Libertarianizm, sceptycyzm jusnaturalistyczny i argument z uzasadnionego użycia siły

• Authors: Łukasz Dominiak

Title variants

EN

Libertarianism, Jusnaturalist Skepticism, and the Argument from the Legitimate Use of Force

Abstracts

EN

The article analyses the argument from the justified use of force, put forward against jusnaturalist skepticism by Stephan Kinsella. This argument is intended to show that skepticism about natural rights has become entangled in a performative contradiction, because in order to prove that no natural rights exist, it must assume the existence of such rights. The defeat of jusnaturalist skepticism, in turn, is to prove apagogically the existence of natural rights, including the libertarian private property rights. The article shows, using Hohfeld’s analysis method, that the anti-skeptical argument from the justified use of force does not achieve its goals.

PL

Artykuł analizuje argument z uzasadnionego użycia siły wysunięty przeciwko sceptycyzmowi jusnaturalistycznemu przez Stephana Kinsellę. Argument ten ma za zadanie wykazać, iż sceptycyzm odnośnie do uprawnień naturalnych wikła się w sprzeczność performatywną, ponieważ aby dowieść, że żadne prawa naturalne nie istnieją, musi on założyć istnienie takich praw. Porażka sceptycyzmu jusnaturalistycznego ma z kolei dowodzić apagogicznie istnienia uprawnień naturalnych, a więc i libertariańskich praw własności prywatnej. Artykuł wykazuje za pomocą metody analizy hohfeldowskiej, że antysceptyczny argument z uzasadnionego użycia siły nie osiąga swoich celów.

Keywords

PL

libertarianizm; sceptycyzm jusnaturalistyczny i argument uzasadnionego użycia siły

EN

libertarianism; jusnaturalism; skepticism; natural rights

• Publisher: Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
• Journal: Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
• Year: 2024
• Volume: 40
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 5-15

Dates

published

2024

Contributors

author

Łukasz Dominiak

• Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

• https://orcid.org/0000000161928468

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Identifiers

DOI

10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.3.5

Biblioteka Nauki

55577531