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Effective Models of Reintegration for De-occupied Territories

Skuteczne modele reintegracji terytoriów okupowanych

Abstract

The article aims to reveal the essence of the reintegration process of the occupied and de-occupied territories, determining the current state and characterizing the conflict in the East of Ukraine. Its components and implementation tools are analyzed, and foreign models of reintegration of the occupied and de-occupied territories are presented and evaluated; there is also determined the degree of their conformity for Ukraine. In this research, there was made an attempt to find the most effective model for the reintegration of Donbas, which would not only contribute to the demilitarization and restoration of state control in these territories, but also prevent the emergence of separatist movements, stimulate the process of returning, and integration of citizens to the social, cultural, economic and political life of their country of origin. It was stressed that the Ukrainian model for restoring the territorial integrity and reintegration of Donbas should be based on compromise and key issues that have a positive international grounding for which the government has a public support, combined with a strong national, international, and military one. There is a greater chance for working out a mutual standpoint of Ukraine and its international partners which would allow the conflict with Russia to be solved. It is noted that the problem remains since there is no consensus among citizens on the optimal way of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

That is why there is an urgent need to create a comprehensive strategy to restore the territorial integrity and reintegration of Donbas. It will have a necessary impact on all the parties of the conflict, and result in a publicly supported compromise. This can be achieved despite the current domestic and international peculiarities of the process; help can be expected from international experience in restoring peace as well as from the government's approach to the process of reintegration and shaping up a unified state.

Key words: *Donbas, East of Ukraine. reintegration, occupied territories, deoccupied territories, reintegration model.*

Abstrakt

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie istoty procesu reintegracji terytoriów okupowanych i wyjętych z okupacji/de-okupowanych, określenie stanu obecnego i charakterystyka konfliktu na wschodzie. Analizowane są jego komponenty i narzędzia realizacji, prezentowane i oceniane są zagraniczne modele reintegracji terytoriów okupowanych i wyjętych z okupacji, określany jest także stopień ich zgodności dla Ukrainy. Podjęto próbę znalezienia najskuteczniejszego modelu reintegracji Donbasu, który nie tylko przyczyniłby się do demilitaryzacji i przywrócenia kontroli państwowej na tych terytoriach, ale także zapobiegł powstawaniu ruchów separatystycznych, stymulował proces powrotu i integracji obywateli w życie społeczne, kulturalne, gospodarcze i polityczne kraju. Podkreśla się, że ukraiński model przywracania integralności terytorialnej i reintegracji Donbasu powinien opierać się na kluczowych stanowiskach i kompromisach, które mają pozytywne doświadczenia międzynarodowe i cieszą się poparciem publicznym, w połączeniu z silnym poparciem prawnym-militarnym o charakterze krajowym i międzynarodowym. W tym kontekście są większe szanse na wypracowanie wspólnego stanowiska Ukrainy i jej partnerów międzynarodowych z pozytywnym wynikiem dla uregulowania konfliktu z Rosją. Tu należy zaznaczyć, że problem pozostaje, ponieważ brakuje wspólnego stanowiska obywateli co do optymalnego sposobu przywrócenia integralności terytorialnej Ukrainy.

Dlatego istnieje pilna potrzeba stworzenia kompleksowej strategii przywrócenia integralności terytorialnej i reintegracji Donbasu. Wpłyń to bowiem na wszystkie strony konfliktu, zawarcie kompromisów, które mogą mieć poparcie społeczne, z uwzględnieniem aktualnej krajowej i międzynarodowej specyfiki procesu, międzynarodowego doświadczenia w przywracaniu pokoju, a także przyczyni się do reintegracji i kształtowania spójnego podejścia państwa do problemu.

Słowa kluczowe: *Donbas, Wschód Ukrainy, reintegracja, terytoria okupowane, terytoria de-okupowane, model reintegracji.*

Introduction

Considering the prospect of settlement and overcoming its consequences, the Military conflict in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions is seen to be durable and protracted. The factors, hampering the establishment of an optimal model of the reintegration of the Donbass region are the following: hybridity of the external influence, cyber aggression, international agreement sanctioning the situation in these territories, separatism, foreign policy commitments of Ukraine, heterogeneous public opinion on Donbas problems, and lack of the unified political position on this issue.

Besides, it is time for elaboration of the comprehensive strategy of the State that is crucial not only for the nongovernment controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, but also for the de-occupied parts of the region. Not only should the Ukrainian model of Donbas reintegration facilitate the demilitarization and restoration of state control in these territories, but also prevent the emergence of separatist movements, stimulate the repatriation and integration of citizens within the informational, cultural, economic and political space of Ukraine.

The problem of reintegration of Donbas remains open to public and political discussions, and the process of forming and implementing the optimal model of reintegration, which would take into account the international experience and specifics of military conflict in the East of Ukraine, requires careful research and expert support.

That is why in this research, we aim to analyze the international experience of reintegration of the occupied and de-occupied territories, set the parameters of the most effective model for reintegration of Donbass.

Methods and materials

Using the structural-functional approach, we formulate the concept of “reintegration”, define its components and instruments of implementation, present and assess foreign models of reintegration of occupied and de-occupied territories and identify their correlation to the situation in Ukraine.

In order to achieve the abovementioned goals, the author shall assess the effectiveness of Ukrainian legislation in the field of public policy in the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. One of the effective methods that can be used to analyze an effective model for reintegration is the Pareto principle. The Pareto principle, or the 80/20 rule, states that for many phenomena, 80% of the result is 20% of the effort. (Koch, 1999)

The use of the criteria of Pareto optimality enables us to come up with an optimal model for overcoming the military conflict in the East of Ukraine.

As defined by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), reintegration is the re-engagement of a person into a social group or process (a kind of re-socialization, N. R.), for example, the inclusion of a migrant in the society of his or her country of origin or place of residence. So, reintegration is a process of re-engagement of citizens to the social, cultural, economic and political life of their countries of origin. (*Return Migration and Development Platform*, 2011)

Accordingly, reintegration means the opportunity to become self-sufficient, to have access to social networks and contacts, and to psychosocial health. (*Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace*, 1997) For some individuals, the reintegration process is complicated by the lack of access to the revenue-generating resources. The state should take into account the cases where the most vulnerable migrants, due to the health problems, are unable to ensure their material need, and offer alternatives to meet the basic needs of returnees.

The profound interpretation of the concept “reintegration” is contained in a document developed by the Center for Documentation and Research of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – “Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace”. (*Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace*, 1997) This document is aimed at providing a political basis for the resolving of the reintegration dilemmas, and thus, it proposes to develop joint strategic programs for multilateral actions to promote sustainable repatriation.

The development of the strategy involves three main steps: a study of the political context, development of the conditions for reconstruction and reconciliation, and evaluation of the common guidelines for multilateral activities. In order to eliminate the flaws and gaps in understanding the essence of reintegration, the UNHCR proposes to analyze the causes of threats to national security, the nature of conflicts, and to study regulatory mechanisms as well as to consider the ability of the state to national protection and to examine the potential impact of repatriation on the process of reconstruction and reconciliation. (*Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace*, 1997) The results of the analysis will allow to identify the key components of reintegration.

The document also presents two groups of building blocks and thus – components of reintegration: “reconstruction” and “reconciliation”. Reconstruction means the necessity to meet the immediate material needs of the war-affected populations and those who returned after the conflict had been resolved: clearance and disarmament, the repair of damaged infrastruc-

ture, commitment to the expansion of production and trade, employment, education and social service, the strengthening of reforms of political institutions and administrative structures.

And reconciliation provides a monitor of the human rights situation, promotion of justice in the field of political, social and economic rights, introduction of legal mechanisms for punishment for crimes related to conflict, demilitarization of society and reintegration of the militaries, strengthening/reforming of the civilian police and judicial systems, strengthening of civil society structures and promotion of reconciliation. The consensus in the guideline principles of such activities is crucial in implementation of this kind of approach.

In 2014, the UN developed an “Operational guide to the integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards, (DDR)”, which sets out the principles and standards of the DDR system. According to its content, the social and economic process is seen as the basis of reintegration, but this does not exclude the fact that reconstruction is essential in establishing relations of trust among citizens, strengthening communities and promoting reconciliation and strengthening democracy. (*Operational guide to the integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards, 2014*)

Reintegration must be accompanied by important policy measures that will promote peace and achieve the goals of the DDR. These measures include: establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, implementation of the reconciliation policy and effective human rights strategy, setting up of new political parties, constitutional changes, elections, the formation of new judiciary system, promotion of good governance, the security system reforms, insurance of access to land and credit, and more. That is why, the strategy should be comprehensive and aim at restoring peace and human development. (*Briefing note for senior managers...*, 2005)

The effectiveness of reintegration can only be achieved through development of local communities and balance between state aid and independent civil initiatives. Apart from the measures focused on the re-building or developing of economic and material resources, social service and infrastructure, which have been damaged or destroyed during the conflict, due attention should be paid to the segments of the problem that caused the conflict. Reintegration should strengthen capacity of the state and civil society in the conflict zone. In order to formulate an effective reintegration strategy, it is necessary to analyze and consider causes of national security threats, the nature of conflict and its settlement, capacity of the state for national protection, and a possible impact of repatriation on the process of reconstruction and reconciliation.

The necessity to analyze the nature of military confrontation, the causes of threats to national security, and ability of the state to extend national protection, is an important stage in the development of the comprehensive strategy for the reintegration of the territory. (РЖЕВСЬКА, 2020)

The military conflict in Donbass has several unique features that should be taken into account when assessing the foreign reintegration models and developing the national strategy for the reintegration of the occupied and de-occupied territories. In particular, the civilizational and economic, but not ethnic factors, are among the causes of the military confrontation in the East of Ukraine. The unsatisfactory socio-economic status of the region, the low level of political education and culture of local residents, the passivity of civil society, the rigid hierarchical organization of local authorities and Russian informational influence were among the triggers of the separatists' movement. (Філіпчук, Окисюк, Поворозник, Ярошенко, 2016)

It should be mentioned that the demarcation line in Donbass is the result of military actions, but not of political nor ethnic division. The military conflict in eastern Ukraine is characterized by a high level of external intervention. The viability of the so-called DPR/LPR is ensured by the financial, military and political support from Russia, which supplies troops and arms across an uncontrolled border area. Russia, denying its influence, continues the intervention and other actions to destabilize Ukraine, which makes it impossible for the latter to resolve the conflict on its own terms, as the ORDLO remains under the actual political and military control of Russia.

The Bosnian federalization model is an example of a compromise for preservation of the territorial integrity of the state. The Minsk process, which offers to settle the conflict in Donbas by creating a "special order of local self-government in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions", is often compared to the Dayton Agreement, which contributed to the end of the three-year war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian model of settlement is focused on the internalization of conflict rather than on the elimination of its potential. (Філіпчук, Окисюк, Поворозник, Ярошенко, 2016)

However, the Minsk Agreement, unlike the Dayton Agreement, does not contain two important elements, which weaken the capabilities of Ukraine. The Dayton Agreement, unlike the Minsk Agreement, did not provide amnesty for the members of the armed forces involved in war crimes against humanity, although a NATO peacekeeping contingent was present in БаН (later replaced by EUFOR). However, without regaining Ukrainian control of the state border and the introduction of an international peacekeeping contingent in Donbass, there is no chance for stability. The situation in Ukraine is now much

worse than that in BaH functioning in the past under the Dayton Agreement. (Філіпчук, Ок蒂斯юк, Поворозник, Ярошенко, 2016)

In general, the preservation of territorial integrity in pre-war border networks and restraining hostilities create opportunities for dialogue and reconciliation within the State. Moreover, the access to international credits is necessary to rebuild the affected areas, as credits were among component parts of the Bosnian model. On the other hand, the lack of consensus on important state decisions, including foreign policy, the high level of intervention of foreign players in the internal processes, the threat of new separatist movements and the preservation of the conflict, are significant obstacles to national security and effective functioning of the State.

Another model that is often used by Ukrainian experts is the Croatian one. If the Bosnian model appeals for peace negotiations and compromise, the Croatian model is based on unilateral action and the use of force.

The current situation in Ukraine and the crisis in Croatia in the 1990s have several similarities. First, both countries confronted self-proclaimed entities, where local identity was not closely related to the ideas of Croatian and Ukrainian statehood, formed in accordance with the European civilization vector. The majority of the population of the Serbian Krajina sought to join the Greater Serbia, and the ORDLO also seeks to become part of the "Russkiy mir". Second, the governments of Croatia and Ukraine have been offered peace settlement plans developed by foreign players and aimed at preventing the hot phase of the conflict rather than settling it. At the same time, it was required from Croatia to grant a broad autonomy to the Serbian Krajina. Now, a similar requirement is addressed to Ukraine but it must be remembered that such concessions were not accepted by the absolute majority of the citizens of Croatia in the past, and the majority of the Ukrainian people at present.

At the same time, there is a significant difference between these conflicts, complicating the implementation of the Croatian model in Ukraine; the military-political potential of Serbia in the 1990s, which supported the Serbian Krajina, could not be compared to the military force of Russia, which provides direct and indirect military assistance to the so-called DPR/LNR; Serbia, at that time, was intensively involved in the war in neighboring BaH, which distracted a large part of its resources. Russia is simultaneously involved in the conflict in Donbass and Syria, but its presence in the zones of conflict is ensured by only a small military contingent. The Serbian Krajina bordered with BaH, not Serbia, which triggered the conflict, whereas the so-called DPR/LNR control more than 400 km of

the Ukrainian-Russian border through which arms and other resources are supplied. (Буняк, 2016)

This is the reason why it is difficult to adapt the Croatian model to Ukrainian realities. Significant military casualties, civilian casualties, large-scale destruction, high possibility of external intervention and defeat or political and economic destabilization, and also the threat of international isolation are risks for the implementation of the Croatian model.

Another model of conflict resolvableness is the Pakistani model. Orientation to such a model is conditioned by a weak prospect of returning the ORDLO territories by force and by public reluctance to reintegrate them under the conditions imposed by the Russian Federation. The Pakistani model emerged as a result of durable and bloody conflicts when the State realized its inability to defeat separatist forces by military methods, and concluded that resources spent on the maintaining of the disloyal territory far outweighed the potential benefits from its possession. History shows that states resorted to the Pakistani model, mainly as the result of continuous civil wars.

The Pakistani model eliminates the territorial enclave with mostly disloyal population to the central authorities, deprives the disloyal territory of its ability to influence the internal and foreign policy of the state and saves military and financial resources. At the same time, it brings about the loss of direct access to natural resources, industrial sites and infrastructure in these territories, negative attitudes from both the public and the international community. In addition, such action can trigger separatism in other regions and cause internal destabilization.

The German model remains the most appropriate one, albeit the most difficult, being an option for a long-term settlement of the territorial problem. It envisages the return of the demarcated territories on pre-war terms, through peaceful negotiations with the involvement of external players. The positive aspects of this model mean that the return of lost territories occurs by using the soft power, not by military force, which means that the benefits of the political and economic system of the initiator of the unification are recognized by the other party.

The chances for such scenario will increase significantly if Ukraine builds an effective political, economic and legal model of the country in the coming years. The achievements in these spheres will inevitably increase political and economic contrast in controlled and uncontrolled territories. Considering the optional identity of the majority of ORDLO residents, the process of reforming and modernizing Ukraine might significantly weaken pro-Russian views and strengthen pro-Ukrainian sentiment among the population of

the non-controlled territories, thereby creating a demand for reintegration of the territories across the demarcation line.

However, even having established the effective state, there remains a need to change the position of the Russian Federation, which effectively controls the militants and manages hostilities. It will take much effort and time until Russia, under the pressure of international sanctions, economic imbalances, social protests and tensions, faces necessity to cut its military budget, that might lead to military and political vacuum in the territory controlled by pro-Russian militants in Donbas.

Strong aspects of the German model are the reliance on the “soft power” instead of military forces, consensus, concerning unification, and its orientation on the population with the variable identity. Such a model enables the settlement of this territorial problem on the terms of the winner, increasing the legitimacy of the political elite and state institutions, creating favorable conditions for reconciliation, peacekeeping and increasing the influence of the state in the international arena. However, this model is significantly dependent on the position of external players and the threat of disloyal socio-political groups after unification.

The armed conflict in Donbass has several unique features that do not allow to fully adopt any of these foreign reintegration models. The existing factor of separatism in Ukraine, unlike other states, is political in nature, inspired and supported by the other state – the Russian Federation. The demarcation line appeared as the result of military actions rather than existence of ethnic, religious or ideological factors. The self-proclaimed republics in the territory of Ukraine operate at the expense of financial, military and political support of the Russian Federation, which, in turn, denies its intervention in the conflict.

So, having analyzed the capabilities of the models, we have to consider the following:

- the Bosnian model, although it can preserve territorial integrity within the pre-war borders and save resources, does not solve the problem of separatism, so it increases the risk of internal destabilization and restricts important state decisions by integrating disloyal groups in the Ukrainian political space;
- the Croatian model can lead to significant military casualties, political and economic destabilization and international isolation;
- the Pakistani model, that is based on the abandonment of the territories, is unacceptable because of the risks to the national security and economy, the spread of separatism in other regions, and negative public perception.

- and, finally, the German model, although has many advantages, requires much time, efforts (in our case – enormous) for the effective development of the State, unified political strategy and changes in the policy of the aggressor state.

That is why Ukraine needs its own model that should consider national peculiarities.

Results

In order to resolve the conflict situation in the East of Ukraine, we offer solutions that were optimal (as a result of the evaluation according to the Pareto optimality principle) for all participants of the studied conflict.

Participants of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine:

1. S1 – Ukraine
2. S2 – the Russian Federation
3. S3 – the European Union
4. S4 – the Self-proclaimed Republics, the so-called LPR and the DPR

Possible participants' strategies:

- X11 – General mobilization and start of active fighting for the return of territory;
- X12 – Introduction of the UN International Peacekeeping Mission and implementation of the security arrangements of the Minsk Agreement;
- X13 – Granting special status to Donbass, amnesty of fighters and holding elections in Donbass;
- X14 – Freezing of the conflict;
- X21 – Direct military invasion of Ukraine;
- X22 – Implementation of the Minsk Agreement;
- X23 – Legitimization of terrorists through the electoral process in order to destabilize and federalize Ukraine;
- X31 – Strengthening of sanctions against the Russian Federation;
- X32 – Removal of sanctions from the Russian Federation;
- X33 – Provision of military assistance to Ukraine;
- X41 – Participation and election support in these territories;
- X42 – Escalation of the conflict for independence.

According to the data on participants and their strategies, Table 1 is constructed, taking into account the evaluation of the weight of each strategy on a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 is the minimum gain and 5 is the maximum gain) and the weight of each participant (scale is 0 to 1). 1 is a weighting

factor that describes the influence of a particular participant on the development of the investigated conflict situation.

Table 1: Expert assessment of conflict participants' strategies

	S1 – Ukraine	S2 – RF	S3 – EU	S4 – LPR and DPR
X_{11}	3	3	1	4
X_{12}	5	3	5	1
X_{13}	1	4	5	5
X_{14}	2	3	4	4
X_{21}	1	3	1	4
X_{22}	5	3	5	2
X_{23}	2	5	3	5
X_{31}	5	1	3	2
X_{32}	1	5	3	5
X_{33}	5	1	3	1
X_{41}	3	4	3	4
X_{42}	1	3	1	4
β_i	0,30	0,30	0,20	0,20

Now we construct Table 2 of implementation of each participant's possible strategies, taking into account the weight of each

Table 2: Implementation of each participant's strategies

№		S1 – Ukraine	S2 – RF	S3 – EU	S4 – LPR i DPR
1.	$X_{11}X_{21}X_{31}X_{41}$	2,8	2,8	1,8	3,6
2.	$X_{11}X_{21}X_{31}X_{42}$	2,4	2,6	1,4	3,6
3.	$X_{11}X_{21}X_{32}X_{41}$	3	3,6	1,8	4,2
4.	$X_{11}X_{21}X_{32}X_{42}$	1,6	3,4	1,4	4,2
5.	$X_{11}X_{21}X_{33}X_{41}$	2,8	2,8	1,8	3,4
6.	$X_{11}X_{21}X_{33}X_{42}$	2,4	3,2	1,4	3,4
7.	$X_{11}X_{22}X_{31}X_{41}$	4	2,8	3	3
8.	$X_{11}X_{22}X_{31}X_{42}$	3,6	3,47	2,6	3
9.	$X_{11}X_{22}X_{32}X_{41}$	3,2	3,6	3	3,6
10.	$X_{11}X_{22}X_{32}X_{42}$	3,6	2,6	2,6	3,6
11.	$X_{11}X_{22}X_{33}X_{41}$	4	3,6	3	2,8
12.	$X_{11}X_{22}X_{33}X_{42}$	3,6	3,4	2,6	2,8
13.	$X_{11}X_{23}X_{31}X_{41}$	3,1	3,4	2,4	3,9
14.	$X_{11}X_{23}X_{31}X_{42}$	2,7	4	2	3,9

№		S1 – Ukraine	S2 – RF	S3 – EU	S4 – LPR i DPR
15.	$X_{11}X_{23}X_{32}X_{41}$	2,3	4,2	2,4	4,5
16.	$X_{11}X_{23}X_{32}X_{42}$	2,1	4	2	4,5
17.	$X_{11}X_{23}X_{33}X_{41}$	3,1	3,4	2,4	3,7
18.	$X_{11}X_{23}X_{33}X_{42}$	2,7	3,2	2	3,7
19.	$X_{12}X_{21}X_{31}X_{41}$	3,4	2,8	3	2,7
20.	$X_{12}X_{21}X_{31}X_{42}$	3	2,6	2,6	2,7
21.	$X_{12}X_{21}X_{32}X_{41}$	2,6	3,6	2,4	3,3
22.	$X_{12}X_{21}X_{32}X_{42}$	3	3,4	2,6	3,3
23.	$X_{12}X_{21}X_{33}X_{41}$	3,4	2,8	3	2,5
24.	$X_{12}X_{21}X_{33}X_{42}$	3	2,6	2,6	2,5
25.	$X_{12}X_{22}X_{31}X_{41}$	4,6	2,8	4,2	2,1
26.	$X_{12}X_{22}X_{31}X_{42}$	4,2	2,6	3,8	2,1
27.	$X_{12}X_{22}X_{32}X_{41}$	3,8	3,6	4,2	2,7
28.	$X_{12}X_{22}X_{32}X_{42}$	3,4	3,4	3,8	2,7
29.	$X_{12}X_{22}X_{33}X_{41}$	4,6	2,8	4,2	1,9
30.	$X_{12}X_{22}X_{33}X_{42}$	4,2	2,6	3,8	1,9
31.	$X_{12}X_{23}X_{31}X_{41}$	3,7	3,4	3,6	3
32.	$X_{12}X_{23}X_{31}X_{42}$	3,3	3,2	3,2	3
33.	$X_{12}X_{23}X_{32}X_{41}$	2,9	4,2	3,6	3,6
34.	$X_{12}X_{23}X_{32}X_{42}$	3,3	4	3,2	3,6
35.	$X_{12}X_{23}X_{33}X_{41}$	3,7	3,4	3,6	2,8
36.	$X_{12}X_{23}X_{33}X_{42}$	3,3	3,8	2,6	2,8
37.	$X_{13}X_{21}X_{31}X_{41}$	2,2	3,1	1,8	3,9
38.	$X_{13}X_{21}X_{31}X_{42}$	1,8	2,9	2,6	3,9
39.	$X_{13}X_{21}X_{32}X_{41}$	1,4	3,9	3	4,5
40.	$X_{13}X_{21}X_{32}X_{42}$	1	3,7	2,6	4,5
41.	$X_{13}X_{21}X_{33}X_{41}$	2,2	3,1	3	3,7
42.	$X_{13}X_{21}X_{33}X_{42}$	1,8	2,9	2,6	3,7
43.	$X_{13}X_{22}X_{31}X_{41}$	3,4	3,1	4,2	3,3
44.	$X_{13}X_{22}X_{31}X_{42}$	3	2,9	3,8	3,3
45.	$X_{13}X_{22}X_{32}X_{41}$	6,9	3,9	4,2	3,9
46.	$X_{13}X_{22}X_{32}X_{42}$	2,2	3,7	3,8	3,9
47.	$X_{13}X_{22}X_{33}X_{41}$	2,4	3,1	4,2	3,1
48.	$X_{13}X_{22}X_{33}X_{42}$	3	2,9	3,8	3,1
49.	$X_{13}X_{23}X_{31}X_{41}$	2,5	3,7	3,6	4,2
50.	$X_{13}X_{23}X_{31}X_{42}$	2,1	4,3	3,2	4,2
51.	$X_{13}X_{23}X_{32}X_{41}$	1,7	4,5	3,6	4,8
52.	$X_{13}X_{23}X_{32}X_{42}$	2,1	4,3	3,2	4,8
53.	$X_{13}X_{23}X_{33}X_{41}$	1,7	3,7	3,6	4
54.	$X_{13}X_{23}X_{33}X_{42}$	2,1	3,5	3,2	4
55.	$X_{14}X_{21}X_{31}X_{41}$	2,5	2,8	2,7	3,6

№		S1 – Ukraine	S2 – RF	S3 – EU	S4 – LPR i DPR
56.	$X_{14}X_{21}X_{31}X_{42}$	2,1	2,6	2,3	3,6
57.	$X_{14}X_{21}X_{32}X_{41}$	1,7	3,6	2,7	4,2
58.	$X_{14}X_{21}X_{32}X_{42}$	1,3	3,4	2,3	4,2
59.	$X_{14}X_{21}X_{33}X_{41}$	2,5	2,8	2,7	3,4
60.	$X_{14}X_{21}X_{33}X_{42}$	2,1	3,2	2,3	3,4
61.	$X_{14}X_{22}X_{31}X_{41}$	3,7	2,8	3,9	3
62.	$X_{14}X_{22}X_{31}X_{42}$	1,8	3,4	3,5	3
63.	$X_{14}X_{22}X_{32}X_{41}$	1,4	3,6	3,9	3,6
64.	$X_{14}X_{22}X_{32}X_{42}$	1	2,6	3,5	3,6
65.	$X_{14}X_{22}X_{33}X_{41}$	2,2	2,8	3,9	2,8
66.	$X_{14}X_{22}X_{33}X_{42}$	1,4	2,6	3,5	2,8
67.	$X_{14}X_{23}X_{31}X_{41}$	2,2	3,4	3,3	3,9
68.	$X_{14}X_{23}X_{31}X_{42}$	2,4	3,2	2,9	3,9
69.	$X_{14}X_{23}X_{32}X_{41}$	2	4,2	3,3	4,5
70.	$X_{14}X_{23}X_{32}X_{42}$	1,6	4	2,9	4,5
71.	$X_{14}X_{23}X_{33}X_{41}$	2,8	3,4	3,3	3,7
72.	$X_{14}X_{23}X_{33}X_{42}$	2,4	3,2	2,9	3,7

Calculate the minimum guaranteed result for each participant:

- (S1) $\alpha_1 = 5 * 0, 30 + 1 * 0, 30 + 1 * 0, 20 + 1 * 0, 20 = 2, 2;$
(S2) $\alpha_2 = 5 * 0, 30 + 3 * 0, 30 + 1 * 0, 20 + 3 * 0, 20 = 3, 2;$
(S3) $\alpha_3 = 3 * 0, 20 + 1 * 0, 30 + 1 * 0, 30 + 1 * 0, 20 = 1, 4;$
(S4) $\alpha_4 = 4 * 0, 20 + 1 * 0, 30 + 2 * 0, 30 + 1 * 0, 20 = 1, 9.$

As conclusion, it can be stated, that among many rational solutions the optimal solution of the investigated conflict situation was not found. In order to settle the conflict, it is necessary to introduce mediators, additional strategies of participants or reevaluate the participants' strategies and strategies of the other side participants. (Rzhevskaya, 2019)

Therefore, in order to resolve the conflict in the East of Ukraine and overcome its consequences, the unified national strategy for resolving the conflict in the East of Ukraine is of crucial importance. This strategy may include the compromises agreed by Ukrainian citizens, key decisions regarding not only military but also political, economic and informational dimension of the conflict, international experience of reintegration of territories.

To solve this problem there is an urgent need to create a comprehensive strategy for the restoration of the territorial integrity and reintegration of Donbass, which will encompass the necessary actions for all dimensions of the conflict and a compromise based on public support. Moreover, to solve the problem, it is also necessary to take into consideration the current domestic and international peculiarities of the process, international experience

in peace restoration and reintegration, and form a unified state approach to this situation.

Conclusions

The military conflict in Donbass has several unique features that do not allow to fully adopt any of the foreign reintegration models. The existing factor of separatism in Ukraine, unlike in other states, is political in nature, inspired and supported by another state – the Russian Federation. The demarcation line appeared as the result of military actions rather than existence of ethnic, religious or ideological factors. Self-proclaimed republics in the territory of Ukraine, operate at the expense of financial, military and political support of the Russian Federation, which, in turn, denies its intervention in the conflict and destabilization of Ukraine.

The lack of a unified opinion among citizens on the optimal way of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine remains crucial, which, given the existence of such request among all Ukrainian citizens and the aforementioned common points of understanding, creates the most optimal conditions, considering the whole period of armed confrontation, for the establishment of comprehensive state policy on this issue, which should have information service and political support.

According to the Pareto optimality principle, none of the common strategies expressed by the parties to the conflict can lead to an optimal settlement of the conflict. The results of the study reaffirmed the need for the reassessment of temporally existing strategies, their more comprehensive elaboration and complementarily. The Ukrainian model for restoration of territorial integrity and reintegration of Donbass, based on key positions and the compromise based on positive international experience, combined with a strong national and international legal and military support, has a greater chance for establishing a unified position of Ukraine and its international partners, which altogether should result in the positive outcome of the conflict.

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