops, which some, having already plundered those countries, left, and the others again to possess these countries there, as prisoners, they give the case, they drag on”⁶¹. Therefore, the nobility agreed that the funds for 700 horses should be allocated for 6 months, with a salary of 20 zlotys per horse and a provisions of 150 zlotys for every 100 horses. The banners were to register in the filed in Kalisz in three weeks’ time, based on instructions issued by Hieronim Gostomski, the Castellan of Nakło and Starost of Wałcz⁶². According to Potocki’s accounts, the *sejmik* in Środa almost fully met this obligation, as it enlisted 670 horses. The nobility also agreed to further recruitment if similar decisions were made at the Łęczyca congress.

The nobility of Brześć Kujawski and Inowrocław who gathered at the *sejmik* in Radziejów on 11 September, expressed concern about the information they had received regarding the Tatar invasion from the deputies of the Ruthenian Voivodship that were delegated to them. The assembly agreed, following the example of other *sejmiks*, to quickly adopt taxes and to send representatives to Łęczyca, where it was yet to take a stance on the size of its own enlistment⁶³. It cannot be ruled out that this attitude was to some extent determined by geographical factors, or possibly by a strong legalistic attitude related to the initiative of Primate Karnkowski. Furthermore, it should be noted that the nobility of Mazovia and Podlasie were proactive regarding the invasion, and their declarations regarding the number of banners they were to recruitment should be considered generous. The Masovian, Płock, Podlaskie Voivodeships, decided to enlist a combined total of 900 horses, of which the largest Mazovian Voivodeship – consisting of ten lands – committed itself to recruitment 450 horses in four banners⁶⁴.

As already mentioned, the congress in Łęczyca, which took place on 20 September, had an important role to play. Ten senators attended the meeting: Primate Karnkowski (moderator of the congress); Łukasz Kosciecki (Bishop of Poznań); Olbracht Łaski (Voivode of Sieradz); Jan Spåwski (Voivode

⁶¹ „Sejmik nadzwyczajny województw poznańskiego i kaliskiego w Środzie, Środa, 11 IX 1589”, in *Akta sejmikowe województwa poznańskiego i kaliskiego*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 1572–1616, ed. Włodzimierz Dworzaczek (Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1932), 80.

⁶² Ibid., 81.

⁶³ „Sejmik radziejowski, Radziejów, 11 IX 1589”, in *Dzieje ziemi kujawskiej. Lauda i instrukcje 1572–1672*, vol. 2, ed. Adolf Pawiński (Warszawa: w drukarni Józefa Bergera, 1888), 15–16.

⁶⁴ See table 3.

of Inowrocław); Gostomski (Castellan of Nakło); Łukasz Kretkowski (Castellan of Brzeg); Janusz Rysiński (Castellan of Kowal); Marcin Fałęcki (Castellan of Rozprza); Bykowski (Castellan of Łęczyca and Starost of Sieradz), and Andrzej Opaliński (Great Crown Marshal and the General Starost of Greater Poland). Moreover, representatives from the Poznań, Kalisz, Sieradz Voivodeships and Wieluń Land, Brześć Kujawski, Inowrocław and Łęczyca Voivodeships and Dobrzyń Land attended the congress, along with delegates of *sejmik* in Raciąż from Płock Voivodeship, and Rawa Voivodeship and Gostyń Land. It is worth noting that the representatives of the noble came with *plena potestas*⁶⁵ of their defence mandates from the assemblies, which made it much easier to make joint decisions⁶⁶. Indeed, this is what happened, as we can see from the resolutions adopted by the congress:

„certain batches of soldiers from each voivodeship for the pay from taxes at the recently passed *Sejm*, adopted at those *sejmiks* that we had at that time to elect tribunal deputies, we wrote down and decided, as well as the decisions of each voivodeship in more detail they slander both cavalrymen riders and infantrymen pedestrians. The number of which we send to the Crown hetman, whose service we assign for half a year. And now every cavalry captain with his company's detachment, according to the promise of his service, should present himself completely as hussar and cossack, as well as infantry, according to the custom of ordinary military soldiers, as which of these servants are used to serve, in the manner of today's soldiers, before the hetman near Lviv, or where necessary, no later than four Sundays from the date of this decision”⁶⁷.

These banners were to be led by castellans together with land standard-bearers, and in the event of their absence, other officials in accordance with the established hierarchy.

Contrary to the declarations of some *sejmiks*, the congress in Łęczyca did not express any interest in a noble mass levy, stating that it would not be possible in the absence of the king. In return, however, it obliged all royal, clergy and noble towns of Greater Poland (excluding Royal Prussia) to provide one equestrian for every 10 *włóka*⁶⁸ and one infantryman from 1000 polish zlotys fee charge from city councils, tenuraries of the Crown land and private own-

⁶⁵ In the Polish parliamentary tradition, deputies with *plena potestas* could take all decisions at the *Sejm* that were obligatory for the nobility. The opposite of *plena potestas* was *limita potestas*, which meant that the *sejmiks* could later question some of the decisions of the *Sejm* (mainly in tax matters).

⁶⁶ „Zjazd senatorów i posłów województw wielkopolskich w Łęczycy, Łęczyca, 20 IX 1589”, in *Akta sejmikowe województwa poznańskiego*, 1/1:83–84.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁶⁸ A *włóka* was an old land measurement that was equal to approximately 18 hectares.

ers⁶⁹. As for those assemblies of 11 September which did not pass measures regarding recruitment, the congress ordered them to reconvene on 12 October and adopt appropriate resolutions in this regard. This concerned the *sejmik* in Radziejów representing the Brześć Kujawski and Inowrocław Voivodships, the Wieluń *sejmik* for the Wieluń region and the *sejmik* in Bolimów for the Rawa Voivodeship. In addition, the congress agreed that the Łęczyca *sejmik* original declaration to provide 200 hussars under Jan Karśnicki, the Chamberlain of Łęczyca, would now comprise one hussar banner with the strength of 150 horses that would be paid 20 zlotys per horse per quarter and „100 riding cossacks with matchlocks” under the command of Jan Ślatkowski, who were to be paid 15 zlotys per horse per quarter⁷⁰. This means that the *sejmiks* had reduced the pay rate in comparison to the allowances paid during the period of Archduke Maximilian’s war for the throne, when they spontaneously paid 30 zlotys per hussar, which caused the dissatisfaction of the treasurer and the senate at the Coronation *Sejm* of Sigismund III⁷¹.

The assemblies met on the indicated date. In Radziejów, the nobility agreed to field two 100-horse banners from the Brześć Kujawski Voivodeship led by Jarosław Sokołowski and Jan Grabski, and one 100-horse banner from the Inowrocław Voivodeship under the command of Jakub Rusinowski. It is worth adding that these banners were to be recruitment by hussars. This *sejmik* also allotted a 200-zloty food allowance for every 100 horses, which was twice as much as the other *sejmiks*. These units were to assemble in four-weeks’ time at a location designated by the hetman⁷². Due to the lack of a *sejmik*’s resolution, it is difficult to state unequivocally how the nobility of Wieluń and Rawa reacted to the congress in Łęczyca. We know that the Sieradz Voivodeship fielded just one banner, albeit with the strength of 300 horses under Sebastian Tarnowski, the Castellan *Konarski*⁷³ of Sieradz. Perhaps the Wieluń Land, instead of recruitment a separate banner, contributed to Tarnowski’s banner. On the other hand, the nobility of Rawa recruitment a banner under the command of Jan Gostomski, which probably numbered 150 horses, although there is no detailed information regarding this company.

Apart from the files of the regional councils relating to the provincial enlistments (not all of them have survived), we have two sources from the AGAD. The first concerns Potocki’s accounts that were compiled under the

⁶⁹ „Zjazd senatorów”, 87–88.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 88–89. However, the records from the end of 1589 show that Ślatkowski’s 100 horse banner was also a hussar company, see table 3.

⁷¹ Pieńkowski, „To jest firmamentum”, 27.

⁷² „Sejmik radziejowski, Radziejów, 12 X 1589”, in *Dzieje ziemi kujawskiej*, 2:17–18.

⁷³ Among castellans, there were also castellans with title *konarski*. This title was a relic of the Middle Ages, denoting a land official responsible for horses during wartime.

name „Cavalry in the year 1589 admitted in the Voivodeships”, and the second is a list of banners issued without a date entitled „Description of the Cavalry Captains, those banners that are sent from the districts on an expedition against the Tsar of Perekop, Anno 1589”, which was compiled in Red Ruthenia or Podolia no earlier than November or December 1589 (the decision to recruitment new banners in the voivodeships was first taken on 12 October)⁷⁴. So, as with table 2 we are dealing with two types of record.

The differences in the table 3 (see next page) above can be explained in two ways. The first hypothesis is that the voivodeship banners did not reach the concentration area in Khmilnyk by 16 October (as designated by the great Crown hetman) because their formation was suspended. The second explanation, which is more likely in my opinion, concerns the involvement of units from certain voivodeships (together with the quarter army) in tasks on the south-eastern border, which prevented them from showing up together⁷⁵. This hypothesis is enhanced by the fact that in the same year Hejder-pasha led the Tatars of Budzhak (Budziak) in their attack on Pokutia under the command of Akanibeg, which resulted in Sniatyn being burnt down, partially damaging the local castle⁷⁶. This may indicate why Potocki, when listing the provincial troops at the end of 1589, included a number of banners. It is fruitless to look for them in the resolutions of the assemblies and the congress in Łęczyca, although they replaced the declared units from September and October. The starost of Kamianets-Podilskyi listed as many as 17 banners that were not included in the resolutions of the *sejmiks*⁷⁷:

- Jan Ostrorog’s, Crown Cupbearer – 305 horses (hussars),
- Wiśniowiecki’s, Starost of Cherkasy 214 horses (hussars),
- [Paweł] Garwaski’s – 161 horses (hussars)⁷⁸,

⁷⁴ Interestingly, this register takes into account the type of enlistment, but only in relation to the hussars (referred to as „Usarian” banners) and arquebusiers (referred to as „shooters”). The remaining units do not have a specific affiliation, hence the assumption that these may be Cossack banners.

⁷⁵ B.Czart., no. 1621, Uniwersał Zamoyskiego do żołnierzy koronnych, Terebovlia, 16 X 1589, 451. It should be noted that this universal rule regulated discipline during the march and the stationing of troops in the camp, and moreover had a large propagandistic overtone encouraging war, see Karol Łopatecki, „*Disciplina militaris*” w wojskach Rzeczypospolitej do połowy XVII wieku (Białystok: Instytut Badań nad Dziedzictwem Kulturowym Europy, 2012), 246–249.

⁷⁶ Plewczyński, *Wojny i wojskowość*, 3:112; Plewczyński, *Żołnierz jazdy*, 31.

⁷⁷ AGAD, ASK, Department 82, no. 6, Popis Panów Rotmistrzów, tych rot które są z powiatów wyprawieni na expedycję przeciwko carowi perekopskiemu Anno 1589 r., s.l., s.d., 36r–36 v, 41r–41v, 54r–54 v, 55v, 59r–59v, 60r–60v, 61r–62 r, 63r–63v, 64r, 65r–65v, 66r, 69r–69v, 70r–71v, 72r–72v, 73r–73v, 74r–75v, 76r, 77r.

⁷⁸ There is no first name in Potocki’s description, but it should be assumed that he is talking about Paweł, a Field Clerk from Płock Land, and not Stanisław Garwaski, the Royal Secretary

Table 3. A list of cavalry banners accepted into service in the voivodeships during 1589

No.	Voivodeship	Captain	Type	Number of horses (according to field Crown clerk)	Number of horses (according to a record in the field of the end of 1589)
1	Cracow	Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, the Voivode of Lublin, Court Crown Hetman and Starost of Cracow	hussar	200	207
2		Joachim Ociecki, Starost of Olsztyn	hussar	200	198 + 26 Hungarian cavalrymen + 50 arquebusiers
3	Poznań	Adam Czarnkowski, Starost of Pyzdry	hussar	175	225
4		Abraham Ciswicki	hussar	120	165
5		Marcin Gostyński	cossack [?]	175	unknown
6		Piotr Choiński	cossack [?]	100	unknown
7	Sandomierz	Stanisław [?] Rozeń*	cossack [?]	100	unknown
8		Stanisław Tarnowski, Castellan of Sandomierz	hussar	100	unknown
9		Hieronim Mielecki, Starost of Sandomierz	hussar	100	106
10		Stanisław Ligęza, Starost of Opoczno	hussar	105	105 + 30 arquebusiers
11	Sieradz	Krzysztof [?] Konięcki**	hussar	100	100
12		Sebastian Tarnowski, Castellan <i>Konarski</i> of Sieradz	hussar	300	342
13	Łęczyca	Jan Karśnicki, Chamberlain of Łęczyca	hussar	150	152
14		Jan Śliatkowski	hussar	100	102
15	Kujawski	Jarosław Sokołowski	hussar	100	115
16		Jan Grabski	hussar	100	85
17	Inowrocław	Jakub Rusinowski	hussar	100	112
18	Dobrzyń Land	Jerzy Kretkowski, Starost of Wschowa and Commander of the Royal Guard	cossack [?]	100 [?]	unknown
19	Ruthenia	Prokop Raszko, Chamberlain of Halych	hussar	125	unknown

20	Vollhynia	Fedor Zahorowski, Collector in the Vollhynian Voivodship (1589)	hussar	100	111 + 53 Cossack cavalry
21		Jan Bochotnicki	hussar	200	190 + 10 Tatar cavalry
22		Piotr Myszkowski, Starost of Oświęcim	hussar	200	232
23	Lublin	Adam Gorajski	hussar	100	100
24		Stanisław Jaszowski	hussar	50	50
25	Belż	Piotr Łaszcz	hussar	150	156
26	Płock	[?] Zawadzki	cossack [?]	100 [?]	unknown
27		Piotr Troszczyński	cossack [?]	100	unknown
28		[?] Piłebowski	cossack [?]	100	unknown
29	Masovian	Adrian or Andrzej Dobrzyniecki	hussar	100	102
30		Wojciech Ręczajski, Castellan of Warsaw	hussar	150	160 + 23 cossack cavalry
31	Podlaskie	Hieronim Idzikowicz	cossack [?]	100	unknown
32		Jan or Krzysztof Grek***	hussar	100	87
33	Rawa	Jan Gostomski	hussar	150	146 + 38 arquebusiers
Total horses				c. 4225	c. 3678

* The most famous representative of the Rozeń family at the time was Adam Rozeń (d. 1619), a cavalry captain of the Crown army since 1565 who became strongly associated with the Maximilianists during the third interregnum. After the defeat at Byczyna, he left for Prague and returned to the Crown at an unspecified time. He operated mainly in the Cracow Voivodship, where he owned hereditary estates. Therefore, it should be assumed that Stanisław Rozeń, who represented Greater Poland during the Congress in Wislica on 5–8 October 1587, may have been obliged to take up the banner based on the decision of the Środa sejmik. See Halina Kowalska, „Rozeń Adam”, *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* 32 (1989–1991): 444; Pienkowski, *Triadna droga*, 76; Niesiecki, *Herbarz Polski*, 8:153.

** According to Niesiecki, there were two families named Koniecki in the Voivodeship of Sandomierz: the Odrowąż family, whose representative Wojciech was envoy to the Sejm of 1576/1577, and the Brodzic family, whose member Krzysztof was active during the third interregnum, see Niesiecki, *Herbarz Polski*, 5:190; *Posłowie ziemscy koronni 1493–1600, lata 1587–1600*, edited by Irena Kaniewska and Janusz Byliński (Warszawa: Wyd. Sejmowe, 2013), 248.

*** At the beginning of Sigismund's III reign, Jan Grek, a member of the chamber of deputies in 1587, and Krzysztof Grek, mentioned as a courtier of the king in 1589, were active, see Chłapowski, *Ordynacja*, 56–57; Pienkowska, *Zjazdy i sejmy z okresu bezkrólewia po śmierci Stefana Batoro* (Pułtusk: Wyd. Akademii Humanistycznej im. Aleksandra Gieysztoro, 2010), 247.

Source: AGAD, ASK, Department LIV, No. 17, Jezdnych w tymże roku 1589 przyjętych w Województwach, 22r–23v; Department 82, No. 6, Popis Panów Rotmistrzów, tych rot które są z powiatów wyprawieni na expedycję przeciwko carowi perekopskiemu Anno 1589 r., s.1., s. d., 30r–77r.

- Stefan Kazimierski's – 114 horses; (hussars),
- [Wentzel] Bekiesz's – 133 horses (hussars)⁷⁹,
- Prusinowski's – 149 horses (hussars),
- Jakub Pilchowski aka Pilichowski's, Royal Courtier – 101 horses (hussars),
- Ulanicki's – 153 horses (arquebusiers),
- Baworowski's – 107 horses (arquebusiers),
- Golski's – 107 horses (arquebusiers),
- Nowicki's – 101 horses (arquebusiers),
- Krassowski's – 53 horses (arquebusiers),
- Ernest Wejher's, Starost of Puck – 254 horses (arquebusiers),
- Górski's – 127 horses (cossacks),
- [unidentified] – 128 horses (unknown type),
- Joachim Hedel's – 111 horses (unknown type),
- Lipnicki's – 139 horses (unknown type).

These units represented a combined total of 2,457 horses. However, several of the listed banners were formed earlier. Namely, the banners of Prusinowski, Nowicki and Krassowski, which were included in older records of the quarter army, while those of Wiśniowiecki, Raszko, Golski, Ulanicki, Baworowski and Górski became active from 9 September 1589, i.e. before the sessions of the *sejmiks*. Therefore, it can be surmised that the financial burden was shifted from the *kwarta* tax to the *sejmiks* – from the central to the local level. This would explain the presence of Garwaski's hussars from the Płock Voivodeship and Raszko's hussar banner – which was certainly maintained by the Ruthenian Voivodeship (it is listed in the treasury accounts of the voivodeship, see table 3); it cannot be ruled out that the costs incurred by Wiśniowiecki's banner were covered by the Kyiv Voivodeship, and those of Wejher and Hedel by Royal Prussia.

After analysing this material, we get the following data. At the end of 1589, the voivodeships financed a total of 51 banners (mostly from Greater Poland)

and Starost of Gostynin, see Zbigniew Anusik, „Garwascy herbu Grzymała w XV–XVII wieku. Przyczynki do dziejów i genealogii rodu”, *Przegląd Nauk Historycznych* 14, no. 2 (2015): 52, <http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1644-857X.14.02.02>.

⁷⁹ During the wars with Moscow under Báthory reign, Kasper and Gabriel Bekiesz, who came from wealthy Hungarian nobility, served in the Crown army. The first died in the siege of Połock in 1579, and the second in the siege of Pskov in 1581. They both had sons: Gabriel and Wentzel (Wacław), who served under Sigismund III, receiving his indigenate in 1593. Wentzel was a courtier of Sigismund III and one of the infantry commanders during the king's expedition to Sweden in 1598, for which he later became starost of Wschowa. Bekiesz, in this case Wentzel, appears in the registers of field Crown clerk as a cavalry captain only in the records for 1591–1592. See Plewczyński, *Wojny i wojskowość*, 3:35, 92, 148, 152, 153, 160, 195, 196, 278, 279, 285, 288, 289, 306, 311, 314, 316; Niesiecki, *Herbarz Polski*, 2:90–91; *Ordynacja dworu*, 56; AGAD, ASK, Department 86, no. 34, Rozliczenie roty Wentzela Bekiesza w 1591 r., s.l., s.d., s.p.

with the strength of at least 6,682 horses, which were composed of 33 hussar, 9 cossack, 5 arquebusier and 4 unspecified units. In this case, the nine quarter army banners (with a combined total of 1,136 horses) taken over by the voivodships should be subtracted from the total number of banners to avoid counting them twice. This works out as follows: $3648 - 1136 = 2512$ horses. Thus, at the end of the year, Zamoyski had 77 cavalry banners at his disposal, numbering no less than 9,194 horses, and at least 8,000 when taking into account the „blind soldier’s pay”. This is basically in line with the total strength of the Crown army at that time, which according to Wimmer’s calculations numbered approximately 9,000⁸⁰. At the same time, I have to question whether the great Crown hetman at that time also had 1,200 infantry, because Potocki’s calculations from 1589 do not include any new infantry companies, except for Wolski’s company in Kamianets-Podilskyi and Nadolski’s company in Lubowla⁸¹. This was only changed by the provisions of the next *Sejm*, which is discussed below.

Sigismund III returned to Warsaw from Tallinn at the beginning of December 1589, which was of great relief to most of the nobility and senators, who feared a repetition of the king Henry Valois (1574) situation and another *interregnum*, this time due to Swedish matters. Zamoyski, whose relationship with the monarch was becoming more and more strained, greeted the king unenthusiastically as he had been thinking about the Crown for himself since the election of 1587⁸². Moreover, he did not hide the fact that he needed new recruits not only to defend against the Tatars, but also in the event of an *interregnum*, which was meticulously noted by Nuncio Annibal di Capua⁸³. Also, in a letter to the nobility of Greater Poland, the great Crown hetman and chancellor reiterated that all banners should remain in service longer, as the situation still required the further involvement of the Crown army⁸⁴. Therefore, in November he enquired about the possibility of keeping the voivodship banners in service for the next quarter in a letter to the senators from Lesser Poland, which especially concerned those units for which the *sejmiks* had not declared a salary for 6 months (such

⁸⁰ Wimmer, „Wojsko i skarb”, 11.

⁸¹ AGAD, ASK, Department LIV, no. 17, Piesi na zamkach pogranicznych, s.l., s.d., 24v.

⁸² Pięnkowski, *Trudna droga*, 459. Regarding the intentions of the chancellor, see Jan Dziegielewski, „Jana Zamoyskiego gra o tron Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1587–1589”, in *Przeszłość i terażniejszość. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Adamowi Koseskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, ed. Marian Dygo (Pułtusk: Wyd. Akademii Humanistycznej im. Aleksandra Gieysztor, 2009), 81–88; Edward Opaliński, „Zygmunt III wobec Habsburgów i Jana Zamoyskiego”, *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 123, no. 4 (2016): 783–786.

⁸³ BPAU/PAN w Krakowie, no. 8384, Teki Rzymskie, vol. 44, Annibal di Capua do Alessandra Perettiego de Montalto, Warszawa, 9 XI 1589, 40.

⁸⁴ B.Czart., rkps. 1621, Zamoyski do senatorów wielkopolskich, Terebovlia, 17 X 1589, 463–465.

a declaration was made by the congress in Łęczycza regarding the Greater Poland enlistments, while from the *sejmiks* of Lesser Poland only Lublin Voivodeship)⁸⁵.

Meanwhile, in December, the king convened another *Sejm* for March 1590. In a royal proclamation to the *sejmiks*, dated 23 December 1589, attention was paid primarily to the threat to the southern border, presenting the course of the last Tatar invasion and its effects. Zamoyski emphasized that the Ottomans were assembling their forces in Moldavia and Wallachia, and their goal was „to seize the Ukrainian castles and destroy the Zaporozhian Cossacks”⁸⁶. The *sejmiks* were reminded of the need to retain the provincial units in their service. In the communiqué, several references were made to Stephen Báthory, who had warned against the activities of the Ottomans during his tenure. The hostile intentions of the Tsardom of Russia were also mentioned, who had encouraged the Tatars to invade the Crown and had also conducted confidential talks with the Habsburgs. The threat from Moscow was also raised by the king due to the imminent expiry of the truce between Sweden and the Tsardom, which was the subject of the talks between Sigismund III and his father in Tallinn. Indeed, in March 1590, i.e. only three months after the legation was drawn up, conflict between Sweden and Russia recommenced in the vicinity of Narva (Narwa). The capture of which would provide Moscow with access to northern Livonia and the Karelian Isthmus, located between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. As far as defending against the Ottomans was concerned, the legation, even though it was quite extensive in content, was not specific with regards to the type of taxes or the number of recruits that were needed, however it did appeal to the nobility for self-sacrifice⁸⁷.

Zamoyski provided more details regarding this matter in a letter to the king dated 17 February, when he was forced to send a number of the voivodeships banners from their camp by order of the monarch, writing:

„there is no sign of peace, although this Turkish fury may change, but it will not change, nothing will happen to Turks, after praying to the Lord God, for a dear Homeland, for a pleasant freedom, and not to regret anything. Then I disagree with the hetman [Żółkiewski – M.P.] to wage war for a delay. We stand like snow, but I understand that resolutions must be made quickly, and be at the Danube every second year as soon as possible”⁸⁸.

⁸⁵ Ibid., Zamoyski do senatorów małopolskich, Płoskirów, 1 XI 1589, 443–444.

⁸⁶ Ibid., Instrukcja na sejmik powiatowy, Warsaw, 23 XII 1589, 167.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 167–179.

⁸⁸ AGAD, Archiwum Zamoyskich (Zamoyski's Family Archive, hereafter: AZ), no. 126, Zamoyski do Zygmunta III, Sokal, 17 II 1590, 2–4.

The great Crown hetman convinced Sigismund III of the inevitability of confrontation with the Ottoman Empire and encouraged the king to undertake a diplomatic initiative aimed at obtaining funds from abroad. In addition, he suggested a pre-emptive attack by the Crown army on the Danubian Principalities and the creation of a defensive cordon on the Dnieper line, which, as expected, was to be performed by the quarter army. In addition, Zamoyski encouraged the monarch to shorten the usual duration of parliamentary sessions in order to speed up the military preparations, which were to follow King Stephen Báthory's old, unrealized plans⁸⁹.

Żółkiewski, who was staying in Bar (Podolia) at the time, collecting information about the enemy from various sources, especially from Zamoyski, Field Crown Guardian, and Struś, the Starost of Vinnytsia (Winnica), tried to predict the direction of the next Tatar invasion. His correspondence shows that he was afraid of being strongly criticized by the nobility at the pre-*Sejm sejmiiks* for his incompetence in defending the Ruthenian lands of the Crown. For this reason, the field Crown hetman tried to be vigilant, saying with regret that „at the *sejmik*, I cannot be in Kamianets-Podilskyi or anywhere. I am asking God to let the Tartars spare me, at least for two days”⁹⁰. Due to the fact that „I didn't manage to move all the army, because I didn't have perfect news about the great enemy army yet”⁹¹. Żółkiewski divided the quarter army at his disposal into two cavalry regiments: the first was to be sent to the Vinnytsia region under his personal command in February, the second was to operate near Cherkasy under the command of Wiśniowiecki, the Starost of Cherkasy. Despite the fact that the quarter army was now larger than it was before the August invasion, it suffered from overdue pay as the next quarter of service was approaching and the Crown treasury was short of money. In this situation, some of the units were abused; we know that the soldiers of three banners: the hussars of Broniowski, the hussars of Bohotnicki, who was leaving the service (enlistment of the Volyhnian Voivodeship) and the arquebusiers of Ulanicki, entered into a sharp dispute with the townspeople of Bila Tserkva (Biała Cerkiew) because of choosing the provisions, in order to make up for the shortage of supplies⁹². Money must have been a pressing problem even then, as can be seen by the firm tone used by Struś, the Starost of Bratslav, in the following letter:

„and because of the sudden need and the shedding of our blood, this scarcity forces us to this, that company in everything, although there are

⁸⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁹⁰ „Żółkiewski do Zamoyskiego, Bar, 6 II 1590”, in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego 1584–1618*, ed. Jan Tadeusz Lubomirski (Kraków: Drukarnia UJ, 1868), 16.

⁹¹ Ibid., 15.

⁹² Ibid., 13–14.

some people who are poor in this pay for their merits, and the gracious Lord deigned to give some zlotys 16 each, and the second one for 12 zlotys, what else is it about me and my company that they are not such that they should be handicapped in anything and I am asking you m'lord to look into my and the deceased's services [regarding Jakub who died near Baworów – M.P.], and do not impair me with this, because I feel that no one is more deserving than me and I will stand equal to everyone, for which my company and with me sends the merciful Lord to you"⁹³.

Żółkiewski also pointed out that even if the *Sejm* decided to introduce new enlistments and taxes, there would be little time left to prepare for war, because „the Turks will not leave their wartime, because the Tatars order us to fight this time, and the army with the *beylerbey* in the neighbourhood winters with us"⁹⁴. As can be inferred, the field Crown hetman was primarily afraid of another Tatar attack, although he did not rule out that the Crown could be attacked from two directions, referring to the Ottoman forces in the south.

Even though Zamoyski planned a pre-emptive attack on the possessions of Ottoman vassals, he did not mention this in the royal legation to the *sejmiks*. Therefore, even if the situation escalated within two months of the instructions being sent to the nobility, we should not be surprised that nobility could feel confused. There is no space here for a detailed analysis of the resolutions of the pre-*Sejm sejmiks*. It is worth emphasizing, however, that a large number of Greater Poland *sejmiks* did not share the opinion of the great Crown hetman regarding the Turkish threat. The Środa *sejmik* was completely silent on this issue. In turn, apart from the Proszowice and Lublin *sejmiks*, which provided their deputies with broad recommendations regarding tax issues and new enlistments, the Ruthenian *sejmiks*, including that of Sudova Vyshnia, asked for a new peace agreement with Murad III, and also requested the reinforcement of border castles and fortresses, including those at: Bar, Bratslav, Busk, Khmilnyk, Halych, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Lviv, Przemyśl, Rohatyn (Rohatyń), Sniatyn, Terebovlia and Tlumach (Tłumacz). There was also no question of extending the service of the voivodeship banners⁹⁵. Hence, it should be assumed that most of the *sejmiks* wanted to avoid, not just an offensive war, but confrontation in general. This was reflected during the course of the *Sejm*, which was one of the most unusual in the parliamentary history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth⁹⁶.

⁹³ AGAD, AZ, no. 697, Jerzy Struś do Jana Zamoyskiego, Vinnytsia, 29 I 1590, 1–2.

⁹⁴ „Żółkiewski do Zamoyskiego, Bar, 8 VIII 1590”, in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, 17.

⁹⁵ Pieńkowski, „Kwestia wojny”, 22–24.

⁹⁶ Pieńkowski, „Chronologia sejmów z lat 1587–1600”, in *Chronologia sejmów Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów 1569–1795*, ed. Kupisz and Leszek Andrzej Wierzbicki (Warszawa: Wyd. Sejmowe, 2021), 19.

The *Sejm* completed its deliberations, despite the fact that about 70 deputies from the Crown and every Lithuanian deputy boycotted the proceedings. This happened as a sign of protest against the war policy of Zamoyski, who in his capacity as Great Crown Hetman argued for the Crown army to be marched to the Danube and pushed for a significant and precedent increase in the powers of his hetman office due to the alarming news brought to Warsaw by Mikołaj Czyżewski, who informed the *Sejm* that Uchański had died on his way to Istanbul, and that the Ottomans had made a number of demands. The assembly was deeply worried by this news and in the atmosphere that prevailed the hetman obtained the following resolutions: „Hetman’s Assault”, „Disciplina militaris”, and „Exclusion of soldiers from the law”, the possibility of issuing hetman’s crime articles with the force of a parliamentary resolution and of trying soldiers without restrictions. Soldiers were not to be held accountable before the civil courts on the basis of being exemption (*egzempta*)⁹⁷, which, although this made it possible to keep soldiers in camp, it also gave rise to formal and practical fears among the nobility⁹⁸. In addition, on the basis of the resolution „Deputies to the War Council”, a special body was established consisting of senators and deputies. This council was to take over the role of the king and the Crown Councils with regards to the use of executive power, especially foreign policy; to a large extent this body consisted of Zamoyski’s political allies⁹⁹. The great Crown hetman also envisaged the enlistment of a large number of new recruits, which would include 30,000 hussars, 15,000 arquebusiers, 10,000 foreign infantry, 30,000 Polish infantry, 20,000 Zaporozhian Cossacks, and the noble mass levy¹⁰⁰. Even a cursory review of these intentions shows that they were impossible to implement for organizational, financial and demographic reasons. The *Sejm* also adopted four resolutions relating to the quarter army: „The manner and condition of returning the quarter”, „Judging the quarter *pro hac vice*”, „About the judging quarter” and „The quarter from the Volhynian Voivodeship”. Based on these resolutions new deputies to the treasury were appointed in Rawa (*kwarta* tax was brought to the castle of Rawa), as follows: Wojciech Wilkanowski, Castellan of Płock; Piotr Niszczycki, Castellan of Bełz; Stanisław Karśnicki, Land Judge of Sieradz, and Jan Gołuchowski. It was decided to make a double *kwarta* tax and to improve its collectability by vetting unverified Crown estates and

⁹⁷ *Egzempta* – it was a kind of privilege granted by the hetman. Thanks to that, the soldier did not have to stand trial and the cases against him were temporarily suspended.

⁹⁸ Łopatecki, „Egzempcje wojskowe – immunitet żołnierski w Rzeczypospolitej Szlacheckiej XVI–XVII wieku”, *Zeszyty Prawnicze UKSW*, no. 5 (2005): 1015.

⁹⁹ Gawron, „Hetman i kanclerz”, 643–646; Pieńkowski, „Kwestia wojny”, 31–33.

¹⁰⁰ Pieńkowski, „Kwestia wojny”, 28; Wimmer, „Wojsko i skarb”, 11.

holding the tenures by the Crown instigator before the Crown Tribunal. In addition, two inspectors, namely the cavalry captains Lanckoroński (the Castellan of Halych) and Raszko (the Chamberlain of Halych) were sent to those towns that had suffered during the last Tatar invasion¹⁰¹. It is worth emphasizing that including the Volhynian Voivodeship in the resolution of *kwarta* tax was extraordinary, considering that the Ukrainian voivodeships that were incorporated into the Crown under the Union of Lublin (1569) were exempt from this obligation. These examples show that the deputies wanted to increase the income from *kwarta* tax in the face of the growing problems of defending the south-eastern border and having insufficient funds to increase the number of banners in service.

Based on the resolutions of the *Sejm* of 1590, Zamoyski began recruiting new banners in April, although in May the nobility's negative attitude towards the resolutions of the *Sejm* became visible, and even the accusation from the nobility of Poznań and Kalisz Voivodeships that the *Sejm* had failed to comply with formal and legal procedures by withdrawing the conclusions from the monarch, as the resolutions were printed before the *Sejm* concluded¹⁰². Also, some observers voiced their suspicions concerning Zamoyski's activities, suggesting that the great Crown hetman wanted to strengthen his own power by exaggerating the Ottoman threat, because Sigismund III did not permanently move to Sweden¹⁰³. According to the nuncio, „this news about the Turks are spread by servants, but they do not believe them, saying that it is the chancellor in order to gain more tribute at the *Sejm*, and seriousness and ruthlessness in the army. They also say that the chancellor wants to exploit the impression of this news in order to gain more power as hetman”¹⁰⁴. Also, in a letter to the Field Lithuanian Hetman Krzysztof „Piorun” Radziwiłł, the Royal Bed Maker Jan Bojanowski, who was reporting from the *Sejm*, noted that „there are many whispers among people, that these are futile fears from the Turks, but no one dares to talk about it in such a voice”, highlighting the strong position of Zamoyski's faction¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰¹ See individual resolutions in *Volumina Constitutionum*, 2/2:139–148.

¹⁰² Pieńkowski, *Trudna droga*, 459–460.

¹⁰³ Jan Dzięgielewski, *Sejmy elekcyjne, elektorzy, elekcje 1572–1674* (Pułtusk: Wyd. Akademii Humanistycznej im. A. Gieysztora w Pułtusku, 2003), 176; Stanisław Grzybowski, *Jan Zamoyski* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1994), 234; Lepszy, *Rzeczpospolita Polska*, 141; Gawron, *Hetman koronny*, 230.

¹⁰⁴ BPAU/PAN w Krakowie, no. 8384, Teki Rzymskie (Rome's Files), t. 44, Annibal z Kapui Alessandra Perettięo de Montalto, Warsaw, 11 II 1590, 155.

¹⁰⁵ AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłów (Radziwiłł's Family Archive), Department V, no. 1082, Bojanowski do Radziwiłła, Warsaw, 4 IV 1590, 171–172.

Despite this, criticism of the nobility caused Sigismund III to stop charging taxes throughout the country¹⁰⁶. An important role in this context was played by the congress of the Greater Poland nobility that took place in Koło in August 1590, convened on the initiative of Primate Karnkowski, who saw in the activities of the Zamoyski an attempt to upset the balance of political system of the Commonwealth. As a result of this congress, postulates were put forward that not only limited the power of the great Crown hetman but also abolished lifetime appointments and required the office holder to take an oath. The new resolutions would also deprive military members of the opportunity to take up seats in the *sejmiks*, thus removing the possibility of them influencing political life. This was met with a strong reaction from Zamoyski, who invoked propaganda but was not able to overcome the unfavourable opinion of him held by some of the nobility. What made matters worse for the great Crown hetman was that the news coming from the new Polish envoy to Murad III suggested that relations between the two states were normalizing, and that there was also no prospect of obtaining military and financial support from abroad¹⁰⁷.

By June 1590, another 11 cavalry banners with a combined strength of at least 2,003 horses and 16 infantry companies totaling 3,420 soldiers had been raised, as shown in tables 4 and 5. In addition, 13 units of „chosen infantry” (pol. *piechota wybraniecka*) with the strength of 2,306 soldiers were formed¹⁰⁸. Also, in his accounts Potocki listed cavalry banners that had not received any pay, therefore it should be assumed that these units did not enter service in 1590. There were 6 banners among them, led by: Zbaraski, the Voivode of Bratslav; Stanisław Bykowski, Castellan *Konarski* of Łęczycza and Starost of Sieradz; Franciszek Wesselni; Jędrzej Leszczyński; Mikołaj Lanckoroński and Sebastian Wiernicki¹⁰⁹. It follows that in the summer of 1590, Zamoyski had at his disposal no less than 5,698 horses and 5,726 infantry soldiers (a total of 11,424 – 10%, i.e. still over 10,000 soldiers). However, compared to the extremely ambitious targets and despite the Crown army being at its largest since the time of Stefan Báthory and his wars with Moscow, Zamoyski’s plans had not come to fruition.

¹⁰⁶ Gawron, „Hetman i kanclerz”, 651; Pieńkowski, „Kwestia wojny”, 34.

¹⁰⁷ Pieńkowski, „Kwestia wojny”, 35–38. A certain amount of money was transferred only by the Duchy of Prussia as part of its feudal obligations towards the Crown, see Milewski, „Zabiegi Zygmunta III”, 52–54.

¹⁰⁸ Wimmer, „Wojsko i skarb”, 12.

¹⁰⁹ AGAD, ASK, Department LIV, no. 17, *Jezdni w roku 1590 przyjęci*, s.l, s.d., 23v–24r.

Table 4. List of cavalry banners adopted in 1590

No.	Captain	Number of horses
1	Jerzy Mniszech, Voivode of Sandomierz	721
2	Ernest Wejher, Starost of Puck	500
3	Jerzy Farensbach, Hetman of Livonia and Starost of Karksi	[?]*
4	Jan Ostroróg, Crown Cupbearer	100
5	Stanisław Przerębski <i>aka</i> Przerembski, Starost of Radoszyce	200
6	Sebastian Sobieski, Royal Courtier	100
7	Maciej Leniek <i>aka</i> Lenik, Starost of Livonian Nowogródek (Neuhausen)	100
8	Wentzel Bekiesz	100
9	Stefan Kazimierski	135
10	Jarosz Bulatowicz	50
11	Leonard Słończewski	[?]*
Total horses		at least 2003

* According to the records, these banners received pay, but the field Crown clerk did not specify their size.

Source: AGAD, ASK, Department LIV, no. 17, Jezdni w roku 1590 przyjęci, s.l., s.d., 23v–24r.

Table 5. List of infantry companies commissioned in 1590

No.	Captain	Number of troops
1	Łukasz Serny	180
2	Łysakowski	200
3	Frydrychowski	176
4	[unidentified]	169
5	Drohojowski, Crown Referendary and Starost of Przemyśl	50
6	Dalmata	1100
7	Wendelski	156
8	Konarski	78
9	Fredro	150
10	Jantal	50
11	Beleger	80
12	Jazłowiecki, Starost of Sniatyn	70
13	Trzaska	100
14	Baranowski	30
15	Paradowski	231
16	Andrzej de Concreur*	600
Total troops		3420

* Scottish infantry.

Source: AGAD, ASK, Department LIV, no. 17, Roty pisze, s.l, s. d., 24r–24v.

The failure of the military policy quickly affected the army's financial situation, which made it impossible to implement most of the objectives due to a lack of funds in the Crown treasury. Even in the case of banners already on active duty who were about to receive additional pay, there were significant organizational complications. Raszko, a hussar captain of the quarter army, wrote to Zamoyski in May: „I have m'lord order to have 200 hussars for this need of the Commonwealth against the Turks, being afraid that I might not fail to arrange another company soon, I send m'lord to find out where and from whom I will receive the money for this service, because it is difficult for us to arrange company without money, and I ask you to send me their m'lord ordered to give them in time”¹¹⁰. In turn, the Crown Cupbearer, Ostroróg, informed the great Crown hetman that „the Voivode of Kalisz, Mr. Potulicki [Stanisław, son of the voivode, Piotr – M.P.] sent this boy to me after his loving Lord left Warsaw, for enlistment letter and showing money for one and a half hundred horses, or for two hundred ready company”¹¹¹. As Filipczak-Kocur points out, the debt to the army grew exponentially and in the summer it reached almost 420,000 zlotys, despite putting at the disposal of the field Crown hetman the money collected by virtue of the decisions of the *sejmiks*¹¹². This coincided with the death of the former treasurer Dulski in March 1590, after which the office was taken over two months later by Jan Firlej, who was unable to review the financial affairs of the office at such short notice. Zamoyski was aware of this, because in a letter addressed to the deputies of *kwarta* tax in Rawa, he informed them that „this news has now come to me from Ukraine, that the Tatar army is crossing the Dnieper River, that they will visit us in a short time. [...] I am asking you, then, to send the quarter [money from tax – M.P.] to Ruthenia as soon as possible, so that the coating of this payment can wipe them off with anything”¹¹³.

The lack of pay was the catalyst for the first army mutinies and establishment of the first confederation of the Crown army in the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on 18 September, headed by Żółkiewski, the commander of the quarter army. The king did not manage to stop the soldiers, although he did attempt to do so by sending the following envoys to Gliniany – Niszczycki, Castellan of Bełz, and the Royal Courtier Krzysztof Dzierżek¹¹⁴. The provisions of the confederation were signed by almost every cavalry captain of the units that were adopted into service between

¹¹⁰ AGAD, AZ, no. 693, Raszko do Zamoyskiego, Lviv, 24 V 1590, 20.

¹¹¹ Ibid., no. 685, Ostroróg do Zamoyskiego, Lublin, 10 V 1590, 68–69.

¹¹² Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość*, 81.

¹¹³ AGAD, AZ, no. 126, Zamoyski do deputatów od kwarty, Zamość, 14 VII 1590, 2.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., no. 238, Akt konfederacji wojska koronnego, Gliniany, 18 IX 1590, 1–11; for a clearer copy on microfilm see Biblioteka Narodowa, Biblioteka Ordynacji Zamojskiej, no. 1809/I, 131r–133v; see also Ciara, „Konfederacje wojskowe”, 62–66.

1588–1590, who complained about the failure to implement the resolutions of the last *Sejm* regarding the Conscription Universal. They also defended Zamoyski's prerogatives, positioning themselves on the opposite side of the participants of the Koło congress, which quickly turned into a serious political issue because the army would not disobey the hetman, Zamoyski decided to take advantage of the army's dissatisfaction and lack of pay by allocating them for „winter bread”¹¹⁵, not only in the Ruthenian and Podolia Voivodeships, but also in Lublin and even in Czersk Land. This brought the confederated banners dangerously close to Warsaw, whilst Zamoyski moved his quarters Wola¹¹⁶. These actions were met with a firm reply from the nobility of Poznań Voivodeship and Kalisz at the *sejmik* in Środa, held in November 1590 prior to the next regular *Sejm*. The nobility accused Zamoyski of trying to pressurize the *Sejm* through the use of armed force. The envoy's instruction thundered: „and that we are all being sought, that he should have o'lord the hetman with his jurisdiction to extend the common laws further, it is necessary and *expedit Reipublicae* to stop it. [...] And since, according to the Koło congress, we were to go to the *Sejm* with a noble mass levy, [...] then I will deal with it, waiting for it from my deputies, where they need to be, announcements, being *nihilominus* ourselves [in] ready”¹¹⁷. Such a position was not only a reference to Zamoyski's authority, but could be a prelude to internal unrest. Therefore, the *Sejm* had to resolve of this dispute immediately.

The course of these sessions show that those in support of limiting Zamoyski's influence had gained the upper hand, i.e. the senators and deputies from the province of Greater Poland, including Masovia, which strongly supported the newly created royal political base¹¹⁸. Although Zamoyski was defended by the deputies of the Ruthenian Voivodeship and Bełż, where he enjoyed great influence, this did not fundamentally change the position of the *Sejm* which invalidated the constitutions extending the hetman's powers and reduced his customary role. The *Sejm* also ordered that all units, both cavalry and infantry, be accounted for during the commission meeting in Lublin, which was to take place on 29 September 1591,

¹¹⁵ „Winter bread” (pol. *chleb zimowy*) or *hiberna* was an obligation to guarantee accommodation for Crown army units during winter time by hetman.

¹¹⁶ Ciara, „Konfederacje wojskowe”, 64. In addition, it was contrary to the expectations of the nobility that the winter camps of individual banners should be located a short distance from the south-eastern border of the Crown, which allowed for faster concentration in the face of an invasion.

¹¹⁷ „Instrukcja z sejmiku średzkiego, Środa, 3 XI 1590”, in *Akta sejmikowe województwa poznańskiego*, 1/1:146–147.

¹¹⁸ Pieńkowski, *Trudna droga*, 452–453.

and was to consist of 6 senators as well as representatives of the nobility that were elected at the *sejmiks*. Arrears of pay were to be covered by extraordinary taxes¹¹⁹.

Based on the resolution „Abolition of certain constitutions of the past *Sejm*”, the extensions of power that were granted in 1590 were annulled, and the resolution „*Disciplina militaris*” limited the judicial power of the hetman in favour of the Crown Tribunal and the *Sejm* court, which was the highest authority regarding criminal matters. The recruitment possibilities of the Crown army were also limited, as individual banners could no longer exceed 100 horses. In the case of the quarter army, its size was not to exceed the financial capabilities of the *kwarta* tax, while supplements were dependent on the decision of the *Sejm* unless there was an urgent need, in which case the consent of the senators staying with the monarch at the time was sufficient¹²⁰. This provision was important because the Henrician Articles did not provide for such a possibility, leaving such matters to the deliberating estates, which gave the king more flexibility regarding formal and legal grounds than before. It is also not a coincidence that this resolution emphasized the superior role of the king (without mentioning the hetman at all in this context) in moderating the size of the army, a clear result of the Koło congress. This, however, did not weaken Zamoyski’s influence over the army staff, because in this respect his position was not seriously shaken¹²¹. Despite this, the great Crown hetman filed three protests at the end of the *Sejm*. The first concerned his disapproval of the reduction of the quarter army, which thus prevented him from performing his duties. However, he did not resign his hetman’s office to the king, therefore his protest should be interpreted as a demonstration of dissatisfaction. The second was related to the limiting of his influence over the Zaprozhan Cossacks, whilst the third was directed against the Koło congress provisions¹²². The latter was also signed by several senators and over 20 deputies, including eight cavalry captains with a *sejmik* mandate: Ocieski (the Starost of Olsztyn), Swoszowski (a Land Clerk from Lviv), Drohojowski (the Crown Referendary and Starost of Przemyśl), Stadnicki, Raszko (Chamberlain of Halych), Wojciech Chocimirski, Andrzej, Jan and Jakub Potocki¹²³.

¹¹⁹ Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość*, 82.

¹²⁰ *Volumina Constitutionum*, 2/2:176–180; see also Gawron, „Hetman i kanclerz”, 666–667; Gawron, „Hetman koronny”, 240–241.

¹²¹ Gawron, „Proces tworzenia kadry oficerskiej armii koronnej w czasach Zygmunta III Wazy (1587–1632)”, in *Organizacja armii w nowożytnej Europie: struktura – urzędy – prawo – finanse*, ed. Łopatecki (Zabrze: Infortedititions, 2011), 248.

¹²² B.Czart., rkps., no. 94, *Protestacje Zamoyskiego*, Warsaw, 15 I 1590, 619, 625.

¹²³ *Posłowie ziemscy*, 331–339.

The *Sejm* also elected deputies to receive the *kwarta* tax in the form of two senators: Hieronim Bużeński, the Castellan of Sieradz, and Andrzej Zborowski, the Castellan of Biecz who had been restored to favour by Sigismund III¹²⁴, and two deputies: Stanisław Zeleski and Jerzy Stan. The size of the quarter army was also reduced. In the first quarter of 1591 it numbered 2,700 horses in 27 banners (see table 6), but after the disbandment of several companies after February 1 this figure dropped to 15 banners. Moreover, only 6 of these banners were composed of 100 horses with the others having half that amount (see table 7), which left the army with a modest total of 1,050 horses – its lowest number since 1586¹²⁵. At the end of 1591, the Lublin commission accounted a total of 49 banners of the „old and new enlistment”, thus liquidating the pay arrears¹²⁶.

Table 6. The list of quarter cavalry banners that received pay from 9 December 1590 to 1 February 1591

No.	Captain	Number of horses
1	Stanisław Włodek, Voivode of Belz	200
2	Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, Voivode of Lublin, Court Crown Hetman and Starost of Cracow	100
3	Stanisław Tarnowski, Castellan of Sandomierz	100
4	Stanisław Żółkiewski, Crown Field Hetman and Castellan of Lviv	100
5	Joachim Ocieski, Starost of Olsztyn	100
6	Piotr Myszkowski, Starost of Oświęcim	100
7	Jan Potocki, Field Crown Clerk and Starost of Kamianets-Podilskiyi	150
8	Jan Ostroróg, Crown Cupbearer	100
9	Paweł Węgliński	100
10	Wojciech Chocimirski	150
11	Andrzej Bełżecki	150
12	Szymkowicz Temruk	150
13	Jan Oborski	150
14	Krzysztof Leśniowski	100
15	Krassowski	150
16	Jan Golski	150

¹²⁴ Andrzej Zborowski was adherent of Archduke Maximilian during election in 1587.

¹²⁵ According to Wimmer, the quarter army was reduced to 1,000 men: 800 cavalrymen and 200 infantrymen in Kamianets-Podilskiyi, see Wimmer, „Wojsko i skarb”, 13.

¹²⁶ AGAD, ASK, Department 86, no. 33, Zapłata rotom w Lublinie przez Ichmościów Panów Deputatów uczyniona. Rotom dawniejszym. Rotom nowym, s.l., s.d., s.p.; see also Wimmer, „Wojsko i skarb”, 12–13.

17	Aleksander Wiśniowiecki, Starost of Cherkasy	200
18	Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, Starost of Sniatyn	100
19	Andrzej Bełżecki	50
20	Sebastian Sobieski, Royal Courtier	50
21	Jan Bułakowski	50
22	Andrzej Potocki, Cupbearer of Kamianets-Podilskyi	50
23	Mikołaj Daniłowicz	50
24	Piotr Łaszcz	50
25	Jakub Prusinowski	50
26	Adam Stadnicki	50
27	Adrian Andrzej Dobrzyniecki	50
Total horses		2700

Source: AGAD, ASK, Department LIV, no. 17, Porachunki P. Pisarza Polnego. Podane są pewne rotę, którym nadszedł pewny czas do ściągnięcia po wypowiedzeniu służby na sejmie 1591, s.l., s.d., 31r–33v.

Table 7. List of quarter army banners in service after 1 February 1591

No.	Captain	Number of horses
1	Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, Voivode of Lublin, Court Crown Hetman and Starost of Cracow	100
2	Stanisław Żółkiewski, Crown Field Hetman and Castellan of Lviv	100
3	Stanisław Tarnowski, Castellan of Sandomierz	100
4	Piotr Myszkowski, Starost of Oświęcim	100
5	Joachim Ocieski, Starost of Olsztyn	100
6	Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, Starost of Sniatyn	100
7	Andrzej Bełżecki	50
8	Jakub Prusinowski	50
9	Sebastian Sobieski, Royal Courtier	50
10	Jan Bułakowski	50
11	Jan Ostroróg, Crown Cupbearer	50
12	Mikołaj Daniłowicz	50
13	Piotr Łaszcz	50
14	Adam Stadnicki	50
15	Adrian Andrzej Dobrzyniecki	50
Total horses		1050

Source: AGAD, ASK, Department 86, no. 34, Ad diem 1 February 1591. Pro Septimamis, s.l., s.d., 10.

Due to the short period covered by the research and the gaps in the military and treasury records in AGAD of the quarter army during the reign of King Stephen Báthory, it is difficult to precisely isolate and then divide the cavalry

captains in terms of their professionalism¹²⁷. Of all the quarter army captains from the discussed years, only five can be considered „professional” (having more than 15 years of service), i.e. Herbut, Temruk, Uhrowicki and the two Struś brothers. These captains served either from the time of Sigismund II Augustus or from the beginning of the reign of Báthory, although Herbut had breaks in his service. The other captains were either semi-professional or non-professional, the number of which fluctuated (depending on the political and military situation at the time) in line with the size of the army. Semi-professional captains (over 5 years of service) include Włodek, Podlodowski, Bełżecki, Charłęski and Chocimirski. In this context, it remains an open question whether all quarter army captains exercised direct command over their banners, which is not directly evident from the treasury records or from registers of the field Crown clerk. In the case of those holding senatorial offices, it is likely that leadership of their banners was deputized to the unit’s lieutenants, especially when a *Sejm* was in session. Apparently, this aroused controversy in the opinion of the nobility, because in the provisions of the *Sejm* of 1591 it was stated: „no senator or borough court starost can have such banner [in quarter army – M.P.], for the duties of their offices”¹²⁸. It can be seen that for the nobility the fulfilment of duties by officials was very important. However, this resolution was clearly not applied immediately as three senators and one borough court starost appear in lists of quarter army captains after this *Sejm*. These included Żółkiewski (who from 1590 was the Castellan of Lviv), Zebrzydowski (the Voivode of Lublin, Court Crown Hetman and the Starost od Cracow) and Tarnowski (Zamoyski’s father-in-law and the Castellan of Sandomierz).

Leaving aside the obvious influence Zamoyski had on the staffing of the army, it should be noted that the actual capacity of the *kwarta* tax did not exceed several hundred horses a year, which is why the remaining banners were commanded by rich and powerful elites, which was profitable for them in terms of prestige. I suppose, however, that behind the above statement of the *Sejm* there could also be a desire to attack the political background of the great Crown hetman, who had a personal connection with every quarter army captain, some of whom directly belonged to his faction. This association was perfectly demonstrated by the Gliniany army confederation. There is no doubt, as I stated in my previous article, that between 1588–1590 these captains received profitably by starosties, as well as official seats in the senate thanks to the protective capabilities of Zamoyski as Great Crown Chancellor (Zamoyski

¹²⁷ Regarding the subject of the Crown army during Báthory’s wars with Moscow, see Henryk Kotarski, „Wojsko polsko-litewskie podczas wojny inflanckiej 1576–1582”, *SMHW* 16, pt. 2 (1970): 63–123; 17, pts. 1 and 2 (1971): 51–124, 81–151; 18, pts. 1 and 2 (1972): 3–92, 43–104.

¹²⁸ *Volumina Constitutionum*, 2/2:177.

combined this office with hetman office since 1581 thanks to King Bathory). This group mainly included representatives of families from Lesser Poland that had military connections (including the Herbut, the Potocki, the Sobieski, the Tarnowski, the Uhrowiecki, the Włodek, the Zebrzydowski and the Żółkiewski Families) and separating them from Zamoyski was not easy for Sigismund III¹²⁹. The king had to take into account the popularity of certain nobles and the need to ensure appropriate cooperation between individuals entrusted with defending the south-eastern border, as this duty also rested on his shoulders. The events at the turn of 1589/1590, provoked by the Tatar invasion, showed that a solid basis for the rapid expansion of the Crown army existed, but it required a comprehensive approach from both the rulers and the ruled.

The separation of the royal court treasury from public treasury at the *Sejm* of 1590 and the separation of a part of the Crown land meant a formal departure from the assumptions of the enforcement reforms of the 1560s towards providing the king with real income, but only from a part of the domain (although it was the richest part of the Crown land)¹³⁰. In addition, the willingness of the tenutaries to pay a double *kwarta* tax (that was expressed at the next *Sejm*), although desired by the monarch, did not solve the issue of the lack funds required to maintain the quarter army¹³¹. Thus, the functioning of the regular army had a systemic dimension. The escalating conflict between the king and the „first minister” Zamoyski endangered future cooperation regarding the hetman-king-nobility line and raised concerns regarding the defence policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In later years, the king informed the nobility of the need to create a permanent military treasury with increased revenues from taxes or, alternatively, to allow the chamber of deputies majority voting on military and treasury matters (because on these issues deputies had to vote unanimously). However, these suggestions were opposed later by the chancellor’s faction and some of the nobility leaders, which accused the king of trying to increase his power by reducing *Sejm* influence on tax matters, following the example of other European rulers¹³².

¹²⁹ Pieńkowski, „To jest firmamentum”, 28–36; Wojciech Sokołowski, *Politycy schyłku złotego wieku. Małopolscy przywódcy szlachty i parlamentarzysty w latach 1574–1605* (Warszawa: Wyd. Sejmowe, 1997), 138.

¹³⁰ Pieńkowski, „Trudna droga”, 423–424; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska, „Losy egzekucji dóbr domeny w latach 1574–1650”, *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 80, no. 1 (1973): 7. The *Sejm* did not find money to repurchase all Crown estates. The nobility believed that the king should do it, which was the subject of dispute.

¹³¹ See *Volumina Constitutionum*, 2/2:178; Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość*, 87.

¹³² Some parallels can be seen in the reign of James I Stuart or Habsburgs in relations to Kingdom of Bohemia. However, this problem requires a separate study.

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STRESZCZENIE

**Maciej Adam Pieńkowski, „Rotmistrze, jako towarzystwo JKMcI”.
Wojsko kwarciane w latach 1589–1591**

Artykuł prezentuje liczebność i funkcjonowanie wojska kwarcianego w latach 1589–1591. Problem ten nie był dotychczas szerzej omawiany w literaturze przedmiotu, a jedynie zasygnalizowany w opracowaniu Jana Wimmera. Dzięki dotarciu do materiałów skarbowo-wojskowych udało się ustalić nie tylko liczebność tego wojska w poszczególnych kwartałach interesującego okresu, ale także nazwiska rotmistrzów. W okresie tym doszło do dużego najazdu tatarskiego inspirowanego przez Imperium Osmańskie, w związku z zawarciem między Rzeczpospolitą i Habsburgami traktatu pokojowego, kończącego rywalizację o tron polski z lat 1587–1588. Atak ordy zbiegł się w czasie z nieobecnością Zygmunta III w kraju, co spotęgowało zagrożenie, skutkując szybkim powiększeniem wojska kwarcianego i całej armii koronnej. Kwestia ta znalazła swoją kontynuację na sejmie 1590 r., który uchwalił ogromne podatki z perspektywą wojny zaczepnej przeciwko Wysokiej Porcie. W związku z tym, że opinia szlachecka była temu przeciwna, doszło do polaryzacji politycznej i anulowania części uchwał sejmowych. W rezultacie szybko powiększająca się armia nie otrzymała należnego żołdu, zawiązując pod Glinianami pierwszą w dziejach konfederację wojskową. Doszło wówczas do znaczącej redukcji wojska kwarcianego oraz zmniejszenia władzy hetmańskiej Jana Zamoyskiego na tle jego rywalizacji z królem o wpływy w państwie.

Słowa kluczowe: wojsko, rotmistrz, hetman, chorągiew, starosta

SUMMARY

**Maciej Adam Pieńkowski, „All Captains of His Majesty”.
The Quarter Army between 1589–1591**

The article discusses the strength and functioning of the quarter army between 1589–1591. This problem has not been discussed in detail in the subject literature so far, besides being highlighted in a study by Jan Wimmer. Thanks to having access to military and treasury materials, it was possible to determine not only the strength of the quarter army during the period in question but also the names of individual cavalry captains. During the chronological period covered by the article there was a large Tatar invasion inspired by the Ottoman Empire, which was connected to the disagreement between them and the Habsburgs with the peace treaty that ended the rivalry for the Polish throne between 1587–1588. The invasion coincided with the absence of Sigismund III from the country, which intensified the threat and resulted in the rapid enlargement of the entire Crown army. The issue was discussed at the *Sejm* of 1590, which in turn imposed huge tax increases due to the imminent prospect of war with the Ottoman Empire. There was political polarization among nobility was against the war, which resulted in the cancellation

of several parliamentary resolutions. Consequently, the rapidly growing army did not receive its due pay, establishing the military confederation under Gliniany. As a result, there was a significant reduction of the quarter army and a reduction in the power of the Great Crown Hetman Jan Zamoyski, who had attempted to rival the king regarding influence over the state.

Keywords: army, captain, hetman, banner, starost

ZUSSAMENFASSUNG

Maciej Adam Pieńkowski, „Alle Rittmeister Seiner Königlichen Hoheit”. Die Quarttruppen in den Jahren 1589–1591

Dieser Aufsatz befasst sich mit dem Umfang und der Funktionsweise der Quarttruppen in den Jahren 1589–1591. Diese Problematik war kein ausführlicher Gegenstand der bisherigen Literatur und wurde lediglich in der Studie von Jan Wimmer oberflächlich behandelt. Durch den Zugang zu militärischen Finanzakten konnten nicht nur die zahlenmäßigen Ausmaße dieser Armee in den einzelnen Quartieren des relevanten Zeitraums ermittelt werden, sondern auch die Namen der Rittmeister. In dem behandelten Zeitraum kam es zu einem großen, vom Osmanischen Reich inspirierten Tatareneinfall im Zusammenhang mit dem Friedensschluss zwischen der Polen-Litauen und den Habsburgern, der die Rivalität um den polnischen Thron von 1587–1588 beendete. Der Tatarenangriff fiel mit der Landesabwesenheit Sigismunds III. zusammen, was die Bedrohung verschärfte und zu einer raschen Vergrößerung der Quarttruppen und der gesamten Kronarmee führte. Das Thema fand seine Fortsetzung auf dem *Sejm* von 1590, der umfassende Steuern mit der Aussicht auf einen Angriffskrieg gegen die Hohe Pforte erhob. Da der Adel sich gegen diese Beschlüsse positionierte, kam es zu einer politischen Polarisierung, und damit zur Annullierung eines Teils der Sejmbeschlüsse. Infolgedessen erhielt die sich rasch vergrößernde Armee nicht den ihr zustehenden Sold und bildete bei Gliniany den ersten militärischen Zusammenschluss der Geschichte. Infolgedessen kam es zu einer erheblichen Umerziehung der Quarttruppen und zu einer Verringerung der hetmanischen Macht Jan Zamoyskis vor dem Hintergrund seiner Rivalität mit dem König um Einflüsse im Staat.

Schlüsselwörter: Armee, Rittmeister, Hetman, Banner, Starost