Original article

Challenges to the strategic art at the beginning of XXI century – the twelve fundamental problems that strategists cannot cope with

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ABSTRACT

The main aim of this research is to attract security and defense practitioners as well as theorists attention to the common as well as frequently spotted fundamental problems concerning developing and implementing strategies of using force to solve security matters in conflicts. The research identified that ineffective strategies are often hampered by the twelve fundamental errors that strategists cannot cope with. Belong to them: 1) inadequate level of knowledge among military and political leaders concerning the strategic art and strategy itself; 2) hardship in defining the end state of the operation as well as creating unachievable strategic goals; 3) formulating a strategy on flawed assumptions; 4) inability to find the balance among the key components of each strategy like: goals, ways and means; 5) difficulties in achieving a political and military dialogue; 6) overestimating the effectiveness and usefulness of "hard" power as well deprecating utility of non-military power; 7) underestimating the influence of social and cultural aspects on the desired end state of the operation; 8) developing strategy upon inadequate theoretical and practical models; 9) using the comprehensive approach of developing strategy in an uninspired and mechanical way to achieve a competitive advantage over opponent; 10) measuring the success of the operation through the prism of short-term and tactical effects instead of long-term and systemic one; 11) viewing an "exit strategy" as a predetermined date of withdrawal military forces from operation; 12) disregarding usage of the "just" strategies in accordance with international rules of law. Eliminating those errors form the contemporary practice will make all implemented strategies far for effective in its nature as well as significantly strengthen the probability of success in complex security situation where the force is intended to be applied.

KEYWORDS

strategy, strategic art; use of force, military power, conflicts, war

Introduction

In the recent history of conflicts, numerous attempts made by the nations or the international community to establish peace and stability around the globe occurred ineffectively. Even though the West was able to run successful military campaigns, winning the battles only partially contributed to the overall victory in the long run. In result, executed strategies had not been able frequently to manage the conflicts or imposed political will on the adversary. One of the reasons for such a situation is a visible plunge in strategic art. It turns out that in spite of the significant development of the theory and practice of that particular knowledge, implementing strategies are still vulnerable to recurring mistakes.

That situation inclines to put a question: what are the main reasons that chosen strategies are so ineffective in practice while dealing with a conflict or an adversary? What are the main reasons that achieved effects during implementing strategies are not fully contribute to the ultimate victory? And finally, where lays the frequent mistakes made by strategists and what has to be changed in the field of strategic art to make it more effective in practice? These problems directed that research to identified main current errors hampering the effectiveness of the contemporary strategies. As a hypothesis to be tested assumes that among the most common errors, there are visible twelve fundamental problems that strategists mostly cannot cope with. Belong to them:

1. Insufficient knowledge of the strategic art and misunderstanding the essence of strategy.
2. Hardship in defining victory – creating unrealistic visions and unachievable goals.
3. Building a strategy on incorrect assumptions.
4. Inability to balance the "strategic triad" – goals, ways and means.
5. Difficulties in establishing and maintaining a "strategic dialogue".
6. Overrating the usefulness of "hard" power.
7. Underestimating the socio-cultural aspects in strategy.
8. A formulating strategy based on inadequate approaches and models.
9. Using the comprehensive approach in an uninspired and mechanical way to create a competitive advantage.
10. Measuring victory through the prism of short-term and tactical effects.
11. Viewing an "exit strategy" as a predetermined date of withdrawal.
12. Retreating from the implementation of "just" strategies.

Their detailed description is made the main subject of this research.

1. Insufficient knowledge of the strategic art and misunderstanding the essence of strategy

A deficit of strategic knowledge is still visible at the highest level of political and military activity. It manifests itself in the form of a misunderstanding of the essence and

function of strategy, as well as the practical application of the principles of strategic art in achieving political goals, and in a broader sense – in achieving victory.

Quite often, practitioners come down the strategy to the physical breakdown of the opponent's armed forces and the seizure of its territory. As a result, the sense of modern strategy is often reduced to the annihilation or destruction of the opponent, not to break up his strategy and impose on him a different will as well as a vision of the new order.

Although the nature and essence of the strategy is derived from war and, consequently, from a physical, armed conflict in which antagonist parties consciously using organized armed violence as the principal means of their policy in order to achieve its victory, in the current strategic environments a victorious battle is not always a sufficient and necessary means to impose our vision and will on the enemy.

To win, today's strategic art must postulate deep penetration of the minds, hearts, and psyche of the conflict's participants. This is also the essence of the strategy, which must find a way to force the opponent, whether in the act of persuasion, the threat of using force, or the physical application of armed violence to accept a different will and vision of a new state of affairs. In this case, achieving victory requires reaching out to a wide spectrum of strength potential, extending from the soft force of persuasion, through the non-military force of coercion, ending with armed violence.

2. Hardship in defining victory
– creating unrealistic visions and unachievable goals

The unquestionable problem of contemporary strategies is the difficulty of creating the proper strategic vision of the end state of operation, tailored to the conditions, capabilities and power potential. The practical development of the victory definition was difficult for practitioners both in Iraq and in Afghanistan war. It has resulted in a setting up both unrealistic goals and often erroneous assumptions.

In Afghanistan, for example, the biggest mistake of the Western planners was formulating a strategy on the assumption that stabilizing the country would be easy, fast and mainly armed in its nature [1]. Rory Stewart stated that "policymakers grotesquely exaggerated the threat from Afghanistan. They convinced themselves that unless they created a stable, effective, pro-Western regime, Afghanistan would pose an overwhelming terrorist threat to the West, destroy the credibility of the United States and NATO, and undermine the stability of Pakistan" [1]. As a result, Stewart concluded, "the West was trying to do something it couldn't do, and it was trying to do something it didn't need to do. Its basic assumptions were wrong. Afghanistan did not pose an existential threat to international security; the problem was not that it was a 'failed state'. The truth is that the West always lacked the knowledge, power, or legitimacy to fundamentally transform Afghanistan. But policymakers were too afraid, too hypnotized by fashionable theories, too isolated from Afghan reality, and too laden with guilt to notice that the more ambitious Afghanistan mission was impossible and unnecessary" [1].

Similar problems occurred in the case of the campaign in Iraq in 2003. The vision of the peace of the country, with Saddam Hussein removed from power, was missing the whole range of objectives necessary to stabilize Iraq, administer it and rebuild it.

In both cases, the political goals were articulated unclearly, labile and too general. As a result, it was difficult to process them and operationalize them into indirect targets. In addition, aims often not derived from a realistic assessment of the situation, caused a dissonance between excessive political aspirations and real needs and opportunities. Although in many cases it can be agreed that aims were intentionally correct, unfortunately in terms of culture they were also grossly disrespectful.

To cope with it, strategic art must strive to create and describe a strategic shift that policy aspires to achieve and strategy has to manage. What's more, strategic art has to be able to create the future fragment of reality that is intended to impose on the opponent will in a conflict situation, that is ambitious, politically and militarily agreed, and possible to achieve in a specific time frame. A comprehensive vision of victory should also describe in details a strategic change in the full spectrum of the conflict, in political and diplomatic, military, economic, socio-cultural, information, etc. domains.

3. Building a strategy on incorrect assumptions

The assumptions play a critical role in the processes of strategy formulation and execution. In essence, they determine the effectiveness of the entire strategy, and therefore the full spectrum of organized action, at all its levels extending from strategic, throughout operational, to tactical.

Currently implemented strategies are often based on wrong assumptions. "They will greet us as liberators" – it was one of the keys, though the undoubtedly erroneous assumption that was adopted during the planning and then executing of the American strategy in Iraq (2003). The UK government, as stated in Sir John Chilcot's report [2], could not have imagined other than just the "best scenario for developing the situation" after the invasion in Iraq. What's more, quite naively, UK assumed that a UN-authorized operation under US leadership would operate in a "relatively mild security environment" [3]. Meanwhile, the war in Iraq has been going on for nearly two decades.

Until 2014, so until the Russian Federation's aggression on Ukraine, among politicians and western strategists, there was a relatively constant conviction that post-Cold War Europe "is on the irreversible path to becoming fully integrated and free" [4, p. 28] and the trend is not going to be threatened by no serious military danger. Unfortunately, this assumption was immediately overturned when the Ukrainian Crimea has been seized by Russia and the Kremlin government decided to "frozen" rebellion in eastern Ukraine, in Donbass.

Another example of the formulation the wrong strategic assumptions is the current operation against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Daesh). Brian Michael Jenkins, analyzing the current strategy of combating ISIL, underlines the existing gap between the objectives of the operation and the real situation prevailing at the theater in Syria and Iraq. He draws attention to the existence of "significant discrepancies between American national goals and a realistic assessment of the situation" [5],

underling that the main reason for such failure is the excessive aspirations of politicians that are not suited to the strategic context.

The above-mentioned examples illustrate the critical function of assumptions in the process of developing and implementing a strategy. They confirm the statement of Colin Gray, who claims that "wrong assumptions are the most lethal source of strategic error" [6, p. 14]. Therefore, in the process of formulating the strategy, a planistic imperative should be respected, that the political and military decision-makers have to formulate assumptions in a clear, logical and coherent way as well as rigorously subject them to testing.

4. Inability to balance the "strategic triad" – goals, ways and means

Another deficit of contemporary strategies is the disturbance of cohesion and balance in the so-called strategic triad. This is about the issue of proper balance – the three basic elements constituting the strategy - goals, ways, and means (resources) – in the context of specific circumstances and an opponent's approaches.

In this triad, the aims express what is to be achieved as a result of the taken action. The articulated goals answer the question – what to achieve? More specifically, they determine what, who, when to complete. They formulate the object of aspirations, i.e. the final result, giving it qualitative as well as quantitative features. They indicate the entity that the result is to achieve, and also specify the date or period of occurrence of the desired state. The choice of strategic goals is primarily policy domain activity.

Ways are differently strategic concepts (strategic options) that specify: what to do and how to do to achieve strategic goals. They are usually a dynamic combination of complex actions. They aggregate entities, conditions, goals, resources, risks and other elements of activities. They also define goals for the operational level.

The means indicate what specific resources are to be used in the strategic concept to achieve the defined goals. The means may be of a tangible or intangible nature. Usually, resources include:

      – creative potential – the human (intellect, courage, creativity, initiative, etc.),

      – natural – nature,

      – artificial – material, technical, energy, financial and information [See: 7, p. 35-8].

As Richard Betts pointed out "the strategy fails when the means chosen are insufficient to achieve the objectives", when "inappropriate means are chosen or when the targets are too ambitious or imprecise".

All these errors have been pointed out by RAND analysts in the report *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*, analyzing the long-term commitment of American forces in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan [8]. The results of the report indicate that in each case the incoherence of the strategy was caused due to setting up too ambitious goals, choosing not always effective and appropriate ways to achieve them, as well as the selecting inadequate means. In result, implemented strategies were not able to provide the conditions to achieve the planned goals in a final or permanent manner, and thus achieve the expected outcome and lead to the end of the conflict.

The simplicity and transparent structure of the strategy (aims, ways, and means) facilitates its development, implementation and increases the efficiency of operations. However, a strategy has to be properly balanced during implementation. It means that it is necessary to make some changes and modifications to the available resources, to the concepts of operation, and also to defined goals. This is the consequence of a dynamic environment in which strategy comes to act, as well as the occurrence of unpredictable and hostile action of the opponent.

5. Difficulties in establishing and maintaining a "strategic dialogue"

An important issue that impedes the effectiveness of any strategy is also the difficulty in maintaining appropriate civil-military relations at the highest level of decisions and implemented actions. Misinterpreted strategic dialogue or its absence allows a policy to dominate over strategy or to allow operational art lying lower in the hierarchy of the levels of war to overtake strategy's competencies.

A clear, as well as the disgraceful example of the political and military disruption in strategy implementation, was a dispute regarding the issue of strengthening military posture (Surge) in Iraq. The decision on the form of US involvement in the conflict was made after two years of ongoing discussions between politicians and military personnel. Importantly, this decision did not ultimately lead to the removal of a significant difference of views between these parties as well as did not agree on the general concept of the effort. As a result, the military staff still opted for a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach (COIN), while high-level White House officials opted for a narrow, anti-terrorist engagement, essentially directed against al-Qaeda. This situation not only hampered the planning process and the elaboration of the final strategy but above all strongly conditioned the effectiveness on the theater and hindered coalition ability to adapt to the constantly changing war conditions.

Another example of the collapse of the political and military "tandem" was the dismissal of General Stanley McChrystal, the commander in chief of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan (2010). Removing him from office as well as his closest collaborators due to undermining the authority of the US president, illustrates the problem of permanent frictions in the history of the civilian control over the army, but also shows the clear collapse of strategy that in its nature is a political-military tool critically conditioning the achievement of victory during the war campaign. At that time, the defeat of the strategic dialogue was veiled by the alleged frustration of the general caused mainly by the politicians' inability to understand war realities and formulating unrealistic political guidelines on which the operational concept had to be established [9, p. 210].

Therefore, maintaining civil-military dialogue is a critical factor in determining the success of the strategy. Strategic art to solve that problem should strive to mitigate discrepancies in the perception of strategic conditions, the assessment of threats, assumptions, and limitations how to the use of military force or the assessment of the risks and effects of operations. The preservation of proper political and military dialogue is the key to the success of the chosen and implemented strategy. It is also a way

to efficiently combine all elements of power and skillfully focus them on targets to achieve the synergistic results.

6. Overrating the usefulness of "hard" power

The consequence of misunderstanding the essence of the strategy is also an excessive concentration on the military factor and treating it as the decisive, kinetic center of policy. Meanwhile, the tendency of the declining effectiveness of the armed force as a successful means of policy in resolving the modern conflict is quite clear. The current wide spectrum of possible forms of war, with great certainty, allows us to conclude that the military factor over other non-military violence forms of policy will only prevail in the classic armed clashes.

The operational practice also shows that the abuse of hard power, especially in low-intensity conflicts, where the society is the center of gravity of the operation, often becomes counter-productive to the intended effects. For example, the night raids of NATO special forces in Afghanistan, aimed at intercepting key local insurgent's leaders, at first glance seemingly extremely effective at the tactical level, led to alienation of the society and local Afghan authorities, making its strategic outcomes ineffective and, importantly, inconsistent with the overall strategy of the ISAF mission.

Focusing on kinetic aspects makes the tactical and to some extent also operational level the center of gravity of the most conflicts. Consequently, this approach automatically denies each strategy of using the full arsenal of means, especially hampering the employment of the non-military power of coercion and the potential of soft power lying at the disposal of every policy. This prevents to combine the efforts and capabilities of civil-military potential in order to achieve a synergistic outcome. These limitations result in the generation of partial and short-term effects, which makes it impossible to achieve the planned end state of the operation.

Today's strategic art cannot, therefore, overemphasize the usefulness of the application of hard power. What's more, it must use the strengths of the soft power, as well as the non-military coercion forces to replace and/or support armed power, because it is able to generate strategic effects that may, to some extent, be an alternative to the application of conventional forms of armed violence.

7. Underestimating the socio-cultural aspects in the strategy

Another problem, often and clearly determining the processes of creating and implementing strategies, is an attitude acquired by planners that conflict can be fought and won thanks to the superiority of technology and military technique. Overrating the importance of the technological factor in the contemporary conflict, while depreciating or marginalizing socio-cultural, religious, ethnic and historical aspects, often leads to the failure of developed strategies.

Meanwhile, in intercultural conflicts that take place on the borderline of many different cultures, there is a justified strong need to have a high degree of cultural aware-

ness and responsibility. As noted by David Kilcullen, "planners, intelligence personnel, civilian-military operations teams, and those working with local security forces need higher levels of cultural understanding" [10, p. 223]. Particularly in counterinsurgency activities, knowledge of a language, beliefs, cultural norms, and local expectations becomes necessary to generate positive operational effects in a winning strategy.

In the new strategic conditions, knowledge and abilities from this area are necessary for each strategy to create the so-called cultural leverage. This influence, in conjunction with other created advantages, is necessary to maintain the freedom of action, to release the strategic effects and finally to achieve the victory.

8. A formulating strategy based on inadequate approaches and models

In strategic practice, quite often, approaches and planning models on which strategies are based do not completely correspond to contemporary strategic conditions, as well as they do not fully reach up to the achievements of management theory and practice. As a result, developed strategies cannot meet the challenges currently imposed on state entities by paramilitary structures using inter alia hybrid strategies and organized violence below the "threshold" of war.

Strategy creation is still deeply rooted in the "trap of continuity" in thinking, forecasting, planning, and management. The predominant model of the planning processes is based on the assumption that the future will basically reflect the past. As a result, the strategies of modern wars reflect the strategy paradigm of the past conflicts, so that they are not able to fully answer the problems posed by the present challenges, let alone the future.

Strategic analysis while creating a strategy, although it applies a wide range of useful and modern methods and techniques, too little effort puts on synthesis. Thus a comprehensive studies generally emphases an examination of individual parts of the problem (system) instead of viewing it as the whole. As a result, an analysis that explains the functioning of the opponent as a whole and its strategy are marginalized. The consequence of such approach is a development of own strategies that do not center on breaking the opponent's strategy, but at eliminating individual parts of its "system", including those that do not require destruction looking from the effectiveness point of view.

Quite often, the creation of strategies is based on the false thesis that the destruction of the center of gravity of the opponent provides a quick and favorable solution to the conflict. Meanwhile, the concept of the center of gravity is experiencing now a crisis of identity and usefulness. This category has not a common and agreed definition. What is more, the operational art has "appropriated" this planning concept almost exclusively for its own use related to the exercise of military power. Importantly, the strategic center of gravity of the modern operations lies often outside of the "battlefield", and as thus its undermining requires the use of combined power, and often the use of only non-military force of coercion, which in certain circumstances, due to the produced effects, exhibit greater effectiveness than armed force.

9. Using the comprehensive approach in an uninspired and mechanical way to create a competitive advantage

At present, in planning practice, we are dealing with the frequent glorification and overestimation of the comprehensive approach in strategy development. The point is that strategy formation is quite often reduced only to matching resources to objectives, making the strategic process a mechanical, uninspired and imitative. Quite often, crafting strategy and building a strategic advantage, regardless of the complexity and importance of the problem, takes place through the automatic adjustment of available resources: diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence or law enforcement (DIMEFIL) to the aims. As a result, each element of power becomes the line of operational effort. "Under this approach – as Jeffrey W. Meiser concludes – the strategist simply fills in each box or, better yet, creates a diagram showing each element of national power as a line of effort directed at an enemy center of gravity or critical vulnerability. This is the stuff of 'PowerPoint nirvana' but encourages strategists to avoid thinking creatively and precisely about resources and power" [12, p. 82]. Similarly speaks Jack D. Kem, who states that "using […] instruments for the logical lines of operation adopts a 'means' approach rather than a 'ways' approach" to accomplish objectives [12, p. 54]. Consequently, such an approach marginalizes the importance of the decisive idea on which a lever of competitive advantage should be created over the opponent.

What's more, this phenomenon is accompanied by a restriction of cooperation and stovepipes mechanism. This problem is highlighting by David Kilcullen, who claims that the lines of operational effort separated from each other create conditions for limiting mutual integration, cooperation, exchange of information, which hurts the effectiveness of operation and its outcome [10, p. 54].

10. Measuring victory through the prism of short-term and tactical effects

Each strategy in order to be effective must be evaluated. This is planning imperative that strategists have to follow due to the nature of the conflict and constant adaptation of the opponent to the changing conditions and imposed strategy on him.

Unfortunately, in strategic art, this process is not free of errors. There are many examples in military history, where the strategic goals were fairly loosely connected to the measures of effectiveness, as well as measuring the victory was conducted only through the prism of the present, short-term, tactical effects, not overall impact.

The exception of this practice was the planners approach used during the air campaign "Instant Thunder" as a part of the operation "Desert Storm" in Iraq (1991). In the course of it, military planners measured the results of the air campaign in the entire "system" of the enemy, and how the effects contribute to achieving the strategic goals of war and final victory. In this case, the strategic success was measured by adopting the following indicators: Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, the sovereignty of Kuwait was

restored, the free flow of oil from the Middle East was secured. The adopted indicators "monitored" the strategic effects and their impact on the entire "system" of the opponent. In this way, the strategic progress and probability of achieving the victory were assessed faster and in a holistic manner [13, p. 15-6].

In practice, there are frequent examples of leaving this rule and measuring success only through the lens of short-term, and therefore tactical outcomes. In response to that problem, the strategic art must strive to anchor measures of progress in the ultimate goals described by the political vision of victory. What's more, the measurement has to be made through the prism of not only effectiveness but also efficiency, durability, and ethics.

11. Viewing an "exit strategy" as a predetermined date of withdrawal

Currently, there is observed a narrow approach in a strategic art to the so-called "exit strategies". Frequently, their understanding boils down to the treatment as a specific date of troops withdrawal from the operation. What is more, the politically imposed schedule for completing mission often does not fully respect the strategic conditions on the theater of operations, as well as the military recommendations related to it.

In June 2011, President Obama announced the withdrawal of 10,000 American soldiers, and by the end of 2012, another 23 thousand from Afghanistan. He also announced that the process of transferring security responsibility to the Afghans from the coalition forces would be completed by 2014. The decision on the troops' withdrawal, Obama justified due to the significant progress that has been made in the battles with the Taliban and al-Qaeda [17]. However, the decision has not dispelled military skepticism. General David Petraeus, who was in charge of the ISAF's mission, assessed success in Afghanistan as "fragile and potentially impermanent gains" [17]. In Congress, Senator John McCain criticized the presidential decision suggesting that the president should listen to the commanders who allegedly advocated withdrawing forces on a smaller scale and in the longer horizon. Undoubtedly, Obama's decision was essentially determined by internal politics and the attitude of American society to war [17].

In this context, strategic art should strive to treat the "exit strategy" as an integral part of the overall plan of operation. Hence, it should be perceived, planned, implemented and evaluated as one of the operational lines in the overall strategy. What's more, properly carried out "exit" – requires first of all establishing clear, real and achievable goals in the whole spectrum of activities, at every stage of the operation. The "exit strategy" to become effective must also have clearly defined criteria and indicators of "exit" not only for the whole operation but for its phases. In unfavorable conditions, this approach would be able to mitigate the consequences of inevitable failure, and in the best scenario would assure a smooth withdrawal from the operation after achieving the strategic objective and establishing conditions for the new order and peace.

12. Retreating from the implementation of "just" strategies

A strategy, in order to be recognized as "just" and authorized to armed intervention, must comply with the principles of ethics and the norms of international law. Mean-

while, the war's experiences of the recent years show that the implemented strategies, including the Western one, do not pass the "test" of just war. It turns out that the use of armed force is not always the final means of policy, that it is not in each case based on a justified cause and that not every time violence is applied in the right intention and to the realization of a just peace. Besides, the implemented strategies are not always supported by legal authorization, as was the case during the war in Iraq in 2003, where the operation was not approved by the United Nations Security Council. The use of armed violence often also fails to meet the condition of proportionality in relation to the purpose and the expected effect. Such doubts appeared even after the NATO operation "Unified Protector" in Libya in 2011.

Often, the use of force does not follow the principle of distinguishing and therefore separating, troops from civilians and military targets from non-military one. The fulfillment of the ethical-moral-legal norms' catalog is fundamental and indispensable for achieving a "just" victory. Understanding the moral and legal dimension of strategy is fundamental to its efficiency and effectiveness. Hence, the strategic art – as Edward Luttwak points out – must always find a "consensus" between the rival aspects of ethics and law and the paradoxical logic of war situations [15]. Maintaining the ethical-moral paradigm the center of each strategy will be able to guarantee a "justified" success.

Conclusions

At the beginning of the 21st century, achieving victories in the contemporary as well as in the future conflicts requires from the leaders to le learn again what is the essence of the strategy and what are the key rules of the strategic art. Therefore, they must devote more attention to the issue of defining the victory, in particular, they have to start creating real visions and possible to achieve strategic goals. Their strategies must be based on credible, realistic, necessary and likely assumptions. Politicians, as well as military personnel, need to realize again how important is maintaining a coherent strategic dialogue, and how its failure is destructive to the pursued strategy. Perseveration these basic guidelines will allow them to maintain a "strategic triad" (goals, ways, means) in necessary balance. Strategists must also remember that the creation and implementation of the strategy are, first of all, an art activity. Therefore, its development by no means can be mechanical and imitative. Even creating a strategy based on the comprehensive approach, but in an uninspiring and mechanical way, not guarantees to create the necessary advantage over the opponent and break his will. This issue is of particular importance because in nowadays conditions, "hard" force alone, without "soft" power support, cannot solve the current security dilemmas. What's more, strategists must ensure proper and measuring success is only through the prism of overall, systemic effects. And finally, leaders and strategists must remember that only "just" strategies are winnable.

Conflict of interests

The author declared no conflict of interests.

Author contributions

The author contributed to the interpretation of results and writing of the paper. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethical statement

The research complies with all national and international ethical requirements.

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**Wyzwania dla sztuki strategicznej początku XXI wieku
– dwanaście podstawowych problemów,
z którymi stratedzy nie mogą sobie poradzić**

STRESZCZENIE	Głównym celem prezentowanych badań jest zwrócenie uwagi teoretykom i praktykom bezpieczeństwa oraz obronności na powszechnie i często dostrzegane fundamentalne problemy dotyczące opracowywania i wdrażania strategii użycia siły w rozwiązywaniu problemów bezpieczeństwa w sytuacjach konfliktowych. Badania wykazały, że nieskuteczne strategie są często wynikiem dwunastu podstawowych błędów, z którymi stratedzy nie mogą sobie poradzić. Należą do nich: 1) niewystarczający poziom wiedzy przywódców wojskowych i politycznych na temat sztuki strategicznej i samej strategii; 2) trudności w określeniu stanu końcowego operacji, a także wytyczanie nieosiągalnych celów strategicznych; 3) formułowanie strategii w oparciu o błędne założenia; 4) niemożność ustanowienia równowagi między kluczowymi elementami każdej strategii, takimi jak: cele, sposoby i środki; 5) trudności w nawiązaniu i utrzymaniu dialogu polityczno-wojskowego; 6) przecenianie skuteczności i użyteczności „twardej" siły, a także de-

precjonowanie użyteczność siły niemilitarnej; 7) niedocenianie wpływu aspektów społecznych i kulturowych na pożądany, końcowy stan operacji; 8) opracowywanie strategii na podstawie nieodpowiednich modeli teoretycznych i praktycznych; 9) stosowanie kompleksowego podejścia podczas opracowywania strategii osiągnięcia przewagi konkurencyjnej nad przeciwnikiem w mechaniczny i nietwórczy sposób; 10) mierzenie powodzenia w realizowanej operacji przez pryzmat efektów krótkoterminowych i taktycznych zamiast długoterminowych i systemowych; 11) postrzeganie „strategii wyjścia" jako z góry określonej daty wycofania sił zbrojnych z operacji; 12) lekceważenie stosowania „sprawiedliwych" strategii zgodnych z międzynarodowymi przepisami prawa.

Eliminowanie powyższych błędów z obecnej praktyki strategicznej czynić będzie wszystkie wdrażane strategie zdecydowanie bardziej skutecznymi w swej naturze, a także umożliwi zwiększenie prawdopodobieństwa odniesienia sukcesu w złożonej sytuacji bezpieczeństwa, w której zdecydowano się na użycie siły.