When Competence Hurts: Revelation of Complex Information

• Authors: Joanna Franaszek

Title variants

PL

Kompetencje a rozumienie złożonych informacji

Abstracts

PL

Kiedy informacje przekazywane między agentami ekonomicznymi są złożone, a stopień rozumienia ich – niepewny, „szum” w informacji niekoniecznie oznacza złe wieści. W artykule zbadano prostą grę w perswazję między nadawcą a odbiorcą, w której efektywna komunikacja zależy nie tylko od wysiłków nadawcy, ale również od złożoności świata i kompetencji odbiorcy. W tym modelu równowaga optymalna z punktu widzenia nadawcy maksymalizuje ilość szumu w komunikacji. Odbiorca staje się ofiarą „przekleństwa kompetencji” – typ odbiorcy lepiej radzącego sobie ze złożonym przekazem może uzyskać mniej informacji i niższą wypłatę niż odbiorca o niższych kompetencjach komunikacyjnych.

EN

Even when information is complex and the information processing capacity of economic agents uncertain, noisy messages do not necessarily indicate bad news. I exploit this intuition to examine a simple sender – receiver persuasion game in which effective communication about the state of the world depends not only on the sender’s efforts but also on the complexity of that state and the receiver’s competence. In this environment, the sender-optimal equilibria maximise the amount of noise. The receiver faces a ”competence curse” whereby the smart types might end up with less information and a lower payoff than those who are somewhat less competent.

Keywords

PL

komunikacja; model nadawcy-odbiorcy; ujawnianie informacji

EN

communication; sender-receiver model; information revelation

• Publisher: Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie. Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 307
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 5-23

Dates

published

2021

Contributors

author

Joanna Franaszek

• SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

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Identifiers

DOI

10.33119/GN/139049

Biblioteka Nauki

2033216