



Sondre Lindahl

Associate Professor, Østfold University College, Norway
sondre.lindahl@hiof.no. ORCID: 0000-0002-9937-5675

20 Years with the Global War on Terror: A Critical Evaluation and Thoughts on How to Prevent Future Terrorism

Introduction

20 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and the beginning of the ensuing Global War on Terror (GWOT). There is little that has dominated the security discourse more than terrorism these past 20 years, and states have spent billions of dollars on countering terrorism. For example, since 2001 the US has appropriated and is obliged to spend an estimated US\$6.4 trillion in budgetary costs related to and caused by the GWOT.¹ The number of killed, injured and displaced people is staggering. Conservative estimates in Iraq alone suggest that several hundred thousand people have been killed in result of this violence.² These figures rise fast when Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and Pakistan are added to the list, and there is no doubt that the death toll as a consequence of the GWOT has been enormous. The obvious question then is: has the GWOT worked? Has it allowed states to prevent and reduce the threat of terrorism? After all, 20 years is a substantial amount of time, and one should expect to see results in such a long period. The simple answer is that the GWOT has largely failed to achieve the stated goals of preventing future terrorism and reduce the threat of terrorism. In fact, it is clear now that the war in Iraq did a lot more to intensify terrorism rather than prevent it. Not only has it torn the

¹ C. Neta Crawford, *United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post 9/11 Wars through FY2020: \$6.4 Trillion*, Watson Institute, Brown University, Boston 2019.

² *Iraq Body Count*, 2021, Iraq Body Count, <https://www.iraqbodycount.org> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

fabrics of countries apart, in a fashion that weaving those fabrics together again seems almost impossible. It has also created a social environment in which a group like ISIS could establish itself and thrive. Moreover, Western states are still engaged in the same countries today with the same declared goal of preventing and countering terrorism, but no tangible results of the effort can be seen. The very fact that the US engaged in peace talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan is evidence that the use of violence can only go so far. The solution to a complex political situation and conflict seems to be an intricate and nuanced peace deal which includes negotiations with the enemy.

This article focuses on the key reasons for the GWOT failure on its own terms to counter and prevent terrorism. It will be argued that this is largely due to the theoretical and epistemological crises of counterterrorism that make it one-dimensional and incapable of identifying and understanding the nuances of the complex realities that acts of terrorism, for the most part, are situated within. The chapter does not, however, argue that the use of violence is never permitted, or that non-violent means are the only way to prevent and counter terrorism. Instead, the main argument is that the over-reliance on violence has, in large part, closed down other options of dealing with terrorism, and by so doing, made terrorism a self-fulfilling prophecy: violence begets violence and there is seemingly no way to break the cycle of violence and counter-violence.

Evaluating the Global War on Terror

There are several ways to evaluate the efforts and policies known as the GWOT. Firstly, and perhaps the most important measure of evaluation would be whether it has been successful in countering terrorist groups and, subsequently, in preventing new terrorist groups from organising and perpetrating attacks. The GWOT began with the express purpose of defeating al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and later expanded to alleged sponsors of terrorism, such as Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. However, 20 years later the two countries are marred by violence and political instability, and Western military forces are still deployed there. In 2018, the US started negotiations with the Taliban, seemingly because the US had realized that the group could not be militarily defeated and eliminated as a political actor. The situation is perhaps even worse in Iraq. The invasion in 2003 helped create the conditions that were conducive to the emergence of terrorist groups such as ISIS, and the chaos and cycles of violence that marked Iraq from 2003 continued. As such, the very fact that groups like the Taliban and al-Qaida still operate indicates that the GWOT has failed on its own terms to reduce the threat of terrorism, and with the advent of ISIS it indicates a failure to prevent future terrorism. Secondly, it is possible to evaluate the GWOT based on the various costs associated with it. Trying to count casualties is always a difficult endeavour, but a report from 2016 concluded that the war in Iraq had resulted in one million civilian casualties, the displacement of approximately three million people, as well as the death of 4,800 coalition soldiers.³

³ 'Blood and treasure: The costs of the Iraq war', 2016, Middle East Eye, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/blood-and-treasure-costs-iraq-war-1660190585> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

In addition, several hundred thousand people have been killed in countries like Yemen, which have been drawn into the GWOT. At any rate, the human costs connected with the GWOT dwarfs the death toll from the 9/11 attacks. Another important aspect are the financial costs, and since 2001 the US has appropriated and is obliged to spend an estimated US\$6.4 trillion in budgetary costs related to and caused by the GWOT.⁴ In their straight-forward break-even analysis, Mueller and Stewart calculated how many otherwise successful attacks would have to take place to justify the risk-reducing investments on terrorism after 9/11. This sum totals \$75 billion, and they calculated that the authorities would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 333 very large attacks what would otherwise have been successful every year.⁵

All in all, it is clear that the human and financial costs of the GWOT have been staggeringly high, and yet, the incurred expenses have been largely incapable of reducing the threat of terrorism, or to prevent future terrorism. Thirdly, a critical evaluation of the GWOT would look at the effectiveness of the methods used. For example, in recent years there have been studies on the effectiveness of targeted killing of terrorists by drone strikes, or so-called leadership decapitation strategies. These studies, perhaps because they are often based on different metrics, data and methods, have produced contrasting and overall inconclusive findings. A good example of this is Micah Zenko's reporting that Obama had, as of 2016, authorised 506 strikes that have killed 3,040 alleged terrorists and 391 civilians.⁶ The term 'alleged' has been used when it comes to claims about how many terrorists are killed, because President Obama embraced a disputed method for counting civilian casualties. In effect, this 'counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.'⁷ Some scholars, such as Byman, argue that drone strikes can be a useful counterterrorism tool while a larger number of studies find that they are either ineffective, or counterproductive.⁸ Abrahms and Mierau argue that leadership decapitation leads to greater indiscriminate violence by militant groups.⁹ More methods could be included, such as the use of torture, mass-surveillance, counter-radicalization programmes and indefinite detention. The material point, however, is that there are few studies on the effectiveness of counterterrorism, and the

⁴ C. Neta Crawford, *op. cit.*

⁵ J. Mueller, M.G. Stewart, *Terror, Security, and Money. Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, p. 107.

⁶ M. Zenko, 'Do Not Believe the U.S Government Official Numbers on Drone Strike Civilian Casualties', 2016, *Foreign Policy*, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/05/do-not-believe-the-u-s-governments-official-numbers-on-drone-strike-civilian-casualties> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

⁷ J. Becker, S. Shane, 'Secret "Kill List" Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will', *New York Times*, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=0 [accessed: 12.01.2021].

⁸ T. Bolland, J. Andre Lee Ludvigsen, "'No Boots on the Ground': The Effectiveness of Us Drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula', *Defense and Security Analysis* 2018, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 127–43, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2018.1478184.

⁹ M. Abrahms, J. Mierau, 'Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2017, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 830–51, DOI:10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671.

GWOT in particular.¹⁰ It should be in the public interest to know as accurately as possible what works and what does not work when it comes to countering and preventing terrorism. In 2016, the Norwegian government was presented with an evaluation of Norway's contribution to making Afghanistan a stable and peaceful democracy that did not serve as a safe haven of recruiting ground for international terrorism. The main conclusion was that Norway's efforts had largely been in vain, and the only goal the country achieved was to be a good ally for the NATO partners.¹¹ Overall, however, the dearth of research on these questions, and the unwillingness by governments to evaluate their own policies, methods and tactics should be of huge concern.

The theoretical failures of counterterrorism

The cursory review and evaluation of the GWOT reveals a flawed counterterrorism paradigm. However, the GWOT was not initiated and sustained in a vacuum, and it is thus of great interest to investigate and explore the theoretical failures that have contributed to this situation. It is obviously easy to argue with the benefit of hindsight that the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing global war on terror could have been handled differently. At the time, the attacks were described by the Bush administration as an extraordinary attack on civilisation itself.¹² The media contributed to the response with *The Economist* declaring that:

[...] the appalling atrocities of September 11th – acts that must be seen as a declaration of war not just on America but on all civilised people – were crueller in conception and even more shocking than what happened in Hawaii. [...] This week has changed America, and with it the world, once again.¹³

The country was quickly put on a war footing, and President Bush declared that: 'The search is under way for those who are behind these evil acts. [...] We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them.'¹⁴ Indeed, as Jackson documented four meta-narratives were employed

¹⁰ T. van Dongen, 'Mapping Counterterrorism: A Categorisation of Policies and the Promise of Empirically Based, Systematic Comparisons,' *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2010, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 227–241, DOI: 10.1080/17539150903306170; K.T. Kattelman, 'Assessing Success of the Global War on Terror: Terrorist Attack Frequency and the Backlash Effect,' *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide* 2020, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 67–86, DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2019.1650384.

¹¹ *A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014*, 2016, NOU, <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/09faceca099c4b8bac85ca8495e12d2d/no/pdfs/nou201620160008000ddd.pdf> [accessed: 21.01.2021].

¹² *Transcript of Bush's Address*, 2001, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript> [accessed: 12.01.2021]; R. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2005.

¹³ The Day the World Changed, *The Economist*, September 2001, <http://www.economist.com/node/780341> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

¹⁴ S. Schmemmann, 'U.S. ATTACKED; President Vows to Exact Punishment for "Evil"', *New York Times*, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/us-attacked-president-vows-to-exact-punishment-for-evil.html> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

to explain the attacks: *World War II and the attack on Pearl Harbour, The Cold War, civilisation versus barbarism, and globalisation*.¹⁵ The attack on Pearl Harbour is an event that lives on in the American psyche, and is an example that most Americans know, and which invokes specific feelings. These meta-narratives helped establish an impression of the attacks as part of a long and heroic struggle by the US against totalitarian and murderous ideologies. Terrorists were 'endlessly demonised and vilified as being evil, barbaric and inhuman',¹⁶ and in direct opposition to the narratives of Americans as generous, kind, resourceful and brave.¹⁷

In academia, the attacks were met with shock, and an impression that the world was faced with a new and unprecedented threat. Bruce Hoffman, a leading terrorism expert, claimed that, 'on 9/11, of course, Bin Laden wiped the slate clean of the conventional wisdom on terrorists and terrorism, and, by doing so, ushered in a new era of conflict – as well as a new discourse about it.'¹⁸ As such, it was not uncommon to see the 9/11 attacks discussed as 'new' terrorism, 'superterrorism' or even 'megaterorism'.¹⁹ Thus, 9/11 changed everything,²⁰ as it were. The 'new' terrorism was seen to be marked by its religious and apocalyptic nature, and the view that this form of terrorism not only had lethality as its ultimate goal, but it also eschewed political goals.²¹ In the publishing frenzy that followed in the wake of the attacks in 2001, at one point a book on terrorism in English was published every six hours²², almost all of this literature was found by a scholarly review to be mostly think pieces, and only a handful could be considered to be methodologically rigorous.²³

Surely, it is impossible to be completely correct in assumptions and knowledge claims even in the easiest situations, and this quick review serves to provide the context in which the war on terror was waged. The post-9/11 understanding of terrorism, therefore, was shaped by the view that it represented an unprecedented evil

¹⁵ R. Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–58.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

¹⁷ G.W. Bush, *President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance*, The National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

¹⁸ B. Hoffman, 'Foreword.' In: *Research on Terrorism. Trends, Achievements & Failures*, ed. A. Silke, Abingdon, Frank Cass, 2004, p. xvii.

¹⁹ G. Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, 2004, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/nuclear-terrorism-ultimate-preventable-catastrophe/p7410> [accessed: 12.01.2021]; L. Freedman, 'Introduction.' In: *Superterrorism. Policy Responses*, ed. *idem*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 2002, pp. 1–6; J. Gearson, 'The Nature of Modern Terrorism', *Superterrorism...*, pp. 7–24; M. Ignatieff, 'It's War, but It Doesn't Have to Be Dirty', *The Guardian*, 1 October 2001, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/01/afghanistan.terrorism9> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

²⁰ Ch. Townshend, *Terrorism. A Very Short Introduction*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, p. 122.

²¹ M. Stohl, 'Don't Confuse Me with the Facts : Knowledge Claims and Terrorism', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2012, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 36.

²² A. Silke, 'Contemporary Terrorism Studies: Issues in Research', *Critical Terrorism Studies. A New Research Agenda*, eds. R. Jackson, M. Breen-Smyth and J. Gunning, Routledge, Abingdon 2009, pp. 34–48.

²³ C. Lum, L.W. Kennedy, A. Sherley, 'The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies', *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 2006, no. 2, p. 3, DOI: 10.4073/csr.2006.2.

that could only be eradicated with force. As such, the *exceptional* was adopted as the norm.²⁴ Zulaika has described this as a *crisis of knowledge*. It begins 'with the placement of the entire phenomenon in a context of taboo and the wilful ignorance of the political subjectivities of the terrorists.'²⁵ One consequence of this crisis is that the counterterrorist becomes preoccupied with reacting against an utterly dangerous and sinister actor that is not known. Thus, what *could* happen weighs as much, if not more, as what is actually the case. In this setting, governments are inclined to focus on worst case scenarios, and may very well find themselves looking and preparing for what Rumsfeld famously labelled the 'unknown unknowns'.

A key part of this crisis is also that previous knowledge about terrorism was ignored, among them a report from 1998, ordered by the Pentagon, which documented a strong correlation between terrorist attacks against the US and US military intervention abroad.²⁶ In addition, John Mueller, a renowned terrorism scholar, argued in 2002 that the 9/11 attacks were more likely an aberration, rather than a harbinger.²⁷ Based on empirical research at the time, his argument was that terrorists would find it hard to match or top the spectacular attacks and concluded with a warning that, 'a vastly exaggerated U.S. global military response to September 11, however, could inadvertently produce enough fear and resentment abroad to increase the possibility of this happening. No chance of that, is there?'

As the previous section of this article documented, the US and a coalition of the willing did respond with a vastly exaggerated military response, and that has proven to be detrimental to the efforts to counter and prevent terrorism. What is clear, however, is that the global war on terror was made the dominant counterterrorism paradigm in an intellectual and political context that deliberately ignored certain knowledge about terrorism and political violence, and subsequently precluded certain options and strategies. This point is perhaps best made by Gomis, who concluded his study on counterterrorism since 2001 with the following summary:

There is extensive evidence that the war on terror has often led to oversimplifications of challenges that were in fact much more complex and multifaceted. This flawed analysis has repeatedly given way to inadequate, disproportionate, and ineffective policies, often supporting dictatorial and repressive regimes in the name of countering international terrorism.²⁸

²⁴ J. Wolfendale, 'The Narrative of Terrorism as an Existential Threat', *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies*, ed. R. Jackson, Routledge, Abingdon 2016, pp. 114–23.

²⁵ J. Zulaika, *Terrorism. The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2009, p. 2.

²⁶ I. Eland, *Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism?*, CATO Institute, Washington, D.C. 1998.

²⁷ J. Mueller, 'Harbinger or Aberration? A 9/11 Provocation', *The National Interest*, 2002 (Fall), pp. 45–50, <https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NIHARB.PDF> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

²⁸ B. Gomis, *Counterterrorism: Reassessing the Policy Response*, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL 2015, p. 116.

Where from here?

Over the past 20 years, Western countries have used vast resources to counter terrorism by waging a global war on terror. However, as the above paragraphs have shown, it seems reasonable to argue that the GWOT has failed on its own terms to control, reduce and prevent terrorism. Political chaos, violence and terrorism still plague Afghanistan and Iraq, and through the GWOT, Western countries have employed illiberal and violent means that are contrary to the stated ends of achieving peace and stability. When we take stock of the GWOT, therefore, there are a few points that stand out.

Firstly, the most important lesson to be learnt from the GWOT is that violent means are ill-suited to produce or bring about peaceful and non-violent ends. The GWOT has been marked by an illusion that 'good' violence can be employed to achieve 'good' ends. However, the reality is that violence tends to result in more violence, thereby creating and perpetuating cycles of violence.²⁹

Secondly, it is of the utmost importance that the gathered knowledge about terrorism and counterterrorism is critically and rigorously examined, questioned and analysed. This includes highlighting and focusing on the knowledge and voices that are often subjugated and ignored. Successful counterterrorism depends, in large part, on correct and accurate information, and this could be extended to the knowledge that is gathered.

Thirdly, the failures of the GWOT are an invitation to reconceptualise counterterrorism. Instead of reacting to various terrorist groups with violent and suppressive means, or what we might call a *negatively* defined condition of counterterrorism, there should be an emphasis on preventing terrorism through means that are conducive to the ends we want to achieve. This latter approach is a *positively* defined condition of counterterrorism. It puts a premium on understanding and dealing with acts of terrorism within their contexts, and employing ordinary politics means creating conditions that will make populations, countries or regions resistant to terrorist groups. Some scholars, such as Stephan, have shown how non-violent resistance has worked against ISIS,³⁰ and lessons on how Norway has dealt with terrorist groups in peace negotiations³¹ indicate how important it is to support peaceful and non-violent political processes and movements in countries plagued by terrorism.

A *cliché* says that we ought to learn from history. Often that is not the case. As this brief article has shown, when we evaluate the GWOT, it is clear that it has failed on its own terms. It seems clear to me that if the goal is to successfully counter and prevent terrorism, states and organisations need to think and act differently. As we enter the third decade of the GWOT, the goal should be to reconceptualise counterterrorism to a more realistic and humane approach which recognises and deals with

²⁹ S. Lindahl, *A Critical Theory of Counterterrorism: Ontology, Epistemology, Normativity*, Routledge, Abingdon 2018.

³⁰ M.J. Stephan, Reflections Civil Resistance vs. ISIS, *Journal of Resistance Studies* 2015, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 127–50, <https://resistance-journal.org/product/civil-resistance-vs-isis/2015> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

³¹ S. Lindahl, A CTS Model of Counterterrorism, *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 2017, p. 1–19 [accessed: 12.01.2021].

the political causes conducive to terrorism in the first place. Critical evaluations are a good first step in that process.

References

- Abrahms, M., Mierau, J., 'Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2017, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 830–51, DOI:10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671.
- Allison, G., 'Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe', Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/nuclear-terrorism-ultimate-preventable-catastrophe/p7410> [accessed: 13.01.2021].
- Becker, J., Shane, S., 'Secret "Kill List" Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will', *New York Times* 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=0 [accessed: 14.06.2021].
- 'Blood and Treasure: The Costs of the Iraq War', Middle East Eye, 2016, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/blood-and-treasure-costs-iraq-war-1660190585> [accessed: 14.06.2021].
- Bolland, T., Ludvigsen J.A.L., 'No Boots on the Ground: The Effectiveness of Us Drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula', *Defense and Security Analysis* 2018, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 127–43, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2018.1478184.
- Bush, G.W., 'President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance', The National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html> [accessed: 12.01.2021].
- Dongen, T. van, 'Mapping Counterterrorism: A Categorisation of Policies and the Promise of Empirically Based, Systematic Comparisons', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2010, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 227–41, DOI: 10.1080/17539150903306170.
- Eland, I., *Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism?*, CATO Institute, Washington, D.C. 1998.
- En God Alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014', *NOU* 2016, vol. 8, <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/09faceca099c4b8bac85ca8495e12d2d/no/pdfs/nou201620160008000dddpdfs.pdf>.
- Freedman, L., 'Introduction', *Superterrorism. Policy Responses*, ed. L. Freedman, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford 2002, pp. 1–6.
- Gearson, J., 'The Nature of Modern Terrorism', *Superterrorism. Policy Responses*, ed. L. Freedman, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 2002, pp. 7–24.
- Gomis, B., *Counterterrorism: Reassessing the Policy Response*, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL 2015.
- Hoffman, B., 'Foreword.' In: *Research on Terrorism. Trends, Achievements & Failures*, ed. A. Silke, Frank Cass, Abingdon 2004.
- Ignatieff, M., 'It's War, but It Doesn't Have to Be Dirty', *The Guardian*, 1 October 2001, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/01/afghanistan.terrorism9> [accessed: 14.06.2021].
- Iraq Body Count*, 2021, Iraq Body Count, <https://www.iraqbodycount.org> [accessed: 10.01.2021].
- Jackson, R., *Writing the War on Terrorism*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2005.

- Kattelman, K.T., 'Assessing Success of the Global War on Terror: Terrorist Attack Frequency and the Backlash Effect', *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide* 2020, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 67–86, DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2019.1650384.
- Lindahl, S., *The Theory and Practice of Emancipatory Counterterrorism*, PhD thesis, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, 2017.
- Lindahl, S., *A Critical Theory of Counterterrorism: Ontology, Epistemology, Normativity*, Routledge, Abingdon 2018.
- Lindahl, S., 'A CTS Model of Counterterrorism', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2017, vol. 10, pp. 1–19, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2017.1336289.
- Lum, C., Kennedy, L.W. and Sherley, A., 'The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies', *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 2006, no. 2, DOI: 10.4073/csr.2006.2.
- Mueller, J., 'Harbinger or Aberration? A 9/11 Provocation', *The National Interest*, 2002 (Fall), pp. 45–50, <https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NIHARB.PDF>.
- Mueller, J., Stewart, M.G., *Terror, Security, and Money. Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011.
- Schmemmann, S., 'U.S. ATTACKED; President Vows to Exact Punishment for "Evil"', *New York Times*, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/us-attacked-president-vows-to-exact-punishment-for-evil.html> [accessed: 12.01.2021].
- Silke, A., 'Contemporary Terrorism Studies: Issues in Research', *Critical Terrorism Studies. A New Research Agenda*, eds. R. Jackson, M. Breen-Smyth, and J. Gunning, Routledge, Abingdon 2009, pp. 34–48.
- Stephan, M.J., 'Reflections Civil Resistance vs . ISIS', *Journal of Resistance Studies* 2015, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 127–50, <https://resistance-journal.org/product/civil-resistance-vs-isis/> [accessed: 14.06.2021].
- Stohl, M., 'Don't Confuse Me with the Facts : Knowledge Claims and Terrorism', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2012, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 31–49.
- 'The Day the World Changed', *The Economist*, September 2001, <http://www.economist.com/node/780341> [accessed: 12.01.2021].
- Townshend, C., *Terrorism. A Very Short Introduction*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011.
- 'Transcript of Bush's Address', 2001, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript> [accessed: 12.01.2021].
- Wolfendale, J., 'The Narrative of Terrorism as an Existential Threat', *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies*, ed. R. Jackson, Routledge, Abingdon 2016, pp. 114–23.
- Zenko, Mi., 'Do Not Believe the U.S Government Official Numbers on Drone Strike Civilian Casualties', 2016, Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/05/do-not-believe-the-u-s-governments-official-numbers-on-drone-strike-civilian-casualties> [accessed: 14.06.2021].
- Zulaika, J., *Terrorism. The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2009.

20 lat globalnej wojny z terroryzmem. Krytyczna ocena i uwagi na temat zapobiegania terroryzmowi

Streszczenie

Od ataków z 11 września 2001 r. mija 20 lat. W odpowiedzi Stany Zjednoczone rozpoczęły globalną wojnę z terroryzmem, która zdominowała ostatnie dwie dekady stosunków międzynarodowych. Misje wojskowe w Afganistanie i Iraku, błyskawiczny rozwój programu użycia dronów, powszechne stosowanie tortur i masowa inwigilacja to tylko niektóre z aspektów tej wojny. Globalna wojna z terroryzmem stała się dominującym paradygmatem kontrterroryzmu, a stosowanie przemocy zostało uznane za podstawowy sposób przeciwdziałania i zapobiegania terroryzmowi. Teraz, kiedy mijają dwie dekady od rozpoczęcia tej wojny, zagrożenie terroryzmem jest tak samo aktualne jak w 2001 r. W artykule podsumowano globalną wojnę z terroryzmem i oceniono ją z dwóch perspektyw: pierwszej, która obejmuje empiryczny wynik zapobiegania i zwalczania terroryzmu, oraz drugiej, opartej na teoretycznych założeniach leżących u podstaw paradygmatu tejże wojny. Z oceny wynika, że globalna wojna z terroryzmem zakończyła się porażką w dużej mierze ze względu na teoretyczny i epistemologiczny kryzys walki z terroryzmem. W ostatniej części tekstu zaprezentowano możliwe sposoby naprawy popełnionych błędów, tak aby państwa mogły przyjąć bardziej realistyczną i humanitarną formę walki z terroryzmem.

Słowa kluczowe: kontrterroryzm, wojna, terroryzm, przemoc, ocena

20 Years with the Global War on Terror: A Critical Evaluation and Thoughts on How to Prevent Future Terrorism

Abstract

20 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In response to the attacks, the US initiated a Global War on Terror which has dominated international relations for 20 years. The military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, a rampant drone programme, widespread use of torture, and the mass surveillance of people are some of the aspects of this war. The Global War on Terror has become the dominant counterterrorism paradigm, and the use of violence has been taken for granted as the primary tool to counter and prevent terrorism. Yet, 20 years have passed since 2001, and the threat of terrorism is as prevalent now as it was then. This chapter evaluates the Global War on Terror along two main axes: first, on its empirical record on countering and preventing terrorism; and second, on the theoretical assumptions that underlie the paradigm. The evaluation concludes that the GWOT has failed on its own terms to counter and prevent terrorism, and this is largely due to a theoretical and epistemological crisis of counterterrorism. The last part of this chapter presents possible ways forward to remedy these failures so that states may adopt a more realistic and humane form of counterterrorism.

Key words: Counterterrorism, War, Terrorism, Violence, Evaluation

20 Jahre globaler Krieg gegen den Terror: Kritische Betrachtungen und Überlegungen, wie Terrorismus in der Zukunft verhindert werden kann

Zusammenfassung

Seit den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 sind 20 Jahre vergangen. Als Reaktion auf die Angriffe begannen die USA einen globalen Krieg gegen den Terror, der die internationalen Beziehungen in den letzten 20 Jahren beherrscht hat. Die

Militärkampagnen in Afghanistan und dem Irak, ein ausuferndes Drohnenprogramm, der weit verbreitete Einsatz von Folter und die Massenüberwachung von Menschen sind einige Aspekte dieses Kriegs. Der globale Krieg gegen den Terror ist zum dominierenden Anti-Terror-Paradigma geworden, und der Einsatz von Gewalt wurde ganz selbstverständlich als Mittel der Wahl zur Bekämpfung und Verhinderung von Terrorismus angesehen. Seit 2001 sind mittlerweile 20 Jahre vergangen, und die Terrorismusgefahr ist heute genauso groß wie damals. Dieses Kapitel wertet den globalen Krieg gegen den Terror anhand von zwei Hauptachsen aus: erstens auf Grundlage der empirischen Daten zur Bekämpfung und Verhinderung von Terrorismus, und zweitens mit Blick auf die theoretischen Annahmen, die dem Paradigma zugrunde liegen. Der letzte Teil des Kapitels stellt mögliche Wege vor, um die Fehler der Vergangenheit wett zu machen, damit die Staaten eine realistischere und humanere Form der Terrorismusbekämpfung finden können.

Schlüsselwörter: Terrorismusbekämpfung, Krieg, Terrorismus, Gewalt, Betrachtung

20 лет глобальной войны с терроризмом. Критическая оценка и замечания на тему предотвращения терроризма Резюме

Прошло 20 лет с момента терактов 11 сентября 2001 года. В ответ Соединенные Штаты начали глобальную войну с терроризмом, которая продолжалась последние два десятилетия и имела огромное влияние на международные отношения. Военные миссии в Афганистане и Ираке, стремительное развитие программы использования беспилотных летательных аппаратов, применение пыток и тотальное наблюдение – это только некоторые аспекты этой войны. Глобальная война с терроризмом стала доминирующей парадигмой этой борьбы, а применение насилия было признано основным способом противодействия и предотвращения терроризма. Не смотря на это, спустя два десятилетия с начала этой войны, угроза терроризма остается столь же актуальна, как и в 2001 году. В статье дано оценку глобальной войны с терроризмом с двух точек зрения: первая включает эмпирический результат предотвращения терроризма и борьбы с ним; вторая, основанная на теоретических предпосылках, лежащих в основе парадигмы этой войны. Оценка показывает, что глобальная война с терроризмом закончилась провалом в значительной степени из-за теоретического и гносеологического кризисов борьбы с терроризмом. В последней части исследования представлены возможные способы исправления допущенных ошибок, которые позволят государствам начать более реалистичную и гуманную форму борьбы с терроризмом.

Ключевые слова: контртерроризм, война, терроризм, насилие, оценка