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DEFINING THE IDEOLOGICAL 'ENEMY': THE KGB'S REPORTS ON 'TRENDS IN THE TACTICS OF THE ENEMY FOR CONDUCTING IDEOLOGICAL SUBVERSION', 1974–1988

The East-West détente of the 1970s brought with it a number of benefits that the Soviet Union and its allies sought: *de facto* recognition of borders and the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe; increased trade with the West, along with greater access to Western credits and Western technology; and the possibility of advantageous agreements on arms control and disarmament.

However, the increased interaction with the West also brought with it dangers for the communist regimes in the form of a greater movement of people, information and ideas from West to East – or, from the communist perspective, 'political-ideological subversion'. At the same time, the People's Republic of China (PRC), which increasingly benefitted from its own détente with the United States, sought to influence other communist states and their people to break with Moscow. To blunt the threat of Western and Chinese 'subversion', the KGB sought to mobilise its 'fraternal organs' – the secret police in the other Warsaw Pact states, except Romania, along with their counterparts in Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba – to combat the growing ideological threats. The most visible sign of this attempted mobilisation were the triennial meetings of the 'fraternal organs' on ideological subversion: first in Havana (1974), then

in Budapest (1977), Moscow (1980), Sofia (1983), and Prague (1986).¹ These meetings served arguably four major goals: first, to compare notes on which governments, institutions, organisations and individuals in the West were allegedly organising ‘ideological subversion’ against the East; second, to discuss strategy and tactics, along with problems and successes, in combatting them; third, to pressure the ‘fraternal organs’ to be watchful and active in defending their particular province in Moscow’s outer empire against potential ideological weakening and collapse; and fourth, to improve cooperation among the secret police against centres of ‘ideological subversion’ that were active against more than one communist state.²

This article will discuss a parallel, corresponding effort by the KGB to mobilise its ‘fraternal organs’ against ideological subversion: its semi-annual or annual reports from 1974 to 1988 on the ‘Trends in the Tactics of the Enemy for Conducting Ideological Subversion against the USSR’. The KGB’s reports helped to serve the same four goals as the multilateral meetings on ideological subversion. Just like the records from the multilateral meetings on ideological subversion, most of the KGB’s reports can be found in German translation, along with many in the original Russian, in the archives of the Federal Commissioner for Stasi Records (Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR – BStU) in Berlin.³ Based on the author’s research,

¹ On the multilateral meetings, see: W. Süß, ‘Wandlungen der MfS-Repressionstaktik seit Mitte der siebziger Jahre im Kontext der Beratungen der Ostblock-Geheimdienste zur Bekämpfung der “ideologischen Diversion”’, in *“Das Land ist still – noch!”: Herrschaftswandel und politische Gegnerschaft in der DDR (1971–1989)*, ed. L. Ansorg, B. Gehrke, Th. Klein, and D. Kneipp (Köln–Weimar–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 111–34. Süß focuses on the Western and European aspects of the meetings, which were predominant, but most speeches at the multilateral meetings also contained references to the ideological threat from Maoism and the Communist Party of China (CPCh), and some individual speeches were devoted to this topic. See, for example, the speech from the Bulgarian delegation in Havana, ‘Tezy wystąpienia na temat dywersji ideologiczno prowadzonej przez Chiny przeciwko ZSRR i pozostałym państwom socjalistycznym w świecie oraz na Balkanach (tłumaczenia z bułgarskiego)’, [no date], kept in the archives of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw: Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej w Warszawie (hereinafter: AIPN), 0296/133, vol. 3, pp. 112–43; or the Russian version in: Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR (hereinafter: BStU), Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (hereinafter: MfS), Zentrale Auswertungs – und Informationsgruppe (hereinafter: ZAIG), no. 6083, vol. 1, pp. 1–30.

² Süß, ‘Wandlungen der MfS-Repressionstaktik’, *passim*; BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 5487, ‘Erste Hinweise zum Seminar über ideologische Diversion in Havanna (März 1974)’ [no date], pp. 65–66.

³ The KGB reports can be found in German translation in the files of BStU as follows: for the first half of 1975 – BStU, MfS, Hauptabteilung (hereinafter: HA) XIX, no. 9357, pp. 92–98; for the second half of 1975 – BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 77, pp. 37–44;

a number of the reports are also available to researchers in the archives of the Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – IPN) in Warsaw,⁴ and, one suspects, in the archives of the other former Soviet-bloc security services.

Specifically, the article will focus on the evolution of the topics of discussion in the reports during three major periods of perceived threat on the part of the KGB: the dangers of détente and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 1975–80; the threat of Ronald Reagan's proclaimed 'crusade' against communism and the parallel US arms buildup, 1981–85; and new threats in the era of Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*, 1986–89. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the role of the reports in bilateral cooperation with the KGB based on the example of Moscow's 'fraternal organ' in the GDR: the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) or *Stasi*.

The Threat of Human Rights and Human Contacts: Détente and the Helsinki Final Act (1974–1980)

The KGB sent its first report on 'Trends in the Tactics of the Enemy for Conducting Ideological Subversion against the USSR', covering the year 1974, to its 'fraternal organs' in February 1975.⁵ The Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) considered the Soviet report to be a logical continuation of the discussion at the first multilateral meeting on ideological subversion in Havana in 1974. Citing the conclusions of

for the year 1976 – *ibid.*, no. 780, pp. 302–10; for the second half of 1977 – *ibid.*, no. 781, pp. 426–33; for the first half of 1978 – *ibid.*, Abt. X, no. 310, pp. 290–300; for the second half of 1978 – *ibid.*, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, pp. 1–15; for the first half of 1979 – *ibid.*, no. 5891, pp. 16–31; for the second half of 1979 – *ibid.*, no. 5891, pp. 46–59; for the second half of 1980 – *ibid.*, HA XX, no. 17559, pp. 77–94; for the first half of 1981 – *ibid.*, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, pp. 63–71; for the second half of 1981 – BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 15402, pp. 41–54; for the first half of 1982 – *ibid.*, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, pp. 172–81; for the second half of 1983 – *ibid.*, pp. 183–91; for the first half of 1984 – BStU, MfS, HA XX, no. 17484, pp. 25–40; for the second half of 1984 – *ibid.*, no. 11475, pp. 1–21; for the first half of 1985 – *ibid.*, no. 17741, pp. 95–107; for the second half of 1985 – no. 17740, pp. 272–84; for the first half of 1986 – *ibid.*, no. 17391, pp. 267–80; for the second half of 1986 (in the Russian original) – *ibid.*, no. 17391, pp. 71–88; for the year 1987 – *ibid.*, no. 17442, pp. 224–48; for the year 1988 – BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 6645, pp. 84–95. The author did not find copies of the KGB's reports on ideological subversion against the Soviet Union for the year 1974, the first half of 1977, or the first half of 1980 in the BStU archives.

⁴ For example, the author found the KGB's report for 1974, which he did not find at BStU, at IPN; see: AIPN, 0296/257, vol. 2, pp. 1–12, and in the Russian original in *ibid.*, pp. 13–28.

⁵ *Ibid.*

the Havana meeting, the MSW followed the Soviet example and prepared its own report for the year 1974 on 'Several New Elements in the Tactics of the Work of the Centres of Political-Ideological Subversion against the PRL' (People's Republic of Poland).⁶ Many, if not all, of the fraternal organs, wanted to follow the KGB's example and distribute such reports at least once a year, but all of them, including the MSW, were seemingly inconsistent in doing so.⁷ In contrast, the KGB distributed such reports

⁶ 'Informacja dot. niektórych nowych elementów w taktyce działania ośrodków dywersji ideologiczno-politycznej przeciwko PRL', February 1975. The report is attached with a routing memorandum from Brigadier General A. Krzystoporski, Dept. III, MSW, to Colonel Z. Olenderczyk, Deputy Director of the Minister's Office, MSW, in AIPN, 0365/35, vol. 1, pp. 16–39. The head of Division X of the East German MfS, Willi Damm, confirmed that the distribution of a similar report by the MSW had come about as a result of the discussions at the 1974 meeting in Havana. The report, along with a routing memorandum from Damm to the First Deputy Minister of State Security of the GDR, Bruno Beater, can be found in: BStU, MfS, HA XXII, Bd. 500, vol. 11, pp. 3–14. The Polish report for 1975 can be found in: AIPN, 0365/35, vol. 1, pp. 40–49.

⁷ In addition to the Polish report for the year 1974 (*ibid.*), the author has found a report with the same title for 1975 in: BStU, MfS, HA XXII, no. 500, Bd. 11. In the database of the Stasi's intelligence branch, the Hauptverwaltung A, there are entries for reports from Poland with similar – yet distinct – titles for the years 1977, 1979, and 1980. See BStU, MfS, Hauptverwaltung A (hereinafter: HVA) HVA/MD/6, System der Informations-Recherche der HV A (hereinafter: SIRA), Teildatenbank (hereinafter: TDB) 12, Entries SE7702502, SE7921377, and SE8021762, respectively. For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR), there are similar entries for the years 1978 ('The Current Tactics and Tendencies in the Ideological Subversion against the ČSSR and the Countries of the Socialist Commonwealth') and 1985 ('Ideological Subversion of the West against the ČSSR'). See *ibid.*, SE7807602 and SE 8532069, respectively. The Bulgarian secret police seemingly followed the Soviet example and issued biennial reports on ideological subversion for at least a part of the same period, 1975–1988. In SIRA, there are entries for such reports from Bulgaria for the second half of 1981, the second half of 1982, the second half of 1983, and the second half of 1987. See *ibid.*, SE8202247, SE8331162, SE8430972, and SE8730523, respectively. There is a paper copy of the Bulgarian report in the same series for the first half of 1980 in: BStU, MfS, Abt. X, Bd. 1971, pp. 77–81; a paper copy for the second half of 1986 in: BStU, MfS, Abt. X, Bd. 1971, pp. 62–71; and a paper copy for the second half of 1987 in: BStU, MfS, ZAIG 14094. Vietnam also submitted reports for at least part of the same period as the KGB; the SIRA database contains entries for such reports from Vietnam for the year 1984, the first half of 1986, and ostensibly the first half of 1987. See: BStU, MfS, HVA/MD/6, SIRA, TDB 12, SE8530766, SE8631350, and SE8731268, respectively. The Stasi was uncharacteristically inconsistent in following the KGB's example. The HVA prepared such an intelligence report (Einzelninformation, or EI 835/75) in 1975 (see *ibid.*, SA7504526), but it did not send it out. See: BStU, MfS, ZAIG 14387, p. 86. In 1978–1980, the HV A prepared annual 'Assessments on Current Aspects and Tendencies of Enemy Ideological Activity against the Socialist Commonwealth' for distribution to the 'fraternal organs', but apparently stopped in 1981. See: BStU, MfS, HVA/MD/6, SIRA, TDB 12, SA7805572, SA7906187, and SA8005865, respectively. The reports for 1978 – EI 375/78; and 1980 – EI 340/80, were distributed to all the 'fraternal organs' in Europe, but the 1979 report was apparently only sent to the KGB. See: BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 14388, pp. 21, 184, and 436.

biennially for the years 1975 and 1977–1986 and on an annual basis for 1974, 1976, 1987 and 1988. It is possible that the KGB or its successor agency prepared such a report for 1989, but the author did not find a copy in Berlin or Warsaw. At any rate, the consistency of the KGB in preparing and distributing such reports suggested that they attached to them certain importance as guidelines for structuring the struggle of the 'fraternal organs' against foreign political and ideological subversion.

The KGB reports for 1974 and the first half of 1975 set a certain baseline for the subsequent reports by naming specific alleged centres of ideological subversion that were mentioned in practically all subsequent reports through 1988. First, there were the US radio stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union: Radio Liberty (RL) and Voice of America (VOA).⁸ Occasionally, Radio Free Europe (RFE) was also cited as a partner institution to RL and as the main broadcaster to the Soviet Union's allies. The KGB noted with alarm the ongoing internal improvements and budget increases for VOA, RFE, and RL in the Carter and Reagan years, which also served as a barometer of increasing US assertiveness in ideological and psychological warfare against the East.⁹ Second, the reports from 1974–1975 and after that complain about the activities of so-called 'Zionists', which included not only Zionists inside and outside the Soviet Union but also other Jewish groups and individual Jews who dared to criticise the Soviet Union for its human rights records, its emigration policies, or its discrimination against Jews.¹⁰ Third, nationalists in the various Soviet republics and their supporters abroad, especially in the United States, appear in all the reports beginning in 1974. Particularly active, at least from the KGB perspective, were the Ukrainians, emigrants from the Baltic states, and the Armenians.¹¹ A fourth topic was the activities of various Christian organisations, especially "foreign clerical centres".¹² In the report for the second half of 1978, Pope John Paul II receives special mention for the first time;¹³ in the ensuing years, there are brief references to the Catholic Church's activities under his leadership. This lack of detail regarding John Paul II in subsequent reports did not reflect a lack of

⁸ AIPN, 0296/257, vol. 2, Raport KGB za okres 1974, pp. 1–2; BStU, MfS, HA XIX, no. 9357, KGB Report for the first half of 1975, pp. 93–95.

⁹ BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, KGB report for the first half of 1981, p. 65.

¹⁰ Raport KGB za okres 1974, pp. 4–6; KGB Report for the first half of 1975, pp. 93–94.

¹¹ Raport KGB za okres 1974, pp. 6–7, 9; KGB Report for the first half of 1975, pp. 92, 95–97.

¹² Raport KGB za okres 1974, pp. 7–8; KGB Report for the first half of 1975, p. 98.

¹³ BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, KGB report for the second half of 1978, p. 11.

concern on the KGB's part; it prepared separate, *ad hoc* reports on the Polish Pope's Eastern policy that it distributed to the 'fraternal organs'.

The fifth centre of 'ideological diversion' that always received special attention in the KGB's reports was the *Narodno-Trudovoy Soyuz Rossijskikh Solidaristov* (NTS), a Russian émigré organisation established in 1930.¹⁴ At least one page of the KGB's ca 14-page reports was usually devoted to the NTS. Headquartered in Frankfurt am Main, the NTS had cooperated with Nazi Germany in World War II against the Soviet Union with the hope of liberating Russia from Bolshevism. During the 1950s, the heyday of the US 'liberation' policy toward Eastern Europe, the NTS had then worked closely together with the CIA and possibly the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND).¹⁵ In the wake of the CSCE, the NTS had altered its strategy once more; it now focused almost exclusively on human rights in the Soviet Union, which it sought to promote especially through smuggled publications.¹⁶ Although the KGB referred to the activities of other Russian opposition groups and 'renegades' in the West, such as Vladimir Bukovskii,¹⁷ these other 'enemies' never received the same attention as the NTS.

The KGB's reports from the second half of 1975 through 1980 stress as their main theme the West's focus on the provisions for human rights (Principle VII) and human contacts (Basket III) in the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki.¹⁸ Over half of the report from the second half of 1975 focuses on the efforts of 'enemy intelligence services' and 'anti-Soviet ideological centres' to exploit these provisions to activate their "ideological penetration of the USSR".¹⁹ The report asserted: "The enemy is trying to treat the parts of the Final Act [...] on the exchange of ideas, information and people in isolation from the other principles and to interpret it as mutual ideological penetration, for which no state borders should allegedly

¹⁴ See, for example: Raport KGB za okres 1974, p. 4; KGB Report for the first half of 1975, p. 93.

¹⁵ B. Stöver, *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus. Amerikanische Liberation Policy im Kalten Krieg 1947–1991* (Köln–Weimar–Wien: Bohlau Verlag, 2002), pp. 318–21, 325–28.

¹⁶ BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 777, KGB report for the second half of 1975, p. 40.

¹⁷ See, for example, BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 781, the KGB report for the second half of 1977, p. 427.

¹⁸ KGB report for the second half of 1975, pp. 37–40, 42–43; KGB report for 1976 – BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 780, Bd. 1, pp. 302–05; KGB report for the second half of 1977 – *ibid.*, no. 781, pp. 430–33; KGB report for the first half of 1978 – *ibid.*, Abt. X, no. 310, p. 193; KGB report for the second half of 1978 – *ibid.*, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, pp. 11–12; KGB report for the first half of 1979 *ibid.*, pp. 16–18, 26–27; KGB report for the second half of 1979 – *ibid.*, pp. 46–47, 57–58; KGB report for the second half of 1980 – *ibid.*, HA XX, no. 17559, pp. 78, 80, 83.

¹⁹ KGB report for the second half of 1975, pp. 37–40, 42–43.

exist”.²⁰ A certain turning point in the reports and their focus on CSCE came in the first half of 1978, as the administration of US President Jimmy Carter became more active in criticising human rights violations in the Soviet bloc. At this point, discussion of actions by the US government began to move to the front of the reports. The first report for 1978 noted efforts by the Carter Administration and the US Congress to exploit cultural exchanges through the US Information Agency – temporarily renamed and subsumed within the new International Communication Agency – to promote human rights, to establish official and semi-official organisations dedicated to human rights in the Soviet Union, and to strengthen Radio Liberty’s impact inside the Soviet Union.²¹

In the first half of 1979, the KGB noted a change in tactics on the part of the US administration. Having allegedly realised that the policy of human rights had ‘exhausted itself’ at the governmental level, the Carter administration had decided to turn over the initiative to private organisations.²² Although, as always, the implication was that the US government or the CIA was thus controlling the activities of such groups as Amnesty International, the report did have some basis in truth. After the Belgrade Conference of the CSCE, the head of the US delegation, Arthur Goldberg, had decided that private initiatives might be more effective than governmental diplomacy in promoting human rights. Thus, he helped establish the private US organisation, Helsinki Watch, which subsequently criticised human rights abuses on both sides of the Iron Curtain.²³ The reports listed and noted the ongoing growth in the number of NGOs in Western Europe and the United States pushing for the observance of human rights in the Soviet Union.²⁴ The ongoing campaigns in the West regarding human-rights abuses in the USSR and the struggle of dissidents and human-rights groups inside the USSR became a mainstay of the reports.

The Reagan Challenge (1981–1985)

A turning point in the KGB’s assessment of the ideological threat from the West and the world at large came with Ronald Reagan’s assumption of the US presidency 1981 and his ensuing ‘crusade’ against communism.²⁵

²⁰ Ibid., p. 37.

²¹ KGB report for the first half of 1978, pp. 190–91.

²² KGB report for the first half of 1979, pp. 15–17.

²³ S.B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 115–18.

²⁴ See, for example, KGB report for the first half of 1979, pp. 17–18, 20.

²⁵ BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, KGB report for the first half of 1983, p. 172.

Reagan, who had served as a spokesperson for Radio Free Europe's 'Crusade for Freedom' in the early 1950s,²⁶ had continued to use the term in speaking about the eventual democratisation of the Soviet-bloc, most notably in his speech to the English Parliament at Westminster on 8 June 1982.²⁷ The eventual de-communisation of the Soviet sphere of influence – his 'crusade for freedom' – remained one of the key pillars in his national security policy concerning the Soviet Union.²⁸

Already in the second half of 1981, the KGB usually devoted at least the first three pages of their reports to the initiatives of the Reagan Administration in the realm of psychological warfare.²⁹ Radio Liberty, VOA, and other US broadcast centres, the KGB reported in 1982, demonstrated "greater toughness and lack of restraint"³⁰ – a fact confirmed by key actors responsible for the Reagan Administration's psychological warfare.³¹ The Reagan Administration, the KGB noted, was moving away from the Carter Administration's near-exclusive focus on human rights; it focused much more on promoting nationalistic – and potentially separatist – tendencies within the Soviet republics.³² Indeed, the Reagan Administration sought to support national self-determination in the Soviet bloc and within the Soviet Union itself through its various initiatives in

²⁶ R.H. Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom": Rallying Americans behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950–1960* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2010), p. 53.

²⁷ With regard to "the Communist world", Reagan spoke of "grim reminders of how brutally the police state attempts to snuff out this quest for self-rule – 1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1981 in Poland". He called for Western support for similar efforts at democratisation and self-determination, "a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation", Ronald Reagan, 'Address to Members of the British Parliament', 8 June 1982, online by G. Peters and J.T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/245236>, accessed 15 Sept. 2020.

²⁸ J.G. Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 32, 51–53.

²⁹ BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 15402, KGB report for the second half of 1981, pp. 41–43.

³⁰ BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, KGB report for the first half of 1982, p. 97.

³¹ See, for example: A. Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), pp. 253ff.; A.L. Heil, Jr., *Voice of America: A History* (New York–Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 199ff. Puddington, assistant director of RFE/RL's New York office from 1985 to 1993, writes positively about Reagan's more assertive approach, while Heil, who served in a number of higher management positions at VOA under Reagan, criticises the increasingly ideological, anti-communist approach of VOA under USIA Director Charles Wick, which conflicted with VOA's traditional focus on broadcasting straightforward news.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97, 102; BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 5891, KGB report for the second half of 1982, pp. 153–54.

support of democratisation. Within the Reagan Administration, the belief prevailed that the more the Soviet Union had to focus on problems at home, including growing nationalism within the Soviet republics, the less likely it would be to engage in aggression abroad.³³

In the second half of 1985, the KGB also noted what we would now call 'blowback'³⁴ from its support for peace movements in Western Europe and the US. The KGB informed the 'fraternal organs' about an "activation of the subversive activities of the enemy under the guise of pacifist slogans". It claimed:

"The intelligence agencies of the USA and its NATO allies have smuggled their agents into the leadership of a number of Western peace organisations and could to a certain extent lend an anti-Soviet character to their activities. Proof of this can be seen, for example, in the resolutions drafted by participants in the meetings last year of several peace organisations in West Berlin, Amsterdam and Washington regarding "the close link between the struggle for peace with the struggle for human rights in Eastern Europe". On the basis of these declarations, individual peace organisations have strengthened their attacks against the USSR, denounce the repression of the "independent peace movement" and the "violations of human rights", and have begun to include the establishment of contacts to enemy elements [dissidents] in their activities [...]"³⁵

It was not only the Reagan Administration's more assertive approach to psychological warfare that was causing problems for the Soviet chekists. By 1985, the KGB's reports on 'ideological subversion' read at times like a laundry list of alleged subversive organisations and movements outside the borders of the USSR. Everything from punk rockers³⁶ to the Hare Krishna³⁷ made their appearance alongside the greater threats allegedly spurred by the US government. Throughout the 1980s, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the reports also noted a growing threat of 'ideological subversion' from so-called 'Islamic centres', including radio propaganda from the Islamic Republic of Iran, support

³³ K. Geoghegan, 'A Policy in Tension: The National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Response to the Collapse of the Soviet Union', *Diplomatic History*, 42, no. 5 (2018), 780ff.

³⁴ To this point, see D. Selva and Walter Süß, *Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess. MfS zwischen SED und KGB (1972–1989)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), p. 477. The term comes from Ch. Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2011), *passim*.

³⁵ BStU, MfS, HA XX, no. 11740, KGB report for the second half of 1985, p. 277.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 11741, KGB report for the first half of 1985, p. 96.

³⁷ KGB report for the second half of 1985, p. 284.

from Saudi Arabia for various Islamic organisations active in the Soviet republics bordering Afghanistan, and the threat of a spillover of Islamic fundamentalism, promoted by the US and Pakistan in Afghanistan, into the Soviet Union itself.³⁸

Ideological ‘Subversion’ in the Era of *Perestroika* (1986–1989)

After Gorbachev’s implementation of his policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, the KGB began to distribute its reports on an annual, rather than a biennial, basis. Although they continued to name specific enemies and to castigate the policies of the Reagan Administration, they read less like the ‘laundry list’ reports of the 1980s. Instead, they focused on the major alleged themes of Western propaganda with regard to Gorbachev’s new policies. The reports from 1987 and 1988 focused in particular on how the West sought to misinterpret, criticise and undermine Gorbachev’s reforms by infiltrating the USSR with false, ‘revisionist’ conceptions of Marxism or, quite simply, bourgeois conceptions of democracy and free markets.³⁹ The reports thus served as a warning of the need for increased vigilance to other communist states that were pursuing reforms, such as the PRL and the People’s Republic of Hungary. Arguably, they also unwittingly served as further confirmation for such hardline states as the GDR and CSSR to forego Gorbachev’s reform program.

The Use of the KGB’s Reports by the East German Stasi

Although the author could not visit the archives of all the KGB’s former ‘fraternal organs’ to seek out the KGB’s reports and find evidence regarding how they were used, the case of the East German Stasi can serve as a case study – or at least as an example – of their potential use throughout the Soviet bloc.

Within the East German Ministry of State Security (MfS) the division responsible for countering ‘political-ideological subversion’, Main Division (*Hauptabteilung*, HA) XX was the main recipient of the KGB’s reports, given that the KGB reports discussed its main area of responsibility. On the orders of the Stasi’s leadership, Main Division XX analysed the KGB reports with an eye to assisting their Soviet ‘friends’

³⁸ See, for example: KGB report for the second half of 1982, pp. 153–54; KGB report for the second half of 1984, pp. 19–21.

³⁹ BStU, MfS, HA XX, no. 17442, KGB report for 1987, pp. 224–26, 229–30, 233; *ibid.*, HA XX/AKG, no. 6645, KGB report for 1988, pp. 84, 88.

in combatting the Western organisations, along with the individuals from East and West named in the reports.⁴⁰ Main Division XX could be fairly certain that the KGB would follow up the reports – as it did in the case of its other information sent to the MfS – with more detailed requests for information about the given individuals and organisations and perhaps even for assistance in combatting them.⁴¹

Within the MfS, HA XX or the Secretariat of the Minister (*Sekretariat des Ministers*, SdM) shared the reports on an ad hoc basis with other Stasi units based on the contents of the reports. For example, the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate – namely, Main Directorate A (*Hauptverwaltung A* – HVA) – apparently received some of the KGB's reports⁴² because it bore responsibility within the MfS for collecting intelligence on a number of the Western organisations and individuals mentioned in the KGB's reports or even combatting them through covert action ('active measures'). To date, there is only one known case in which the HVA used one of the annual or biennial reports from the 'fraternal organs' for finished intelligence – in the case of the report from Vietnam for the year 1984.⁴³

⁴⁰ For example, the Director of Main Division XX (*Hauptabteilung* – HA XX) of the MfS, Major General Stefan Kienberg, responsible for combatting 'political-ideological subversion' and other forms of anti-state activity in the GDR, forwarded the report for the second half of 1984 to his subordinates for their 'information' and 'operational evaluation'. See the routing memorandum for the report in: BStU, MfS, HA XX, no. 11475, p. 1. In the case of the KGB report for the second half of 1981, Deputy Minister of State Security Rudi Mittag ordered that it be forwarded to the relevant operational divisions of the MfS for analysis and operational use. According to a routing memorandum attached to the KGB's report, it was forwarded to HA XX, the Main Division for Foreign Intelligence (*Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* – HVA) and the criminal investigations division, Main Division IX (*Hauptabteilung IX* – HA IX). All three divisions were to pay attention to the KGB's information regarding newly-created 'anticommunist' organisations in the West and to collect further information about their activities directed against the USSR. BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 15402, 'Zum Auskunftsbericht des KfS (290/82)', pp. 41–42.

⁴¹ In response to such requests from the KGB's Fifth Directorate, responsible for combatting ideological subversion and other forms of anti-state activity, the Stasi's HA XX prepared in January 1976 a detailed report on various centres of 'ideological subversion', mainly in West Germany, see: BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, no. 778, Bd. 1, Information, 26 Jan. 1976, pp. 76–114.

⁴² The HVA received at least the KGB's reports from 1974 and from the first and second halves of 1979. See, respectively: BStU, MfS, HVA/MD/6, SIRA, TDB 12, SE7505744, SE8002407, and SE8007253.

⁴³ For the incoming report for the year 1984 from Vietnam that went to the HVA, see: BStU, MfS, HVA/MD/6, SIRA, TDB 12, SE8530766. The finished intelligence report based in part on this information went to the International Division of the East German communist party's Central Committee and the East German foreign ministry. See *ibid.*, SA8560050.

Conclusion

Summing up, the KGB's semi-annual or annual reports on 'trends in the tactics of the enemy for conducting ideological subversion against the USSR' served as an informal lever between the triennial meetings of the 'fraternal organs' on ideological subversion to push the KGB's allies to maintain their vigilance. They also served, just like the triennial meetings, to reaffirm the KGB's supremacy in the realm of cooperation among the East European security services. The reports challenged the relevant divisions of the fraternal state security services to find parallels in the erstwhile 'attacks' of the enemy against their particular communist party-state. The 'fraternal organs' also knew that these topics would undoubtedly be discussed in bilateral meetings, in the ongoing contacts with the KGB's liaison officers, and in the cable traffic between the KGB and its allied services. The laundry lists of organisations and individuals served as an indirect, but urgent request to the 'fraternal organs' to obtain and provide relevant information to Moscow and to assist the KGB in its active measures against foreign groups, organisations and movements. Based on the example of the East German Stasi, the reports did serve, in conjunction with bilateral and multilateral meetings on ideological subversion, as well as the normal, routine exchange of information between the Stasi and the KGB, to spur the MfS to assist the KGB in collecting intelligence about the foreign and domestic 'enemies' that it cited in the reports and, in certain cases, assisting the KGB in undermining and attacking them.

In conjunction with the triennial, multilateral meetings on ideological subversion, as well as bilateral meetings between the Stasi and the KGB on the topic, the reports helped to define in general terms the Western, Chinese, and – increasingly – the Islamic 'threats' to the Soviet bloc based on the propagation and spread of anti-communist and non-communist ideas within the Soviet sphere of influence. Much like the triennial meetings, their goal was arguably as much to create a *chekist* sense of solidarity throughout the bloc as to alarm the 'fraternal organs' about specific threats.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ On this point, see E. Droit, 'Arena der Tschekisten: die politischen Dimensionen der multilateralen Beratungen der kommunistischen Geheimdienste (1970er bis 1980er Jahre)', in *ZeitRäume: Potsdamer Almanach des Zentrums für Zeithistorische Forschung 2014*, ed. M. Sabrow (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), pp. 43–56.

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Definicja „wroga” ideologicznego: Raporty KGB o „Tendencjach dotyczących taktyki wyrotowych działań ideologicznych wroga” 1974–1988

Streszczenie: Od 1974 r. sowiecki Komitet Bezpieczeństwa Państwowego (KGB) zaczął przekazywać służbom bezpieczeństwa z innych krajów bloku wschodniego roczne lub półroczne raporty pt. „Tendencje dotyczące taktyki wyrotowych działań ideologicznych wroga przeciw ZSRR”. Raporty skupiały się na rzeczywistych lub domniemyanych działaniach USA, a także Chin, krajów islamskich i zagranicznych organizacji mających na celu wzmacnianie opozycji politycznej w ZSRR. Raporty w połączeniu z odbywającymi się raz na trzy lata spotkaniami wydziałów służb bezpieczeństwa krajów bloku wschodniego odpowiedzialnych za zwalczanie „wyrotowych działań ideologicznych” miały mobilizować „bratnie organy” do przeciwdziałania wpływowi zagranicy i kontaktom zagranicznym nasilającym się za sprawą odprężenia w stosunkach Wschód–Zachód w latach siedemdziesiątych. Raporty sygnalizowały także obszary, w których KGB zabiegała o pomoc sojuszniczych służb bezpieczeństwa. Artykuł analizuje zmieniające się treści raportów oraz ich odbiór przez służby bezpieczeństwa bloku wschodniego na przykładzie Stasi w NRD.

Słowa kluczowe: KGB, Stasi, wyrotowe działania ideologiczne, Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie, prawa człowieka, Ronald Reagan, Radio Wolna Europa, Agencja Informacyjna Stanów Zjednoczonych (USIA), *Narodno-Trudovoy Soyuz Rossiyskikh Solidaristov* (NTS), dysydenci, środowiska opozycyjne, prawa człowieka, odprężenie

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Abstract: Beginning in 1974, the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) began sending the other Soviet-bloc security services annual or semi-annual reports entitled 'Trends in the Tactics of the Enemy for Conducting Ideological

Subversion against the USSR'. The reports focused on real and alleged efforts of the United States, as well as China, Islamic countries and foreign organisations, to encourage political opposition inside the Soviet Union. The reports, in conjunction with the triennial meetings of the divisions of the Soviet-bloc security services responsible for combatting 'ideological subversion', served to mobilise these 'fraternal organs' against increased foreign influence and contacts in the wake of the East-West détente of the 1970s. They also signalled areas in which the KGB would seek assistance from its allied security services. The article analyses the evolving content of the reports and the reaction of the Soviet-bloc security services to them based on the example of the East German Stasi.

Keywords: KGB, Stasi, ideological subversion, Conference on Security and Organization in Europe (CSCE), human rights, Ronald Reagan, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, United States Information Agency (USIA), *Narodno-Trudovoy Soyuz Rossiyskikh Solidaristov* (NTS), dissidents, human rights, détente

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