Into the Grey Zone. What Do We (Don’t) Know About Types of Concentrations Between Undertakings Under EU law After Austria Asphalt?

• Authors: Adrian Bielecki

Abstracts

FR

Dans l’affaire Austria Asphalt, la Cour de justice a rendu le premier arrêt préjudiciel relatif au régime communautaire de contrôle des concentrations. Dans les termes de l’avocat général Kokott, la Cour suprême autrichienne a demandé à la Cour de justice de répondre à la question fondamentale de la definition d’une concentration entre entreprises dans le cadre de l’article 3 du Rè glement (CE) No 802/2004. La Cour de justice a jugé que l’article 3 de l’EUMR doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une concentration est réputée survenir lors d’un changement de la forme du contrôle d’une entreprise existante qui ne devient commune que si l’entreprise commune créée par une telle opération remplit de manière durable toutes les fonctions d’une entité économique autonome. Bien que la décision ait été rendue dans le contexte d’un scénario d’opération précis, le raisonnement sousjacent pourrait jeter un nouvel éclairage sur la façon d’évaluer les opérations qui se situent entre la prise de contrôle et la création d’une co-entreprise. Toutefois, ce raisonnement n’est pas conforme aux objectifs et aux fondements économiques du régime communautaire de contrôle des concentrations. Cela peut être prouvé tant par rapport au scénario de transaction directement couvert par la question préjudicielle que par rapport à d’autres scénarios de transaction.

EN

In Austria Asphalt, the Court of Justice issued the first preliminary ruling related to the EU merger control regime. In Advocate General Kokott’s words, the Austrian Supreme Court asked the Court of Justice to answer the fundamental question of what constitutes a concentration between undertakings within Article 3 of the EUMR. The Court of Justice held that Article 3 of the EUMR must be interpreted as meaning that a concentration is deemed to arise upon a change in the form of control of an existing undertaking which, previously exclusive, becomes joint only if the joint venture created by such a transaction performs on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. Although the ruling was rendered in the context of a specific transaction scenario, the underlying reasoning could shed new light on how to assess transactions that fall between acquisition of control and creation of a joint venture. However, this reasoning is incompliant with the purposes and economic foundations of the EU merger control regime. This can be proven both in relation to the transaction scenario directly covered by the question for a preliminary ruling and, if extrapolated, in relation to other transaction scenarios.

Keywords

EN

concentrations; EU Merger Regulation; full-function undertaking; joint; venture; mergers

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 13
• Issue: 21
• Pages: 219-236

Dates

published

2020

Contributors

author

Adrian Bielecki

• Uniwersytet Warszawski: Wydział Prawa i Administracji

• https://orcid.org/000000020516697X

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2020.13.21.8

Biblioteka Nauki

2158989