The Implementation of the ECN+ Directive in Hungary and Lessons Beyond

• Authors: Katalin J. Cseres

Abstracts

FR

Pour faciliter l’application des règles de concurrence de l’UE par les autorités nationales de concurrence, le législateur européen a adopté la directive 2019/1/UE. L’objectif de la directive est de permettre aux autorités de concurrence des États membres d’être plus efficaces dans l’application du droit de la concurrence et d’assurer le bon fonctionnement du marché intérieur. La directive dite «ECN+» définit des règles minimales d’harmonisation permettant aux autorités de concurrence de disposer de pouvoirs communs d’enquête, de décision (notamment en matière d’amendes) et d’exécution. En outre, la directive fixe des guaranties minimales pour l’indépendance, la responsabilité et les ressources des ANC, harmonise les programmes de clémence, y compris la coordination des programmes nationaux de clémence entre eux et entre ces programmes et ceux de la Commission européenne. Le présent article analyse de manière critique les développements juridiques et politiques qui ont ouvert la voie à l’adoption de la directive. En outre, il examine les changements que la mise en oeuvre de la directive est susceptible de générer dans la législation et la politique hongroises actuelles en matière de protection de la concurrence. Au centre de l’évaluation du présent document figurent les aspects institutionnels de la directive et l’application des articles 101 et 102 du TFUE, en particulier les mécanismes garantissant l’indépendance et la responsabilité des ANC. Grâce à l’évaluation de la transposition hongroise, le présent article vise à clarifier le contexte plus large de la directive et de l’application du droit communautaire de la concurrence dans les États membres de l’UE. L’article montre que la mise en oeuvre de la directive pourrait ne pas se traduire par une application (plus) efficace sans une capacité institutionnelle effective de la part des ANC et dans le contexte juridique et constitutionnel plus large du droit de la concurrence et son application à plusieurs niveaux.

EN

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement.

Keywords

EN

EU Competition law; Institutional design; Competition Law procedures; Hungary; Decentralization

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 20
• Pages: 55-90

Dates

published

2019

Contributors

author

Katalin J. Cseres

• University of Amsterdam

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2019.12.20.2

Biblioteka Nauki

2159117