Marynarka wojenna Chin w erze Xi Jinpinga: zdolności wojskowe i kierunki rozwoju sił morskich

• Authors: Rafał Kwieciński

Title variants

EN

China’s Navy in the Era of Xi Jinping: Military Capabilities and Directions for the Development of Naval Forces

Abstracts

EN

The article analyses the growth of the naval capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. From a comparative perspective with the United States, the reasons and directions for the qualitative and quantitative development of the Chinese fleet are outlined. This article adopts a neoclassical realism perspective and hypothesises that China has adopted a policy of internally balancing the United States in the maritime domain during the Xi Jinping era. The author considers China’s vision of a future global maritime power as an intervening variable moderating the development process of the Chinese navy. This idea is developing dynamically and is associated with plans to build capabilities at the level of a “global military power” by 2049. The Chinese Navy is to defend “the near seas and protect the far seas”, securing the Chinese coast and operating in shallower waters closer to the coastline while developing the capabilities of the ocean fleet. Organisational changes accompany this modernisation, but the capabilities of the PRC fleet are still incomparably smaller than those of the U.S. Navy in terms of the quantity and quality of equipment. However, it should be remembered that the efficiency of Chinese shipyards is greater than that of the United States, and the introduction of new technical solutions and changes in strategy are redefining the role of Chinese naval forces. This means that under such conditions, the relative advantage of the United States in maritime waters will continue to decrease.

PL

Artykuł analizuje wzrost zdolności sił morskich marynarki wojennej Chińskiej Armii Ludowo-Wyzwoleńczej. W perspektywie porównawczej z USA zarysowano przyczyny oraz kierunki jakościowego i ilościowego rozwoju chińskiej floty. W artykule przyjęto perspektywę realizmu neoklasycznego i postawiono hipotezę, że w erze Xi Jinpinga Chiny podjęły politykę wewnętrznego równoważenia Stanów Zjednoczonych w domenie morskiej. Za zmienną interweniującą, moderującą proces rozwoju chińskiej marynarki wojennej, autor uznał wizję Chin jako przyszłego, globalnego mocarstwa morskiego. Idea ta dynamicznie się rozwija i wiąże się z planami budowy zdolności na poziomie „światowego mocarstwa wojskowego” do 2049 r. Chińska marynarka wojenna ma bronić „bliskich mórz i ochraniać morza dalekie”, zabezpieczając chińskie wybrzeże, działając na płytszych wodach i bliżej linii brzegowej, rozwijając jednocześnie zdolności floty oceanicznej. Modernizacji towarzyszą przemiany organizacyjne, jednak możliwości floty ChRL są wciąż nieporównywalnie mniejsze od U.S. Navy pod względem ilości i jakości wyposażenia. Należy niemniej pamiętać, że wydajność chińskich stoczni jest większa niż amerykańskich, a wprowadzane nowe techniczne rozwiązania oraz zmiany w strategii na nowo definiują rolę chińskich sił morskich. Oznacza to, że w takich warunkach względna przewaga Stanów Zjednoczonych na akwenach morskich będzie się nadal zmniejszała.

Keywords

EN

China; Xi Jinping; army; military; navy; PLAN

PL

Chiny; Xi Jinping; armia; wojsko; marynarka wojenna; ChAL-W

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Dolnośląski DSW. Wydawnictwo Naukowe DSW
• Journal: Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego
• Year: 2024
• Volume: 18
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 63-89

Dates

published

2024

Contributors

author

Rafał Kwieciński

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński

• https://orcid.org/0000000235442728

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Identifiers

DOI

10.34862/rbm.2024.2.4

Biblioteka Nauki

55995796