Using Competitors’ Data – a Role for Competition Law? Some Thoughts on the Amazon Marketplace Case

• Authors: Iga Małobęcka-Szwast

Abstracts

FR

Sur la base de l’enquête de la Commission sur les pratiques d’Amazon, l’article analyse si l’utilisation par Amazon de données sensibles provenant de détaillants indépendants qui vendent par l’intermédiaire de sa place de marché peut soulever des problèmes anticoncurrentiels et, dans l’affirmative, comment les aborder et, en particulier, si le droit de la concurrence est le bon outil pour répondre à ces préoccupations. Le comportement d’Amazon, qui fait l’objet d’une enquête de la Commission, ne s’inscrit pas facilement dans le cadre de théories de préjudice établies. Il est donc proposé de développer de nouvelles théories du préjudice qui seraient spécifiquement adaptées aux défis des marchés numériques et des modèles économiques des plateformes en ligne. Le comportement d’Amazon pourrait être considéré comme un parasitisme forcé, une copie prédatrice, un effet de levier abusif ou un auto-référencement. Il est également soutenu que certains des problèmes de concurrence pouvant découler de l’utilisation des données des concurrents par des plateformes d’intermédiation en ligne telles qu’Amazon pourraient être résolus plus efficacement par l’introduction d’une réglementation, telle que la legislation sur les marchés numériques.

EN

Based on the Commission’s investigation into Amazon’s practices, the article analyses whether Amazon’s use of sensitive data from independent retailers who sell via its marketplace may raise anticompetitive concerns and, if so, how they should be tackled, in particular, whether competition law is the right tool to address these concerns. Amazon’s conduct, which is being investigated by the Commission, does not easily fit in with well-established theories of harm. Therefore, it is proposed to develop new theories of harm that would be specifically tailored to challenges of digital markets and online platforms’ business models. Amazon’s conduct could be regarded as a forced free-riding, predatory copying, abusive leveraging or self-preferencing. It is also argued that some of the competition concerns that may arise from the use of competitors’ data by online intermediation platforms such as Amazon could be more efficiently tackled by introducing a regulation, such as the Digital Markets Act.

Keywords

EN

Article 102 TFEU; competition law; online platforms; use of data; vertical integration

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 24
• Pages: 7-32

Dates

published

2021

Contributors

author

Iga Małobęcka-Szwast

• Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Warsaw

• https://orcid.org/0000000247194899

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2021.14.24.1

Biblioteka Nauki

2158416