Addressing Anticompetitive Data Aggregation: a Comment to Bundeskartellamt Decision B6-22/16

• Authors: Laura Skopowska

Abstracts

FR

L’agrégation de données, entendue comme le processus de collecte et de combinaison de données en vue de la préparation d’ensembles de données qui pourraient être utiles à des fins commerciales spécifiques ou pour d’autres fins, n’est pas en soi interdite. Toutefois, certaines formes peuvent être considérées comme anticoncurrentielles. Dans la décision B6-22/16, l’Office fédéral allemand des cartels(Bundeskartellamt) a examiné l’agrégation de données effectuée par Facebook, qui comprenait la collecte de données provenant de sources autres que le réseau social Facebook (de services appartenant à Facebook tels que WhatsApp et Instagram ou sites Web tiers ou applications mobiles) et leur combinaison aux informations liées aux comptes utilisateurs Facebook sans consentement de l’utilisateur. Premièrement, le Bundeskartellamt a considéré qu’un tel comportement constituait un abus de position dominante de Facebook sur le marché allemand des réseaux sociaux. Le Bundeskartellamt a également constaté que le traitement des données à caractère personnel des utilisateurs par Facebook a, dans une certaine mesure, été effectué en violation des dispositions du GDPR. Dans la même décision, le Bundeskartellamt a aussi identifié le caractère exclusif du comportement anticoncurrentiel de Facebook. Selon le Bundeskartellamt, l’agrégation illégale de données a constitué une barrière à l’entrée pour les concurrents de Facebook qui, en respectant les normes de protection des données, se sont trouvés dans la pire position. Facebook, par son agrégation inappropriée de données, a acquis un avantage concurrentiel. La décision du Bundeskartellamt reflète donc les dangers anticoncurrentiels que l’agrégation de données pourrait poser. Néanmoins, la question de savoir si le Bundeskartellamt, en tant qu’autorité de concurrence, est compétent pour déterminer si les conditions commerciales sont conformes ou non aux dispositions du GDPR est une question qui fait débat. Le présent article analyse la décision du Bundeskartellamt lorsqu’une nature anticoncurrentielle du traitement des données a été identifiée et essaye de répondre à la question du fait que ce soit le Bundeskartellamt qui ait pris une telle décision et non une autorité de contrôle en charge la protection des données.

EN

Data aggregation, understood as the process of gathering and combining data in order to prepare datasets that might be useful for specific business or other purposes, is not per se forbidden. However, some forms of it can be considered anticompetitive. In the Decision B6-22/16 of the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) data aggregation, which included the collection of data from sources outside of Facebook’s social network (from Facebook-owned services such as WhatsApp and Instagram and from third party websites or mobile applications) and their combination with the information connected with a particular Facebook user account without that user’s consent, constituted an abuse of Facebook’s dominant position on the German market for social networks. The Bundeskartellamt found that the processing of user’s personal data by Facebook has, to some extent, been carried out in a way which infringed GDPR provisions. In the same decision, the Bundeskartellamt also identified the exclusionary nature of Facebook’s anticompetitive behaviour. According to the Bundeskartellamt, the illegal data aggregation formed a barrier to entry for Facebook’s competitors which, through compliance with data protection standards, found themselves in a worst position. Facebook, through its inappropriate data aggregation gained a competitive advantage. The Bundeskartellamt’s decision is, therefore, reflecting the anticompetitive dangers that data aggregation might pose. Nevertheless, it is debated whether the Bundeskartellamt, as a competition authority, is competent to determine the compliance or lack of compliance of business terms with the provisions of the GDPR. This paper analyzes the Bundeskartellamt’s decision as to where an anticompetitive nature of data processing has been identified, and tries to answer the question why it is problematic that it was the Bundeskartellamt and not a data protection supervisory authority that has issued such a decision.

Keywords

EN

data aggregation; data-driven markets; platforms; networks; data; information asset; abuse of dominant position; abusive business terms; exclusionary; abuse; exploitative abuse

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 19
• Pages: 139-172

Dates

published

2019

Contributors

author

Laura Skopowska

• Instytut Nauk Prawnych Polskiej Akademii Nauk

References

• Article 29 Working Party (2017). Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679 (WP259 rev.01) Adopted on 28 November 2017 As last Revised and Adopted on 10 April 2018. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=51030 (31.07.2019).
• Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2016). Competition Law and Data Report. Retrieved from: http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf (31.07.2019).
• Barth, S., Jong, M.D.T. (2017).The privacy paradox – Investigating discrepancies between expressed privacy concerns and actual online behavior – A systematic literature review. Telematics and Informatics, Vol. 34/7, 1038–1058. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2017.04.013.
• Buttarelli, G. (2015). Privacy and Competition in the Digital Economy speaking points at the European Parliament’s Privacy Platform, 21 January 2015. Retreived from: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/15-01-21_speech_gb_en.pdf (20.06.2019).
• Bundeskartellamt. (2018). Arbeitspapier Marktmacht von Platformen und Netzwerken. Retrieved from https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Think-Tank-Bericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (15.06.2019).
• Bundeskartellamt. (2019). Case summary, Facebook, Exploitative business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for inadequate data processing. Publication place: Bundeskartellamt. Retrieved from: https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Missbrauchsaufsicht/2019/B6-22-16.html?nn=3591568 (17.06.2019).
• Bundeskartellamt. (2019a). Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from combining user data from different sources, Background information on the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook proceeding, Retrieved from : https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook_FAQs.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6FAQ (17.06.2019).
• Cunnane, Y. (2019). Why We Disagree With the Bundeskartellamt. Retrieved from: https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/02/bundeskartellamt-order/ (31.07.2019).
• Evans, D. (2016). Multisided Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market Power for Internet-Based Firms. CoaseSandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics, No. 753 (2016).
• Evans, D., Schmalensee, R. (2007). The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3, 6–11, http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11603.
• Graef, I. (2015). Market Definition and Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms, World Competition: Law and Economics Review, vol. 38/4, 473–506, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2657732.
• Grunes, A.P., Stucke, M.E. (2015). No Mistake About It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data, Antitrust Source, vol. 14/4, 1–14.
• Gurkaynak, G., Güner Dönmez, A., and Yasar, A.G. (2015). Competition Law and Personal Data Crossing in Digital Markets. Ian S. Forrester, A Scott without Borders, Liber Amicorum – Volume II, Concurrences Review, 153–172, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3149530.
• Heinz, S. (2018). Bundeskartellamt sends preliminary assessment to Facebook. Retrieved from: http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2018/01/09/bundeskartellamt-sends-preliminary-assessment-facebook/ (31.07.2019).
• Lamadrid, A. (2014). On Privacy, Big Data and Competition Law (2/2) On the nature, goals, means and limitations of competition law. Retrieved from: https://chillingcompetition.com/2014/06/06/on-privacy-big-data-and-competition-law-22-on-the-nature-goalsmeans-and-limitations-of-competition-law/ (31.07.2018).
• Lamadrid, A., Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2019). The Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook Decision-What’s not to like? Well…. Retrieved from: https://chillingcompetition.com/2019/02/27/the-bundeskartellamts-facebook-decision-whats-not-to-like-well/ (31.07.2019).
• Linklaters. (2019). Facebook – Bundeskartellamt’s landmark decision blurs the line between data protection and competition law. Retrieved from: https://www.linklaters.com/pl-pl/insights/publications/2019/april/facebook-bundeskartellamt-s-landmarkdecision (01.08.2019).
• Małobędzka-Szwast, I. (2018). Naruszenie prawa ochrony danych osobowych jako nadużycie pozycji dominującej? Postępowanie Bundeskartellamt przeciwko Facebookowi. Internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny, vol. 8/7, 139–153, http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/2299-5749.IKAR.8.7.10. Retrieved from: https://ikar.wz.uw.edu.pl/numery/55/139.pdf.
• Manne, G., Doing double damage: The German competition authority’s Facebook decision manages to undermine both antitrust and data protection law, https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/02/08/doing-double-damage-bundeskartellamt-facebook/ (31.07.2019).
• Mordall, J. (2018). Big Data and Merger Control in the EU. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 9/9, 569–578, https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpy062.
• Newman, J. (2019). The Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook Decision: Good, Bad and Ugly. Retrieved from: https://leconcurrentialiste.com/2019/02/11/bundeskartellamt-facebook/ (31.07.2019).
• Schneider, G. (2018). Testing Art. 102 TFEU in the Digital Marketplce: Insights from the Bundeskartellamt’s investigation against Facebook. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 9/4, 213–225, https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpy016.
• Volmar, M.N., Helmdach K.O. (2018). Protecting consumers and their data through competition law? Rethinking abuse of dominance in light of the Federal Cartel Office’s Facebook investigation, European Competition Journal, 14/2–3, 195–215, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2018.1538033.
• Zanfir-Fortuna, G., Ianc, S. (2018). Data Protection and Competition Law: The Dawn of ‘Uberprotection’ (August 30, 2018). Research Handbook on Privacy and Data Protection Law: Values, Norms and Global Politics, Gloria González Fuster, Rosamunde van Brakel and Paul De Hert (eds.), 2019 (Forthcoming), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3290824.

Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2019.12.19.7

Biblioteka Nauki

2159203