Regulating Unfair Trading Practices in the EU Agri-food Supply Chain: a Case of Counterproductive Regulation?

• Authors: Victoria Daskalova

Abstracts

FR

Les pratiques commerciales déloyales (PCD) imposées par des parties détenant un pouvoir supérieur dans le cadre d’une relation verticale sont une problématique qui se situe à la marge du droit de la concurrence, du droit privé et, quelques fois, de la réglementation sectorielle. Pendant longtemps, l’approche générale du droit de la concurrence a consisté à déléguer ces problématiques à d’autres domaines du droit et de la réglementation. Dans l’UE, l’approche de la Commission européenne a été de poursuivre une séparation stricte entre les questions de concurrence et les questions concernant les PCD. Cet article s’interroge sur le caractère raisonnable d’une division du travail si rigoureuse. En prenant comme cas d’étude la combinaison de diverses initiatives adoptees pour réglementer les PCD dans la chaîne d’approvisionnement agroalimentaire, il soutient que l’effet de la limitation de l’application du droit de la concurrence sur cette question a été contre-productif. L’article explique tout d’abord le contexte du problème et la question des PTU dans la chaîne d’approvisionnement agroalimentaire. Ensuite, il dresse la fiche des différentes évolutions législatives qui ont eu lieu au niveau des États membres de l’UE. Enfin, en se référant à la méthodologie des études réglementaires de Grabosky (1995) sur la réglementation contre-productive, l’article souligne certains des effets secondaires négatifs qui surviennent lorsque la réglementation des déséquilibres de pouvoir et des PCD se fait au niveau national dans le contexte d’un marché intérieur comme l’UE. À la lumière de l’analyse, il exprime des doutes sur le fait que ces risques seront entièrement corrigés par la directive 2019/633 sur les PCD dans la chaîne d’approvisionnement alimentaire. La conclusion est que les développements législatifs nationaux n’ont pas été capables de compenser le manque d’application supranationale du droit européen de la concurrence sur la question et ont même peut être exacerbé le problème en question. L’article conclut que l’application supranationale du droit de la concurrence peut jouer un rôle clé dans la résolution des problèmes fondamentaux qui sous-tendent les pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises. Il affirme que ce rôle ne peut être joué par d’autres instruments dans le contexte d’un marché intérieur avec une gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux. Cet article montre que si le droit de la concurrence n’est peut-être pas capable de résoudre tous les problèmes posés par les PCD, il reste indispensable pour préserver le bon fonctionnement du marché intérieur ainsi que les intérêts des consommateurs.

EN

Unfair trading practices (UTPs) imposed by parties with superior power in the context of a vertical relationship are an issue at the periphery of competition law, private law, and, sometimes, sectoral regulation. For a long time, the mainstream competition law approach has been to relegate such issues to other areas of law and regulation. In the EU, where complaints about the prevalence of such practices in the agricultural and food supply chain have been voiced for decades, the approach of the European Commission has been to pursue a strict separation between competition issues and fair-trading issues. This article questions the reasonableness of such a strict division of labour. Taking the sum of various initiatives undertaken to regulate UTPs in the agri-food supply chain as a case study, it argues that the effect of limiting competition law enforcement on this issue has been counterproductive. The article firstly explains the background of the problem and the issue of UTPs in the agri-food supply chain. Secondly, it maps the various legislative developments which have taken place at the EU Member State level. Thirdly, by referring to Grabosky’s (1995) regulatory studies typology of counterproductive regulation, the article focuses attention on some of the perverse side effects which arise when regulation of power imbalances and UTPs occurs at the national level in the context of an integrated market like the EU. In light of the analysis, it expresses doubt that these pitfalls will be fully corrected by Directive 2019/633 on UTPs in the food supply chain. The conclusion is that national legislative developments have not been able to make up for the lack of supra-national enforcement of EU competition law on this issue and have possibly even exacerbated the problem at hand. The article concludes that supranational competition law enforcement can play a key role in addressing the fundamental problems underlying business-to-business unfair trading practices. It argues that this role cannot be played by other instruments in the context of an integrated market with multi-level governance. This article shows that while competition law may not be capable of solving all the problems with UTPs, it remains indispensable in safeguarding the proper functioning of the internal market as well as the interests of consumers and taxpayers.

Keywords

EN

buyer power; business-to-business; competition law; food supply chain; superior bargaining power; unfair trading practices

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 13
• Issue: 21
• Pages: 7-54

Dates

published

2020

Contributors

author

Victoria Daskalova

• https://orcid.org/0000000324261339

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2020.13.21.1

Biblioteka Nauki

2158979