The author analyzes the problem with the vision of Chinese domestic and foreign policy after the 2012 power transfer to the fifth generation of its leaders. It also discusses appointing the sixth generation of leaders, who are to take over in 2022. In the conclusions and key findings, the author highlights that, at present, there is no threat for the process of power transfer to come out from under the control of the CPC, and not to complete in accordance with its mechanism. One should not expect, however, the liberalization of politics and the state system in China. Larger confidence, higher assertiveness and the rise of global ambitions, along with readiness for the change of global norms and institutions will characterize the foreign policy of the new Chinese central authorities. The author assesses that some threat to the continuation of the undertaken reforms can constitute the renaissance of Maoism that can now be seen in China, and which is supported by some politicians. However, its potential is not dangerous enough to change the course of the modernization process in China. There exists an overall consensus among the fifth and sixth generation of leaders in relation to the national goals and strategy of China. The designation of someone from Inner Mongolia by Hu Jintao to become a sixth generation leader will confirm long running concerns of state leadership over domestic separatism, and the threat to the system it brings.