

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's View on Negation in the *Nañarthanirṇaya* of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*

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Abstract: Studies on negation in the school of Vyākaraṇa have focused on the early period of its development, especially on the interpretation of *prasajya* and *paryudāsa* types of negation provided by early commentators starting with Patañjali and elaborated on by Bhartṛhari. The post-Bhartṛhari period requires thorough research when it comes to the theory of meaning and cognition proposed by Indian grammarians. The present article analyses the interpretation of negation proposed by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* and shows it against the background of theory of negation that had been developing for centuries within the school of Vyākaraṇa.

Keywords: negation, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, *vaiyākaraṇa*, superimposition, *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, *paryudāsapratīṣedha*, *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*

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Introduction

The concept of negation has been investigated in the West and East alike since the dawn of linguistic and philosophical thought. Both traditions developed their own, sometimes incompatible, logical systems tackling the problem of negative propositions, negative facts, contradictions and contraries in a language. What makes the school of Vyākaraṇa in India unique in this context is its combination of a formal linguistic as well as philosophical approach to the subject. So far, it has been mostly this formal, more semantically oriented position proposed by Pāṇini (4th century BCE) and Patañjali's (2nd century BCE) that has been given more attention. Later grammatical tradition has not been sufficiently examined and a complete theory of negation developed by the school of grammarians remains a desideratum.¹ Analysis of grammatical and philosophical commentaries beginning with Patañjali shows a path of development in the understanding of negation, shifting the focus onto the semantic and pragmatic domains to justify the various forms we find in Sanskrit. This development seems to be quite uniform, stemming from Patañjali's concept of headedness (*prādhānya*) in compounds,² through Bhartṛhari's (5th century CE) metaphorical or secondary existence (*upacārasattā*), and finally, to the utilisation of the concept of superimposition (*āropa*) by post-Bhartṛhari commentators. Sanskrit grammatical literature of the late period drew heavily from discussions with other philosophical systems such as the school of Nyāya. It also developed concepts borrowed from other systems in an ingenious way, adapting them to their linguistic and epistemic constructs. One of those concepts, the concept of superimposition (*āropa*), can be found in the discussion on negation, which entered the school of grammarians at a relatively early stage but was employed to explain the cognitive processes behind the comprehension of negative expressions only at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries CE.³ The application of superimposition to the analysis of negation was further advanced by the grammarians of the 17th century. The present article presents the views of one of the most prominent representatives of the late period of development

¹ There have been some works on the subject of negation in the post-Bhartṛhari period, such as OGAWA 1984 (in Japanese) or, more recently, LOWE and BENSON 2023, both of which contain translations of original Sanskrit texts. TIMALSINA 2014 with his analysis of Bhartṛhari's position should also be mentioned.

² Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya* proposed the analysis of compounds based on their semantic headedness (*prādhānya*), which he discussed in a number of places (see e.g. VMBh_1 I.359.21–361.24, I.378.23–379.5). He distinguished between *pūrvapadārthaprādhānya*, *uttarapadārthaprādhānya* and *anyapadārthaprādhānya*, which corresponded to *avyayibhāva*, *tatpuruṣa* and *bahuvrīhi* types of compounds respectively. On the limitations of such a semantically oriented classification see also WUJASTYK 1982: 181.

³ I discuss the adoption of *āropa* for the interpretation of negation by Sanskrit grammarians in SULICH-COWLEY 2022 and in SULICH-COWLEY 2023.

of the school of grammarians (Vyākaraṇa) in India, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa (17th century CE), which he expressed in his treatise *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's background

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa was a linguist and philosopher composing circa 1650 in Varanasi in heavily intellectual circles (JOSHI 1990: 255). He is believed to have authored the works in the field of Nyāya as well as Vyākaraṇa. His versatile background in both grammatical and philosophical areas allowed him to discuss, and refute, the arguments of other schools such as Nyāya or Mīmāṃsā. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa was the son of Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa and the nephew of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, whose works he commented on. The *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* (VBhS), being in itself an abridged version of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, serves as a commentary to Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā* (VSK), also known as *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*, a set of only 75 verses on the philosophy of language (RATHORE 1998: 5–6). VSK, in turn, was intended as a summary of concepts presented by Bhaṭṭoji in his commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini – the *Śabdakaustubha*. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's VBhS is therefore an expansion and explanation of the ideas on negation contained in VSK; in this explanation he draws heavily from the earlier tradition – preceding Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita – and references both Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* (11th century CE), as well as Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*.

Issues raised

The present paper is based primarily on the text of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* as contained in the Ānandāśrama Saṃskṛta Granthāvali edition (VSK and VBhS) with occasional references to the editions of Penna and Dās. It contains a translation of the text with explanations extrapolated from Māṛulakara's commentary following the VBhS edition.

As mentioned above, the school of Vyākaraṇa operated in the framework of verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*), and an understanding of how this process occurred was the foundation of many of the proposed ideas, especially in the late period of the school's development. When it comes to negation, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa naturally operates on the well-known distinction between *prasajyapratīṣedha* (non-implicative, sentential negation) and *paryudāsapratīṣedha* (implicative, nominal negation),⁴ which he, however, neither defines nor even refers to explicitly. This division does not correspond precisely to sentential versus nominal negation as negative compounds (*nañsamāsa*) can sometimes exhibit both types depending on the adopted interpretation. As Cardona puts it, *nañ* in a compound “can be construed with the nominal following it in the compound,

⁴ See CARDONA 1967 and STAAL 1962 for more detailed description.

or it can be construed with a verb” (CARDONA 1967: 34). Later grammarians also explain negation in terms of *atyantābhāva* (complete absence) and *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence), this nuanced distinction also found in VBhS.⁵ As we will see below, the versatile character of *nañsamāsa*s and the lack of their semantic uniformity led the Vaiyākaraṇas to accept other meanings that the negative particle could express. This view, however, is challenged by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, who makes an attempt to account for all the cases of negation employing merely the notion of absence (*abhāva*). He thus, interestingly, questions the interpretation of superimposition (*āropa*) proposed by Kaiyaṭa (11th century CE). By not entirely rejecting the role it plays in the cognition of negative statements, he nonetheless modifies it to present a semantically simpler approach to negation. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in the VBhS primarily concentrates on an explanation of examples that pose morphological issues (*abrāhmaṇa*, *asarva*, *atvaṃ bhavaṣi*), and his aim is to find a solution that would be morphologically and semantically sound.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa also pays a lot of attention to the relation between negation and its substratum, which is generally described by Pāṇinīyas in terms of a qualifier and a qualificand (*viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva*). Despite various semantically and pragmatically feasible interpretations, grammarians usually accept that negation serves as a qualifier, especially in compound constructions, as such an interpretation allows for the simplest morphological explanation of different examples. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa does not seem to be attached to such a position, though.

Text and explanations

VSK 42.14–20 / VBhS 356.1–7

nañartham āha –

[The author] talks about the meaning of *nañ* –

VSK 39

nañsamāse cāparasya prādhānyāt sarvanāmatā |
āropitvatvaṃ nañdyotyam na hy aso 'py a(sarvo)'tisarvat ||

⁵ As will be seen in the glosses provided by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, the meaning of difference is also expressed with the help of the verb *bhid*, hence either *bheda* (“difference”) or *bhinna* (“different from”).

⁶ The last *pāda* of this *kārikā* differs in various editions. Mārulakara’s edition is identical to Āpte’s; Dās’s edition reads *na hy aso 'py atisarvat* (DĀS 1990: 146); and Penna’s *na hy aso 'py apy asarvat* (PENNA 2013: 484). Āpte’s, Mārulakara’s and Dās’s versions are acceptable as they juxtapose the forms *asaḥ* and/or *asarva* with *atisarva* to show the difference in the pronoun classification between them. Penna’s reading is not supported by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa’s explanation.

And in a negative compound the [technical] term *sarvanāman* [applies] because the other [member] is predominant. What has been superimposed is to be indicated by *nañ* because it is not so that *atad* [and] *asarva* are like *atisarva*.

VBhS: *nañsamāse 'parasyottarapadārthasya prādhānyāt sarvanāmatā sidhyaṭīti śeṣaḥ | ata evāropitatvam eva nañdyotyam ity abhyupeyam iti śeṣaḥ | ayaṃ bhāvaḥ – asarva ityādāv āropitaḥ sarva ity arthāt sarvaśabdasya prādhānyābādhāt sarvanāmatā sidhyati | anyathāṭisarva ity atreva sā na syāt |*

Because the other, that is the latter, member of a compound is predominant in a negative compound, the state of being a *sarvanāman* is achieved – this is how [the sentence] should be completed. From this follows that only that which was superimposed is to be indicated by *nañ*, this should be agreed upon – this is how [the sentence] should be completed. So, this is the meaning – in the case of *asarva* etc., [the meaning] *sarva* is superimposed on [another] meaning and the state of being a *sarvanāman* is achieved, because there is no obstruction of the predominance of the word *sarva*. Otherwise, this (i.e. the designation of a pronoun) would not happen as in the case of *atisarva*.

Explanation

The first of two *kārikās* discussing negation refers to the issue of headedness (*prādhānya*) in a compound raised already by Patañjali, which Kaiyaṭa explains through the notion of superimposition (*āropa*).⁸ The question of semantic predominance in a compound is important because faulty attribution can result in mistaken designations and, consequently, incorrectly declined words. The examples cited are *asarva* (“incomplete”) and *atisarva* (“superior to all”), both containing the element *sarva*, classified as a pronoun (*sarvanāman*) by A 1.1.27⁹; yet despite their superficial similarity, they behave differently morphologically. This difference in form is attributed to the predominant element in each compound, which in the case of *asarva* should be the latter, thus giving rise to a *tatpuruṣa* compound in accordance with Pāṇini's rule A 2.2.6¹⁰. Consequently, the compound *asarva* will be treated as a pronoun as well, which will enable the forms such as *asarve* or *asarvasmai* in its declension. This is not the case

⁷ Dās proposed the reading *ityarthe* (Dās 1990: 146), which seems more logical.

⁸ See VMBh_2 II: 670, 672, 674.

⁹ A 1.1.27 *sarvādīni sarvanāmāni* | (“[The technical term] *sarvanāman* denotes the class of [nominal bases] beginning with *sarva* (‘all’).”) All the translation of Pāṇini's rules is based on Katre unless stated otherwise.

¹⁰ A 2.2.6 *nañ* | (“[The indeclinable] *nañ* [combines with a *pada* conveying the same meaning as the formally corresponding wordgroup and being called *tatpuruṣa*].”) ”

with *atisarva*, where the predominance is granted to the initial member of a compound (*pūrvapada*), thus making *sarva* a subordinate element (*upasarjana*¹¹) and resulting in a different declension type.

VSK 42.20–23 / VBhS 357.1–359.1

VBhS: *ghaṭo nāstītyādāv abhāvaviṣayakabodhe tasya viśeṣyatāyā eva darśanāt | asmadrītyā ca sa ārtho bodho mānasah | tathā cāsarvasmā ityādy asiddhiprasaṅga iti | atra cāropitatvam āropaviṣayatvam, āropamātram artho viṣayatvam tu saṃsarga iti niṣkarṣah | dyotyatvoktir nipātānām dyotakatvam abhipretya ||*

Because in cases such as *ghaṭo nāsti* (“There is no pot”) etc., when there is comprehension that it is an object of negation, it (i.e. negation) is only seen as being the qualificand. In our view, this comprehension of the meaning is mentally produced. Accordingly, there is the possibility that examples such as *asarvasmai* etc. are wrong. In this respect then, what is meant by the state of being superimposed is the object of superimposition; the meaning is just superimposition and the state of being the object is the relation – this is the main point. What is intended by the statement *dyotyatva* (the state of being indicated) is that particles are indicative.

Explanation

In this passage Kaunḍabhaṭṭa discusses the option where negation is a qualificand characterised by the object of negation. What that means is that the analysis of an uncompounded particle in a sentence should be understood thus:

(1) *ghaṭo nāsti* = *ghaṭābhāva* 'stitvāśrayah / *ghaṭakarṭṛkasattābhāvaḥ*

Absence of a pot that has a substratum in [its] (the pot's) existence. /
Absence of existence whose (i.e. existence) agent is a pot.

The meaning of *nañ* would then be *abhāva*, and the sentence would be completed by adding a verbal root with the ending. Treating negation as *viśeṣya* rather than *viśeṣaṇa* would allow for agreement between the action (*kriyā*), the verb, and the agent whose existence is being denied. Simultaneously, however, a problem arises with compounded forms, such as the aforementioned *asarva* or *aghaṭa*.

¹¹ The term *upasarjana*, meaning a subordinate element, can be used with reference to semantic subordination (see also fn. 2 regarding Patañjali's classification of compounds) as well as in its technical meaning defined by Pāṇini in A 1.2.43 *prathamānirdiṣṭam samāsa upasarjanam* | (“[The technical term] *upasarjana* denotes an element prescribed in the nominative in [a rule referring to] a compound”) and A 2.2.30 *upasarjanam pūrvam* | (“An *upasarjana* is an element occurring as the first (prior) [member in a compound]”). In the discussed cases of *atisarva* and *asarva*, there is a difference in which element gets the designation of *upasarjana*. As we can see, in *asarva* subordination is both based on semantic as well as technical grounds. In the case of *atisarva*, on the other hand, the rule A 2.2.30 clearly fails to apply.

(2) *asarvaḥ* = *sarvabhinnah* / *sarvapratyogiko bhedaḥ*

Different from *sarva*. / Difference whose counterpositive is *sarva*.

Allowing for *bheda* to be the qualificand characterised by *sarva* leads to the latter serving as *upasarjana* in a compound, which ultimately makes the proper declension impossible. So, what Kaunḍabhaṭṭa takes into account is superimposition (*āropa*) and what the state of being superimposed means. As will be seen below, this is the point where he differs from Kaiyaṭa in his interpretation of the concept. For Kaunḍabhaṭṭa *āropitatva* means being the object of superimposition, and this object is indicated when *nañ* is used alongside it. When we look at the example *abrāhmaṇa* (“a non-Brahmin”), which is the core example cited for *āropa* to take place, we can understand it in two ways:

(3.1) *abrāhmaṇa* = *āropaviśayatvavān brāhmaṇah* / *āropitabrāhmaṇyavān kṣatriyah*

That which possesses/is characterised by *brāhmaṇa* being the object of superimposition / Kṣatriya that has Brahminhood superimposed on him.

(3.2) *abrāhmaṇa* = *āropitabrāhmaṇatvavān* / *āropitavaviśiṣṭabrāhmaṇa-tvavattvaṃ brāhmaṇabhinnah*

That which possesses/is characterised by superimposed Brahminhood. / Someone different from *brāhmaṇa* whose nature is being like Brahminhood further characterised as being superimposed.

In (3.1) there is the connection of the object with the relation of difference; superimposition is the reason for usage through analogy. In this case the particle *nañ* would serve to indicate the object of superimposition, which is *brāhmaṇa*. In (3.2), on the other hand, the word *brāhmaṇa* is not used in its primary meaning in a negative compound. This could lead to the conclusion that *āropa* is actually an additional meaning of the particle *nañ*, which is what Kaunḍabhaṭṭa is trying to avoid. This is why he presents an alternative.

VSK 42.24–43.4 / VBhS 359.2–360.5

ghaṭo nāsti abrāhmaṇa ityādāv āropabodhasya sarvānubhavaviruddhātvaṭ pakṣāntaram āha –

As in the expressions *ghaṭo nāsti* and *abrāhmaṇa* the comprehension of superimposition goes against common understanding, the author has proposed another view:

VSK 40

*abhāvo vā tadārtho 'stu bhāṣyasya hi tadāśayāt |
viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyo vā nyāyatas tv avadhāryatām ||*

Alternatively, let its (i.e. the negative particle's) meaning be “absence” because this is the intention in the Bhāṣya; whether it (negation) is a qualifier or a qualificand should be logically determined.

VBhS: *tadārtho nañarthah | arthapadaṃ dyotyatvavācyatvapakṣayoḥ
sādhāraṇyena kīrtanāya | bhāṣyasyeti | tathā ca nañsūtre mahābhāṣyam
– nivṛttapadārthaka iti | nivṛttaṃ padārtho yasya napuṃsake bhāve kta iti
kto 'bhāvārthaka ity arthaḥ | yat tu nivṛttaḥ padārtho yasminn ity arthaḥ |
sādrśyādinādhyāropitabrāhmaṇyāḥ kṣatriyādayo 'rthā yasyety artha iti
kaiyaṭaḥ | tan na, āropitabrāhmaṇyasya kṣatriyāder nañavācyatvāt¹² |
anyathā sādrśyāder api vācyatāpatteḥ |*

[The expression] *tadārtha* means the “meaning of *nañ*”. The word *artha* is used to offer an overview of the views related to the suggestiveness and expressiveness [of particles]. [The expression] *bhāṣyasya* [is now explained]. Thus the *Mahābhāṣya* on A 2.2.6 states “*nivṛttapadārthakah* – whose meaning has been removed”. [The suffix] *Kta* is used [in the participle *nivṛtta*] based on A 3.3.114 in the sense of state (*bhāva*) and neutral gender (*napuṃsaka*).¹³ So the meaning is the following: “*Kta* whose meaning is absence”. According to Kaiyaṭa, the meaning [of the expression *nivṛttapadārthakah*] is “that in which the meaning has been removed”; [consequently,] the meaning [of *abrāhmaṇa*] is the following: “whose meanings of *kṣatriya* etc. have Brahminhood imposed on due to similarity”. This is not the case [in our opinion], because [the word] *nañ* does not express the meaning of *kṣatriya* etc. on whom Brahminhood was superimposed. Otherwise, [*nañ*] would also express similarity etc.

Explanation

What Kaundabhaṭṭa means by the introductory passage to the *kārikā* is that the common usage and understanding of negative expressions focuses on negation itself, not secondary processes. So even though we know what *abrāhmaṇa* ultimately means, that it does have a positive referent in a *kṣatriya*, we do not perceive the particle itself as expressive of imposing one entity onto another.

¹² Āpte's edition reads *vācyatvāt* here but this does not fit the context. I am following Mārulakara's edition with *nañavācyatvāt*.

¹³ A 3.3.114 *napuṃsake bhāve ktaḥ* | (“[The suffix] *Kta* is introduced [after a verbal stem] to denote a neuter action noun”.)

In this passage, Kaunḍabhaṭṭa also refers to the ongoing discussion among various schools of thought regarding words as meaning carriers. Disagreement, especially between the schools of Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya, regarding the indicative and expressive properties of particles and prepositions was widely debated, and the arguments exceed the scope of the present article. It should be mentioned, however, that the possibility was considered that the negative particle can change its properties depending on whether it appears in a compounded or un-compounded form. As we can see from this passage, however, there were certain discrepancies within the school of Vyākaraṇa itself. The author of VBhS refers to an expression used by Patañjali, in which he explains the nature of negative compounds and says that the following item becomes *nivṛttapadārthaka* – whose object/meaning has been removed or denied, and Kaiyaṭa's interpretation of the said "removal of meaning" (*nivṛtti*), which he explains via superimposition.¹⁴ As mentioned above, *āropa* refers to the object being imposed for Kaunḍabhaṭṭa. Accepting Kaiyaṭa's position would, in Kaunḍabhaṭṭa's opinion, inevitably lead to the negative particle being expressive (*vācaka*) of superimposition (and other secondary meanings). The problem seems to be two-fold for Kaunḍabhaṭṭa here; firstly, it is the semantic range of *nañ*, exceeding absence, and secondly, the potential *vācakatva* of particles which he does not accept.

VSK 43.5–9 / VBhS 360.6–361.2

VBhS: *yat tu* –

tatsādṛśyam abhāvaś ca tadanyatvaṃ tadalpatā |
aprāsastyam virodhaś ca nañarthāḥ ṣaṭ prakṛtītāḥ ||

iti paṭhitvābrāhmaṇo 'pāpam anaśvo 'nudarā kanyāpaśavo vā anye
go-aśvebhyo 'dharma ity udāharanti, tat tu ārthikārtham abhipretyeti
sapaṣṭam anyatra |

Because [some], having cited [the following verse]

Six meanings of [the particle] *nañ* are mentioned: similarity to that, absence, being different from that, smallness of that, lack of excellence/inauspiciousness and opposition/contradiction,

give the examples, such as: *abrāhmaṇa* (similar to a Brahmin), *apāpa* (lack of sin), *anaśva* (other than a horse), *anudarā kanyā* (a girl with a thin waist), *apaśavo vā anye go-aśvebhyaḥ* (animals other than cows and horses are inauspicious) and *adharmā* (unrighteous); it is clear elsewhere that the intended meaning is the mental meaning.

¹⁴ VMBh_2 II: 670.5–8: *nañviśiṣṭasyeti | āropitabrāhmaṇasya kṣatriyāder ityarthaḥ | kaḥ punar aśv ity | bhāvābhāvayor virodhān nañviśiṣṭo brāhmaṇārtho nopapadyate iti bhāvāḥ | nivṛttapadārthaka ity | nivṛttāḥ padārtho mukhyaṃ brāhmaṇyaṃ yasmin sa kṣatriyādir arthaḥ | sādrśyādinādhyāropitabrāhmaṇyo nañdyotitadavastha ityarthaḥ |*

Explanation

The quoted verse is often attributed to Bhartṛhari, but, to my knowledge, he does not enlist those meanings of the negative particle. It is, however, commonly quoted in the later literature, and the examples provided are usually similar. Despite the fact that the verse mentions the particle *nañ* in general, a variety of examples refer to *nañsamāsas*; it is not observable in the case of sentential negation. It also states that all those meanings enlisted in the cited verse are actually secondary to the meaning of *abhāva*. This is what Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa seems to be agreeing with here; the basic meaning of *nañ* is always absence.

VSK 43.9–16 / VBhS 361.2–363.4

VBhS: *viśeṣaṇam iti | pratiyoginīti śeṣaḥ | tathā cāsarvapade sarvanāmasaṅjñā* | “*anekam anyapadārthe*” (A 2.2.24) “*sevyate ’nekayā samnatāpāṅgayā*” *ityādāv ekaśabdārthaprādhānyād ekavacananiyamaḥ | abrāhmaṇa ityādāv uttarapadārthaprādhānyāt tatpuruṣatvam | atvaṃ bhavasi anahaṃ bhavāmītyādau puruṣavacanādivyavasthā copapadyate* | At “a qualifier” the completion [of the meaning is] “with regard to a counterpositive”. Thus, in the word *asarva* the technical term *sarvanāman* (pronoun) applies; and in the examples such as A 2.2.24 *anekam anyapadārthe*¹⁵ or *sevyate ’nekayā samnatāpāṅgayā* (“is enjoyed by many women with the corner of their eyes”, *Śiśupālavadhā* 4.42) there is restriction on using the singular number as a result of the predominance of the word *eka*. [The compound] *abrāhmaṇa* etc. gets the designation of *tatpuruṣa* as a result of the predominance of the latter member. In the examples *atvaṃ bhavasi* (“This is not you”) and *anahaṃ bhavāmi* (“This is not me”) the use of the person and number are determined.

VBhS: *anyathā tvadabhāvo madabhāva itivadabhāvāṃśe yuṣmad-asmador anvayena yuṣmatsāmānādhikarānyasya tiṅkṣv asattvāt puruṣavyavasthā na syāt | asmanmate ca bhedaḥpratiyogitvadabhinnāśrayikā bhavanakriyety anvayāt sāmānādhikarānyam nānupapannam iti bhāvaḥ* |

Otherwise, in “the absence of you”, “the absence of me” and the such through the logical connection of [the pronominal stems] *yuṣmad* and *asmad* to the part of absence, and because there would be no co-referentiality of *yuṣmad* with the verbal endings, the use of the [correct] person would not occur. In our view then, the meaning [of *atvaṃ bhavasi*] is the action of becoming having a substratum not different from you whose counterpositive is difference, [therefore] it is not impossible [to achieve] co-referentiality due to the logical connection.

¹⁵ A 2.2.24 *anekam anyapadārthe* | (“Two or more [nominal *padas* combine] to denote something different [from what is implied by the constituent *padas* to form a *bahuvrīhi* compound].”)

Explanation

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa proceeds to investigate the possibility of the negative particle serving as a qualifier rather than a qualificand. He focuses on explaining some terminological and morphological features, which could be more difficult to account for if negation were considered a *viśeṣya*. Terminological issues regard the previously discussed cases of *asarva* (with its pronominal designation) and *abrāhmaṇa* (being a *tatpuruṣa* compound), both resulting from the predominance of the latter member of a compound. Two following cases are *aneka* (“many”), with the justification of the singular number, and *atvaṃ bhavasi* / *anahaṃ bhavāmi*, where agreement between a pronoun and a verbal form is being investigated. We see that agreement thanks to the predominance of the second member in a negative compound. The forms *atvaṃ* and *anahaṃ* are still considered pronouns, similarly to *asarva*, because the meaning of the compound, and consequently its morphosyntactic features, are determined by *tvam* and *aham* respectively, not by *nañ*. As Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa explains in the next passage, considering *abhāva* as the main meaning in these expressions might lead to a lack of co-referentiality between a pronoun and a verb. He does, however, find a solution to that as well, thus indicating that he does not share the commonly accepted viewpoint in the school of Vyākaraṇa that a compounded *nañ* should always be treated as a *viśeṣaṇa*.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa is convinced that even by granting semantic predominance to negation rather than other elements, one is able to account for proper grammatical forms. This is how he explains *atvaṃ bhavasi*:

(4) *atvaṃ bhavasi* = *abhāvapratiyoginī yo yuṣmadarthas tadabhinnā-śrayikā sattā*

Existence with the substratum not different from you whose meaning is counterpositive to absence.

In other words, you are the substratum for the action of existence, and that the meaning (of you) is opposite to non-existence.

Such a shift in meaning and focusing on the substratum of existence rather than absence allows for the logical co-referentiality between a pronoun and a verb. Despite such a possibility, however, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa goes back to negation as a qualificand and looks for a solution within Pāṇini's grammar.

VSK 43.16–18 / VBhS 363.4–363.7

VBhS: *viśeṣyo veti | pratiyoginīti śeṣaḥ | ayaṃ bhāvaḥ – gauṇatve 'pi nañsamāse* “*etattadoḥ sulopo 'kor anañsamāse hali*” (A 6.1.132) *iti jñāpakāt sarvanāmasaṃjñā nānupapannā |*

At “or a qualificand” the completion [of the meaning is] “with regard

to a counterpositive”. This is the meaning – even if this (i.e. the second member of a compound) is secondary in a negative compound, based on the indication in A 6.1.132¹⁶ it is not impossible to get the designation of *sarvanāman*.

Explanation

The problem with *yusmad* and *asmad* being designated as pronouns occurs when they lose their status as *viśeṣya* and are considered *viśeṣaṇa*, as this would force them to be considered subordinate¹⁷ in a compound; the case is identical to *asarva* discussed earlier. There is, however, an indication found by the author of VBhS in A 6.1.132, that is the explicit mention of *anañsamāsa*, thus implying that regardless of the *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa* relation between the negative particle and the following stem, words such as *tad* etc. can be still assigned the technical term *sarvanāman*.

VSK 43.18–27 / VBhS 363.7–366.1

VBhS: *asaḥ śiva ity atra sulopavāraṇyānañsamāsa iti hi viśeṣaṇam | na ca tatra tacchabdasya sarvanāmatāsti gauṇatvāt | akor ity akac-sahitavyāvṛtyā sarvanāmnor eva tatra grahaṇalābhāt | tathā cānañsamāsa iti jñāpakam suvacanam* |¹⁸

Thus, the qualifying [expression] *anañsamāse* (“not in a negative compound”, from A 6.1.132) is done in order to prevent the deletion of [the ending] *sU* in [the expression] *asaḥ śivaḥ* (“Someone else is Śiva”). And in this case the word *tad* does not get the designation of a pronoun as a result of being secondary. As through the exclusion of *akAC* [obtained by mentioning the condition] *akoḥ* only two pronouns (i.e. *tad* and *etad*) are included there. In such a way, the indication *anañsamāse* is easily explained.

VBhS: *anekam anyapadārtha ityādāv ekavacanam viśeṣyānurodhāt | “sub āmantrite parāṅgavat svare” (A 2.1.2) ity ato ’nuvartamānam subgrahaṇam viśeṣyam ekavacanāntam eva | kiṃ cānekaśabdād dvivacanopādāne bahūnām bahuvacanopādāne dvayor bahuvrīhir na*

¹⁶ A 6.1.132 *etattadoḥ sulopo ’kor anañsamāse hali* | (“A nominal ending, namely *sU*, when used after [the pronominal stems] *etad* (‘this’) and *tad* (‘that’) not containing *k* and not being used in a negative compound, is deleted, provided a consonant follows and *samhīta* finds its scope.” trans. Sharma)

¹⁷ See fn. 11.

¹⁸ Neither Āpte nor Māṛulakara divide the text here, but read it together with the beginning of the following explanation. I opt for Penna’s reading where the individual examples are separated (PENNA 2013: 493–494).

sidhyet ity ubhayasaṃgrahāyaikavacanam jātyabhiprāyam autsargikam vā |

In A 2.2.24 etc. the single number (of *aneka*) is used following the qualificand. The word *sUP* following from A 2.1.2 (*sub āmantrite parāṅgavat svare*)¹⁹ is the qualificand ending in the singular number. Moreover, if the dual number were added after the word *aneka*, a *bahuvrīhi* compound [consisting] of many [elements] would not result, and if the plural number were added, a *bahuvrīhi* compound [consisting] of two [elements] would not result; the singular number [is adopted] in order to include both, either with the intention to signify a class or as a general rule.

VBhS: *sevyate 'nekayety atrāpi yoṣayetiviśeṣyānurodhāt pratyekam sevānānvayabodhanāya caikavacanam na tūttarapadārthaprādhāny aprayuktam | ata eva patanty aneke jaladher ivormaya ityādikam api sūpapādam |*

In *sevyate 'nekayā* (“is enjoyed by many”, *Śiśupālavadha* 4.42) here as well [the word *aneka* is in] the singular number following the qualificand, that is [the word] *yoṣā* (“girl”), and in order to comprehend the connection of *sevanā* (“act of enjoying”) with each [element], it is not used [to indicate] the predominance of the second member [in a compound]. From this follows that in [the sentence] *patanty aneke jaladher ivormayaḥ* (“Many fall like the waves of the ocean”) and the such, it [i.e. the use of the plural number] is also highly adequate.

Explanation

The last example in this passage that Kaunḍabhaṭṭa discusses is the case of *aneka* yet again, but in a different context. Here, in *sevyate 'nekayā* (*yoṣayā*) the use of a singular number is not in correlation with the noun *yoṣā*, also in singular, but points to the individual experience. The expression indicates that the act of *sevanā* is experienced one by one, regarding every particular girl, not a group. This is how Kaunḍabhaṭṭa omits the predominance of *uttarapada* and is able to account for the *nañ* as a *viśeṣya* interpretation.

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa also tries to avoid the need for *uttarapadārthaprādhānyā* in the case of pronouns by resorting to a *jñāpaka* (indication) contained in A 6.1.132. He claims that the very use of the expression *anañsamāse* in the wording of that rule shows that the designation of *sarvanāman* does apply to negative compounds regardless of its predominant member. One could argue, however, that from

¹⁹ A 2.1.2 *sub āmantrite parāṅgavat svare* | (“[An expression ending in] *sUP* occurring before a vocative is treated as an integral part of the subsequent pre-affixal stem with respect to accent.”)

Pāṇini's perspective this solution is more far-fetched than the acceptance of negation as *viśeṣaṇa*, which is stated almost explicitly in A 2.2.6 by making negative compounds of a *tatpuruṣa* type.

The following, final, passage summarises Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's view on negation and the process of its cognition.

VSK 43.27–44.2 / VBhS 366.1–367.3

VBhS: *atvaṃ bhavasītyādau yuṣmadasmados tadbhinne lakṣaṇā | nañ dyotakaḥ | tathā ca bhinnena yuṣmadarthena tiṅaḥ sāmānādhikaranyāt puruṣavyavasthā | tvadbhinnābhinnāśrayikā bhavanakriyeti śābdabodhaḥ | evaṃ na tvaṃ pacasīty atra tvadabhinnāśrayakapākānukūlabhāvanābhāvaḥ | ghaṭo nāstīty atra ghaṭābhinnāśrayakāstivābhāva itirītyā bodhaḥ | asamastanañāḥ kriyāyām evānvayabodhāt | sa cābhāvo 'tyantābhāvatvānyonyābhāvatvādirūpeṇa śakyas tattadrūpeṇa bodhād ity anyatra vistarāḥ |*

In [the examples] such as *atvaṃ bhavasi* etc. there is the secondary meaning of [the stems] *yuṣmad* and *asmad* in the sense of “different from that”. [The particle] *nañ* [serves as] an indicator [of that secondary meaning]. And thus, the person is determined through the co-referentiality of the verbal ending with the meaning of *yuṣmad* that is different. The verbal cognition is the following: the action of becoming has a substratum not different from what is different from you. In the same way, in [the example] *na tvaṃ pacasi* (“You do not cook”) there is the absence of action conducive to cooking which has a substratum not different from you. In [the example] *ghaṭo nāsti* (“There is no pot”) the customary cognition is this: the absence of existence in the substratum not different than the pot. [This understanding] is due to recognising the connection with the action only when *nañ* is uncompounded. And this absence is possible to [be understood] in the form of *atyantābhāva* (absolute absence) or *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence), because this is how it is cognised. This is explained elsewhere.

Explanation

In this last passage, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa rejects the multitude of meanings that *nañ* can express and accepts *abhāva* as the only one of significance. He does distinguish two aspects of the said absence: absolute (*atyantābhāva*) and relative (*anyonyābhāva*), but also recognises that negative compounds should be analysed differently. He presents his final thoughts on the verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) of negative expression by giving three different examples. Those already discussed above:

(4) *atvaṃ bhavasi = tvadbhinnābhinnāśrayikā bhavanakriyā*

The action of becoming whose substratum is not different from what is different from you.

In other words, the substratum of the action of becoming lies in someone other than you.

(5) *na tvaṃ pacasi = tvadbhinnāśrayakapākānukūlabhavanābhāvaḥ*

Absence of an action conducive to cooking whose substratum is not different from you.

That is, you are the substratum of the action of cooking; the action which is being negated.

(6) *ghaṭo nāsti = ghaṭābhinnāśrayakāstitvābhāvaḥ*

Absence of existence whose substratum is not different from a pot.

That is, a pot is the substratum of existence and this existence is being negated.

As we can see, in the examples (5) and (6) Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa chooses negation to be a qualificand characterised by accompanying elements. Sentential negation, namely the negation of an action, is the crucial meaning of the sentence further specified by its substratum and participants. In this case then, he decides to go against the early Pāṇinian commentators such as Patañjali, and even Pāṇini himself, and treat *abhāva* (absence) as an element to be specified rather than a specifier.

The case of negative compounds, however, such as in (4), poses some problems for Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, because it cannot be explained with the help of *abhāva* as a *viśeṣya*. What Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa decides to do here is resort to the notion of *lakṣaṇā* (secondary meaning), which is contained within the word itself. The existence of this secondary meaning allows the author to achieve co-referentiality with the verb in a sentence, thus explaining the second person ending. In other words, the stem *tvaṃ* in (4) contains in its meaning the existing as well as non-existing aspect of “you”, with the latter considered a secondary meaning. This absence of existence is, according to Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, brought to our knowledge and is revealed by the use of the negative particle *nañ*. As the author says, negation is the indicator (*dyotaka*) of the *lakṣaṇā* (secondary meaning), of this difference from the original “you” (*tvadbhinnatva*).²⁰

²⁰ Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa elaborates on the secondary meaning and the capability of particles to reveal it in the following chapter in his treatise, the *Nipātārthanirṇaya* (“The determination on the meaning of particles”), where he discusses the relation between words that are commonly accepted as meaning carriers (*vācaka*), such as nouns and verbs, and those whose status was heavily debated among various schools. Particles (*nipāta*) and prepositions (*upasarga*) were generally considered as suggestive or indicative (*dyotaka*) of meaning by the Vaiyākaraṇas, while the Naiyāyikas claimed the expressive nature of particles and suggestive character of prepositions.

Concluding remarks

The theory of negation we find in the post-Bhartṛhari period of the Vyākaraṇa school was reaching its final form in the works of 17th-century grammarians and philosophers. We can observe the centuries-long development from a purely linguistic syntactic and morphological analysis into the territory of semantics and pragmatics, concentrating on the deconstruction of mental processes behind the comprehension of various types of negation. There seem to be two crucial elements defining the manner in which the school of Vyākaraṇa conducted its analysis. Firstly, the usage of language (*prayoga*); a fact often emphasised by commentators. What the grammarians were trying to do was a kind of reverse engineering; they were not trying to figure out the meanings of particular utterances, which were known and obvious, but were trying to determine what happens in our mind before we reach the conclusion. Secondly, they took ontology out of the picture in a way. When we analyse negative expressions, the actual ontological status of various referents is secondary, if not entirely irrelevant, because we operate on a purely linguistic level. The aforementioned superimposition (*āropa*) is a mental process, not an actual substitution of entities existing in reality.

Yet this philosophical analysis by the grammarians of the later period was still rooted in the Pāṇinian formal system, thus what the commentators, including Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, were trying to do was explain the semantic intricacies of negative expressions while remaining faithful to the original classification. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's analysis of negation was part of a broader discussion on the meaningfulness of indeclinable parts of speech, such as prepositions and particles, which were predominantly considered indicative (*dyotaka*) rather than expressive (*vācaka*) in the school of grammarians. As the discussion on negation centred to a great extent on the determination of a qualifier-qualificand relation between the elements involved, it prompted Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa to treat it separately from the other particles. The unique character of the negative particle lies naturally in its semantic domain of absence, lack or non-existence and its capability of either qualifying or being qualified by the existence of accompanying elements, albeit on a purely linguistic level. Pāṇini's classification of the particle *nañ* as a qualifier was questioned, or at least approached with flexibility, in the later tradition. While commenting on Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's *kārikās*, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa is more inclined to consider negation as a qualificand than a qualifier as far as sentential negation (*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*) is concerned. What Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa is more interested in is the semantics of the negative expressions and the meaning expressed, or more precisely suggested, by *nañ*. While recognising the variety of shades found in negative expressions, he limits the meanings of negation to absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) and mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*), both of which we can find in *prasajyapraṭiṣedha*.

Turning to analysis of *nañsamāsas*, however, the situation seems more complex. As Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa concentrates on the suggestive, or indicative, role of particles, he points to elements that are revealed by the use of the particle *nañ*. In this context, he makes reference both to the notion of superimposition (*āropa*), in whose analysis he goes against the interpretation proposed by Kaiyaṭa, and in his final argument, to the secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) of the stem, with the help of which he establishes the meaning of *bheda* (difference) in a negative compound. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa claims that the purpose of *nañ* is to bring to our attention the secondary meaning of the negated stem, thus showing the difference between the two.

Analysis of this chapter shows the following: (1) Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa is trying to limit the semantic range of the negative particle to absence as much as possible, which he does in the case of sentential negation; (2) he opts for negation being a qualificand rather than a qualifier; (3) he does not treat the negative particle as expressive, but only indicative; (4) in negative compounds the particle is indicative of the secondary meaning the negated stem possesses, which – in some cases – might be superimposed. It seems, though, that the relation between *lakṣaṇā* and *āropa* is not entirely clear.

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