

Thomas Aquinas's Arguments in Defense of the Unity of the Substantial Form in Human Being

Keywords: Thomas Aquinas, unity of substantial form, plurality of forms, corpus of Christ

Abstract

There is widely known disagreement between Thomas Aquinas and John Peckham which concerns the plurality of human being.

The problem of unity of form is by Thomas Aquinas related to other issues such as the one (*unum*), which is a transcendental property of being. Acceptance of plurality of forms – as Aquinas claims – renders the possibility of the unity of being *simpliciter*. Similarly *esse*, which by the rational soul is implemented into the wholeness – *compositum*, must be the only existence of being. When we agree that there are many forms in the structure of human being,

and each of them would be responsible for constituting a particular essence respectively, it would be impossible for the genuine creation and perishing of being to happen. For instance, intellectual part would perish, but corporeal, would remain. The entire annihilation of man would take place only when the last form was annihilated, as this form in the first place must have been regarded as the substantial one.

The presentation of views and arguments of Thomas Aquinas on the unity of substantial form in human being has been divided into four parts. The first concerns the problem of rational soul as

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the substantial form. The next regards the question of the matter in the context of a debate on the unity of substantial form. The third concerns the question of creation of man (*animatio*). The fourth hence, introduces philosophical views of

Thomas Aquinas regarding the ontic status of both, the living and dead body of Christ. Although the latter concerns theological issues, it concerns philosophical matters.

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Public critic of Thomas' Aquinas views by John Pecham, further the Archbishop of Cantenbury at the University of Paris initiated the long lasting debate on the unity and plurality of substantial forms in human being¹. In consequence, at the beginning of the 14th century the dispute needed the settlement of the Council of Vienne.

The crux of a debate between John Pecham and Thomas Aquinas on unity and plurality of substantial forms, was of metaphysical matter as a result of confrontation of two philosophical traditions: Neo-Augustinian and Thomistic one. For both of them the starting point were the Aristotelian views. Hence the debate seems impossible to overcome and be solved on the ground of both philosophy and theology, and resulted in the

new perception of the Aristotle's works and Aquinas's new model of metaphysics². Next, the political context, different church and scientific environment of which both sides aroused and the fact that the question was strictly theological, lead to escalation of the conflict between the Neo-Augustinian and Thomistic school³.

There are numerous works and commentaries on Thomas' views regarding the topic of our interest. Hence, we are going to draw from the source text, especially to the *Summa Theologiae*⁴. All secondary sources and commentaries will serve for an analysis only supplementary. In Aquinas' texts there are discussions with contemporary authors. The problem of the body of Christ is the most significant example.

¹ The following article refers to the conclusions of monography D. Lipski, *Jan Peckham i Tomasz z Akwinu. Spór o jedność formy substancjalnej w człowieku*, in: *Opera Philosophorum Medii Aevi*, vol. 15, Warszawa 2015.

² R. Zavalloni, and further F. Steenberghen, claim that Aristotle is the starting point for controversy regarding the quantity of forms for both contradictory stances, because in his works part from the metaphysical doctrines adopted and analysed by Thomas Aquinas, we may also find "intra-metaphysical theories" inspired by the preceding Greek thought and adopted by proponents of multiplicity of form. See: R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des forms. Éditions de l'institut supérieur de philosophie*, in: *Philosophes Médiévaux*, vol. 2, Louvain 1951; F. Steenberghen, *La Philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, 1991 (Polish edition 2005).

³ On historical character this dispute see: D. Lipski, *John Pecham's dispute with Thomas Aquinas at the University of Paris – Causes and Effects*, "Rocznik Tomistyczny" 9 (2020) 2, pp. 73-87.

⁴ For Thomas' works I draw from the *Corpus thomisticum* (<http://www.corpusthomicum.org>).

I. Rational soul as the substantial form

The starting question should be what is the essence of uniqueness of the substantial form. In his article *Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex*⁵ on the simplicity of God, Thomas says that the form must in its essence be unified to such extent that particular parts cannot be distinguished when it is taken as a whole. With regard to the composite of form and matter in human being, determinants of particular faculties of soul (vegetative, sensitive and rational functions) need to be harmonised and actualised in the “unified” soul. Following Aristotle Aquinas says that in a substantial form of man there cannot exist parts which would be proportionate to particular activities or faculties (as a kind of conglomerate of forms).

The other question regarding the unity of substantial form is for Thomas the intellectual activity of man. In what sense a material body can be a realisation of rational form? Implementing the ability to think into the properties of a concrete man is another step which Thomas does to show that the substantial form actualizes and binds the whole human being into the so called psycho-psychical unity. The intellectual cognition is an activity proper to human species and it is also its qualitative property. As we know, it is form that is a principle of activity for a separate being, hence, the substantial form of a particular man

must be a rational form⁶. However, a problem arises here how something of immaterial nature and which belongs to a different ontological order, moreover, conducts its activities without corporeal organs, can at the same time be the form of body linked inseparably with it. Following Aristotle⁷, Aquinas claims that if we denied that human soul is the direct form of human body we would inevitably be obliged to claim that the particular act of thinking is not the act of thinking of that particular man. This contradicts the experience in which everyone who thinks observes himself that he is the one who thinks⁸.

It does not however, explain the question why activity of the intellect should be in correlation with a particular body – that is – that the particular act of thinking or cognition is in activity related to “that body”. Aquinas illustrates this as follows: If a body is a part of this particular man, who sensates by this body, than the intellect by which Socrates is able to think, is a part of Socrates somehow united with his body. A question arises how this unity (*uniatur*) is possible to come to existence. Even we grasp that we ourselves make an act of cognition, it is necessary to show how this activity is proceeding when the intellect and matter are mutually connected. If a particular man as a separate *individuum* of one essence is composed of the

⁵ *STh I*, q. 3 a. 7.

⁶ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 1.

⁷ See: Aristoteles, *De anima* 414a 1-14.

⁸ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 1. Similarly J. Goyette. See: J. Goyette, *St. Thomas on the Unity of Substantial Form*, “Nova et Vetera”, English edition, vol.7, No.4 (2009), p. 789.

form and matter, rationality would be part of its form. Otherwise the intellect would be understood as a mover for the motion of a human being (*motor ad motum*). The latter – Thomas claims – is erroneous, as intellectual cognition is the activity remaining in the acting subject, it is not transferred into something else, as in the case of heating for example. The unity of intellect and man, where the relative entirety would be created according to the pattern mover-moved, does not allow to say that we may consider man as the one (*simpliciter*). In this place Thomas follows the stance on the transcendental properties of being when he says that when something is the one it is a being⁹.

The above analysis leads to the implication, adopted by Thomas from Aristotle, that “this man” is able to cognize intellectually as the intellective principle is its form. The activity of the intellect enables to understand how the intellect as a principle unites body as a form¹⁰.

The problem of *esse* is a further aspect of study on rational soul as the only substantial form of man. The existence of rational soul is a donor for the existence of entire man. As the Doctor Angelicus

says, soul has its existence and exists thanks to that existence and provides that existence to the entire composite. It is present in a substantial form of human being, because after decomposing the matter, the entire composite ceases to exist, but the soul, providing the existence, maintains it¹¹. Nothing is directly *unum* if not by the one form, from which it receives its existence. Soul, a rational soul of human being must determine a body as a substantial form, not accidental one. The accidental form (*accidentalis*) is not the provider of the *esse* directly. Similarly, heat does not create its object in general, but it makes the object warm. The substantial form hence, is responsible for the existence of being essentially and directly (*simpliciter*)¹². According to Thomas, a rational soul is the only substantial form in human being. The form of matter hence, would be a particular act with regard to a soul. The soul would actualize a being in some sense only¹³.

A question arises what according to Aquinas means “including” the lower forms in higher ones. Let us point out that for both Thomas and Aristotle, the intellectual soul, sensitive and vegetati-

⁹ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 1.

¹⁰ „ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet quod intellectivum principium unitur corpori ut forma” (ibidem). On the issue of the structure of human being in Aquinas in a concise way see for ex.: A. Andrzejuk, *Tomasz z Akwinu jako filozof*, Warszawa 2017, p. 52-60.

¹¹ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 1 ad 5.

¹² See: *Quaestio disputata de anima*, a. 9 resp.

¹³ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 4; See also: *Quodlibet XII*, q. 7 a. 1 co. Thomas points out at the fundamental relations of *esse* and form in being. As F. Roensch says, the unity of form was for Thomas the only acceptable reason for the unity of *esse*. See: F. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, Iowa 1964, p. 189. It is worth to mention that although Thomas uses interchangeably the term „one and the one” regarding a being, but the latter term in some way reveal wider aspects of „the one”. See: T. Klimski, *Jedno i byt*, ATK, Warszawa 1992, p. 58.

ve one are in human being the one (*eadem numero*)¹⁴. In the nature the difference between these forms regards to the level of their perfection which keeps hierarchy of all natural beings in the world. This distinction of perfection of forms is responsible for the species distinction of beings. It implies from the observation of reality, where we may notice that animated being differ qualitatively from that non-animated. In this place Aquinas again follows Aristotle's works and compares species to the already mentioned example of numbers. Each species can be regarded as unity changing in a manner similar to a number changes when we add or subtract¹⁵.

Nevertheless the question on how we distinguish the "lower" forms and their functions within the unity which constitutes the species of a thing, remains open. Thomas turns to Aristotle and shows the example of the geometric figures¹⁶. Such as pentagon has quadrangle inscribed and exceeding the one with one more side, the intellectual soul includes a form of the sensitive and vegetative form and it, and exceed them in its quality. But for the fact that the lower forms are inscribed in the more perfect one we may say that a triangle is not another shape in a quadrangle but it can be only distinguished there as property of the quadrangle. And because a parti-

cular man is not himself because of one soul and the animated being because of the another one, but because of the one and the same which is equipped with properties and functions of the lower soul and additionally its own. This example shows another significant issue regarding aspectual dimension of our cognition. It is common for our intellect to order things by counting, dividing, distinguishing and detailing. In this place Thomas notices the stance of those who want to emphasise, in the unity such as each being actualized by its form, that what fulfils its particular functions and to distinguish its various forms. They however, neglect the fact that, as Thomas says, that we cannot adopt various intellectual or logical approaches, which always are some consequence of cognition, in a variety of natural things. This is so because reason (*ratio*) can recognise one and the same thing in various ways. When rational soul recognises its own it can differentiate these functions which are of sensitive origin as something imperfect and material. Next it discovers these similarities in other animated beings and forms the notion of a particular genus, noticing something what would be both the formal difference and complexion (*completivum*) into a higher form, in that case, the intellectual soul¹⁷.

¹⁴ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 3.

¹⁵ See: Aristoteles, *Metaphysica VII*, 1043b 34-1044a 5. Zob. też: *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. IV, c. 33 n. 2; *Quaestio disputata de anima*, a. 7 resp. et a. 9; *Quodlibet I*, q. 4 a. 1.

¹⁶ See: Aristoteles, *De anima* 414b 30.

¹⁷ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 3.

II. The issue of matter in the context of the problem of unity of substantial form

To matter as such we may ascribe two features (*conditio*). At first, in matter is selected that what is proper to a given form. The second, it necessarily possesses that what implies from the prior adjustment. Like a craftsman chooses matter of iron proper to a saw in order to cut hard objects. But its teeth can get dull and the iron can get rusted, what inevitably is the result of limitation of matter. There are properties implying from the nature itself. On one hand form actualizes matter according to its (form's) measure. On the other hand, the entire specific set of material elements, outward to body (and prior to the one in chronological order), influences potentiality actualized by the form¹⁸. This way Aquinas comments the view that spatial dimensionality of the property of matter and it pertains to matter as property present prior to actualisation of the substantial form¹⁹. As Thomas observes, spatial dimensions (*dimensiones quantitativae*) are the potentialities that result from corporeity which is proper to the entire matter. In the result, matter from the perspective of corporeity and spatiality can be apprehended as divisible into various parts. That is why Aquinas claims that

if corporeity will be denoted as a form of body it would mean two things. At first, corporeity described as three random dimensions, therefore it is not a substantial form, but a potential, further – any form which causes that three dimensions come to existence, but in that case this form is not any other species form (*forma specifica*)²⁰.

In the entire *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas speaks of the first matter several times. For the most part he refers to the stance of Aristotle. He points out that the first matter does not exist through its own in natural things as it is pure potentiality²¹. Therefore it is rather something co-created (*concreatum*) than created (*creatum*). Moreover, it is not something directly infinite but proportionally to something because its potentiality does not extend the limits resulting from natural forms²². Forms which actualizes this matter²³. The first matter is not something, however it is not nothing. We may suggest that it exists internally (always) but does not contain any determination in itself when place or time is concerned, as it does not have one particular form²⁴. Thomas, contrary to Aristotle, claims that matter is not eternal

¹⁸ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 5 i 6. Paweł Milcarek calls this system "material". He stresses that material with regard to human being is not human body and disposition is nor identical with human body, and disposition is not identical with conception but accompanies in the order of nature. See: P. Milcarek, *Teoria ciała ludzkiego w pismach św. Tomasza z Akwinu*, Warszawa 1994, pp. 86-88.

¹⁹ Also that view was adopted by John Pecham.

²⁰ See: *Quodlibet XII*, q. 7 a. 1 co.

²¹ See for ex.: *STh I*, q. 115 a. 1 ad 2; *STh I-II*, q. 9 a. 6.

²² See: *STh I*, q. 7, a. 2 ad 3.

²³ See: *STh I*, q. 14 a. 2 ad 3; *STh I*, q. 84 a. 3 ad 2.

²⁴ See: *STh I*, q. 16 a. 7 ad 2.

but is created by God²⁵ and it is not identical with Him²⁶.

Consequently – according Thomas – we cannot say the unspecified matter in some way precedes matter formed by the substantial form. Preceding may be understood only in the order of origin (*origo*), not in the order of existence. Potentiality precedes the act or indicates the part which precedes the entirety. Thomas stresses that even we are similar concerning one genus of corporeity, our corporeity does not undergo any common matter (potentiality) in which we all participate. There is no one form of corporeity (*forma corporeitatis*) for all people, because it is forms which make the matter real make it different at the same time. It happens when the form actualizes matter in one regard leaves a privation in it, in order to actualize its potentiality concerning other forms²⁷.

A question arises here what is a proper matter, pertaining to human species only. Thomas separates species parts of body from the material parts. However he remarks that they are not different parts, but different apprehension of the same matter. He speaks about the example of an individual man and multiplicity of a state. In the country there happens that those who pass away are replaced by the others. In that way parts of multitude come and go materially but they susta-

in formally as there are replacements in the state structures. In that sense we speak of the country which sustains the same with regards to number. Similarly, departing parts of human being are replaced by the new ones. In this way all elements are in constant flow with regard to matter but they sustain with regard to species. There sustain one man, in a number²⁸. That is why the first matter and elements are similar to every people, but the proper matter (*materia propria*) is different in various beings²⁹. To sum up, the principle of individualisation for Thomas is not the first matter directly, but *materia quantitate signata*. Whereas the notion *materia communis* indicates the material element essential for the entire species, not only for a particular individual as in the case of qualitatively determined matter.

Thus, the issue of combining elements (*mixtum elementorum*) which compose human body results in a difficulty. When elements are combined in human body we should assume that they must have had its form prior to the act they were combined. As it is not possible that there would exist those elements or their properties, rooted in matter only and identified beforehand³⁰. The proper solution for the Doctor Angelicus is the stance of Aristotle³¹, adopted and developed³². Forms of these elements rema-

²⁵ See: *STh I*, q. 44, a. 2.

²⁶ See: *STh I*, q. 3 a. 8; *STh I*, q. 115 a. 1 ad 4. Such view is adopted by David of Dinant.

²⁷ See: *STh I*, q. 66 a. 2.

²⁸ See: *Scriptum super Sententiis*, lib. 4 d. 44 q. 1 a. 2.

²⁹ See: *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 8 l. 4 n. 1-2.

³⁰ See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 4.

³¹ See: Aristoteles, *De generatione et corruptione* 327b 28-328b 24.

³² On development by Aquinas the Aristotelian theory of presence of quality of elements in mixed bodies. See: J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated*

in combined not in the act but in its potentiality. It means that properties of these elements, concerning their quality, remain in the form changed during this combination. However these qualities, resulted from this combination, are the proper system for the substantial form of the mixed body³³.

According to Thomas the elements are the outward substances in regard to the

structure of body, but they influence this structure with their power dependent from the substantial forms. It means that forms of combined elements are one of the final causes which influence the essential potentiality as the external causes of shaping the body in order to form potentiality proportionate to these final causes³⁴.

III. *Animatio* – embryological question

In the *Summa Theologiae* the problem of defining embryo arises in the context of analysis of substantial form of man. It seems that the description of the process of insemination and growth of embryo can be problematic in the light of the view of the unity of the substantial form in man.

Thomas asks a question: is semen a final cause of human soul?³⁵ He responds clearly that there is no possibility for something flowing from the force of active matter to influence its cause into immaterial causes. It cannot take place, because the intellectual principle exceeds (*transcendens*) matter. It does so twofold. At first, it has activities in its natu-

re which do not involve body. The second, soul has its own existence which is the result of self-sufficiency of being. But the problem arises when we try to understand how semen (*semen*), which undoubtedly is a form of matter (with some power, as writes Thomas) is the subject of determination of human soul created solely by God. How the particular stages of the initial phrase of human embryo proceed? Thomas, such as his opponent John Pecham, follows the famous Aristotle's stance that this is only intellect that arrives "from outward" to the formed being³⁶. Nevertheless, these words are quoted by Aquinas to show that intellectual element does not belong

Being, Monographs of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, No. 1 Washington 2000, pp. 350-351; A. Andrzejuk, *Filozofia przyrody nieożywionej w De mixtione elementorum (wstęp do przekładu)*, in: *Opera philosophorum mediæ ævi. Textus et studia*, t. 9 fasc. 1, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa 2011, p. 101-106.

³³ „Manent enim qualitates propriae elementorum, licet remisse, in quibus est virtus formarum elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria dispositio ad formam substantialem corporis mixti”. See: *STh I*, q. 76 a. 4 ad 4.

³⁴ See: P. Milcarek, *Teoria ciała ludzkiego w pismach św. Tomasza z Akwinu*, Warszawa 1994, p. 194; M. Gogacz, *Elementarz metafizyki*, Warszawa 1998, p. 130; A. Andrzejuk, *Istnienie i istota. Wstęp do filozofii bytu Tomasza z Akwinu*, Warszawa 2003, pp. 39-41.

³⁵ *Utrum anima intellectiva causetur ex semine (STh I, q. 118 a. 2)*.

³⁶ See: Aristoteles, *De generatione animalium* 736b 27-29.

to the order of matter, that is semen. Not as Pecham intended, to confirm that in the growing embryo there exist parallelly the sequence of forms (souls). False ideas – as the author claims – according to which the life functions do not derive from the soul of embryo itself by from the soul of a mother or the power of semen. Further he disagrees that in embryo a vegetative soul exists in the first place, then further souls arrive, sensitive and rational, as three souls exist mutually in potentiality one into another³⁷. Next rejected by Aquinas view is that the vegetative soul of embryo through the power of semen becomes a sensitive soul, next, the power of God makes it to be rational. This latter change in embryo are, for protagonists of this stance, confirmed by Aristotle when he speaks of the intellect as something what arrives from “outward” by the power of God. For Thomas it is not possible to speak of genuine creation of beings if we accept the fact that the following form maintains the preceding form, especially with regard to perfection of a rational soul. As a kind of subsistence it cannot be an act of the soul already existed as in the

result it would inevitable cause the annihilation of rational soul along with annihilation of body. The moment the next form is created is the moment of annihilation of the preceding one³⁸, although each next and more perfect form possesses that what the precedent has and something more. In the result we should accept that the rational soul which at the same time is a vegetative and sensitive one and is created by God in the final stage (*in fine*) of the creation of human being by God, and it annihilates the formerly existing souls. In other words, when the matter is properly prepared by the power of semen then God infuses (*infundit*) the soul being created³⁹.

The power of semen (*virtus seminis*) prepares and forms the matter to receive the rational form from God. What is significant, human body is formed simultaneously (*simul*) by the power of God and the power of semen. To create human being there are hence two encountering ways. The first concerns body finishes when foetus achieves the sensitive substantial form, the other concerns the intellectual soul which is created directly by God and places the lo-

³⁷ Also John Pecham followed this view.

³⁸ The problem is obviously the sticking point of two orders in the description of creation of man: biological and metaphysical. K. Wojcieszek says that some biological structures should not be treated as non-identical with human being: „the conception of cell structures ad general organismal as the set of integrated by the already created being (act of the existence!) final causes embracing tightly and indicating human body but separate from the one allows to understand deeper the events described”. See: K. Wojcieszek, *Stworzony i zrodzony... Metafizyczne wyjaśnienia biologicznego konstituowania się człowieka w poglądach św. Tomasza z Akwinu – próba aktualizacji*, Warszawa 2000, p. 134). Even Thomas and Aristotle shared these doubts it seems that for both of them considered embryo a human being. See: K. Flannery, *Applying Aristotle in contemporary Embryology*, “The Thomist”, vol. 67, No. 2, April 2003, p. 275. K. Flannery is convinced that Aristotle’s stance (and in the consequence Thomas’) can be adopted by contemporary embryology. Also Wojcieszek follows this view. (ibidem, p. 277-8). See: K. Wojcieszek, opus cit., p. 137-144.

³⁹ See: *STh I*, q. 118 a. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. 4 cap. 82 n. 7.

wer form⁴⁰. That is why we claim that parents are also the final causes of the essence of man with regard to its body and psychic⁴¹.

IV. The issue of living and dead body of Christ

Thomas Aquinas studies directly in several places the questions regarding the death of Christ and identity of His alive and dead body. The fragments presented below are the attempt to show Thomas' understanding of clarity and ambiguity in speaking about the body of Christ (*Quodlibet III*, q. 2 a. 2), and on answering to the questions whether He was a man at the time of death (*STh III*, q. 50 a. 4), and – what death did to Him as a Person (*STh III*, q. 50 a. 4). Moreover, analyses should reveal proper, according to Thomas, understanding of identity and numerical equality of the alive and dead body of Christ (*STh III*, q. 50 a. 5; *Quodlibet II*, q. 1 a. 1; IV, q. 5). Between *quodlibet II* and *III*, and *IV* and the third part of the *Summa* we may

notice a difference in the language of Aquinas as well as in the mode of introducing his arguments to support his doctrine. It derives from the fact that both groups are divided by the year 1270 in which the famous debate between Thomas and John Pecham took place. Contrary to what John Pecham or Roger Marston demanded, the views of the Doctor Angelicus were maintained⁴².

In the article “Whether the dead eye of Christ is called in the unequivocal or ambiguous mode?”⁴³ Thomas says that the expressions “unequivocal” or “ambiguous” are employed according to a definition. The basis for a definition of species is the species form (*forma specifica*). Species form for human being is hence a rational soul. So, as the author sugge-

⁴⁰ See: *STh I*, q. 118 a. 2 ad 3 et 4; *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. 2 cap. 89 n. 15.

⁴¹ See: M. Gogacz, *Elementarz metafizyki*, Warszawa 1998, p. 35.

⁴² As D.A. Callus explained with regard to the *Quodlibet IV*, which is dated later than the famous debate between Thomas and Pecham, Thomas is cautious in his words in order not to offend the delicate ears of the Augustinians. It is visible both in the formulation of the problem and in terminology adopted. Probably Pecham and Wilhelm of La Mare regarded that to be a withdrawal (*recantation*) of Thomas' position (*recantation*) See: D. Callus, *The problem of the unity of form and Richard Knapwell O.P.*, in: *Mélanges Offerts A Étienne Gilson*, Toronto – Paris 1959, p. 154. G. Wilson claim that after the famous debate in 1270, as we observe in the *Quodlibet IV* and in the third part of *Summa theologiae*, Thomas “improved” to some extent the stance concerning his views on the body of Christ. After that event Doctor Angelicus decided to join two theses. The first that the alive and dead body of Christ is identical with regard to its subject (*subiectum*), and the second that all other bodies after death are identical only with regard to matter not with regard to form. It could have been an improvement of the prior Aquinas' stance. Author claims that this modification is regarded by Pecham as renouncing the stance by Thomas. The Archbishop of Canterbury stresses that in the letter to the bishop of Lincoln in 1285. See: G. Wilson, *The Critique of Thomas Aquinas's Unicity Theory of Forms in John Pecham's Quodlibet IV (Romanum)*, “Franciscan Studies” 56 (1998), p. 426-7.

⁴³ *Utrum oculus Christi post mortem dicatur aequivoce oculus, vel univoce (Quodlibet III, q. 2 a. 2).*

sts, when we eliminate the soul a man ceases to be a man and employing the name “man” introduces a kind of ambiguity. Thomas simply follows the Aristotle’s II Book *De anima*⁴⁴. When soul is detached from the flesh we might speak of that body as human, only in ambiguous way, similarly as in the case of eye of man. Moreover, it is significant (*indifferenter*) whether any other substantial form present in body prior to reception of rational soul is presupposed⁴⁵. However, he adds cautiously that it seems that the latter option is closer to truth (*consonum veritati*).

When soul does not unite the body as its form the name “human being” becomes ambiguous. Otherwise, as the author claim, we should adopt that neither the unity of soul and body would result in creation of substance, nor the process of detachment of soul would cause the genuine annihilation. During three days the dead eye of Christ, as the other part of His body, would be called an eye only when we accept ambiguity⁴⁶.

Thomas Aquinas speaks about the following implication: body of Christ was after His death entirely (*simpliciter*) numerically the same body with regard to substance which was hypostasis, not with regard to substance which is the essence or nature. However unambiguity and ambiguity does not refer to a subject

(*suppositum*), but to the essence and nature denoted by definition. Death of Christ did not influence on detachment of His Deity (*divinitas*) from the body and soul. Since there was no sin in Christ, the unity of Deity (*unio divinitatis*) with body, was not possible after His death. As the body of Christ both before and after His death was joined with the World of God in the personal hypostatic union. Hypostasis of the Word of God was (*hypostasis verbi Dei*), as claims Damascus, the hypostasis of the body of Christ after death. The soul of Christ likewise. In the moment of death, which was the moment of separation of soul from body, there was not a separation of one hypostasis into two ones. Body and soul remained, having one and the same hypostasis. The Hypostasis of the Word is hence – as stresses the Doctor Angelicus – the sole primary subject of the activity both for the Word and for the soul and body because neither soul nor body never had any other hypostasis⁴⁷. Hence to say: “Christ at the time of Triduum of His death was a man” is erroneous, if that statement were detached from the context and commentaries. It is not however false for the author to say that Christ was a “dead man” at that time. Hence for Thomas the final implication the following: “Man” designates the nature, but “Son”

⁴⁴ Thomas follows Aristotle in pointing at an example of comparison of an alive eye to an eye painted or sculptured (See: Aristoteles, *De anima* 412b 18-24). This is example also in *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. IV c. 32 and *Scriptum super Sententiis*, lib. 3 d. 6 q. 3 a. 1.

⁴⁵ Thomas probably means John Pecham.

⁴⁶ Dead body of Christ not only was not a human body but it was not a body in a sense of the “organised matter equipped with life in potentiality” (See: J.-L. Solère, *Was the Eye in the Tomb?*, in: *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel, Leiden – Boston 2006, p. 557).

⁴⁷ See: *STh III*, q. 50 a. 2 et See also: *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. IV c. 38.

designates hypostasis. Therefore it would be better to speak about Christ at the time of His death as the human Son (*filius hominis*) not the man⁴⁸.

In the article on the problem “Whether the living body of Christ was numerically identical with the dead body?”⁴⁹ Thomas focuses on twofold meaning of the word *simpliciter*. At first, *simpliciter* may denote the indication of unity of subject, that is the hypostasis of the Word of God, which was the one for both alive and dead body of Christ. Next, *simpliciter* may denote entirely or totally (*omnino vel totaliter*). Then the dead body of Christ cannot be simply (*simpliciter*) identified with the alive one. It was not however the same if life pertains to essence of living body and the word “alive” does not signify an accidental property, but something which pertains to the essence of body (*praedicatum essentiale*). Hence we may assume that body ceases to be entirely the same after losing life. If the dead body of Christ had remained entirely the same, it would be – as the author claims – that it could not have been decomposed, that is dead. Another issue is a proper understanding of decay or corruption (*corruptio*). Thomas, typi-

cally, offers another explanation of the term. At first, it can signify generally to the moment of detachment the soul from body. Also, it can signify the entire decay and corruption of body into elements (*in elementa*). The Angelic Doctor adds that it would be a blasphemy to think that Christ’s body prior to resurrection could not be a subject of decomposition in the first sense of the word. If that were so, Christ’s body would in its essence differ from any other human being. Further consequence would be that Christ would not genuinely die, and the salvation would not be attainable for people. However, Christ’s body was not decomposed in the second case. Such destruction or decay did not affect the body of Christ, contrary to other dead bodies as it remained united with hypostasis of the Word of God. Therefore, any other man’s body after death is not simply the same but it is the same in some respect. It is identical with regard to matter but different with regard to form.

Consequently, we need to maintain numerical identity of the body crucified to the cross and the body rested in tomb, as they both remained identical for the unity of hypostasis.

* * *

Thomas Aquinas shows that if we do not accept the rational soul as the first and the only substantial form of human being then we cannot directly ascribe the intellectual cognition to it. In other words, the intellect and its activity would

be something added but not constituting its nature. The relation of the intellect to body would be a relation of the mover toward the moved.

On the question of diversity of faculties of one simple form Thomas points

⁴⁸ See: *Quodlibet II*, q. 1 a. 1 ad 1.

⁴⁹ *Utrum corpus eius fuerit idem numero vivum et mortuum (STh III, q. 50 a. 5).*

out at two examples drawn from Aristotle. He compares species to numbers, properties and activities of lower forms to the example of including simpler forms in more complicated. He also observes that distinguishing particular faculties of human being has the intellectual character only, in a sense, that we cannot transfer this on differences included in a being itself.

The first matter is distinguished from the matter *communis* as that proper to human species. From the matter *communis* the *quantitate signata* matter, proper specifically to a specific being, is distinguished. The latter is related by Thomas to the issue of *commensuratio* of rational soul to a particular body and the problem of individualization. In body itself Thomas distinguishes the parts of species and of matter.

However, the question of *animatio* is for Thomas another plane to deal with many erroneous views regarding the issue of the unity of the substantial form. He rejects, among others, John Pecham's stance that the process of implementing rational soul is a process of attaching

successively both rational and sensitive souls (forms) to the vegetative soul. Each former soul would become a potentiality to the subsequent one. The famous Aristotle's claim that only the intellect is something arriving from "exterior" into embryo is by the Angelic Doctor understood as pointing out the fact, that it does not appear from the power of sole matter, that is semen.

On to the issue of identity of the alive and dead body of Christ Thomas does not draw from the conception of the *forma corporeitatis*, but regards this identity to the hypostatic union. On the question of the dead body of Christ we cannot say that during three days of death His body was entirely (*simpliciter*) identical with the alive one, as the substantial difference excludes such completeness. "Animative-ness" is just such a substantial difference. Death is annihilation, not a change (*alterari*) only. On the other hand – according to the author – we may speak of the body of Christ within the period of three days of death that it was numerically identical on the basis of hypostasis.

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Argumenty Tomasza z Akwinu w obronie jedności formy substancjalnej w człowieku

Słowa kluczowe: Tomasz z Akwinu, jedność formy substancjalnej, wielość form, ciało Chrystusa

W historii filozofii znany jest spór między Tomaszem z Akwinu i Janem Pechamem, zwany sporem o wielość form. Artykuł jest próbą analizy argumentów podawanych przez Akwinata na rzecz tezy o jedności formy substancjalnej w człowieku.

Problem jedności formy Tomasz z Akwinu łączy między innymi z zagadnieniem jedna (*unum*), czyli transcendentalnej własności bytu. Przyjmując wiele form – jak utrzymuje Akwinata – nie może być mowy o jedności bytu *simpli-citer*. Podobnie *esse*, które jest niejako wnoszone przez duszę rozumną do całości *compositum* musi być jedynym istnieniem bytu. Uznawanie wielu form w strukturze człowieka, gdzie każda z nich odpowiada za konstytuowanie odpowiedniego istnienia, spowodowałoby, że nie zachodziłoby prawdziwe powstanie i ginięcie bytów. Człowiek ulegałby zniszczeniu pod pewnym względem, a pozostawał nim pod innym. Element

intelektualny ginąłby, a pozostawałby na przykład cielesny. Całkowite zniszczenie człowieka miałoby miejsce wyłącznie przy rozpadzie ostatniej formy, ponieważ ona jako pierwsza musiałaby być uznana za formę substancjalną.

Prezentację poglądów i argumentacji Tomasza z Akwinu na rzecz tezy o jedności formy substancjalnej w człowieku podzielono na cztery części. Pierwsza obejmuje problematykę duszy rozumnej jako formy substancjalnej. W drugiej poruszone jest zagadnienie materii w kontekście sporu o jedność formy substancjalnej. Trzecia odnosi się do kwestii powstawania człowieka (*animatio*). Czwarta zaś przedstawia filozoficzne poglądy Tomasza z Akwinu dotyczące statusu bytowego (ontycznego) żywego i martwego ciała Chrystusa. Choć ta ostatnia część podejmuje kwestię teologiczną, ostatecznie i tak sprowadza się do filozoficznych odpowiedzi.