State-Controlled Entities in the EU Merger Control: the Case of PKN Orlen and Lotos Group

• Authors: Alexandr Svetlicinii

Abstracts

FR

Le ralentissement économique provoqué par la pandémie de coronavirus est suppose se traduire par une participation accrue de l’État au fonctionnement des marchés. L’une des formes de cette participation est la recapitalisation et la participation de l’État dans les entreprises commerciales, ce qui pourrait produire des effets anticoncurrentiels au détriment des concurrents et des consommateurs. À cet égard, l’application effective des règles de contrôle des concentrations au niveau de l’UE et national gagne en importance. Le présent article s’interroge sur l’adéquation des normes de contrôle des concentrations et des moyens d’évaluation disponibles pour tenir en compte les effets anticoncurrentiels potentiels découlant des formes de contrôle public sur les entreprises. L’analyse se concentre sur les expériences des entreprises publiques polonaises dans le cadre de l’évaluation du contrôle des concentrations au niveau de l’UE et national. Cette analyse est le résultat de la notification de la fusion PKN Orlen/Lotos qui a reçu l’autorisation conditionnelle de la Commission européenne.

EN

The economic downturn caused by the coronavirus pandemics is expected to result in the increased participation of the state in the functioning of markets. One of the forms of this participation is the recapitalization and state shareholding in commercial enterprises, which could lead to anti-competitive effects to the detriment of competitors and consumers. In this regard, the effective enforcement of merger control rules at the EU and national levels gains in importance. The present paper questions the adequacy of the available merger control standards and assessment tools for taking into account potential anti-competitive effects stemming from ownership and non-ownership forms of state control over undertakings. The analysis is focused on the experiences of Polish state owned enterprises under the EU and national merger control assessment. It was prompted by the notification of the PKN Orlen/Lotos merger that received conditional clearance from the EU Commission.

Keywords

EN

state owned enterprise; merger control; single economic unit; competitive neutrality; Poland; national competition authority

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 13
• Issue: 22
• Pages: 189-210

Dates

published

2020

Contributors

author

Alexandr Svetlicinii

• University of Macau, Faculty of Law

• https://orcid.org/0000000307205263

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2020.13.22.8

Biblioteka Nauki

2159069