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2019 | 12 | 19 | 111-138

Article title

Information Exchange Going Digital – Challenges to Hungarian Competition Law Enforcement

Content

Title variants

Languages of publication

Abstracts

FR
L’objectif de cet article est de donner un aperçu des défis posés par les marchés de la numérisation et des données à la politique de la concurrence et à son application à l’ère des grandes données. En se concentrant sur l’évaluation de l’échange d’information dans l’environnement numérique, les facteurs de risque traditionnels sont analysés et on fait valoir que de nouveaux facteurs de risque peuvent être identifiés. Le texte donne un aperçu de la jurisprudence hongroise récente en la matière afin d’examiner le rôle de l’échange d’informations dans un environnement de données qui offre une quantité accrue d’informations actualisées et pertinentes sur le marché à analyser. En outre, l’article résume les mesures d’application de la loi prises pour relever les défis posés par les plateformes en ligne, dont les interfaces utilisateur appliquent de nouvelles approches et pratiques qui peuvent influencer directement le comportement des consommateurs. La conséquence en est que l’argumentation économique et informatique peut affecter la nature des procédures et certains phénomènes nouveaux, comme le rôle des intermédiaires secondaires, l’intégration des segments de marché en ligne et hors ligne ouvrant de nouveaux domaines d’évaluation.
EN
The aim of the paper is to present an insight into the challenges raised by digitalized and data-driven markets to competition policy and enforcement in the Big Data era. Focusing on the assessment of information exchange in the digitalized environment, traditional risk factors are analyized and it is argued that new risk factors can be identified. The paper provides an overview of relevant recent Hungarian case-law to examine the role of information exchange, taking place in a data environment that offers an increased amount of up-to-date and relevant market information for analysis. Further, the paper summarizes the enforcement responses to the demandside challenges raised by online platforms, user interfaces applying new approaches and practices that can directly influence consumer behavior. The consequence is drawn that the extended economic and IT-related argumentation may affect the nature of proceedings and some new phenomena, as the role of secondary intermediaries, integration of online and offline market segments open new fields for assessment.

Year

Volume

12

Issue

19

Pages

111-138

Physical description

Dates

published
2019

Contributors

  • Faculty of Law at Pázmány Péter Catholic University
  • Faculty of Law at Pázmány Péter Catholic University

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

Biblioteka Nauki
2159197

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_7172_1689-9024_YARS_2019_12_19_6
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