Cele korporacji i jej akcjonariuszy

• Authors: Lesław Pietrewicz

Title variants

EN

The objectives of the corporation and its shareholders

Abstracts

EN

The aim of this paper is to identify weaknesses of the idea of equating company’s interests with shareholders’ interests, and to weigh arguments for its modification. The analysis draws heavily on research findings on the nature of ownership and investor behavior. It is found that relations between company’s interests and shareholders’ interests can take the form of either unity of goals (in the form of increasing the value of the firm) or conflict of interests (when shareholders set and follow other goals). Firm’s goal can be expressed in terms of building a compromise between maximizing the company’s long-term value, and tackling investors’ short-term expectations.

PL

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest identyfikacja słabości idei utożsamiania interesu korporacji z interesem akcjonariuszy i rozważenie zasadności dokonania w niej modyfikacji. Analiza przeprowadzona została na gruncie wyników badań nad naturą własności i zachowaniem inwestorów giełdowych. Pokazano, że relacje między interesem korporacji i akcjonariuszy mogą przyjmować postać zarówno wspólnoty interesu (wzrost wartości fundamentalnej), jak i konfliktu interesów (gdy u akcjonariuszy dominuje cel odmienny). Interes korporacji można wyrazić w kategoriach znalezienia kompromisu między celami maksymalizacji wartości w długim okresie a presją inwestorów na zaspokajanie ich bieżących oczekiwań.

Keywords

PL

cele korporacji; strategie inwestycyjne; natura własności

EN

objectives of the corporation investment strategies; nature of ownership

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Problemy Zarządzania
• Year: 2014
• Issue: 2/2014 (46)
• Pages: 9-25

Dates

published

2014

Contributors

author

Lesław Pietrewicz

• Instytut Nauk Ekonomicznych PAN

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1644-9584.46.1

Biblioteka Nauki

525632